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LUCKNOW AND OUDE 

IN THE MUTINY 



By DR. WILHELM BUSCH. 
ENGLAND UNDER THE TUDORS. Vol. I. Henry 
VII. (1485-1509). Translated from the German by Miss Alice 
M. Todd and the Rev. A. H. Johnson, M.A., sometime 
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LUCKNOW & OUDE 



IN THE MUTINY 



A NARRATIVE AND A STUDY 



BY 

Lieut. -General McLEOD INNES 
R.E., V.C. 



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PREFACE 



This account of the part played by Lucknow and Oude 
in the Bengal mutiny is not meant to be anything more 
than what it is called — a narrative and a study ; and it 
has been written with the desire to show, in their true pro- 
portion and colour, some of the important points of that 
convulsion and contest ; including its antecedents, its 
characteristics and its issues, as well as its actual incidents. 

Much of what I have recorded came within my own 
personal knowledge ; but the book is not an account of my 
private experiences or reminiscences, except to the extent 
requisite to support or illustrate my various statements 
and views. And I entirely disclaim for it the title of 
History, which would demand a completeness of narrative, 
and a fullness of details in incidents and personal references 
that I have not attempted, and that would have tended to 
interfere with the clearness that I have aimed at in the 
narrative and the argument. 

In order to show the relative share that Oude and 
Lucknow had in the conflict generally, I have included 
a brief sketch of the Mutiny as an introduction, deal- 
ing with its origin and development, as well as with its 
course. 

My leading object throughout has been to describe the 
true military characteristics of the defence and the succour 
of the Residency, and to lead to a just appreciation of the 
part played and the influence exercised by Henry Lawrence 
and Henry Havelock in checking and mastering the 



vi PREFACE 

Mutiny at its darkest crisis, and thereby ensuring our 
ultimate success. 

At the Residency, Sir Henry Lawrence's foresight and 
resolute attitude on the outbreak, with his judicious 
arrangements, and careful and thorough preparations, 
formed the foundation for its defence ; of which the 
eventual success was due to our defeating all the ceaseless 
efforts of the enemy to effect the one definite object at 
which they aimed, the sudden formation of a practicable 
breach in our defences. 

As to the general contest ; Sir Henry's beneficent rule 
of the Punjab, on its annexation, created the hearty good- 
will in which lay the influence that kept the Sikhs on our 
side in the dark days of the siege of Delhi. It was his 
attitude at Lucknow that chained to the contest there the 
rebel army of Oude, which would otherwise have joined 
the one at Delhi, and would without doubt have turned 
the odds there against us. Havelock for his part, by his 
brilliant leadership, met with unvarying success ; inspiring 
in his own troops a confidence and spirit, and in the 
enemy a dread, which minimized the gravity of the struggle 
in the days of our greatest straits ; apart from which the 
boldness of his venture in invading Oude, and his skill in 
withdrawing to Cawnpore, stand unrivalled as feats of 
war. His succour of the Residency saved it from an 
inevitable catastrophe, since it was effected just in time 
to anticipate the arrival of the Delhi mutineers, whose 
accession to the investing force would have doubled the 
dangers of the defence, and the difficulties of the relief. 

These are the points to which I have specially en- 
deavoured to give their due prominence. 

For those particulars in which my narrative is at variance 
with other published accounts of Sir Henry Lawrence's 
policy and measures while preparing for the defence of the 
Residency, my authority lies in the record I made in my 
note-book of the direct instructions and information which 



PREFACE vii 

he gave to me personally — a record which was habitually 
read out to him, and to which he constantly referred. 

The account of the Engineer operations in the defence is 
based on my personal knowledge of them, the share I took 
in them, and the records I kept of them, supplemented by 
the information supplied to me by my brother officers ; at 
whose request I drew up the official report of them. 

For information on other points I have been greatly 
indebted to Sir James Outram and Lord Napier of 
Magdala, to Sir Henry Havelock- Allen, General Dodgson, 
Sir William Olpherts, and other friends. 

The account of the Talookdars and people of Oude, and 
of their fluctuating demeanour, has been based on the 
descriptions given me by Sir James Outram, Captain 
Alexander Orr his " Intelligence " officer, and Mr. Patrick 
Carnegy ; and on the records of the trials of the State 
prisoners on the close of the Mutiny. 

In the Appendices will be found extracts from official 
documents respecting the annexation and administration 
of Oude, and the treatment of the Talookdars. One of 
them is a translation of a very singular letter by the Rajah 
Maun Singh to the other Talookdars, written at the 
darkest stage of the convulsion, and conveying the criticisms 
on the situation of one of the cleverest natives of India. 

The maps, plans, and views will, I hope, help to make 
the narrative clear. 

For the panoramic views of the Residency Entrench- 
ments, and for the drawing of the Mutchi Bhown, I am 
under special obligations to my friend Miss Alma Hodge. 
The former are based on a series of photographs of a model 
of the position, constructed by the Rev. T. Moore ; and the 
latter on an excellent photograph of the Mutchi Bhown, 
kindly lent me by Captain Charles Hill, R.A. 

J. J. M, I. 



CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION 
GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

CHAPTER I 

ITS ORIGIN 

Sources of Disaffection — Century of English Aggression — Natives felt 
themselves a Conquered and Subject People — Malcontents in 
Classes and Masses — Mahomedans — Mahrattas — Territorial 
Chiefs — Ambitious Spirits — Form Basis for Sedition— Disaffection 
chronic though latent — Sedative Influences — Some possible 
causes of General Excitement — Dalhousie Administration — 
Annexations— Native sense of English greed and despotism — 
Jhansi : the Adoption Question— Malcontents take advantage of 
the alarm — Mahomedan irritation at Annexation of Oude — 
Annexations cause increase of Sepoy Army — Its Preponderance — 
Its lax Discipline — Its Temptations — No immediate Disaffection 
except among ambitious spirits — Defective Military arrange- 
ments — Malcontents begin tempting Army — Great spread of 
General Sedition — Effects of Dalhousie's Autocracy — Subsequent 
Reaction and Insubordination — Instance in Oude, causing serious 
Disaffection among Talookdars — 1856: General Service Enlist- 
ment Act irritates Army and strains its loyalty — Sedition still 
more active — Government taxed with designs against Caste and 
Religion — War with Persia : Mahomedans exasperated — January 
1857 : Cartridge Incident rouses wild suspicion and disaffection 
in Sepoys — Activity of Moghul Party — In Oude : Sir Henry 
Lawrence arrives in March — Settles and smoothes causes of 
Irritation — Enforces Law and Order — Makes Province tranquil 
and loyal — Mutinies and Conflagrations in Bengal and near 
centres of Moghul influence — Outbreaks of Meerut and Delhi in 
May 1857 — Proclamation of Restoration of Moghul Empire ... I 



x CONTENTS 

CHAPTER II 

ITS DEVELOPMENT 

After Outbreak, no Spread of Mutiny for three weeks — Indicating 
unpreparedness of Army, and its Secondary Share in originating 
Revolt — Proclamation of Moghul Empire precipitated matters, 
indicated leading of Moghuls in creating Revolt — Immediate 
Result — Cessation of Civil Administration in Upper Provinces — 
Calcutta Government acts energetically in calling for Rein- 
forcements, but does not enforce or guide local preparations 
— Previous avoidance of preparation paralyzes move against 
Delhi — Energetic action in Punjab and Oude — Spread of Mutiny 
begins May 30 — Confined to Bengal, north of the Nurbudda 
— Mutineers in Five Groups — Five corresponding and disconnected 
Theatres of Operations : Punjab, Delhi, Oude, Eastern Districts, 
Central India — Punjab Theatre : Mutiny crushed — Delhi Theatre : 
War begun by Battle of Badli ke Serai — British and Mutineer 
Force then and in July — Oude Theatre : Allahabad saved by 
Brasyer and Neill — Cawnpore Garrison attacked by the Sepoys 
and the Nana — Falls before the end of June— Lucknow Residency 
prepared by Sir Henry Lawrence — Oude Mutineers concentrate 
on it— Defeat of Chinhut — Siege begins June 30 — Eastern 
Theatre : Mutiny does not yet develope — Central India : Troops 
Mutiny, but remain inactive — Mutiny generally restricted to 
Hindoostanees, and not joined by Ghoorkas, Sikhs, or Punjabees 
— No Dynastic Chiefs revolt except Nana and Ranee of Jhansi 
— No General Rebellion as had threatened — Moghul Proclama- 
tion, showing true origin of Outbreak, choked off Native States 
— Leaders and general mode of action in the Outbreaks ... 14 

CHAPTER III 

THE CAMPAIGN IN THREE STAGES 
THE VITAL STRUGGLE 

Three Stages— (i) July, August, and September 1857— Vital 
Struggle before Reinforcements arrived from England, in Delhi 
and Oude Theatres — Delhi Captured — Lucknow Succoured — (2) 
October 1857 to March 1858 — Decisive Contest when English 
Reinforcements had begun to join — The Enemy Defeated in Oude 
and Central India Theatres— (3) April to December 1858— The 
Suppression of the Revolt in Rohilkund, Oude, Eastern and 
Central India Theatres. 

First Stage : Operations confined to Delhi and Oude Theatres — 
Delhi Theatre : British Force increased in August — Nujufgurh 
— Siege-train arrives, September 6 — Strength of Force — Breach- 
ing Batteries : how Constructed — Delhi Stormed, September 14, 



COX TENTS xi 

sounding knell of Revolt — Delhi Mutineers stream oft" to Oude— 
A British Force follows via Agra and Cawnpore — Oude Theatre : 
Defence of Luck now Rcside?icy : Concentration on it of Mutchi 
Bhown Garrison — Four Periods of Defence — Mining Defence — 
Dangerous Disbelief of Native Garrison in approach of Relief — 
Proceedings of Rebel Army and Court in Lucknow — Haveloctis 
Movements : Advance to Cawnpore and Bithoor with Four 
General Actions — Crosses into Oude — Advance towards Luck- 
now — Two Actions — Checked by Cholera and Dinapore Mutiny 
— Advances again : a Third Action — Checked by Cawnpore being 
threatened from Furruckabad and Kalpee — His Situation — 
Defeats Enemy in a Fourth Action — Recrosses to Cawnpore — 
Joined by Outram arid Reinforcements in September — Again 
crosses into Oude — Advances on Lucknow — Takes Alum Bagh, 
September 23 — Reaches Lucknow Residency, September 25 — 
The Enemy close round the Combined Force — Failure of Efforts 
to withdraw Families — Store of Food sufficient to avert Starvation 
— October 4 : Force settle down to Continuance of Defence — 
Eastern Theatre: Slight Local Mutiny — Rising and Contest at 
Dinapore — Southern Theatre: Enemy threatened Agra and 
Cawnpore — In October attacked Agra, but defeated by Delhi 
Column — British Force from Bombay begins Advance Northwards 
— Analysis ... ... ... ... ... ... 24 

CHAPTER IV 

THE DECISIVE CONTEST 

Second Stage: October 1857 to March 1858 — Delhi Theatre: 
Operations at an End — Eastern Theatre : Enemy evade all 
Serious Contests — Oude Theatre : Outram remains in Lucknow on 
defensive — Mining Contest — Forces from Calcutta and Column 
from Delhi collect at Cawnpore'for Relief of Lucknow — Gwalior 
Contingent threatens Cawnpore — Outram deprecates Relief till 
it is driven off— Sir Colin Campbell leaves Windham to protect 
Cawnpore, and advances to Lucknow — Relieves and Withdraws 
the Garrison and Families — Leaves Outram at Alum Bagh — 
Returns with Rescued Families to Cawnpore — Finds it Attacked 
and Pressed by Gwalior Contingent — Defeats and Drives off 
the Enemy, December 6 — Fluctuations of Schemes for next 
Operations — Attack on Lucknow decided on — Plan of Attack, 
begun on March 7 — Kaiser Bagh captured on 14th — Cavalry 
fail to head or pursue the Flying Enemy on West — Enemy and 
Leaders escape to collect again — Ce?itral India Theatre : For 
three months, Two Contests ; in the North and in the South — 
In the North : the Gwalior Contingent advances, is defeated 
by Sir Colin, and returns to Central India — In the South : Sir 
Hugh Rose advances to Jhansi — Defeats Tantia Topee — 
Capture of Jhansi in beginning of April ... ... 36 



xii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER V 

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 

Third Stage : Extension of Hostilities from Oude Theatre into 
Rohilkund and Eastern Theatre — Talookdars of Oude join 
actively in Hostilities, consequent on Confiscation Proclamation 
— Rohilkund Theatre: Four Columns converge — Revolt crushed 
— Tranquillity restored with slight exceptions in May — Oude : 
Fortified Position constructed in Lucknow — Mutineer Group in 
its North-west driven into Rohilkund and there defeated — Another 
on its North-east heavily defeated in June — Talookdar Gathering 
in South takes to Guerilla Fighting — Organized Operations de- 
ferred till end of Rains — October : Southern Districts systematic- 
ally Cleared and Settled — Enemy Driven to North of Gogra — 
There swept from East Westwards till dispersed or fled into Nepaul 
— Oude Reduced to Submission — In Eastern Theatre: Konwur 
Singh — Roving Bodies of Enemy finally dispersed — Peace Re- 
stored — In Central India : Tantia Topee eventually Captured by 
Meade— End of War — Analysis of Campaigns, and Prominent 
Features — Military Conduct and Character of Hindoostanee 
Sepoy 41 



BOOK I 

OUDE BEEORE THE SIEGE OF THE RESIDENCY 

CHAPTER I 

BEFORE THE ANNEXATION 

Oude : Its Size — Physical and Geographical Features — Its People — 
Under Native Rule for a Century, while surrounding Provinces 
Annexed by British — Its last Fifty Years — The Treaty of 1801 — 
Stipulation for good Government, violated by ceaseless Misrule — 
Its Characteristics — Chronic War and Bloodshed — Rajpoots fight- 
ing against Oppression of Court Officials and Troops — Results to 
the People — Increase of Feudal System* and feeling — Clan Organ- 
ization : its good and bad features — Rajpoot Chiefs not to be 
classed with the State-created Rajahs — Their friendly feeling to 
English, except as to treatment of Natural Leaders of the People 
— Increase of Misrule and Misery made Position intolerable — 
Outram Resident in 1854 : his Report — Government decide on 
Annexation — 1855 : the Fyzabad Moulvie's attack on the Hun- 
nooman Gurhee ; virtually supported by the Nuwab — Effective 
Interference by Outram ; closely followed by the Annexation — 
Some details and stories of Clan Arrangements 49 



CONTENTS xiii 

CHAPTER II 

THE FIRST YEAR AFTER ANNEXATION 

Orders for Annexation 'notified to Nuwab, February 1856 — New 
Treaty and Terms proposed — Nuwab rejects them — Surrenders 
Rule to Outram, enjoins Obedience to his Orders, and goes to 
Calcutta to Appeal to Governor-General — Proclamation of Annex- 
ation — Its conciliatory Provisions, and Treatment of Land Revenue 
— People content — Absorption of Oude Revenues by Government 
rouses Adverse Comment — Mahomedans Angered by Suppression 
of one of their Dynasties — Outram leaves in April — Change for 
the worse — Violation of Provisions of Proclamation — Disaffection 
— Brigandage — Irritation in Oude Sepoy Homes at General Ser- 
vice Act — Violation of Land Revenue terms embitters the Chiefs, 
which reacts on Clansmen — Cholera — The Chupatties — Their 
mystery creates excitement — War with Persia further rouses 
Mahomedans — Cartridge Incident, January 1857 — Army excited- 
All Classes disaffected — Oude especially irritated — Moulvie at 
Fyzabad openly preaches Sedition — Fuzl Ali heads Gangs of 
Brigands and kills Boileau — In March, Sir Henry Lawrence 
arrives and assumes Administration 61 

CHAPTER III 

UNDER SIR HENRY LAWRENCE 

Sir Henry's Antecedents — Specially fitted for the Crisis — His Rule 
and Pacification of Punjab on its Annexation — His varied Ex- 
perience and Training — His Opinions and Convictions — His 
Prophetic Essay of 1843 — O n reaching Oude, enforces Law and 
Order — Fulfils Terms of Proclamation of Annexation — Redresses 
Wrongs — Restores Tranquillity — Contentment results — Talookdars 
and Country People become friendly — Convinced of impending 
Mutiny, he prepares Mutchi Bhown for Occupation, and roughly 
forms his Plans — His ceaseless Intercourse with all Classes, English 
and Native — Country outwardly Peaceful — On May 3, 7th Oude 
Infantry Mutinies against use of Cartridges — Sir Henry crushes 
Mutiny and disarms Regiment — May 14 : Receives Authentic 
News of Outbreak at Meerut and Delhi— May 17 : Occupies 
Mutchi Bhown, and Re-arranges English Troops so as to com- 
mand Cantonments and hold Residency 66 

CHAPTER IV 

Lawrence's policy on the outbreak 

Defensive Arrangements from Calcutta to Delhi — No check to the 
Rising except in Punjab— Sir Henry's Prophetic View of it in 



xiv CONTENTS 

1843— His View of Present Situation in Detail — Argument for 
Selection of Residency Site — Descriptive Sketch of Lucknow, and 
the Military Features of the Posts held by Sir Henry ... 72 

CHAPTER V 

MEASURES BEFORE THE MUTINY AT LUCKNOW 

Measures up to the Mutiny at Lucknow — Description of Mutchi 
Bhown — How Fortified so as to overawe City — The Essential 
Work carried out by May 23 — Its success : no interruption — 
City remained quiet ever after till Siege began — For another 
Week, Mutchi Bhown work confined to Improvements and 
Storage of Supplies — Residency Defences pushed on rapidly but 
equably — Principle of their Design — Separation of Sikhs — Pen- 
sioners called in — Trustworthy Troops selected for Retention — 
Essential to retain limited number of Faithful Sepoys — Cavalry 
sent into Districts to keep Country and Communications open — 
Cantonments Mutiny on May 30 — 13th Native Infantry remain 
staunch — City Malcontents tried to cross River and join Mutin- 
eers — Stopped by Police — Mutineers attacked and driven off on 
May 31 79 

CHAPTER VI 

THE MUTINIES AT THE OUT-STATIONS 

Mutineers at Out-Stations : Seetapore, Fyzabad, Sultanpore, Salone, 
Baraitch, Gonda, Secrora — Analysis of Conduct of Peasantry and 
Chiefs — Mutinies at Stations adjoining Oude : Azimgurh, Benares, 
Cawnpore, Allahabad, Futtehgurh — Movements of Mutineers — 
Eventual Fate of Seetapore Refugees who did not escape at 
once 84 

CHAPTER VII 

LUCKNOW FROM THE MUTINY TO CHINHUT 

Punishment of Mutineers and Conspirators — Assistance to Refugees — 
Sir Henry Lawrence's Illness — Temporary Council act contrary 
to his Policy — Sir Henry resumes Command — Recalls Sepoys who 
had been ordered to their Homes — His Letter to Inglis— Progress 
of Defences and Preparations at Residency — Continued Defence 
at Cawnpore — No News from Delhi — Food Supplies sent in by 
Talookdars and others — Cholera breaks out on June 12 — Arma- 
ment of Residency — Development of its Batteries and Posts — 
False News of Fall of Delhi— Mutineers holding aloof on the 
North-east — Two Batteries begun at the Mutchi Bhown to in- 
crease impression of Strength and Determination — Rumours of 
Early Advance of British from Allahabad — Demolition of Upper 



CONTENTS xv 

Storeys of Houses surrounding Residency — Lower Storeys left to 
protect Foot of Defences from Artillery Fire ; afterwards form 
Starting-ground for Enemy's Mines — Surrender and Fate of 
Cawnpore— Enemy in North-east at once Concentrate towards 
Lucknow, on Nuwabgunge — Advanced Guard at Chinhut on 
June 29— Our Troops drawn in from Cantonments— June 30 : 
Fight and Defeat at Chinhut: Siege begins 91 



BOOK II 

THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 
CHAPTER I 

CHINHUT AND THE CONCENTRATION 

Reconnaissance ordered for Morning of June 30 — Arrangements — 
Strength of Enemy greater than expected — Strength of our 
Force — Halted at Kokrail for Food, but never got it — Advance 
towards Position at Ishmaelgunge chosen by Sir Henry — Sudden 
Appearance of Enemy in full Force — 32nd Repulsed, outflanked, 
and driven back v : covered by Loyal Sepoys — Work in Lucknow 
stopped on News of Defeat — 'Residency and Mutchi Bhown Gates 
closed and secured — Enemy's advance stopped at Bridges — By 
Evening Residency invested, but not Mutchi Bhown — Enemy's 
Guns all on North of Goomtee — June 31 : Residency Signals to 
Mutchi Bhown to withdraw at Midnight, concentrate on Resi- 
dency, and blow up Magazine — Preparations accordingly — Junc- 
tion effected — All Guns taken over except Three on West of Fort 
— Thus whole Force collected in Residency by Dawn of July 2 — 
The Defence divided by Three General Attacks into Four Stages 
of about Three Weeks each 97 



CHAPTER II 

DESCRIPTION OF THE ENTRENCHMENTS 

Shape and Size of the Entrenchments — Four Faces— Lie of Ground 
and Surroundings — Degree of Facility of Attack on each Face 
— Our Posts at each Angle and Front — South Front the most 
dangerous — Defensive Features — Outposts, Supporting Posts, 
Retrenchments, Flanking Works, Batteries, Ramparts, Parapets, 
Loopholed Walls, Frontal Obstructions — Danger from Johannes' 
House — Our Artillery — Distribution of Garrison to Posts ... 103 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER III 

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEFENCE 

Details of Garrison and Inmates — Arrangements for Families — Rules 
for Posts — Each self-contained, under strict Orders of its Com- 
mandant — Food Supply — Orderly Arrangements for Rations — 
Difficulties owing to Commissariat Officer being disabled at 
Chinhut — Never any Dearth or Want of Food, or need to search 
for it — Our Posts for Watch and Outlook — Want of Servants — 
Want of Artisans— Dearth of Labour— 32nd Regiment provided 
a few Cornish Miners — Water Supply excellent — Sir Henry 
Lawrence's Forethought and Prevision — Mortally wounded, July 2 
— Arrangements on his Death — His Last Orders and In- 
junctions in 



CHAPTER IV 

THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENEMY 

Elements of the Mutineer Force — Licence and Laxity of their Troops 
— Intrigues for Power among Leaders — The Candidates — Nuwab 
selected, Court formed, and Ministry and Commands organized — 
Domination of the Soldiery — Total Lack of Organization and 
Method — Pasees set to Mine the Redan 116 



CHAPTER V 

FIRST STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 

Commands and Staff — Every one on duty, day and night, and slept 
in uniform — Confusion gradually cleared — July 3 : Enemy fired 
stack of fodder near tents and buried powder — Tents cut down 
and fire put out — Improvement of Defences, especially Gubbins's 
and Cawnpore Battery — Essential Features of Defence — Obstruc- 
tions to be sufficient to check Rush, and give time to man the 
point attacked — Retrenchments and Defilading Works started — 
Enemy's Artillery make no attempt to Breach — Constant but aim- 
less converging fire, from all round, of Artillery and Musketry — 
Our Sorties of two or three men from Local Posts — July 7 : Sortie 
organized against Johannes', drawn in before it could do anything 
— Mining suspected in Front of Redan — No News from outside — 
July 20 : Signs of a General Attack seen early — Begun by explosion 
of Mine near Redan, harmless because 140 feet off— Efforts to 
storm at Redan, Innes's Post, and elsewhere — Their ignominious 
Failure — Success of Obstructions — Slightness of our Loss ... 120 



CONTENTS xvii 

CHAPTER VI 

SECOND STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 

Temporary Elation of Garrison — Reaction owing to Mining — Anxiety 
due to mysterious dread of being blown up— Real danger of a 
Practicable Breach being formed, and Irruption of Enemy in mass 
—Four counteracting and precautionary Measures adopted — Fear 
of simultaneous Mining Attack all round, to meet which we had no 
adequate means — Failure of Enemy to adopt this Plan — Six Efforts 
started on July 21 — Three Lodgments and three Galleries — 
The three Lodgments at once detected and defeated by Grenades, 
Musketry, and Sorties — Two Galleries checked by Countermines — 
Collapse of the third, and of a fourth — The two which had been 
checked started afresh — Our three Countermines driven well out — 
One meets, and captures Sikh Square Mine — Additional Pre- 
cautionary Shafts and Galleries at dangerous points — Three small 
Sorties — Enemy's Gun posted at Hill's Shop near Iron Bridge — 
Gun placed at Innes's Post to oppose it — Withdrawn next night — 
Powder buried outside below tents brought into New Magazine on 
July 22 and 23 — Major Banks killed — Receipt of News from out- 
side, July 22, and then on 25th, and afterwards on August 6 — 
Second Attack on August 20, begun by Exploding Mines, harm- 
lessly — Storming Parties foiled — Attacks at Three Angles re- 
pulsed 127 

CHAPTER VII 

THIRD STAGE OF THE DEFENCE — THE MINING 

Condition of the Garrison and of the Defences and Buildings after 
Second Attack — The Third Stage, divided into two sections (1) 
The Mining Contest — Fourteen Mines attempted— One successful, 
one drawn, and twelve failures — Two others still in progress on 
Third Attack — Account of the Fourteen Mines — Our one aggressive 
^line to destroy Johannes' House — Details of Mine — Its Success 
— Simultaneous Sorties 136 

CHAPTER VIII 

THIRD STAGE OF THE DEFENCE — GENERAL INCIDENTS 

{2) Sorties on 13th, 18th, 19th, and 21st — Cawnpore Battery silenced 
by Johannes' House, from August 12 to 21 — Indignation at 
Battery being silenced — We stop the mischief by destroying 
Johannes' House — Enemy makes Battery at Lutkun Durwaza — 
Counter-Battery at Treasury Post — Duel between the Two Batteries 
on September 5 — Enemy makes Heavy Gun Battery opposite 
Gubbins's— Silenced by Bonham's " Ship " — Attempt to burn down 
Baily Guard Gate — Some Outposts however in ruins — Dangerous 

b 



xviii CONTENTS 

growth of long grass— Losses by Death— Major Anderson— Com- 
munications with Havelock — Particulars of collection of Food 
before the Siege— Inventory of it ordered by Sir Henry, never 
made — Inglis's Letter, August 16, to Havelock ; saying, with half 
rations food will last till September 20 — This idea incorrect — 
Havelock's Letter, August 29, gives hope of advance to Relief 
about September 18 — Third Attack on September 5 — Begun with 
Harmless Mines against Gubbins's and Brigade Mess — Attack on 
Baily Guard Gate — Its Collapse — Fruitless Attack on Brigade 
Mess,' Sikh Square, and Gubbins's — Our Loss very trifling ... 144 

CHAPTER IX 

FOURTH STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 

After Third Attack, Enemy lost heart ; no other Close Attack — Their 
Mines continued, but easily foiled — Available Mining Ground 
getting scarce — September 9 : Mine against Cawnpore Battery 
and Sikh Square blown in by our Countermines — Four other 
Mines stopped by our Countermines — Fronts now protected 
against Mining — Harmless Mines subsequently discovered — 
Danger from further Mines if we should have to draw in from 
our Outposts — Sorties at Church — At Innes's Post — Our Losses 
— Captain Fulton killed — Our Great Danger from Incredulity 
of Native Garrison about approach of Relief — Their Possible 
Desertion — Consequent Need to draw in from Outposts — Intel- 
ligent Doubts of Success of any early Attempt to Relieve us — 
Arrival on 22nd of Ungud with News of Havelock's Second 
Advance— Commotion in City — Other Signs of his Approach — 
On September 25, our Friends first heard, then seen — Their 
Arrival — A Veritable Relief from impending Catastrophe 151 

CHAPTER X 

PROMINENT FEATURES OF THE DEFENCE 

Adequacy of Style of Defences— Aim of Enemy to make Practicable 
Breach— Unable to Breach by Artillery— No Means for Vertical 
Fire— Efforts Concentrated on Breaching by Mines— Analysis of 
Mining Warfare— Thirty-seven Efforts— One Successful— Thirty- 
six Failures— Eleven from their own Blundering ; Twenty-five 
Checked or Countermined by us— Cause of our Success— We 
never lost a Foot of Ground— One Battery only Silenced, and 
for only Nine Days— Position weak in Flanking Defence- 
Deadly Fire of Enemy at Loopholes— Our Consequent Precautions 
—Arrangements for Sorties— Small Losses, considering Constant 
Fire of Enemy— Causes of this— The Losses of the 32nd Regiment 
— Losses of Women and Children— Steady System of Rations and 



CONTENTS xix 

Supply of Food — Greatest Feature was Sir Henry's Forethought 
and Thorough Preparations ... ... ... ... ... 159 

Four Tables of Mines— (1) Chronological — (2) By Posts — (3) Sum- 
marized — (4) Grouped by Character of Attack and Defence 165 

CHAPTER XI 

MINOR INCIDENTS OF THE DEFENCE 

Preparations at Mutchi Bhown — Record of Sir Henry Lawrence's 
Orders — My Visits to Residency during Preparations — Last 
Works at Mutchi Bhown — The Children — Difficulties about 
Clothes — Servants — The Gun at Hill's Shop — Exhaustion from 
Work and Want of Sleep — "Judicious Hooker" — " Put him to 
Bed "—Efficiency and Loyalty of our Sepoys — Mining Stories — 
My last Mine — Mystery and Dread of Mining — Ignorance and 
Mistakes about the Contest — Want and Discover}* of Mining 
Implements — Demeanour of Enemy — Pasees with Bows and 
Arrows ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 170 



BOOK III 

HAVELOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

CHAPTER I 

NEILL'S ADVANCE TO ALLAHABAD 

Routes between Calcutta and Cawnpore unite at Benares — Its Position 
— Paramount Importance of Allahabad — Its Secure Possession a 
Primary Object — Troops from Calcutta sent up fast, but in 
Driblets — For Three Weeks no Hitch — Allahabad still not 
Secured on June 3, when Mutinies begin at Azimgurh — June 
4 : Mutiny at Benares, on trying to disarm Sepoys — Mutineers 
Driven off — Benares Saved — Neill sends on Troops to Alla- 
habad — Mutiny there on June 6 — Brasyerwith his Sikh Regiment 
saves the Fort till Neill's Troops arrive — The Greatness of this 
Deed and Service — Success due Primarily to Brasyer, and then 
to Neill's Support — Neill's Energy and Value — Unable to ad- 
vance beyond Allahabad till 30th — Starts Renaud's Detachment 
towards Cawnpore — Havelock arrives to take Command — His 
Antecedents and Characteristics 181 

CHAPTER II 

HAVELOCK'S ADVANCE TO CAWNPORE 

Havelock hears of Fall of Cawnpore— Danger to Renaud from Cawn- 
pore Sepoys, besides those moving into Oude from the East — 
Havelock checks Renaud's Progress, and leaves Allahabad, July 7 



CONTENTS 

— Force 2,000 strong — Battle of Futtehpore, July 12 — Battles of 
Aong and Pandoo Nuddee, July 15 — Three Successive Actions on 
July 16, constituting Battle of Cawnpore — Too late to avert 
Massacre by Nana on the 15th— On July 17, enters Cawnpore — 
Receives the Messenger Ungud from Lucknow — Destroys Nana's 
Seat at Bithoor — Begins Entrenchments at Cawnpore, and Passage 
of Ganges into Oude on 20th — Neill arrives with Reinforcement 
from Allahabad — The State and Spirits of Havelock's Force and 
of the Enemy 187 



CHAPTER III 

havelock's first advance into oude 

Havelock's Force on entering Oude — His knowledge of the Heavy 
Odds against him — The Enemy's Force — Passage of the River 
takes eight days — Base at Mungurwar — Ungud returns twice 
from Lucknow, bringing Letters and Advice of Route — July 29 : 
Force advances — Battles of Oonao and Busherut Gunge, with loss 
of one-sixth of Force — Increase of Cholera — July 30 : News of 
Mutiny at Dinapore — Communications in danger — Reinforce- 
ments stopped — Return next day to Mungurwar — Havelock's 
Reduced Force — He resolves to remain there, till reinforced ; 
punishing Enemy when possible — Talookdars give no trouble — 
Neill sends over a few additional Troops ; reports threatening 
aspect of Enemy at Furruckabad and Kalpee — Enemy gathering 
in front — August 4 : Second Victory of Busherut Gunge — Next 
day only 900 men left for Line of Battle, and hears from Neill of 
Cawnpore seriously threatened — Havelock retires to Mungurwar 
and prepares for return to Cawnpore — His Letters to the Chief, 
August 9, and to Inglis on 8th — Situation and aspect of Affairs on 
August 10 194 



CHAPTER IV 
havelock's withdrawal to cawnpore 
Arrangements for Re-passage of Ganges — August 12 : Third Victory at 
Busherut Gunge— His Generalship — His Situation — He returns 
to Mungurwar, and recrosses to Cawnpore on August 13, un- 
molested — New Plans of Enemy— Talookdars now send Contin- 
gents to Rebel Army— Strong Body of Rebels collects at Bithoor 
— Havelock Routs them on August 16 — Returns to Cawnpore — 
Detaches Force against Enemy opposite Futtehpore — Hears of 
Supersession by Outram — Correspondence on the Situation with 
the Chief — Hears of Eyre's Successes near Dinapore, and hopes 
for Reinforcements — Outram's new Plan— Havelock's consequent 



CONTENTS xxi 

Correspondence with Chief— He shows the Danger to Cawnpore 
—Outram gives up his Scheme, sends on Reinforcements, and 
advances to join him— Extraordinary Delay of Troops in Lower 
Provinces— By September 5 Reinforcements reached Allahabad, 
but not Cawnpore 2 ° 2 



CHAPTER V 
havelock's final advance to lucknow 
Outram about to arrive— His Antecedents and Character— Proposals, 
owing to state of River, for combined movement to effect Passage 
at Cawnpore— Change in state of River stops the Scheme — Rebels 
from Oude threaten Communications between Cawnpore and 
Allahabad— Defeated by Eyre— Outram joins Cawnpore, Sep- 
tember 1 5 — Resigns Command to Havelock, but practically retains 
the Control— Letter from Inglis of September 1, and later, showing 
desperate state of Garrison — Havelock feels gravity of Difficulties 
to be faced — Outram's more sanguine View of the Situation — 
Havelock's arrangement for crossing Ganges overruled — Advance 
on 2 1 st — Enemy driven out of Mungurwar— Pursuit and Running 
Fight, through Oonao to Busherut Gunge, thence to Bunnee 
Bridge— 23rd, to Alum Bagh — Battle — Enemy defeated and 
driven into Lucknow City — News of Capture of Delhi ... 210 



CHAPTER VI 

SUCCOUR OF THE RESIDENCY 

Choice of Four Routes from Alum Bagh to Residency — Havelock 
ready for No. 4, or Trans-Goomtee Route — Outram and Napier 
object, owing to Swampy Ground after Heavy Rain — No. 2, or 
Inside Canal Route, via Char Bagh, adopted — Garrison left at 
Alum Bagh — Force advances early September 25 — Enemy 
driven back from Yellow House — Char Bagh Bridge blocked by 
Battery, supported by Loopholed Houses in Rear — Maude's 
Battery — Enemy's Battery stormed — Madras Fusiliers capture 
Position — A Flank Attack by Enemy defeated and their Guns 
captured by the 90th — The 78th hold Char Bagh Bridge Position, 
while the Main Force moves forward — Its Route to Motee Mahul 
— Thence makes for Neill's Gate, leaving Rear-Guard at Motee 
Mahul— Separate Advance of 78th— Meeting at Neill's Gate— 
Moorsom fails to discover Chutter Munzil Opening — Generals 
discuss about Immediate Advance — Havelock decides on making 
it : rest of Column to follow by better Route, if found — Outram 
claims the Lead, and takes 78th by Khas Bazar and Jail Road 



CONTENTS 

into Residency— Moorsom guides rest of Force through Pyne 
Bagh and Lutkun Durwaza — Relief of Garrison thereby effected 
on Evening of September 25— Plan of Operations perfectly clear, 
but deviations and hitches unavoidable in Ten Hours' Struggle 
— Some Street Fighting also unavoidable — Losses small — How 
incurred ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 218 



BOOK IV 

THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

CHAPTER I 

EFFORTS TO WITHDRAW THE GARRISON 

Havelock's Relief, secures Successful Issue of the First Defence— Its 
Importance in the Oude Conflict— Outram assumes Command, 
and pulls the Force together — September 25 : Aitken clears 
Lutkun Durwaza, and seizes Jail and Tehree Kothee — 26th : 
Rear-Guard at Motee Mahul strengthened, and Ground between 
Residency and River cleared and seized — Furhut Buksh penetrated 
and held — Rear-Guard brought in from Motee Mahul, and Chutter 
Munzil captured — 27th : Outram begins trying to get at City- 
Ineffective Sortie on South Face — 29th : Three Sorties — Two on 
South Face clear wide Space — Third towards Iron Bridge not 
effective — 30th : Destroyed all Enemy's Mines — None dangerously 
near — October 1 : Sortie began for seizure of Cawnpore Road — 
2nd : Phillips's Garden captured — 3rd and 4th : Sortie advances 
along Cawnpore Road — These Sorties due to assumed Ex- 
haustion of Food, founded on Inglis's Letters — Napier finds from 
Commissariat Officers that there is a Sufficiency of Food — Cause 
of Inglis's Misconception unknown — Immediate Fear of Starv- 
ation ceases — -Outram stops Sorties, settles down into Defence of 
Extended Position — His successive Reports about Extricating 
Garrison — Defence of the Alum Bagh by the Rear-Guard left 
there under Maclntyre 226 

CHAPTER II 

THE BLOCKADE 

Outram's Successive Plans and Views to October 6— Description of 
his Extended Position— Old Entrenchment : Lockhart's Post : 
Chutter Munzil Position— Details of Steps to secure it — Attacking 
Mines— Success of Counter-measures — Old Entrenchment never 
again seriously attacked — Chronic Mining Contest at Lockhart's 
Post and Eastern Side of Chutter Munzil— Sixteen Efforts of 
Enemy defeated, Seven Mines destroyed, and Seven captured — 



CONTENTS xxiii 

We Mine and destroy Two of their Buildings — Details of Mines 
— General Aspect and Details of Situation — Casualties and 
Discomforts greatly reduced — No Danger of Catastrophe — The 
Defence of Alum Bagh Post — Communications with it and 
Cawnpore — Outram's Reports of the Food Supply — His Letters 
of Instructions and Advice — His Advice to adopt Route No. 3, 
which Sir Colin followed, but not closely — Question if Route No. 
4 was not preferable — Approved by Havelock — Steps taken by 
Outram's Force to Co-operate with Relief — November 16th : 
Arrival of Relief — 18th : Fiat to vacate Residency Position — 19th : 
Withdrawal to Dil Koosha— 22nd : Residency Evacuated— 24th : 
Death of Havelock 237 

CHAPTER III 

RELIEF BY SIR COLIN CAMPBELL 

Sir Colin Campbell takes Personal Control of Operations — His Ante- 
cedents — Gloomy State of India on his Arrival in August — Very 
great Improvement by October : Back of Revolt broken — Still 
he writes of Situation as if of intensest Gravity and Difficulty — 
Comparison of Former with Present Difficulties and Resources — 
Spirit of Caution and of Weighing of Odds — Measures for Pro- 
tection of Cawnpore against Gwalior Contingent — Joins Hope 
Grant, November 9 — Strength of his Force — 12th : Concentrates 
at Alum Bagh — Adopts Route No. 3 for Relief — His Engineer 
presses No. 4 in Vain — Strength of his Force on November 14 — 
Advances to Dil Koosha — Concentrates there on 15th — Crosses 
Canal on 1 6th— Combat all Day — Captures Secundra Bagh and 
Shah Nujeef— Outram opens out from Chutter Munzil Position — 
17th : The intervening Buildings taken and Junction effected — 
1 8th : Orders for Evacuation of Residency Position — 22nd : 
Evacuation completed : Concentration at Dil Koosha, and then 
at Alum Bagh — Outram left there with 4,000 Men to keep 
Lucknow in Check— Sir Colin returns with Army and Families 
to Cawnpore ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 250 



BOOK V 

CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

CHAPTER I 

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS ON THE GANGES 

Outram at Alum Bagh Position — His Objections to the Position over- 
ruled by Sir Colin, who moves with Families towards Cawnpore 
— November 28 : Sir Colin hears of its Attack by Gwalior Con- 
tingent — Pushes on and joins Windham in evening — Tantia 



xxiv CONTENTS 

Topee's previous Manoeuvres against Cavvnpore — Joined by Nana 
and Oude Troops — 28th : Engagement with Windham — 29th : 
Sir Colin drives back the Enemy's Artillery— Clears East of 
Canal and City— Crosses Ganges — December 3 : Despatches 
Families to Allahabad— 6th : Attacks the Enemy — Shuts off 
those inside City — Drives those outside it back to their Camp, 
capturing all their Guns, and pursuing them towards Kalpee— 
Enemy inside City move out of it to West — Mansfield, sent to 
intercept them, lets them escape — Hope Grant overtakes and de- 
feats them next day, and drives them into Oude — Sir Colin starts 
Columns up the Doab, and captures Futtehgurh and Furruckabad 
— January 3 : Defeats and drives Enemy into Rohilkund — Lord 
Canning" decides that Lucknow is to be attacked before clearing 
Rohilkund— Sir Colin prepares to concentrate on Lucknow — 
Revised Plan of Attack 260 

CHAPTER II 

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS IN OUDE 

Outram left at Alum Bagh — Alum Bagh too close to City — Strength 
of Enemy — Nature of Position — Held for Three Months — Six 
Attacks repelled : Details — Was never attacked by Full Strength 
of Enemy — Plan for Columns to converge on Lucknow — February 
19 : Franks crosses Frontier, and defeats Enemy in Two Actions 
near Chanda — Pushes through Pass of Budayan — February 23 : 
Battle at Sultanpore — March 4 : Joins Army before Lucknow — 
Enemy, chiefly Rajwara Troops, not under their own Rajpoot 
Chiefs, but under Mahomedan Court Officials, did not fight — 
Nepaulese follow Franks — Capture Fort of Ambarpore — Join at 
Lucknow on March 1 1 ... ... ... ... ... ... 269 

CHAPTER III 

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF LUCKNOW 

Three Lines of Massive Defences prepared by Enemy against Attack 
from the East — Nothing important on North — Sir Colin arranges 
Attack — Distribution of Lines of Attack — March 2 : Sir Colin 
occupies Dil Koosha— 6th ; Outram crosses Goomtee — 8th ; 
Reaches position to turn Enemy's ( Works, and constructs 
Batteries — 9th, Attack opens ; Enemy's Front Line turned by 
Outram's Guns and captured by Lugard's Division ; on left Sir 
Colin captures Banks's House — nth, he captures Begum's Palace, 
Secundra Bagh and Shah Nujeef — Outram reaches Iron Bridge — 
13th, Nepaulese begin advance through South-East of City — 14th, 
Franks storms Emambarah, follows up Enemy closely, and turns 
their Second and Third Line successively — Then repulses the 
Enemy flying from the Second Line, and drives them into the 



CONTENTS xxv 

Chutter Munzil — The Right Column advances, takes and holds 
the Enemy's Second Line— Franks seizes Saadut Ali's Mosque, 
and Kaiser Bagh, the Heart of the Enemy's Position — Sir Colin 
restrains Outram from seizing Iron Bridge — 15th; he sends 
whole Force of Cavalry in Pursuit of Enemy, on a wrong scent 
towards Seetapore and Sandeela, thus leaving open Ground where 
the Cavalry were really wanted — Outram crosses Goomtee by 
Temporary Bridge, and moves up right back, capturing Residency 
and Mutchi Bhown— Enemy attacks Alum Bagh in Force but 
without Success— Bulk of Beaten Enemy > escape by circling 
round Walpole's Division towards Fyzabad — 17th and 18th; 
Enemy driven on to the Moosa Bagh, and then out of it, with all 
their Leaders — Campbell's Cavalry sent forward to intercept them 
fail to do so — Nearly all the Enemy escape, free to re-assemble 
and begin fresh Operations ... ... ... ... 278 



BOOK VI 

SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT IN 1858 

CHAPTER I 

HOT-WEATHER CAMPAIGN 

Hostilities in Oude, spread also to Rohilkund and Eastern Districts, 
owing to Escape of Rebel Army and Leaders from Lucknow — 
Hostility of Talookdars roused by Confiscation Proclamation— Its 
Effects — Enemy in Four Parties— Talookdars come out in greatly 
increased Force — Guerilla Warfare chiefly in South of Oude — The 
other Three Parties form Two Groups, in North-West and in 
North-East — Sir Colin fortifies Lucknow — Sending Troops to 
Eastern District and Rohilkund — Force for Rohilkund under 
Walpole, advancing up bank of Ganges, blunders at Roya, and 
encourages Enemy — Hope Grant in Oude attacks North-West 
Group in April and drives it into Rohilkund — Moves against 
Talookdars in South ; and defeats them under Beni Madho ; they 
avoid actual Fighting — Hope Grant leaves Troops to watch and 
check them — Moves against the North-East Group — Attacks and 
disperses them at Nuwabgunge — August 28 : Captures Sultanpore 
— Petty Desultory Fighting till October ... ... 290 

CHAPTER II 

FINAL WINTER CAMPAIGN 

Scheme for Suppression of Rebellion — October : Operations commence 
in South or Western District — Sandeela and Bank of Ganges 
cleared — Movements Northwards to Seetapore, and inwards from 



CONTENTS 

Rohilkund on West — Whole of Enemy driven from that District 
over the Gogra, except Feroze Shah, who doubled back into 
Central India — November : In Eastern District ; Sir Colin takes 
Rampore Russia, Ameythee, and Shurkerpore — Routs Beni Madho 
near Doondia Khera — Drives all Enemy Northwards across 
Gogra — Cordon from Fyzabad to Himalayas — Capture of Tool- 
seepore — Advance Westwards — Baraitch and Secrora cleared — 
Burgidia and Musjidea taken — Enemy forced into Narrow Gorge 
in the Hills — The Remnant driven across the Raptee into Nepaul 
— End of War — The Numerous Troops used in these Last 
Struggles — Establishment of Police, as Force advanced and 
cleared Country — Comparison of Conduct of Operations at 
beginning and ending of Struggle in Oude 299 



APPENDICES 



APl'ENDIX 1'AGE 

I. THE MISGOVERNMENT OF OUDE BEFORE ITS ANNEX- 
ATION 309 

II. BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS MISGOVERNMENT 310 

III. ON THE LOYALTY OF THE NUWABS OF OUDE 311 

IV. ALTERNATIVES OF TREATMENT OF OUDE AND ITS 

DYNASTY ON TAKING OVER ITS GOVERNMENT ... 312 
V. REASONS AND ARTICLES OF THE DRAFT TREATY PRO- 
POSED TO THE NUWAB, FEBRUARY 1 856 313 

VI. PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF OUDE ON ITS 

ANNEXATION, FEBRUARY 1 856 314 

VII. ON THE FEELING OF OUDE TO THE ENGLISH BEFORE 

ANNEXATION 316 

VIII. CONCILIATORY TREATMENT OF PEOPLE ENJOINED ON 

THE ANNEXATION 317 

IX. INSTRUCTIONS RESPECTING THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND 

REVENUE 317 

X. LORD STANLEY'S DESPATCH OF OCTOBER 1 3, 1 858, 
REVIEWING THE TREATMENT OF OUDE AFTER THE 

ANNEXATION 318 

XI. SIR HENRY LAWRENCE'S ESSAY OF 1 843, FORECASTING 

THE EVENTS OF 1857 331 

XII. TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM RAJAH MAUN SINGH 

TO TALOOKDARS; JULY 20, 1 857 334 

XIII. PROCLAMATION, MARCH 1 838 339 



VIEWS, MAPS, AND PLANS 



THE MUTCHI BHOWN 

DIAGRAM FOR VIEWS OF RESIDENCY POSITION 

Views of Residency Position ; 

1. BAILY GUARD ANGLE 

2. RIVER FRONT 

3. CHURCH ANGLE 

4. COMMISSARIAT FRONT 

5. GUBBINS'S ANGLE 

6. BRIGADE MESS FRONT 

7. CAWNPORE BATTERY ANGLE 

8. BAILY GUARD FRONT 



Frontispiece 



at p. 96 



Maps : 

I. INDIA 



2. OUDE 

3. LUCKNOW (SKETCH) 

4. DEFENSIVE POSITION 

5. LUCKNOW : SHOWING ROUTES OF RELIEFS AND ATTACK 



... To face p. 



at p. 340 




8oX<m&±nile J5- of Greenwich. 



\J.*A.K.Jdhnston.ZaiBbvir|h. fc Iimim. 



LUCKNOW AND OUDE 

IN THE MUTINY 



INTRODUCTION 

GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

CHAPTER I 

ITS ORIGIN 

THE great convulsion known as the Indian Mutiny 
broke out in May 1857, consequent directly on the excite- 
lent and ill-feeling engendered in the Bengal army by 
the well-known cartridge incident. Any such military out- 
break would naturally cause much civil disturbance and 
find numerous supporters outside the army, but the wide 
range and virulence of the general commotion that ensued 
\_/Were exceptional, and the rising was throughout marked 
by a variety of phases and by singular episodes, for which 
the disaffection of the troops and the cartridge incident do 
not, of themselves, adequately account. A reasonable ex- 
planation of them, however, is indispensable for a clear 
insight into the subject, and fortunately it is readily found 
on turning to antecedent events and circumstances, and to 
the state of public feeling prevalent among various sections 
of the community. Investigation in those directions pro- 
vides us with facts and points to conclusions and pro- 
babilities which seem to indicate obviously and amply the 
several influences that led to the origin of the outbreak, 
swayed and chequered its development, and further served 
materially to affect the progress and shape the course of 
the contest that ensued. 

B 



2 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

The first matter for consideration is the chronic state of 
public feeling, that is, its general state when not affected 
by any temporary exceptional excitement or agitation. 
Up to 1856, the year before the outbreak, there had been 
for a whole century a continuous, aggressive advance of 
the British Power till it completed the ring-fence of the 
Empire by the annexation of Oude. During all that time, 
it had either been engaged in actual conflict or had been 
forming dominant relations with the several races of the 
country, and had reduced them, one after another, to sub- 
jection ; some provinces being brought under its direct 
administration, and others being left as feudatory or vassal 
States under their native rulers. At the start, the old 
Moghul Dominion had been in a hopeless state of decay, 
leading to all the horrors of internecine war, and some of 
the native principalities had gladly turned for safety to the 
shelter of English protection and supremacy. But the 
great mass of the people had been brought under our 
rule by conquest, or by forcible annexation. With ruling 
dynasties thus set aside, reduced, or crushed, with great 
races humiliated, and bitterness and misery spread broad- 
cast by the loss of power and place and property, it would 
be an outrage on common sense to doubt that we had 
created a host of enemies. Moreover, there had been no 
rest, no time to reduce their numbers or their irritation. 
The benefits of civilized rule, of the Pax Britannica, were 
felt only skin-deep, and the old fierce instincts, the out- 
come of centuries of strife and oppression, were still in the 
ascendant. The memory of injuries was still keen and 
vivid, the newer cases helping to recall the old ones to 
mind, and to reopen sores that might otherwise have been 
getting healed : so that, briefly, the mood and temper 
which prevailed were those of a conquered people who had 
wrongs and humiliations to remember, and were chafing at 
having to endure the sway of aliens in race and creed. There 
existed, in fact, under the best circumstances, a mass of 
constant disaffection, and whole hosts of malcontents. 

Of these, the most powerful and dangerous were the 
Mussulmans. The entire Mahomedan population were, as 
a body, rebels at heart, and resented the Christian supre- 
macy, if only on religious grounds and from fanatical 



ITS ORIGIN 3 

pride. And the Moghuls of the Upper Provinces had, in 
addition, a natural longing to revive their old predominance, 
and restore their old Empire. 

Next may be mentioned the Mahrattas, a warlike and 
unscrupulous Hindoo race, who, though now split up into 
rival states, had been most powerful as a confederacy, 
and felt that, but for the British, they would have been the 
masters of India. 

Another extensive body of malcontents consisted of 
those who were actual sufferers from British conquest or 
annexation, or from the action of British Land Policy. 

And a fourth group, specially dangerous from their 
spirit and energy, was formed by those who fretted at the 
closing of those outlets for ambition, and the loss of those 
opportunities for aggrandizement through political intrigue 
or military prowess, that had been current of old. 

Such a mass of disaffection, however latent or suppressed, 
was obviously a standing menace to the tranquillity of the 
country, constituting a solid basis, and providing a powerful 
agency, for the rousing of evil passions and the promotion 
of seditious enterprise — a sure factor in any movement or 
question involving the peace or security of the State. 

At the same time, any tendency to give vent to this ill- 
feeling in serious action against the British w r as checked by 
the universal sense that our presence constituted the only 
real safeguard against a recurrence of the internecine wars 
of old, with all their attendant horrors, of which the 
memories and traditions were still in force : whilst also each 
of the great races — Rajpoot or Mahratta, Mahomedan or 
Sikh or Jat — felt that the British rule was preferable to 
that of any of its native rivals, by whom it might possibly 
be overcome in a contest for the supremacy. 

Under the counteracting influence of this feeling, the 
chronic disaffection usually remained latent or suppressed ; 
but with any undue temptation or increase of discontent, 
it was apt to awake into activity, with its agents ready to 
intensify and inflame any exceptional causes for irritation 
that might arise. 

For too much stress must not be laid on the fact that the 
races of India are numerous and have conflicting interests 
and aspirations, and on the resulting theory that they 



4. GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

cannot be regarded as one people — as the people of India. 
It is not to be gainsaid, and it ought not to be ignored, 
that they are one people in the very important sense of 
having, in common, characteristics and interests which are 
opposed to those of the British. They belong to the soil, 
while the British are aliens, feringhees. They are dark- 
skinned, kala admi, while the British are fair. Their 
creeds are not those of the English. Their social habits 
and usages, their traditional rights and points of honour to 
which they cling passionately, and their modes of thought, 
are Oriental and not European. They are subjects, and 
practically barred from rule, while the British are rulers, 
and virtually autocratic. If the English even apparently 
though not actually ignore or slight — much more if they 
treat with insult, or outrage — these points of difference, it 
is folly to suppose that the several races will not tend to 
combine and act as one people in hostility to the English. 
And this combination, based on a unity of excited feeling 
overriding reason and sense, will not be readily checked or 
thwarted ; except by the wanton action of some section, 
reminding the rest, with the force of a shock, of the other 
interests at stake. 

And this was precisely the course of events in the revolt 
of 1857. For, as will be seen, the chronic ill-feeling had 
become intensified, and gave an exceptional colour and 
weight to the cartridge incident, causing it to develope into 
a general mutiny. But many of the disaffected sections of 
the people wavered and stopped short, on their eyes being 
opened by the partisan aggressiveness of the Moghul section. 

From the chronic state of public feeling, and its liability 
to fluctuation, we pass on to the facts and incidents that 
affected it. During Lord Dalhousie's rule, which closed in 
1856, the boundaries of British Dominion were very greatly 
extended, so as eventually to include the whole of India ; 
and, in addition to this, many feudatory States which, 
though included within British Dominion and subject to 
its suzerainty, had hitherto been left under the sway of 
their own dynastic chiefs, were removed from such native 
rule and brought directly under British administration. 

These annexations in the aggregate greatly affected the 
native mind, impressing it with the sense that the greed of 



ITS ORIGIN 5 

the English was insatiable, and troubling it as to the further 
steps that might follow. 

The earliest of the annexations was that of the Punjab. 
This was a happy one. It saved the empire in 1857. For 
Sir Henry Lawrence was placed at the head of the adminis- 
tration of the province immediately after its conquest, and, 
through a carefully selected staff, most of whom he imbued 
with his own spirit, he carried out such a liberal policy, 
and showed such a genial demeanour to the proud and 
warlike race who were smarting under the sense of defeat, 
that he turned them from enemies into friends, and won 
their confidence for their ' English rulers. This good-will 
had its foundations laid deep ; and, though somewhat 
affected by the colder and harder rule that replaced Sir 
Henry's on his transfer to another post, it lasted, under 
the staff which he left behind him, till the time of trial came 
and put it successfully to the test. 

Of the other annexations, only two were of any particular 
importance, those of Jhansi and of Oude. But both these 
cases startled the native community, because the rulers of 
both provinces were held to have ever been thoroughly 
loyal and true to British interests. If such fidelity, it was 
argued, could not avert annexation, what State was there 
that could consider itself safe ? They were also mischievous, 
each of them, in other respects. 

Jhansi was annexed because the last Rajah had died 
leaving no lineal heir, but only an adopted one, whom Lord 
Dalhousie had declined to accept. This refusal was doubt- 
less legal and probably justifiable, but its necessity was 
questionable. If avoidable, it was impolitic ; and under any 
circumstances, it was unfortunate, because it set at nought a 
much cherished custom, and was regarded, in conjunction 
with other cases, as significant of annexation, being, under 
similar circumstances, the settled policy of the future. 

This caused serious anxiety and irritation in the feuda- 
tory States, and especially affected the good-will of the 
great princes of Rajpootana, hitherto markedly loyal and 
contented. 

The annexation of Oude had been somewhat anxiously 
regarded by Government with respect to its possible effect 
on the turbulent Talookdars of the province, and on the 



6 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

Sepoys, of most of whom it was the fatherland. The latter 
however did not seem to take it seriously amiss ; while the 
Talookdars accepted it contentedly, being satisfied with the 
terms held out to them by the proclamation that was then 
issued. So the mischief which immediately ensued was not 
in that direction. But the Mussulman community were 
affronted by the insult to their religion in the reduction of 
a Mahomedan power. 

Following on the annexations, and resulting directly 
from them, was the most momentous matter of all. As 
territory extended, the native army was proportionately 
increased, but without any corresponding augmentation 
being made of the British troops. The consequence was 
that the Sepoy force attained to overwhelming prepon- 
derance over the British, their infantry in Bengal being at 
one time in the proportion of 20 to 1. This destroyed 
the equilibrium of the military organization, and thereby 
endangered its stability and the security of the State. 

The risk thus involved was enhanced by the fact — well 
known — that the Bengal Sepoys had been showing signs of 
laxity in tone and discipline. Besides one positive mutiny, 
a group of regiments in the Punjab had been checked in a 
tendency to combination about an alleged grievance. And, 
worst of all, there had been successful resistance to orders 
when troops had been required to proceed on service which 
entailed a sea voyage. Further, the danger of the tempta- 
tion which their overwhelming strength held out to a force 
in which such a tone prevailed, was increased by the absence 
of any effort, on the part of the Government, to conceal or 
to counteract by improved military arrangements the weak- 
ness of the British troops. For these were mainly massed 
in the Punjab, leaving huge stretches of country and 
positions of the first importance, such as Allahabad and 
Delhi, absolutely denuded of their presence, and with only 
three regiments to garrison the 900 miles between Calcutta 
and Meerut. This was the case in Lord Dalhousie's time ; 
and it was not altered by Lord Canning, who was probably 
lulled into security by the favourable opinion which he 
had received from Lord Dalhousie of the state of the native 
army. 

Before passing on from the events during Lord Dal- 



ITS ORIGIN 7 

housie's rule, another point has to be touched on — the 
effects of his own personality. Able, energetic, and bold, 
and withal devotedly bent on fulfilling his duty to the 
country, he conferred lasting benefits upon it. But he was 
essentially an autocrat, exceptionally imperious, self-willed, 
and self-sufficient. So he rode rough-shod over all diffi- 
culties, among them the prejudices, feelings, habits, tradi- 
tions, and modes of thought of the native community ; and 
would brook no advice. Formerly local rulers and other 
responsible authorities were expected to convey information, 
and to tender suggestions, advice, and opinions freely and 
frankly — and also to act upon their own judgment in minor 
matters and in cases of urgency. These were the traditional 
principles of administration by which the empire had been 
built up. But Lord Dalhousie practically changed all this. 
Instead of acting promptly and resolutely on their own 
judgment, officers had to wait for orders ; and advice or 
suggestion, except from a favoured few, was apt to be 
regarded as unparalleled presumption ; so that many 
valuable sources of observation and information naturally 
became closed, independent thought and promptitude of 
action were checked, and public and official spirit were 
greatly deadened. 

We now come to Lord Canning's rule, under which this 
tone of administration naturally continued, whilst, as a 
matter of course, he was personally quite unequal to the 
task of concentrating all springs of action in himself. 

At the same time another and almost opposite result 
was, that with the withdrawal of Lord Dalhousie's personal 
sway, real vigorous control on the part of the supreme 
Government seemed to cease altogether, and administrative 
discipline was greatly weakened. Hence, though the old 
tone among the higher officials was not restored, strong- 
willed subordinates, feeling the relaxation, became inclined 
to kick over the traces, ignore orders, and disregard 
authority. 

An instance of this occurred at once in Oude with very 
mischievous results. Lord Dalhousie had, in his procla- 
mation of the annexation, made certain promises which 
protected the interests of the Talookdars of the Province, 
of the Royal Family, and of the dependants of the deposed 



8 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

king ; and consequently, as has been already mentioned^ 
contentment at first prevailed. But very soon some of the 
officials, who were at variance with the Chief Commissioner, 
disregarded orders, and in their judgments and actions 
violated the terms of the proclamation, and brought much 
loss and misery on the influential classes. Hence the 
Talookdars, naturally a turbulent body, were gradually 
roused during the latter half of 1856 into a state of 
exasperation that threatened evil results, and was indirectly 
the first important outcome of Lord Canning's rule. 

Of equal gravity, especially with respect to the coming 
mutiny, was a measure which Lord Canning himself carried 
out during his first year, called the General Service Enlist- 
ment Act. This made an entire revolution in the future 
terms of service of the Sepoy army, as they would have to 
be prepared to cross the Blackwater (as they called the 
ocean), despite caste or religious obligations. Would 
Brahmins and Rajpoots enlist under such terms, or would 
they give up military service as their career ? This 
apparent attack on caste privileges seemed to fit in but too 
well with the sinister rumours which had, by this time, 
begun to spread respecting the aggressive intentions of 
Government against the creeds of the country. The matter 
became an all-absorbing and agitating topic in the regi- 
mental lines and in the families and homes of the Sepoys, 
and was the first actual and tangible strain on the loyalty 
of the men and their sense of their relations to the 
State. 

Then in January 1857 came the cartridge incident. 

These several circumstances may now be usefully sum- 
marized before proceeding to show their chief results and 
the action to which they gave rise on the part of the 
malcontents. 

I. There had been extensive annexations under Lord Dal- 
housie, leading in the aggregate to a sinister impression, in 
the native mind, of the greedy and grasping tendency of 
Government, especially as the claims of loyalty and fidelity 
appeared to carry no weight. 

II. One of the annexations, that of the Punjab, was 
happy and fortunate, because wisely managed. 

III. The annexation of Jhansi was mischievous from the 



ITS ORIGIN 9 

anxiety and irritation it created in the feudatory States, in 
regard to the practice of adoption of heirs. 

IV. The annexation of Oude was mischievous because 
it angered the Mahomedan community. 

V. The native army had been allowed to attain to 
overwhelming preponderance, and had been subjected to 
undue temptation. 

VI. It had latterly been irritated, and its loyalty strained 
by the General Service Enlistment Act. 

VII. Lord Dalhousie had, throughout his rule, dis- 
couraged independent thought and action, and had exer- 
cised a very powerful personal and concentrated control. 
Hence, on his departure, there was a reaction, leading to 
insubordinate proceedings on the part of officials in Oude> 
which exasperated the influential classes of the province. 

We now come to the effect of these antecedents on the 
chronic disaffection, and the action to which they led on 
the part of the malcontents. 

The annexations in general, though they produced 
anxiety in the feudatory States, did not act much on those 
already disaffected, beyond rousing their watchfulness and 
increasing their suspicion and the discussion of the acts 
and intentions of Government. The annexation of Jhansi, 
however, from the excitement and ill-feeling it created 
among the feudatory princes, led the disaffected at once to 
take energetic measures. 

The Mahomedans, always on the alert, were now excited 
with hopes of the consequent support of the native States 
and of the country generally ; and the malcontents pro- 
ceeded vigorously to spread sinister and seditious rumours, 
and to intrigue with the army. On the one hand, they 
pointed to the conquests and annexations of the British, 
to their railways, telegraphs, and scientific — if not magical 
— innovations, and alleged that they had reached to such 
a pitch of pride and arrogance that they meant to ride 
rough-shod over the rights, the castes, and the religions of 
the country ; on the other, they declared that the British 
Power was a myth, that we had really been worsted by 
the Russians in the Crimea, that our army was insig- 
nificant, and that the Sepoys were ready to join in sub- 
verting our rule. Such were the stories disseminated 



io GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

broadcast by the fakirs and other picked agents of the 
malcontent party. 

After this, the annexation of Oude roused still further 
the activity of the Mussulmans. And the troops, which 
had apparently been indifferent to the temptations held 
out to them, but whose loyalty had latterly been strained 
by the General Service Act, now listened with more 
attention to the whispers of sedition, which quickly became 
more loud and outspoken. 

And then occurred in January 1857 what is known as 
the cartridge incident. The musket with which .the native 
troops had been heretofore armed was about to be dis- 
carded and replaced by a rifle. This rifle required a new 
kind of cartridge ; and these were accordingly being made 
up in the Government factories near Calcutta. The utmost 
care had heretofore been customary in preventing the use 
of objectionable ingredients ; but in the present case the 
contractor had managed, without detection by the authori- 
ties, to introduce as one of the lubricants, cows' fat, the use 
of which would have involved contamination to a Hindoo ; 
though no lard or any other material that would have 
contaminated Mussulmans had been used. 

One day however in January, a factory workman was 
having a squabble with a Sepoy, and taunted him with the 
impending loss of all caste throughout the army, as the 
cartridges they were about to use contained both hogs' 
lard and cows' fat. As the story was partly correct, and 
therefore could not be absolutely denied, it was believed 
and adopted in full, and circulated swiftly through the 
army. And thus a chance spark, but a very fiery one, fell 
upon combustible material, and caught at once. 

At this very time we were about to enter on a war with 
Persia. Hence the state of public feeling seems to have 
been this. 

I. The Mahomedan community were specially excited 
owing to the annexation of Oude, and the impending 
attack on Persia, and were now further counting on the 
certain accession to the malcontent party of the angry 
Talookdars of Oude. 

II. The native States were uneasy about the tendency 
to annexation and the question of the adoption of heirs, 



ITS ORIGIN ii 

but less so than before, owing to Lord Dalhousie's depar- 
ture, and the influence of such men as Henry and George 
Lawrence, and such native statesmen as Salar Jung of 
Hyderabad and Dinkur Rao of Gwalior. 

III. The country generally was agitated by the circulation 
of various rumours ; and for all of them there had appeared 
to be plausible grounds, except for those about interference 
with caste and religion, for which heretofore there had been 
no foundation save such as lay in the General Service Act. 

IV. The army had been specially agitated by this Act 
after having been already worked up to a vivid sense of its 
preponderating power. 

Under such circumstances there could not have occurred 
any more astounding fatuity than this cartridge blunder ; 
made in a matter usually seen to with especial care ; and 
appearing to confirm the truth of the gravest charges of 
the disaffected, rousing the malcontents to the fiercest 
activity, staggering the loyal, and destroying the fidelity 
of the army. 

Between the cartridge incident in January and the 
Meerut outbreak in May 1857, events naturally became 
more marked. The Persian war was carried on, and 
practically came to an end just as the mutiny broke out. 
In Oude the tension became acute. The irritation of the 
influential classes increased more and more. Dacoity 
spread. Gangs of robbers infested the jungles and roads, 
and in one case killed an English officer who tried to 
capture them. And lastly, a fanatic Moulvie (or priest) 
at Fyzabad defied the Government, and advanced towards 
Lucknow proclaiming a jehad or religious war against 
the English. Fortunately however in March, Sir Henry 
Lawrence was transferred from Rajpootana, and appeared 
on the scene in Oude. Assuming the Government, he 
captured and imprisoned the Moulvie, dispersed the 
dacoits, and killed their leader, Fuzl Ali. He then sum- 
moned the nobles and Talookdars to a Durbar or meeting, 
where he addressed them respecting their grievances ; and 
from the promises he gave and the confidence he inspired 
by his high character and reputation, he succeeded in 
sending them back to their homes fairly contented and 
loyally disposed. 



12 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

While all this was going on and the excitement among 
the Sepoys was markedly increasing, nothing of moment 
was done by the Calcutta Government to reduce it or to 
counteract its possible results ; or even to clear up the 
cartridge blunder. Its only resource seemed to lie in 
worthless proclamations, which were merely laughed at, 
and did more harm than good. It even neglected, or 
avoided to take advantage of, the marching season from 
January to April to arrange for a better disposition of the 
forces, the protection of important positions, or the re- 
tention of carriage for British troops in case it should 
become necessary to move them. Allahabad was still 
unprotected, although Sir James Outram had in the 
previous May entreated both the Governor-General and 
the Commander-in-Chief to garrison it with British troops. 
This apathy or inertness was simply bewildering. It is 
impossible to assume that the Government did not receive 
ample warning of the mischief that was brewing. Much 
was patent, beyond all question, to the ordinary public. 
The Calcutta secretariats must have known from the 
English merchants and traders at their very doors that 
up-country business was at a standstill, and that the 
political outlook was alarming. The only possible excuse 
that can be suggested is, that Lord Canning was suffering 
from the result of Lord Dalhousie's autocracy, — having to 
lean on the class of Calcutta officials he had received as 
his counsellors in preference to statesmen of eminence and 
repute elsewhere, such as Sir Henry Lawrence. It may 
also be conceded that the absence of any man of mark 
among the leaders of rebellion made it less easy to detect 
the actual plots at work, or their instigators. But, what- 
ever Lord Canning's motive, his policy was obviously that 
of absolute inaction and abstention from precautionary 
measures ; probably from the fear that they would only 
tend to precipitate the crisis, and the hope that, if let 
alone, the ferment might die out of itself. 

As to the Sepoys, the flame lighted by the cartridge 
incident, though it spread widely, did not flare up rapidly. 
During January, February, and March, the only ebullitions 
were in the direction of Calcutta, where regiments mutinied 
at Barrackpore and Berhampore. Next, incendiarism ap- 



ITS ORIGIN 13 

peared in the camp of exercise at Umballa, to the north 
of Delhi. The mutiny of a local regiment followed on 
May 3 at Lucknow, and then on the 10th came the great 
outbreak at Meerut. These places are all significant. 
Barrackpore was close to the residence of the deposed 
King of Oude in Calcutta, where a sort of Alsatia had 
been created. Berhampore was at the seat of the repre- 
sentatives of the Moghul Viceroy of Bengal ; Umballa 
was near Delhi, the Moghul capital ; and Lucknow was 
the capital of the Moghul viceroys of Oude. These all 
pointed to Moghul influence rather than to any spontaneous 
action of the Sepoys themselves. 

Of the outbreak itself, the incidents are so well known 
that they hardly need to be given here. Some cavalry 
troopers at Meerut, forty miles from Delhi, had been im- 
prisoned for insubordination. On May 10th, their comrades, 
roused by the taunts of the Bazar, riotously broke into the 
jail, liberated the prisoners, and being then joined by the 
rest of the Sepoys, went off in a body for Delhi. The 
ruffians of the Bazar rose at the same time, and murder 
and violence ensued ; but the British garrison of Meerut 
remained passive throughout, neither attacking nor pur- 
suing the mutineers ; who, next day, reached Delhi, and 
were welcomed by the Sepoys there and by the city 
population. Then the palace of the puppet Emperor was 
forcibly entered, and the restoration of the Moghul rule 
ivas proclaimed. 

The reasonable inference from the course of events so 
far seems to be that the leading spirits of the rebellion lay 
in the Moghul faction, and that the Sepoy army was used 
as a catspaw through the operation of the cartridge in- 
cident. Moreover this inference is corroborated by the 
seditious correspondence that was being watched and de- 
tected. At first it was mainly Mahomedan, very cautious 
and in cipher. Afterwards when it spread among the 
Sepoys it was more diffuse and readily detected, being in 
ordinary language with crudely veiled allusions. 



CHAPTER II 

ITS DEVELOPMENT 

The revolt then began in force on the ioth and nth 
May, 1857, with the mutinies at Meerut and Delhi, and 
the Proclamation of the Restoration of the Moghul Empire. 
But the mutiny did not spread or extend further for three 
weeks. The only immediate result of the revolt was the 
cessation of the Pax Britannica, and the entire disorganiza- 
tion of civil administration in those upper provinces ; the 
criminal classes and predatory tribes there at once showing 
their teeth, and making life and property unsafe. This 
halt of three weeks in the spread of the mutiny proved 
incontestably that the Meerut outbreak was not a specific 
or pre-arranged part of any concerted programme or ma- 
tured plan ; and that if it was actually connected with any 
such scheme in preparation, it had been precipitated by 
undue influences, and the scheme itself disconcerted and 
more or less upset. No leaders came forward to guide 
the revolt generally, or even to command in the concen- 
tration and operations at Delhi. 

The Army, in fact, was not yet prepared for the rising. 
Its chiefs had not settled their plans, however busy they 
may have been in arranging them. With the Moghul 
party, on the other hand, the selection of Delhi as the seat 
and centre of the rebellion was obviously a fundamental 
point to be ensured, regardless of any other considerations ;: 
and it had doubtless been pressed on all parties as the first 
step to be taken in the revolt. It certainly was not taken 
haphazard or on the spur of the moment ; it had probably 
been agreed on universally, and, except for the precipita- 
tion, was a masterly move. The strength and political 
importance of Delhi made its seizure a challenge which 
forced the hand of the English, and fixed the vital struggle 



ITS DEVELOPMENT 15 

at the site where the only large body of English troops in 
India could be most easily dealt with. Here they would 
be hemmed in and cut off from their resources, and ought 
soon to disappear, from sheer absence of means for re- 
placing the losses which would befall them in fighting and 
from other causes. The insurgents, on the other hand, 
might easily count on an ever-increasing accession of num- 
bers, and the eventual concentration of a gigantic army. 

During the three weeks then from the 10th to the end of 
May no further troops joined the mutineers at Delhi except 
from the immediate neighbourhood ; nor did any revolts 
take place elsewhere in response to the signal given at 
Meerut. Let us see what advantage the Government and 
the British took of this precious opportunity. Roused out 
of their ostrich-like inertness, the Calcutta authorities acted 
vigorously. They summoned troops from Burmah and 
Madras, and forwarded all whom they could spare to 
Benares and Allahabad. They sent for assistance to 
Ceylon and the Mauritius. They hurried back the army 
which had been employed in the Persian war, and also took 
steps to stop and direct to India the expeditionary force 
which had already started for China. Aid and reinforce- 
ments from England were of course urgently applied for, 
and General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief, was pressed 
to operate at once against the enemy at Delhi. At the 
same time the commanding guidance which would have 
come into force under Lord Dalhousie was wholly wanting. 
Not merely was every local chief left entirely to his own 
devices, or want of device, but no specific orders were given 
on matters of imperial necessity, such as the security of 
Dinapore, Allahabad, Cawnpore, or Agra. 

The Commander-in-Chief endeavoured to collect a force 
at Umballa for a move against Delhi, but he was paralysed 
by the absolute want of transport of any kind — the result 
of his own blindness to the disaffection that was raging, 
and his own neglect of the precautions and preparations 
that might consequently be required. And it therefore 
took him nearly a month to collect a force of even 3,800 
men, including native contingents, with which to begin 
operations against Delhi. 

Exceptionally energetic action was taken in two of the 



16 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

provinces ; in the Punjab where John Lawrence ruled, and 
in Oude where his brother Henry was at the helm. 

In the Punjab the British force was large, and the mea- 
sure which it was therefore natural and easy to adopt there 
was to coerce and disarm the Hindoostanee troops, to 
whom the mutiny was thought to be confined. And this 
was carried out forthwith wherever there were British 
troops cantoned. Where native troops were isolated by 
themselves, this could not be done, and they generally 
mutinied ; but they were soon attacked by British troops 
and destroyed or dispersed. The great Ferozapore arsenal 
was promptly secured ; a matter of great moment, as it 
possessed the only means for supplying the siege-train and 
equipment needed for Delhi. Moreover the powerful Sikh 
chiefs of Puttiala, Jheend, and Nabha, States on the Delhi 
borders, were influenced into supporting the Government 
with their contingents, and holding the country in our 
interest. The Punjabees were roused into siding with the 
British against the Hindoostanees, but it was not till a later 
date that it was thought prudent to raise fresh local levies. 

In Oude there was but the head-quarters of one weak 
British regiment at Lucknow, in the midst of some twenty 
native battalions, and in the heart of the Fatherland of the 
Sepoy race. Sir Henry Lawrence, therefore, held aloof 
from any coercive measures against the native soldiery, 
but prepared promptly for vigorous defence against any 
that might prove hostile. He redistributed the troops, ' 
telegraphed for and obtained the chief command, took 
measures to retain the services of the Sikhs and the more 
loyal men among the Sepoys, and, while securing the 
Mutchi Bhown as a temporary place of refuge against 
ententes, started the construction of the Residency en- 
trenchments, and the storage of supplies in view of defence 
against the attack of a powerful enemy. 

In Agra, where there was a strong fortress, and a British 
regiment, the native troops were disarmed. Nowhere else 
in Upper India were there any steps taken that showed 
any special and resolute recognition of the crisis. Allaha- 
bad was not occupied or even strengthened. At Cawnpore, 
Sir Hugh Wheler abstained from any serious defensive pre- 
parations, though he had an excellent site at hand in the 



ITS DEVELOPMENT 17 

magazine position, and was strongly urged by Sir Henry 
Lawrence to utilize it, and to take other simple precautions. 

The Governments of Madras, Bombay, and Scinde at 
once took measures for a careful watch over their own 
provinces, and for assisting Bengal. 

Such was the state of matters at the end of May, when 
the spread of the mutiny really began. But the method of 
its spread showed as little concert as the outbreak itself. 
It occurred in five distinct groups, 1 each of which, instead 
of co-operating with the others, took its own course and 
line of action. 

I. In the Punjab, the Sepoys were checkmated by the 
British taking the initiative, as has been already shown ; 
only those on its southern borders succeeding in escaping 
to join the enemy at Delhi. 

II. In the north-west, all from Rohilkund in the east, to 
Neemuch and Nusseerabad on the west and northwards 
from that line, concentrated at Delhi, which constituted a 
distinct theatre of operations. 2 

III. All in Oude, and to its immediate south and east 
as far as Benares, remained in the Oude theatre of opera- 
tions, to besiege Lucknow and oppose the advance of the 
British army from the Calcutta base. 

IV. East and south of Benares, down to Bengal proper, 
the Sepoys mutinied at intervals and hung about Dinapore 
and Azimgurh, on the flank of the British advance, generally 
avoiding any real fighting during 1857. 

V. South of the Jumna, the mutineers, including the 
Gwalior Contingent, remained in those districts compara- 
tively inactive, as there were no English troops there for 
them to contend with. They kept hovering, however, on 
the bank of the Jumna, and threatening the flank of the 
British on its north till towards the end of the year. 

In all these five theatres, except the Punjab and the 
eastern, most of the mutinies occurred in the first fort- 

1 See map of India. 

2 This north-west or Delhi group of mutinies included Rohilkund, 
the mutineers from which joined in the Delhi theatre of operations, 
and after our capture of Delhi streamed off with the rest of the Delhi 
rebel force into Oude. But Rohilkund is, in the map, coloured by 
itself, because in the third stage of the war it constituted a distinct 
theatre of operations. 

C 



i8 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

night of June. In the eastern or the Dinapore group the 
rising was later, not breaking out till towards the end of 
July. In the Punjab the coercion of the Sepoys had been 
effected in May. 

Of these five groups then, or corps, of the Bengal native 
army — one, the Punjab group, had been disposed of locally ; 
two, the eastern and the southern, held aloof at this stage 
from joining in the contest. Only the remaining two, the 
north-west and the Oude groups, engaged in the struggle ; 
and they kept each to its own theatre of operations, instead 
of uniting at Delhi, the vital point. 

So that the British force operating against Delhi had 
only one corps instead of five to contend with. That corps 
or group eventually numbered about 30,000 men ; but, in 
consequence of the halt in the spread of the mutiny, when 
the British troops arrived before Delhi, the Sepoys who 
had arrived and who then fought with them were only 
about 8,000 (supported, however by a crowd of unorganized 
detachments and a large number of guns). The rest of the 
30,000 men did not join till later on. 

The contest at Delhi began on June 8th with the battle of 
Badli Ke Serai, seven miles off. The British force, which 
the Commander-in-Chief had managed to collect by that 
time, amounted to only 3,800 men, including native contin- 
gents, and twenty-four guns. But they charged the enemy- 
drawn up on their front, defeated them, capturing twenty- 
six guns, drove them into the city, and began its siege by 
occupying the famous ridge that faces it on its north. For 
two or three days designs were entertained of taking the 
city by assault ; but they were found impracticable, and the 
force settled down to a prolonged siege ; a singular siege, 
however, for the enemy were gradually reinforced during 
the month to their full eventual strength of 30,000, while 
the British force was augmented by supports from the 
Punjab to only 6,500 men ; and this left such a disproportion 
in the relative strength of the two contending bodies that 
the British, instead of being the assailants, were practically 
standing on the defensive. Such then was the development 
of the mutiny at the end of June in the Delhi theatre of 
operations. 

In the Oude theatre, the contest began and developed on 



ITS DEVELOPMENT 19 

the 8th and the 30th June, the same dates as at Delhi. 
The series of Mutinies began at Lucknow on May 30th, 
followed by risings at Azimgurh, Benares, Allahabad, and 
Cawnpore, outside of Oude; and at Seetapore, Fyzabad, 
Sultanpore, and the other stations within it. At Lucknow 
and Benares the mutineers were driven off, and all, except 
at Cawnpore, hovered about till they began to concentrate 
towards the east of Lucknow. At Allahabad the English 
scored their first important success ; a great stroke, which 
has never been properly appreciated. It is the key of the 
north-west, the site of a powerful fortress cf the European 
type, which was garrisoned by Brasyer's regiment of Sikhs. 
There were no English troops. The Sepoy regiment outside 
rose on June 6th, and essayed to seize the fort. But the 
Sikhs, under Brasyer's influence, opposed them, and held 
it for the British until supported a few days later by 
Neill's Madras Fusiliers from Benares. Allahabad, thus 
secured, practically formed an advanced base of operations, 
and gave a very different turn to the future of the war from 
what it would have been but for Brasyer's intrepidity. 

The contest itself began at Cawnpore. The troops there, 
on mutinying, started for Delhi without molesting the 
English residents ; but the Nana Sahib persuaded them to 
return on June 8th to beleaguer and destroy the British 
detachment and residents. The story is too well known to 
need repetition. It suffices to say that, as soon as the fall 
of Cawnpore towards the end of the month became known 
to them, the body of mutineers who had been collecting- 
eastward of Lucknow concentrated on June 28th at Nuwab- 
gunge. They were joined by various adherents of the 
late Oude dynasty, but by only three of the Talookdars. 
On the 30th they advanced on Lucknow, met a small force 
of the garrison that had gone out to reconnoitre towards 
Chinhut, defeated it, and drove it in with heavy loss ; and 
began the siege of the Residency entrenchments, which Sir 
Henry Lawrence had by this time constructed and armed 
and stored. 

Thus it was that the mutiny developed in the Oude 
theatre of operations ; the British being the besieged, in 
contrast to the Delhi theatre, in which they were the 
besiegers. And, as already mentioned, it was only in these 



20 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

two theatres of operations, or with these two groups of 
mutineers out of the whole five, that, at this stage, the 
rising developed in active conflict. 

But, in saying that the mutiny of the Bengal army had 
developed in five groups, it is not to be understood that the 
whole of the native troops in these five groups or theatres 
of revolt had mutinied. The Sikhs, the Punjabees, and the 
Ghoorkas, as a rule, held aloof — both as regiments, and 
also individually. The rising was almost entirely confined 
to the Hindoostanees. And even of them many did not 
join. Thus the 31st N. I. drove off the 42nd, and held 
Saugor for the Government. The 1 3th at Lucknow remained 
staunch. The 43rd at Barrackpore held the other troops in 
check ; Renny's native battery of horse artillery served on 
the ridge at Delhi throughout the siege ; and numerous 
instances could be cited to show that by no means the 
whole of even the Hindoostanees of the Bengal army had 
joined in the revolt. Nor did the mutiny spread beyond 
the Bengal army at all, though for a short time there 
was some uneasiness in Bombay. 

The Sepoys took unquestionably the lion's share in the 
contest ; practically they bore the whole brunt of it until 
towards the end. In the five theatres of operations, the 
civil administration being virtually at an end, the criminal 
and predatory classes, the town ruffians, the retainers of 
disloyal landholders, and occasionally Mahomedan zealots, 
took part in the local conflicts ; not doing so much, how- 
ever, in the fighting line, as proving mischievous in harassing 
the communications. 

No rising occurred in any part of Bengal except in the 
five theatres of mutiny. The only rising that took place 
outside Bengal was in the southern Mahratta country, and 
it was speedily suppressed. 

No members of reduced dynasties joined the enemy, ex- 
cept the Nana Sahib and the Ranee of Jhansi. The Nana 
held himself ill-used as the lineal representative of the head 
of the great Mahratta Confederacy, and had come under the 
influence of the notorious Azimoolla. The Ranee was rank- 
ling under the sense of wrongs from the British annexation 
of Jhansi under the adoption question, in spite of the un- 
swerving loyalty of the House. None of the great native 



ITS DEVELOPMENT 21 

rulers, Mahomedan, Mahratta, or Rajpoot, joined the revolt 
at all, though Scindia's and Holkar's people rose against the 
local British residents and troops. The puppet Emperor at 
Delhi was merely a handle for the Moghul party, and not 
really a leader of the rebellion. 

Hence, as a fact, the great Rebellion, which this rising 
was intended to be, and was on the verge of becoming, had 
drifted into a war in which the Hindoostanees of the Bengal 
army alone played any important part, while the Moghul 
party had sunk almost into insignificance, and none of the 
great races or chiefs joined in it at all. 

At the same time, it is quite certain that only a few- 
months before there had been unusual and bitter disaffection 
among the latter. The explanation of this apparently 
paradoxical attitude and conduct, and of the failure of the 
rising to develope into a great rebellion, lies in the conse- 
quences of the aggressive action of the Moghul party at 
Delhi. They showed their hand too soon, and too eagerly, 
regardless of results. They evinced their determination to 
recover their rule and take the lead ; to assert their supremacy 
and set aside all other interests ; not merely to subvert the 
British rule, but to replace it by their own. And this forcibly 
reminded those other races of that past which they had been 
forgetting under the pressure of the more recent causes of 
irritation. To resent the masterful and imperious policy of 
the British was one thing. To exchange it for what they 
remembered of the lawless tyranny and brutal rule of the 
Moghul was quite another matter. So their thoughts of 
joining in a blow at the English were at once checked, and 
they remained passive. But their temper toward the English 
was shown by that passiveness. None of them came loyally 
and actively to the support of the Government, as the Sikh 
chiefs did. Had there not been this bitterness and dislike 
to the English rule, would not the great Mahratta leaders, 
such as Scindia, Holkar, and the Guicowar, the great 
Rajpoot chiefs such as Oudeypore, Jeypore, Jodhpore, and 
others, have aided the Government against any efforts at 
supremacy on the part of a Hindoostanee army which they 
cordially hated ? 

As to that arm)', and its mutiny, there is every indication 
that its rising had neither been long premeditated nor 



22 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

matured. The isolated groups into which the mutineers 
collected, their delays, their halts, their inaction for many 
months in some cases, their absolute want of concert, the 
absence of any leaders, real or nominal — all this showed that 
they rose without any plan or programme ; nor was there any 
sign that they were imbued with any real hostility to the 
Government before the cartridge incident. They had long 
been a spoilt body, their discipline had been impaired and 
become lax, and they had doubtless become aware of their 
preponderating power. Then in 1856 the General Service 
Act had caused annoyance and disquietude, but had not 
directly angered the existing army, as it affected only the 
future recruits. In January 1857, however, the cartridge 
question had really roused their fears and their animosity, 
but hardly gave time before May for organizing a conspiracy. 

Before quitting the subject of the part taken by the army 
in the organization and development of the revolt, it may 
be as well to point out some other general influences which 
affected its conduct, and also some characteristics of the 
individual mutinies. 

In the first place, the Sepoys were the one body of natives 
who had never suffered, but always benefited from British 
rule. They were identified with it and its power and its 
triumphs during the whole of its rise. They were linked to 
it by these relations and by the fidelity of a hundred years. 
They looked to its service as the career for themselves and 
their sons after them. They were assured of pensions in 
their later years, and their fathers and relations were 
dependent on the pensions they were already enjoying. 
These formed ties which could not be lightly broken or 
easily replaced. Besides this, the men were as a rule 
attached — in some cases greatly attached — to their officers, 
and under their influence ; while there also prevailed the old 
traditional claim of fidelity to the salt, and loyalty to the 
oath, which, with Rajpoots, if properly kept in view, could 
be counted on almost with certainty. The world has shown 
no nobler examples of military fidelity than that of the 
Sepoys of the Lucknow garrison. 

Many of the Hindoostanee regiments, it has been shown, 
did not join in the mutiny. It is quite open to question 
whether the delay of the British for three whole weeks in 



ITS DEVELOPMENT 23 

operating against Delhi did not encourage and lead many 
regiments to break out, which were wavering and might 
otherwise have kept loyal. 

Further, there is every reason to believe that, in most 
cases, the bulk of the men, though angry and bewildered, 
were not disposed to mutiny ; they were, however, excited 
and easily led by the more energetic spirits, who were the 
agents of the party of sedition. These were mostly the 
high caste men, the pulwans (the wrestlers and athletes), 
and those who were personally of a restless, ambitious, and 
discontented character. And when the time for rising came, 
these leaders generally had to shoot an officer or to perform 
some similar act by which the regiment would be led to 
believe that it had no option left it, and was committed to 
mutiny. It was well known that the best and the most popular 
officers were thus sacrificed, to prevent the check which 
might have resulted from their influence. On the other 
hand, where the necessity for this was not felt, the men not 
only avoided molesting their officers, but escorted or helped 
them to places of safety. And there are numerous well- 
known, well-authenticated cases where they rescued ladies 
in difficulties, escorted them in all honour and safety to 
their friends, and then, deaf to all entreaties, saluted and 
returned to their comrades, where they said their proper 
place was. 

As to the counter influences, the principal one was that 
the claim of the State to their fidelity had been weakened 
if not annulled by the treachery of the British, and their 
designs against caste ; while their pride and patriotism were 
touched by the tale that their own tribal chiefs and the 
whole country were with them and expecting them to lead 
the way. The incitements and taunts of the Bazars then 
added their weight ; and latterly, in no small degree, the 
doubting and unfriendly looks, and the injudicious if not 
irritating talk, of many of the English. It may also be 
remarked that, in the case of the great majority of the 
Sepoys, the Oude Rajpoots, their childhood and youth had 
been spent amidst scenes of bloodshed and violence, and 
associated with the spirit of turbulence and contest with 
their rulers. 



CHAPTER III 

THE CAMPAIGN IN THREE STAGES 
THE VITAL STRUGGLE 

THE war into which the mutiny had thus developed at 
the end of June 1857, lasted for eighteen months, through- 
out which the insurgents never appeared to be acting on 
any concerted plan, or under the guidance of any one 
ruling spirit. 

This conflict of eighteen months may be conveniently 
divided into three periods — 

First, the period of The Vital Struggle, in which, during 
the three months of July, August, and September 1857, 
the British garrison of India were fighting for existence, 
unaided by help from England. This desperate conflict 
ended with their victory in the three contests of the period, 
viz. the siege of Delhi, the defence of the Lucknow Resid- 
ency position, and Havelock's advance to its assistance. 

In the second period The Decisive Contest lasted for 
six months, from October 1857 to March 1858, during 
which the reinforcements arrived from England, and the 
insurgents, who had concentrated in full strength at Luck- 
now and at Jhansi, were driven out of those positions, 
and utterly defeated, but not yet crushed. 

The third stage was The Suppression of the Revolt, during 
the last nine months of 1858, when the defeated groups 
of mutineers were being attacked and crushed or pursued, 
till they eventually dispersed to their homes, the country 
settled down, and peace was restored. 

Each of these periods forms a distinct stage of the 
campaign, and its story will therefore be divided accord- 
ingly. The account of each such stage or period will be 
arranged under the separate theatres of operations, which 
coincided closely with what have been already described 
as the theatres of mutiny. 



THE VITAL STRUGGLE 25 

In the first period, the Delhi theatre was the scene of 
the essentially vital struggle ; on its issue all depended. 
It has been shown that, on June 8th, a British force of 3,800 
men drove the mutineer force of about 8,000 men within 
the walls of Delhi ; and that at the end of June, the 
British, increased by that time to 6,500, were holding and 
defending the ridge on the north of Delhi against a mutineer 
army of nearly 30,000 men. The insurgent force there 
never materially exceeded that strength, but the British 
continued to get reinforced from the Punjab, from time to 
time, during the next two months of July and August, 
partly by English troops and partly by new native levies. 

During July the British were practically on the defence, 
and were kept ceaselessly engaged, either fighting or work- 
ing — constructing batteries and defensive posts, repelling 
attacks, or carrying the war into the enemy's ground, and 
checking their efforts at counter-batteries and at manoeuvres 
to turn their position. 

But the enemy's attacks were desultory and isolated, 
the only one that was driven home being the charge of 
the 8th Irregular Cavalry into the camp, where it was 
resolutely met and defeated. With all their preponderance 
of five to one, they never made a concentrated attack, or 
attempted a general engagement to defeat and destroy the 
besieging army, or even to dislodge it from its position. 
There never seemed throughout to be any recognized 
leader or guiding spirit, while the Hindoos and Mussulmans 
were known to be at feud. 

By the end of July the English army had lost three 
commanders in succession — Generals Anson and Barnard 
by death, and General Reid from ill-health ; and it was 
now commanded by General Archdale Wilson. 

By the middle of August it received a valuable rein- 
forcement from the Punjab in a column commanded by- 
General Nicholson, which raised its strength to 10,000 men, 
of whom however 1,800 were in hospital ; and, as the 
battering-train had started from Ferozapore and was likely 
to arrive before long, the force on the ridge began to take 
the aggressive ; to press the siege with greater vigour ; 
and to drive off the enemy from their more advanced 
positions. 



26 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

The mutineers soon heard of the approach of the siege- 
train, and sent off a strong body of troops to intercept it. 
But Nicholson attacked the party on August 25th, at Nujuf- 
gurh, routed them, and so frustrated their design. 

At length, on September 6th, the battering-train arrived, 
and with it the last of the reinforcements that could be 
available for some time to come, and the strength of the 
force now stood thus — 

3,300 British troops effective. 

5,400 Native troops. 

2,500 Contingents of loyal chiefs and allies. 

Total 1 1,200 effective men. 
Besides 3,000 men in hospital. 

Total 14,200 before Delhi. 

Steps were now taken at once to breach the walls of 
Delhi. John Lawrence had apparently been ceaselessly 
urging on the commanders before Delhi to attack and take 
it, but this could not be done till the means for breaching 
its ramparts had been received, and certainly the guns had 
not come a day too soon. The delay on this point, however, 
was in no way attributable to the force before Delhi, or its 
chiefs. Although the guns were now available, it was a 
most serious problem how they could be used and Delhi 
battered at once, and further delay averted. The problem, 
however, had been thought out by Baird Smith and his 
engineers, and it was solved forthwith. Regular siege 
approaches were out of the question, and further, it was 
essential to avoid any movement or sign that would 
indicate to the enemy the points which were to be attacked. 
Otherwise they would have time to strengthen those points 
by retrenchments. 

Now the ridge held by the British, opposite the northern 
face of the city, was not parallel to that face, but, while 
distant from it at its eastern or river end, inclined nearer 
to it at its western end. So operations were openly and 
vigorously carried on at that western end, opposite the 
Moere bastion, where it seemed natural that the attack 
should be made ; but other batteries of equal if not greater 
importance were secretly constructed close to the city 
walls at the eastern end, to breach the Water and Cash- 
mere bastions. The intervening low ground, which was of 



THE VITAL STRUGGLE 27 

considerable width, was crossed at night-time, and the 
batteries were quietly and stealthily constructed behind 
the cover of deserted garden walls and ruins. There, on 
the night of the 10th, they were armed with the heavy 
guns; and on the nth, the cover in front was thrown 
down, and the breaching batteries opened fire. Three days' 
hard pounding made effective breaches without giving the 
enemy time to retrench them, and next morning the attack 
was made. In the early dawn of September 14th, the Cash- 
mere Gate was blown in, and by it and by the two breaches 
(in the Cashmere and Water bastions) which had been 
made by the battering guns, the British troops stormed 
the walls of Delhi. Still, from the strength of the mutineer 
force, it took a week more to drive out that army and 
capture the city fully. 

Thus ended the vital struggle at Delhi, ringing the 
knell of the revolt. This success at once relieved the 
strain on the Punjab. The raising of its levies, which 
heretofore had to be managed with great caution, was now 
carried on more freely. There was a veritable rousing of 
the Khalsa in the British interests. At the same time the 
settlement and pacification of the disturbed districts near 
Delhi went on apace, and Delhi thenceforward ceased to 
be a theatre of military operations ; being replaced by 
Lucknow and Oude, to which the defeated army streamed 
off through Rohilkund, and where it took part in all the 
fighting during the rest of the campaign. 

As soon as Delhi was completely in the hands of the 
British, such of their troops as could be spared were de- 
spatched as a column to clear the Doab (as the country is 
called lying between the Ganges and the Jumna), and to 
join the forces operating at Cawnpore and Lucknow. It 
started on September 24th, and was commanded at first by 
General Greathead, and afterwards by General Hope 
Grant. Whilst going down the Doab, it turned aside to 
Agra, and there, on October 10th, encountered and defeated 
a body of the Central India mutineers (from the southern 
group), who had hoped to take it by surprise. After this 
feat it continued its way to Cawnpore, where it joined Sir 
Colin Campbell's force, to take part in the Oude operations 
of the second period of the campaign. 



28 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

The Oude theatre of operations was the only other 
theatre besides Delhi in which there were any extensive 
operations or contests during the first period of the cam- 
paign ; and although they were equally desperate, they 
were not of the same vital moment as the contest at Delhi. 
These operations were in two parts — one, the defence of 
the Lucknow Residency position, generally known as the 
Baily Guard ; the other the advance of Havelock's force 
to its aid. These have each a distinct and separate story, 
till Havelock reached Lucknow ; when their operations 
became united, and ran into the second period of the 
campaign. This part of the sketch will be very brief, as 
it is fully dealt with in the detailed narrative. 

We left the defence of the Lucknow Residency about to 
begin, after the disaster of Chinhut. It has been shown in 
the sketch of the development of the mutiny that, on the 
morning of that fight at Chinhut, on June 30th, Sir Henry 
Lawrence was holding two positions in Lucknow ; one, the 
Mutchi Bhown, to command the city and keep it quiet, 
while the entrenchments were being prepared ; the other, 
the Residency entrenchments, which he had been preparing 
to withstand an army provided with artillery. The two 
positions were rather less than a mile apart. During the 
rest of the day of Chinhut the force continued to hold 
both the posts, but on the following morning Sir Henry 
signalled to the garrison of the Mutchi Bhown to evacuate 
and blow it up at midnight and concentrate at the Resi- 
dency. This was effected with most unexpected success, 
the march being wholly unopposed, and all the artillery, 
except three guns, being brought over. 

From July 2nd, therefore, the whole force was collected 
and closely besieged in the entrenched position. This was 
an oblong of four faces, of a quarter of a mile each, occupy- 
ing an area of about thirty-two acres (one-twentieth of a 
square mile), and situated in the middle of a city some 
five miles long and two and a half miles wide. Its outline 
was a continuous enclosure formed partly by buildings and 
partly by reveted earthwork and artificial obstacles ; suffi- 
ciently obstructive, so long as it was not breached, to the 
assault of such an enemy as had to be faced. The garrison 
was half European and half native. Half the Europeans 



THE VITAL STRUGGLE 29 

were disciplined troops, the other half were civilian volun- 
teers. Its strength proved sufficient. There were more 
guns than could be worked at the same time. There was 
an ample supply of ammunition. There was no want of 
excellent water ; an abundant store of grain food had been 
laid in ; and a large stock of cattle collected. While 
cheered by the knowledge that he had thus arranged 
effectually all that could be arranged beforehand to meet 
the attack of the enemy, Sir Henry Lawrence was mortally 
wounded on July 2nd, on the very first morning of the con- 
centrated siege ; so falling its first victim. 

A few days, which included one sortie, sufficed to elicit 
important features in the attack, giving grounds for the 
hope of a successful defence. It became clear, for instance, 
that the enemy would not face the British soldier on ordinary 
terms, and also that they would not seriously try to breach 
the defences with artillery. 

The defence, beginning with the fight at Chinhut on 
June 30th, and ending with Havelock's arrival on September 
25th, lasted for some twelve weeks, and was divided into 
four periods or stages of about three weeks each, by three 
all-round attacks on July 20th, August 10th, and Sep- 
tember 5th. 

During the first period the enemy were very busy, but 
did no real harm, while the defenders settled down into 
the hope of a successful defence. 

At the first attack — on July 20th — the enemy showed their 
designs and the mode by which they expected to capture 
the position. They began it by blowing up a mine which 
was evidently aimed at the Redan battery, but fell far 
short of its mark and was off the right direction, so that 
the defences remained intact. The storming parties, finding 
no breach by which to enter, did not attempt to drive the 
attack home, but withdrew under a ceaseless but harmless 
roar of musketry and artillery, which continued for several 
hours. The defenders suffered only very trifling loss, and 
were greatly elated by the success and ease of the repulse. 

But the mining warfare that was now certain, and which 
immediately ensued, involved the most deadly peril to the 
garrison ; whose means of labour were small, while those 
of the enemy were practically unlimited. A simultaneous 



3o GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

effort on their part at several points could hardly fail to 
result in success at some of them ; when there would be 
easy opportunities for the sudden irruptions of large bodies 
of the enemy, which the small garrison would be wholly- 
unable to meet effectively. Fortunately, however, the 
besiegers did not adopt these tactics of simultaneous efforts 
all round the position ; so they gave time to our engineers 
to anticipate them at the weaker points ; and for the rest 
of the siege they continued to make desultory attacks by 
mining, which, when they came sufficiently near, were all, 
with one exception, detected by the vigilance of the out- 
posts and foiled by the counter-mines of the engineers. 
Each of the other two all-round attacks was begun, as 
before, by the explosion of mines which fell short of the 
mark ; and the storming parties would not really attack 
when they found there was no breach to make the road easy. 

So that the catastrophe, of which there was throughout 
a ceaseless and imminent danger, never occurred. Mean- 
while, however, the strength of the garrison was being 
steadily reduced by daily losses from the fire of the enemy, 
and from cholera and illness, and also by the reduction of 
rations ; the position too was being weakened by the 
crumbling away of the defences under round shot and 
rain ; and the state of danger was increased by the possi- 
bility of the desertion of the native troops of the garrison, 
who had become sceptical as to the approach or advance 
of any relieving force. 

For the closeness of the investment had rendered any 
communication with the outside world almost impossible, 
and only three letters had been received ; one at an early- 
date stating that the relief would come off in a few days ; 
the others much later, saying that the advance had been 
found almost impossible at present, and would probably 
have to wait for reinforcements. So the long-continued 
delay had led, in the minds of the natives of the garrison, 
to doubts of the authenticity of those letters and of the 
statements of the men who had brought them in. 

Meanwhile the reply of the garrison to Havelock's letters 
had a most painful effect, for it stated that they would 
have no food left after September ioth. 

When, therefore, Havelock forced his way in to its rescue 



THE VITAL STRUGGLE 31 

on September 25th, he and Outram and their men expected 
to find the garrison and inmates of the position dead or 
dying of sheer inanition ; and pushed on accordingly with 
the desperate efforts and speediness which were suited to 
the supposed exigencies of the case, but were not really 
necessary under the actual circumstances. 

The army that had been beleaguering the Residency the 
whole time consisted of some 20,000 disciplined troops, 
including the whole of the Oude Irregular force, besides 
the soldiers and retainers of the old dynasty. None of the 
Rajpoot clansmen joined it till the beginning of September. 
The Cawnpore mutineer brigade had also joined the be- 
sieging force after being defeated by Havelock at Cawn- 
pore, and altogether the army that was collected at Lucknow, 
investing the Residency and blocking the way against its 
relief, was not far, if at all, short in numbers of the army 
that was holding Delhi. 

The command of this army was constantly being changed,, 
as also the control and guidance of the operations against 
the Residency. There were a number of more or less self- 
constituted authorities, such as the Fyzabad Moulvie, and 
sundry favourites of the rebel court, which had been formed 
in the city, with a young son of the deposed king as its 
nominal head, affecting to act in the name of the Emperor 
at Delhi. 

Of the huge force thus assembled against us at Lucknow,. 
a large proportion, augmented when necessary, used to be 
kept out on the road to hold Havelock in check ; but the 
chief opposition to him was to be at Lucknow itself, where 
the necessary obstacles and batteries were in preparation. 
The weight of the task before him was obvious. To his 
advance, being the other part of the Oude operations, we 
now turn. 

By the end of June, when Cawnpore had fallen, and the 
siege of the Lucknow Residency was beginning, a sufficient 
number of men had reached Allahabad to enable General 
Havelock to move forward with 1,400 British troops and 
500 Sikhs. In the course of a fortnight he defeated the 
enemy who opposed him in four several engagements, and 
captured first Cawnpore and then Bithoor, the neighbouring 
seat of the Nana Sahib. His force of 1,900 men had lost 



32 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

severely in these contests, so that its effective strength now 
was but small ; and at the same time he had only a weak 
line of communication 600 miles long, to connect him with 
his base at Calcutta. Still, as that line was being more 
and more secured by the steady flow of advancing rein- 
forcements, and as his troops were eager and confident, he 
crossed the Ganges on July 25th, as the first step of a move 
towards Lucknow, and established a protective depot on its 
bank at Mungurwar. He made three separate advances 
thence towards Lucknow, on July 29th and the 4th and 1 ith 
of August respectively ; and on each of these occasions 
fought and defeated the enemy at Busherat Gunge, besides 
also fighting elsewhere ; but was obliged by losses, cholera, 
and other causes to stay his hand and return to Mungurwar. 
On the first advance, the special check arose from the 
receipt of intelligence of mutiny at Dinapore, and the con- 
sequent delay in the advance of reinforcements ; on the 
second occasion, it lay in the news of the threatening 
attitude of the mutineers of the Southern or Central India 
theatre, who were concentrating from Gwalior and else- 
where on the Jumna opposite Cawnpore ; and on the third 
occasion he had already made up his mind to return to 
Cawnpore, when he advanced and fought at Busherat 
Gunge, merely as the proper way of checking the enemy 
and securing an unmolested retreat across the Ganges. The 
news from Cawnpore gave serious grounds for anxiety, and 
it was a matter of paramount necessity to secure its safety, 
while he had now less than one thousand men to put in 
line of battle at Busherat Gunge. To face the enormous 
force collected against him with the strength of only an 
ordinary battalion, at 600 miles from his base, with his 
communications interrupted, and to retire successfully to 
Cawnpore, as he did on August 13th, was a feat that seems 
to throw into the shade the most brilliant and audacious 
deeds of the vaunted days of Wellesley and Lake. 

The intense sorrow with which Havelock made up his 
mind to this withdrawal may be easily imagined, but as a 
military measure it was imperatively necessary. As a 
political step, it had one singular and unexpected effect. 
The Talookdars of Oude, who had hitherto remained 
passively friendly, neither joining in the attack on the 






THE VITAL STRUGGLE 33 

Residency, nor molesting Havelock's advance, now wrote 
to say that they were obliged to regard the withdrawal of 
his army as virtually a surrender of the Government of 
Oude, and that they must now obey and send their fol- 
lowers to support the rebel court at Lucknow. Hence the 
presence of their retainers was noticed at the attack on the 
Residency on September 5th, but never before. 

General Havelock then recrossed to Cawnpore on 
August 13th, and the reinforcements he required did not 
reach him until September 16th, although the British troops 
had been so accumulating, chiefly about Dinapore, that 
more than 8,000 infantry were on the line of communications 
before the end of August. Even on September 16th, the 
reinforcements that joined Havelock were only two 
additional regiments ; and with them came Sir James 
Outram, who however chivalrously waived his claims to 
the command and accompanied the force as a volunteer. 
Havelock, then, with such troops as could be spared from 
Cawnpore, again crossed the Ganges into Oude, reached 
the suburbs of Lucknow on September 23rd, heard there of 
the capture of Delhi, and on the 25th fought his way in 
with heavy loss, and relieved the beleaguered garrison of 
the Residency. 

It was a Relief in the sense that the position was so 
reinforced as to be no longer in danger from any attacks 
that the army might make, even when reinforced from 
Delhi ; but it was not a Relief in the sense that the enemy 
were driven away and the families withdrawn to security. 

The enemy contested Havelock's entrance fiercely, closed 
in on his rear, making its junction with the main column 
a matter of great difficulty, and next day attacked and 
destroyed a part of the hospital convoy which had been 
wrongly guided. The extended position occupied by the 
united forces, the relieving and the relieved, was as closely 
invested as the original position had been, and though for 
a week sorties were made daily to clear a way through the 
enemy, they failed to effect their object. 

Now, it had been thought that the food supply of the 
Residency had been practically exhausted, and at the same 
time Havelock's force had carried no provisions in with 
them. So, on finding that they could not make their way 

D 



34 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

out into the open country, the commanders were at first in 
dismay. But Colonel (afterwards Lord) Napier, the chief 
of Outram's staff, instituted a proper inquiry and search, 
which led to the discovery that the supplies, which had 
been collected and kept in store throughout but somehow 
ignored, were sufficient to support the whole united garri- 
sons for nearly two months. On this the garrison gave up 
all thought of withdrawal, and settled down to a steady 
prolongation of the siege. 

In the Eastern theatre of operations, the regiments in 
the out-stations had mutinied generally during June, but 
remained in th.2 outlying districts threatening the flank of 
the road from Calcutta to Allahabad. The only British 
regiment in those parts was at Dinapore, and there the 
troops did not mutiny till after the middle of July, when 
Havelock was beginning his advance towards Lucknow. 
They were incited to the revolt by Rajah Konwur Singh, 
of Shahabad, an old Rajpoot chief; and they attacked a 
post at Arrah in the neighbourhood, which the civil 
residents of the districts and a detachment of Sikhs had 
prepared for defence. They defeated, in an ambush, a 
party of the British regiment from Dinapore which was 
coming to its relief; but they were kept at bay by the 
garrison, and were then attacked, defeated, and driven off 
by a small force under General Eyre. This was all the 
serious fighting that occurred in the Eastern theatre during 
the first period of the campaign. 

In the Southern theatre, the insurgents seem to have 
formed into two bodies, one of which drew towards Agra ; 
the other towards Kalpee, on the Jumna, opposite Cawn- 
pore. The Agra party, as has been shown, crossed over 
to Agra, but were defeated by the column from Delhi. 
The other party threatened Cawnpore, so as to lead 
Havelock to recross the Ganges in order to make it secure. 
When Havelock made his final and successful advance 
towards Lucknow, he left at Cawnpore a force which was 
comparatively weak, but would be strengthened by the re- 
inforcements which would be constantly arriving. Tempt- 
ing though the opportunity must have been, the Gwalior 
Contingent did not then attack it. They were probably 
disconcerted by the intelligence of the fall of Delhi. 



THE VITAL STRUGGLE 3s 

The only other insurgent troops of any consequence 
were those of Holkar at Indore ; though numbers of petty 
chiefs, in their mountain strongholds, were in revolt. The 
Resident at Indore, Colonel Durand, had had to leave it 7 
and made his way first to the friendly State of Bhopal. 
A column which had been despatched from Bombay to- 
wards Indore had halted far south of it, at Aurungabad, 
in consequence of sinister reports from the Nizam's 
territory ; eventually, however, it advanced in July, was 
joined by Colonel Durand at Aseergurh, and restored him 
to his position at Indore on August 2nd. But there had 
been no serious conflict. 

Thus, in the first period of the war, in the months of 
July, August, and September, Delhi had been stormed, and 
the strain on the Punjab removed ; the Lucknow Residency 
entrenchments had been successfully defended ; and Have- 
lock had forced his way in to its aid, and had reinforced 
and saved it. All this had been effected without the help 
of a single additional soldier from England. It had been 
done by a mere handful of troops in the season of intense 
heat, and amidst the raging of a virulent epidemic of 
cholera, followed by the season of the rains and of 
malarious fever. In all the operations, the success had 
been largely due to the superior character and resolution 
of the troops on the British side. In the Delhi operations 
it was further owing to the support of the Punjab, to the 
energy of Sir John Lawrence and his staff, and to the 
genius of John Nicholson and others. At Lucknow it was 
further owing to the foresight of Sir Henry Lawrence, to 
the vigilance and constancy of the garrison, and to the 
success of the Engineers in foiling the efforts of the enemy 
to breach the defences by mines. 

In Havelock's advances it was due to the enthusiastic 
valour and heroic devotion of his men, and to the com- 
bination of skill and prudence with boldness and deter- 
mination that characterized his own generalship ; by which 
he overcame unprecedented odds, avoiding and averting- 
catastrophes when in the direst straits. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE DECISIVE CONTEST 

The second stage of the war, when the power of 
England came into play, lasted for six months, from the 
beginning of October 1857 to the end of the following 
March. 

For some months the reinforcements from England came 
pouring into the country, with the China Expeditionary 
Force as their precursor ; and levies of native troops were 
being raised in the Punjab and elsewhere, till they 
exceeded the British troops in numbers. 

The mutineers collected in strength in the Oude and the 
Southern theatres of operations. In the Delhi theatre the 
war was at an end, though at its Rohilkund section the 
enemy kept the field ; and in the Eastern, the mutineers 
evaded all serious conflict till the close of this second stage ; 
so that this campaign was mainly restricted, during these 
six months, to Oude and the Southern theatre. The enemy 
kept concentrating in Lucknow and Jhansi respectively, 
which accordingly became the decisive battle-grounds of 
the war. So, during the first five months, the neighbouring 
districts were cleared of their outlying enemy, and in 
March, Lucknow and Jhansi were attacked and captured, 
and the enemy dispersed, to be afterwards pursued and 
crushed. 

The more important of the two struggles lay in Oude, 
and in October it was only there that any real contest was 
going on. 

Havelock's force and the original garrison were remain- 
ing there, invested by the enemy, not at first in any danger 
of a real attack, but, as has been shown, unable to remove 
thence through the surrounding thousands of Sepoys the 
families that had been beleaguered in the Residency. 
Outram had now assumed the command. A detachment 



THE DECISIVE CONTEST 37 

of 500 men of Havclock's force had been left at the Alum 
Bagh outside the southern suburbs of Lucknow ; and the 
communications were now comparatively frequent and 
easy, and were supplemented by semaphores erected at 
the two posts. Outram was made uneasy by the news from 
Cawnpore, of its being threatened by the Gwalior Con- 
tingent from the Southern theatre, much more than by the 
constant arrival of fugitive mutineers from Delhi. So, 
feeling secure in his position, and having food enough in 
store to last for some time to come, he wrote to Cawnpore, 
deprecating any advance to the assistance of Lucknow till 
the force at Cawnpore should be strong enough to deal 
with the Gwalior Contingent, and make its communications 
secure. The correctness of Outram's estimate of his own 
position was confirmed by the fact that it was never 
seriously attacked. Meanwhile, the China force, and the 
troops that had been collecting below Allahabad, began 
to find their way to Cawnpore ; Hope Grant's column 
from Delhi also arrived there ; and then, in a few days, 
came Sir Colin Campbell, the new Commander-in-Chief 
sent out from England. 

He was in a dilemma, whether first to deal with the 
Gwalior Contingent, or to relieve Lucknow. That Con- 
tingent, however, kept hanging back; and it might be 
assumed that reinforcements on their way up from 
Calcutta would keep continuously arriving and strengthen- 
ing Cawnpore. Moreover, Sir Colin was inclined to think 
that Outram, from his chivalrous disposition, was making 
light of his own difficulties and writing with too great con- 
fidence, especially in regard to food. He decided, therefore, 
as his first step, to advance to the relief of Lucknow with 
the bulk of his available force. Accordingly, in the middle 
of November, he reached the post at the Alum Bagh, and 
forming a depot there, he moved by a circuitous route to 
the Residency, reaching and relieving it on the 17th. In 
doing this he found the contest a very severe one, and was 
at the same time hampered by having to establish a chain 
of posts in communication with the Alum Bagh, by which 
to withdraw the families. With the families withdrawn, 
the altered circumstances made the retention of the 
Residency position unsuitable for present purposes, so he 



38 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

evacuated it, and selected instead the Alum Bagh, in 
which he placed Sir James Outram with a force of 4,000 
men to face the rebel army in Oude, and to show abroad 
that neither Oude nor Lucknow was abandoned by the 
British. The combined forces that had been holding the 
Residency position were so reduced as to be unable, on Sir 
Colin's arrival, to muster 2,000 men. 

During Sir Colin's operations at Lucknow, the Gwalior 
Contingent had crossed the Jumna at Kalpee, made their 
long-threatened attack on Cawnpore, and were now press- 
ing it hard. Sir Colin's return, however, immediately 
checked them. First driving them off from the eastern 
side of the city, and so being enabled to despatch the 
rescued Lucknow families to Calcutta, he next attacked 
them in full force, and defeating them thoroughly, drove 
them in rout back across the Jumna to the Southern 
theatre of war. 

With Cawnpore thus secured in the beginning of 
December, he began his preparations for a concentrated 
move on Lucknow. Some delay occurred, owing originally 
to doubt whether Rohilkund should not first be dealt with, 
and then to the hesitation of Government respecting the 
strategy for the concentration on Lucknow ; but the 
eventual decision was that the enemy should be allowed 
an outlet to the west, that the south of their position should 
be blocked, and that the attack should be made on its east, 
supported by flanking movements on the north, along the 
left bank of the Goomtee. 

The enemy throughout made vigorous preparations for 
the defence. They surmised correctly that the attack 
would be on the east, where, therefore, they threw up three 
lines of massive works, but without any flanking defences 
to the north. 

In aid of the projected concentration, and to keep his 
force secure from attack from the outlying districts, Sir 
Colin cleared the enemy out of them by sweeping through 
them with five separate columns. Two cleared the southern 
districts of Oude ; one came down with the siege-train 
from Agra to Cawnpore and thence to Lucknow ; and the 
fourth, followed by the fifth, the Nepaulese, under Jung 
Bahadoor, cleared the eastern districts. Meanwhile Out- 



THE DECISIVE CONTEST 39 

ram's force had throughout held the Alum Bagh ; and 
now, early in March, all these columns, besides those troops 
that had been arriving in isolated detachments, concen- 
trated as one large army, to drive the enemy out of 
Lucknow. 

The attack was scientifically managed, and in seven 
days placed Lucknow in Sir Colin's hands. It began on 
March 7th, and the last of the defences was attacked and 
captured on the 14th. Outram's division started the attack 
by crossing the Goomtee, which bounded the enemy's 
works on the north ; and advancing westwards it swept 
the enemy's works by flanking fire, and made them easy 
to attack from the front. They were then turned and 
stormed one after the other, and after the 14th nothing 
was left but street fighting ; which quickly drove the enemy 
into the country by the outlet which had been intentionally 
left for them on the west. There the most magnificent 
force of cavalry which had ever been assembled in India 
was awaiting them to capture their leaders, and to give a 
telling lesson to the defeated mutineers. But, alas ! the 
commander of that force held it inactive. The chief fruits 
of the brilliant siege operations were lost. The bulk of the 
fugitive army, with the Nana Sahib, the Begum, the 
Moulvie, and all the other leaders of the revolt, streamed 
out and escaped into the country, taking such routes as 
they pleased, to rouse the country afresh, to re-form into 
several smaller armies, and to give an infinity of trouble 
before they were eventually dispersed or captured or 
crushed. So ended the operations in Oude, during the 
second stage of the war. 

Next in importance to the operations in Oude, in this 
stage of the campaign, was the contest in Central India 
between the Nerbudda and the Jumna. During October, 
November, and December, it was in two distinct parts : 
one towards the south, between Indore and the Nerbudda ; 
the other to the north, with its base at Kalpee on the 
Jumna near Cawnporc. 

In the south, Sir Hugh Rose, who had arrived from 
England towards the end of September, divided his force 
into two brigades, and took three months to clear that part 
of the country. In the north, the Gwalior Contingent, 



40 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

under Tantia Topee (who now began to come forward as 
the ablest leader in the rebel army), kept threatening 
Cawnpore, with a view to hampering the operations towards 
Lucknow ; and at length attacked it in force at the end 
of November. Eventually, however, it was defeated and 
driven back to Kalpee, as has been already described. 

From this time, the fortress of Jhansi became the real 
objective of the campaign in Central India, and the enemy, 
who heretofore had been only playing at war, now found 
themselves face to face with British troops under the 
brilliant leadership of Sir Hugh Rose. The special diffi- 
culty he had to overcome was the broken and mountainous 
nature of the country, covered with ravines and passes — 
where a handful could check a host, — dotted all over 
with strongholds, many of which were famous in story, in 
even recent times. 

Sir Hugh's first task was to relieve Saugor, which had 
been held for the British Government by the 31st N. I. 
This he effected on February 3rd, after first besieging and 
storming the fort of Ratghur on the way. He then 
advanced, and after fighting and defeating the enemy at 
Baroda, captured on the 13th the fort of Garakota, which 
had been generally held to be impregnable ; thence onward 
towards Jhansi, forcing and turning a series of passes, and 
taking such forts as came in his way. So, by the middle 
of March, six weeks after relieving Saugor, Sir Hugh Rose 
appeared before Jhansi, though his whole force was not 
present till the 25 th. On that date he opened his batteries 
against the south face of the fortress. On the 30th, the 
northern portion of the Central India rebel army approached 
from Kalpee to attack him and relieve Jhansi. But on 
April 1st he moved out to meet it on the Betwah, and routed 
it completely ; and then returning, on the 3rd, he stormed 
and took the fortress. And so ended this stage of the war. 
This successful result of the struggle for supremacy in 
Central India, giving the victory and the prize to the 
British, as had been already done in Oude, sounded the 
general knell of the rebel cause, though much had still to 
be done, and that in the hottest season, to subdue and 
crush the large and scattered bodies of the defeated enemy. 



CHAPTER V 

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 

At the end of March 1858, the war had been confined 
to the Oude and the Central India theatres, where Luck- 
now in the one, and Jhansi in the other, had been stormed 
and captured, and their defenders driven out and dispersed. 
With the operations against the various fugitive groups 
which were then formed, the war entered on its third stage, 
the suppression of the Revolt. 

To deal first with Oude and the adjacent districts. If 
the Lucknow fugitives had been subjected to a crushing 
pursuit, and their leaders killed or captured, it is probable, 
from the analogy of other cases, that there would have 
been a speedy termination of the campaign. But, as has 
been shown, the cavalry failed to carry out the part ex- 
pected from it, and consequently the enemy got off un- 
scathed. This fact became known at once all over the 
country ; fresh bodies of insurgents immediately arose in 
the neighbouring districts, and became active ; and the 
war was resumed not only with vigour, but over a more 
widespread area than before. For it now included not 
only Oude, but Rohilkund to its west in the Delhi theatre, 
and Azimgurh, and the districts in the Eastern theatre. 
In Rohilkund, the Rohillas rose under their chief, Khan 
Bahadur Khan, and joined the fugitive Sepoys ; in the 
east, the mutineers, who had hitherto evaded conflict, were 
roused by Konwur Singh, the old Talookdar of Shahabad 
whom Eyre had defeated in August, and began the contest 
by attacking Azimgurh. And in Oude itself fresh and 
serious trouble arose in consequence of a grave blunder 
committed by Lord Canning. After the capture of Luck- 
now, he issued a proclamation confiscating the property of 
all those who had joined in hostilities against the Govern- 
ment ; and this decree, the Talookdars of Oude found, was 



42 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

held applicable to them. Now they had been absolutely 
friendly until Havelock recrossed to Cawnpore, and after 
that the participation of most of them in the war had been 
more nominal than real. The wholesale ruin with which 
they were now threatened was felt to be undeserved and 
intolerable, and drove them to despair ; and for the first 
time, therefore, they rose in full revolt. 

Hence, in April, and for some months to come, the stern 
conflict, which in March had been restricted to Oude, 
extended to Rohilkund and the eastern districts as well. 

Sir Colin's first step, after capturing Lucknow, was to 
construct there a large and strongly fortified position which 
effectually dominated the city, and gave a secure basis for 
the establishment of law and order ; and having started 
this, he proceeded to operate against the several bodies of 
insurgents that had been collecting at various points. 

In Rohilkund, a large body of Sepoys and Rohillas was 
collected about Bareilly under the leading of Prince Feroze 
Shah and Khan Bahadur Khan. 

In Oude there were three groups : first, in the north- 
west towards Rohilkund, the Mahomedans kept together 
under the Fyzabad Moulvie ; next, on the north-east were 
the bulk of the Hindoo Sepoys, under the nominal rule of 
the Begum and the Nana Sahib ; and third, the southern 
districts were held by the revolted Rajpoot clans, under the 
general guidance of Rajah Beni Madho, the Bys Chief of 
Shunkerpore. 

And in and about Azimgurh were the mutineers of the 
eastern districts, with old Konwur Singh as their recognized 
leader. 

For the subjugation of Rohilkund, Sir Colin sent four 
columns converging on Bareilly ; from Lucknow, from 
Futtehgurh and Budaon on the west, and from Roorkee 
on the north. On the advance of the force from Luck- 
now, the Moulvie group on the north-west of Oude retired 
into Rohilkund, but did not join the other rebel parties. 
The Lucknow force, under Sir Colin's command, en- 
countered, and after a severe contest defeated, Khan 
Bahadur Khan at Bareilly. On the same day, the other 
columns under Jones beat the enemy under Prince Feroze 
Shah at Moradabad, and then the two forces combining 



THE SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 43 

attacked and scattered the Moulvie's army at Shahjehanpur. 
This was all done in the month of May, after which the 
province settled down, and gave no more trouble. 

To turn to Oude, the north-west group under the Moulvie 
had moved into Rohilkund.as has been already described, and 
there been finally defeated at Shahjehanpur ; but it had first 
been attacked and beaten on April 13th, before it left Oude. 

The main body of insurgents, to the north-east, were not 
dealt with till the middle of June, it being very desirable to 
avoid any needless marching of the British troops in that 
very hot weather. But in June, that group, under the chief 
insurgent leaders, moved towards Lucknowas far as Nuwab- 
gunge, where they were attacked and defeated with great 
slaughter, and with the loss of all their guns, after a severe 
and determined engagement. 

In the south, Beni Madho, who tried in May to hold in 
force a strong position threatening the road between Luck- 
now and Cawnpore, was attacked and driven off. 

During the rest of that hot summer, detachments of 
troops kept Western Oude quiet, and a cordon was estab- 
lished round the eastern districts to prevent mischief from 
the Talookdar's men. And then when the cold weather 
came in October, a systematic attack was made on the 
strongholds of the various clans and chiefs, such as Morar- 
mow, Doonden Khera, Shunkerpore, Ameythee, and Ram- 
pore Russia. The clansmen meanwhile were harassing the 
troops during these movements ; leading them a wearisome 
dance all over those districts, and rarely allowing themselves 
to be caught and forced to fight. At length, however, all 
of them who did not submit or were not captured were 
driven to the east of the Gogra ; and then the whole of these 
remnants of the insurgents in Oude were steadily pressed 
northwards, till at the close of the year they were attacked 
on the banks of the Raptee, and driven across it, out of 
British territory into Nepaul. 

The campaign in Behar, in the Eastern theatre, was the 
first that was actively taken in hand after the capture of 
Lucknow ; for the news of the enemy's attack on Azimgurh 
arrived just as the siege of Lucknow was coming to an end. 
Konwur Singh had deferred his movements until Jung 
Bahadur and Franks' column, from the east, were out of the 



44 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

way and engaged at Lucknow. General Lugard was sent 
with a strong force to attack him and pacify those districts. 
But the intrepid old Rajpoot kept up an energetic guerilla 
war, ever on the move, till he was driven to the Ganges, and 
there mortally wounded while crossing it. After his death, 
his followers, including the mutineers of the district, main- 
tained a desultory conflict in the Jugdeespore jungles all 
through that season of heat and rain. But at length, mainly 
through the use of mounted infantry, which gave the enemy 
no rest, no breathing time, they were forced into giving up 
the struggle before the end of the year, and dispersing to 
their homes. Thus, by the end of 1858, there was not even 
the semblance of rebellion left in Upper India. 

There remains the contest in the Southern or Central 
India theatre. After being driven out of Jhansi, the enemy 
there, under Tantia Topee and the Ranee of Jhansi, first 
moved up to Kalpee on the Jumna, and again threatened 
Cawnpore, if not also a junction with the rebels in Oude. 
But, as before, they were met and defeated, and then turned 
off westwards, in their own districts, to Gwalior; where 
they knew they would be joined by the Mahratta soldiery, 
though Scindia did not lead them. They seized the 
fort, but then failed to hold it in face of Sir Hugh Rose's 
troops, who followed them up. There was a hard fight 
here, their last real stand as an army, in which the Ranee 
of Jhansi was killed. This occurred in June, and then the 
bulk of the army dispersed. But Tantia Topee still kept 
the field with a considerable following. A Pindaree war 
ensued, in which the several British columns moving against 
him from several points checked him on every line on which 
he tried to operate, and held him zigzagging through the 
jungles of Central India till, early in 1859, he was hemmed 
in and captured by Major Meade. With this the last 
embers of the revolt died out. 

Thus ended, in complete and unalloyed success for the 
British, a rebellion and a war in which their chances seemed 
at first hopeless — so long at any rate as Allahabad was not 
safe in their hands — and continued to be desperately critical 
until Delhi was captured. As a fitting close to the story, 
let us consider some of the most prominent aspects and 
features of its fluctuations and episodes. 



THE SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 45 

I. The back of the rebellion was broken and our eventual 
success assured by the end of the first stage of the war, 
when Delhi had been captured and the Baily Guard 
(Lucknow) succoured. And the storm had thus been 
weathered before any help from England had arrived. 

II. With our capture of Delhi, all hope of a resuscitation 
of the Moghul empire collapsed, and the chief leaders and 
instigators of the revolt had thus early lost their stake and 
their cause. 

III. The rebellion and the war started wisely with the 
seizure of Delhi, but the failure to concentrate there in 
greater force was the chief cause of the collapse of the 
insurgents. 

IV. A second and prominent cause was the attitude of 
the Punjab — passively friendly to the British at first — 
actively friendly afterwards. 

V. The defence of Lucknow aided our capture of Delhi 
by keeping away from it an army which would otherwise 
have operated against us there. 

VI. The defence and the succour of Lucknow were very 
materially aided by the passive attitude of the Rajpoot 
Talookdars and country population of Oude, whose power 
for mischief was evinced by the part they played in the 
final stage of the war. 

VII. The intensity of the struggle and the gravity of the 
crisis in the first stage of the war dwarfed all that occurred 
afterwards, except in respect of the magnitude of the forces 
that the British Government had in the field ; and our 
success in that first stage was due to the independent action 
and local efforts of men of genius and exceptional resolution 
— John Lawrence in the Punjab ; John Nicholson and 
Taylor at Delhi ; Henry Lawrence at Lucknow ; Brasyer 
and Neill at Allahabad ; and Havelock with his wonderful 
campaign and its effect on the enemy. 

VIII. The forces with which this success was achieved 
in three months were a mere handful compared with the 
armies with which at length, after fifteen months, Sir Colin 
managed to crush the enemy ; and yet that enemy was 
never so strong as in the first stage of the war, for they 
grew weaker and weaker from losses in men and guns, 
until in the last stage their ranks received the accession of 



46 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

the Oude Talookdars, in April 1858, after Lord Canning's 
unfortunate proclamation of confiscation. 

IX. The great contests of the war did not lie in the 
battle-field, except perhaps in Havelock's actions, but in 
siege operations, as at Delhi, the Baily Guard, Lucknow, 
and Jhansi ; which threw an excessive burden on the 
Engineer element in the army, and caused the part it 
played to be exceptionally weighty and important. 

X. Our success against the massive fortifications at Delhi, 
Lucknow, and Jhansi, contrasts with the utter failure of the 
enemy against the slight entrenchments of the Baily Guard, 
and teaches what can be effected against overwhelming 
odds by superior morale, courage, and skill. 

XL The inability of the enemy to storm the Baily Guard 
entrenchments lay technically in their being foiled, by our 
successful countermines, in their unceasing efforts to make 
a practicable breach. 

XII. But the greatest of all the military lessons taught 
us was to be learnt from our difficulties and comparative 
failure at the outset; from our neglect of the broad 
rendering of the old Cromwellian adage, " Keep your 
powder dry." 

To turn from the campaign to the revolt that preceded 
it ; the description which has been given of its origin and 
development points to the circumstances that caused the 
rising, and tended to shape its course and fluctuations. 
They seem to teach the greatest lesson of all. To ensure 
a safe and prosperous rule by the British in India, while 
aiming as a matter of course at the real good and benefit of 
the people, we must carefully regard their prejudices and 
feelings, and scrupulously avoid whatever can tend to cause 
a common or universal irritation and animosity, or even 
suspicion, against us. There are points and matters to 
which they attach an importance which we do not realize, 
which it is folly for us to ignore, and in which their feelings 
will override and make them lose sight of all their real 
interests, and keep them out of sight. 

The results of the undue preponderance of the native 
army — of the absence of any proper strategical occupation 
of the country — of the want of real military administration 
— tell their own tale, and need not be dwelt on. 



THE SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 47 

But there arc a few minor points in the facts affecting 
the course of the revolt which may be touched on usefully. 

One is the conduct of the Rajpoot Talookdars of Oude. 
They were most bitter and hostile whilst the Mutiny was 
brewing, owing to what they held to be a breach of faith. 
They returned to a friendly attitude under the guidance of 
Sir Henry Lawrence, were very helpful to English families 
and fugitives at the outbreak, and held aloof from joining 
the enemy till Havelock's force withdrew from Oude. They 
then yielded nominal allegiance to the rebel Durbar, send- 
ing their quotas of retainers to the rebel army, but did not 
personally join in or guide the hostilities. By Lord Canning's 
proclamation, however, in April 1858, they found their 
estates confiscated and themselves included among our 
most virulent enemies ; on which they revolted, and led the 
enormous forces now employed against them such a dance, 
that it can be readily understood how different matters 
would have been in the summer of 1857, if they had then 
acted against us as they did in 1858. 

Next, while their chiefs remained friendly or passive, so 
did their clansmen. When, however, they turned against 
us, their clansmen went with them. As Lord Canning said, 
the existence of this feudal feeling — of the devotion of the 
men to their chiefs — of the sense of allegiance to their 
natural leaders — was quite unexpected. It practically 
refuted the statements and teaching of a certain school of 
administration which had sedulously tried to crush those 
feelings and relations, and had vainly thought they had 
succeeded. 

A third point is this. By April 1858 the British troops, 
in the several theatres of operations, formed a gigantic army 
for India, and were supported by an equally large native 
army, some 80,000 men from the Punjab alone, besides 
possessing a splendid force of artillery. The Hindoostanee 
Sepoys with whom they were in conflict, and who could 
hardly have approached them in numbers, kept up the 
struggle, as has been described, without leaders, and eventu- 
ally without any hope of success. Are we right in con- 
tinuing to look down on the fighting qualities of these men ? 
We know of their gallantry and devotion in olden days ; 
and never has greater courage, constancy, and fidelity been 



4 8 GENERAL SKETCH OF THE MUTINY 

shown than by the Sepoys who served in the defence of the 
Lucknow Residency. 

May I dwell a little longer on this point ? It is not a 
popular one — and, the Hindoostanee Sepoy is still in dis- 
grace and heavily handicapped in every effort to reassert 
himself, under the prepossession in favour of Sikhs, Ghoorkas, 
and Puthans. But I venture to remark that, throughout 
the Mutiny, while some of the Sepoys were embittered and 
fought with their whole heart, the bulk of them, who had 
simply followed, sheep-like, some truculent and self- 
appointed guide, felt that they were fighting in a bad 
cause, and against their habitual leaders, of whom they 
naturally stood in awe. Under such circumstances, their 
conduct in the field could not draw out their military 
qualities in a true light ; whereas those who remained true 
to their salt were the real representatives of the valour of 
their race. With proper management, with their best 
feelings roused and enlisted, with their old sense of honour 
cherished and encouraged, they may yet be a valuable 
support to the British rule of India. 



BOOK I 

OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE OF THE RESIDENCY 

CHAPTER I 
BEFORE THE ANNEXATION 

OUDE is a province of which the size can be best de- 
scribed as being much the same as that of Scotland. The 
maps of India and of Oude show its geographical position 
and details, but it may be useful to mention some of its 
prominent features, especially those connected with our 
narrative. 

It lies between the Himalaya mountains of the foreign 
territory of Nepaul on the north, 1 and the river Ganges 
on the south. The Rohilkund districts border it on its 
west, and the Benares districts on its east. The large 
native fort of Futtehgurh lies on the Ganges opposite to 
its south-western corner, and the modern European fortress 
of Allahabad is situated close to its south-eastern angle, at 
the confluence of the Ganges and the Jumna. 

Half-way between its eastern and western frontiers is the 
capital, Lucknow, on the Goomtee, some forty-five miles 
from the Ganges ; on the right bank of which, at its 
nearest point of passage, lies Cawnpore. 

There is only one other city in the province that need be 
mentioned — Fyzabad, on the river Gogra, at the eastern 
frontier. Its importance arises solely from its being the 
site of two rival shrines — one Mahomedan, the other the 
Hindoo temple called the Hunnooman Gurhee — which 
have ever been a chronic source of local feud and conflict, 
threatening every now and then to develope into fierce and 
wide-spread religious war. 

1 The general direction of the flow of the rivers is to the south of 
east, but for brevity's sake I call it easterly, and the other bearings 
mentioned are in accordance with this basis. 



50 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

Sometimes called the garden of India, Oude is certainly 
one of its fairest and richest provinces. Noble groves and 
woods are studded over its well-watered plains. Its soil is 
excellent and fertile, and well cultivated, wherever mis- 
government has not depopulated the country or led to the 
growth of thickets and jungles. Only along the northern 
frontier, where the plains begin to slope gently up to the 
lower Himalayas, there is a broad belt of natural forest, 
the haunt of the tiger and the elephant, the choicest of 
hunting-grounds. 

Except where suffering from the results of anarchy, the 
province was well, even thickly, populated. The ruling 
race and a large proportion of the city people were Maho- 
medans of Moghul descent. But the country peasantry 
and their chiefs were almost universally Rajpoots ; a race of 
fine physique, who formed the nursery of the bulk of the 
Sepoy army of old. They were the warrior caste of the 
Hindoo community — divided into clans, and with feudal 
organization and tendencies — with strong traditional sense 
of honour, but not naturally ferocious and bloodthirsty 
like the tribes on our Afghan frontiers. If let alone, they 
formed an excellent and orderly body of cultivators. 

Up to the year 1856 the province had a peculiar appear- 
ance in the maps of India, because until then it was still 
under native rule, and was therefore shown as an un- 
coloured patch, cut out as it were from the red-tinted ex- 
panse of British territory that framed it in on three sides. 
For during the hundred years of the rise of the British 
power and its development into the Empire of India, Oude 
had been allowed to remain under the sway of its native 
dynasty ; while in marked contrast to it, all the surround- 
ing country had been gradually brought under British 
administration. 

The course of events that brought about these results 
forms a singular story — not the less so from its ending 
almost suddenly, at the close of the cycle, in 1856, in the 
suppression of the dynasty and the absorption of the 
province under British rule. 

During the first fifty years, that is, up to the early 
days of the nineteenth century, while the British were 
steadily advancing on the path of conquest, and struggling 



BEFORE THE ANNEXATION 51 

without intermission against their many powerful rivals for 
supremacy, Oude had passed safely through the storm, and 
emerged well-nigh unharmed. But its danger had been 
great at each of the three prominent crises — in the days of 
Give, of Warren Hastings, and of Wellesley. 

At the Plassey epoch, the Wuzeer or Viceroy, who ruled 
Oude in the name of the Moghul Emperor, was at first 
hostile to the English, fought against them, and was 
defeated. But Clive, instead of exacting the penalty in 
his power, played, as a matter of policy, the part of a 
generous victor, and reinstated him as Nuwab or ruler of 
Oude on terms, ratified by treaty, which attached him 
thenceforward to the British interest. 

Then in the days of Warren Hastings, when the Mah- 
ratta armies were at the zenith of their ascendancy and 
success, and the Rohillas on the western borders of Oude 
were intriguing for their alliance and assistance, the Oude 
Nuwab, in danger of destruction from the threatening 
combination, appealed to the English. Hastings responded 
to the appeal, supported him in force, kept the Mahrattas 
in check, crushed the Rohillas, and ended the episode by 
handing over their province of Rohilkund to the Oude 
Nuwab, as an addition to the territory already under his 
sway. This policy confirmed the loyalty, but failed utterly 
in its second object of increasing the military power, of the 
court of Oude. For, subsiding into Oriental sloth and 
disregard of duty, the successive Nuwabs neglected the 
opportunities and advantages thus offered them, and by 
folly and misrule lost even such military strength as they 
had before possessed. 

In Lord Wellesley's time, therefore, at the beginning of 
the present century, when he was contending with Tippoo 
Sultan in the south, and with the Mahrattas in Central 
India, and was at the same time threatened with an invasion 
from the north under the Afghan Zeman Shah, the Oude 
dynasty passed through a specially acute crisis. For, 
instead of receiving from it the aid that was to be expected, 
Wellesley found that the Nuwab was worthless as a 
military power, had entirely lost control over his troops 
and subjects, and, in fact, required the assistance of the 
British for his personal protection and security. So utter 



52 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

was the collapse, so powerless did he feel himself to be, 
that the Nuwab even proposed to abdicate ; though not 
with any serious intent. So critical, however, was the position 
of affairs, and so great the irritation of the Government, that 
the offer was at one time on the verge of acceptance. But 
the fortune of the dynasty was still in the ascendant. Its 
shortcomings had not included hostility or disloyalty ; so 
the Nuwab escaped the fate that threatened him, though not 
scatheless. He was left to reign over his old principality of 
Oude, but he was shorn of the Rohilkund districts, partly as 
the price of the aid which had to be given, and partly 
because, being a frontier province, Rohilkund had to be 
strongly held ; and this, it was clear, could not be done 
except by the British army. 

Thus it was that the Oude dynasty weathered the storms 
that marked the first half-century of the rise of the British 
power. But it was not allowed to enter on a new lease of 
its rule without a fresh treaty, in 1801, which imposed on 
the Nuwab in emphatic terms the obligation to maintain 
good government; "to establish," it said, "such a system of 
administration as should conduce to the prosperity of his 
subjects, and give security to life and property/' 

All the surrounding country had been by this time 
absorbed under British administration — a sufficiently signi- 
ficant warning, it might be supposed, of the necessity of 
conforming to British policy. And, with this proviso, it 
seemed now to be fully in the power of the Oude Nuwabs, 
by simply remaining true to their treaty obligations, to their 
duty, and to their real interest, to retain in perpetuity, 
under British protection, the enviable position in which they 
were now confirmed. 

Saadut Ali Khan, the Nuwab of the days of the treaty of 
1 80 1, responded to the obligation, and proved an able and 
vigorous ruler. But his successors were of a different 
stamp. Brought up in the harem in comparatively peaceful 
times, they subsided into a life of indolence, ease, and 
pleasure. They would have nought to do with the trouble- 
some functions of administration. These they handed over, 
with all the military resources of the State, uncontrolled, 
into the hands of court favourites, and of the highest 
bidders for the farming of the revenues. This, with 



BEFORE THE ANNEXATION 53 

attendant circumstances, as will be described presently, 
induced a shameful and dangerous state of broadcast 
misrule and oppression, bloodshed and rapine. For forty 
years this continued, growing worse and worse. The 
Government remonstrated again and again. The Nuwabs 
remained absolutely callous, and never made even a 
semblance of an effort to interfere, or control and improve 
the administration. They tacitly ignored not merely the 
moral duty, but also the treaty obligation involved ; till at 
length the studied violation of the latter, and the resulting 
danger and wrong to the people, could no longer be 
tolerated ; and Lord Dalhousie, under the orders of the 
Home Government, suppressed the native ruler in 1856, 
and annexed the province under British administration. 

It is necessary to describe this misrule more fully, and 
the attendant circumstances, if only on account of its direct 
effect on the people, and its subsequent influence on their 
bearing and conduct at the annexation, and in the days of 
the Mutiny. 

The misrule la}-, not as Oriental story might lead one 
to imagine, in any personal ferocity, tyrannical conduct, or 
violent crime on the part of the Nuwabs themselves, but 
in the inevitable results of their abstention from the duties 
of government, and their delegation of its functions and 
powers — uncontrolled and unchecked — to worthless favour- 
ites or unscrupulous bidders for office. These were gener- 
ally of the ruling Mahomedan race, or astute and wealthy 
Brahmins ; the most powerful of them being the Amils — 
or collectors of revenue — to whom the revenue had been 
farmed out, with licence to extort the utmost they could 
manage, by any means however violent or murderous, 
without respect to assessments, engagements, or rights of 
any kind. The Rajpoot population, with whom they had 
chiefly to deal, were not of a race that would submit 
tamely to such extortion. They opposed the Amils and 
their troops by force ; and hence rebellion, as this opposition 
was called, became chronic throughout the province. With 
the passions of the people thus excited, it was easy for the 
astute and wily Amils to create animosity between the 
several clans, and make them turn their swords against 
each other ; so that the whole province became one wide- 



54 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

spread theatre of partisan warfare and murderous strife, of 
bloodshed and misery. 

This inevitably led to deterioration in the character and 
tone of the people. A spirit of ferocity and violence was 
developed, which was not natural to the race ; and the 
traditional Rajpoot sense of honour and of clan and feudal 
obligations was sometimes greatly blunted, if not absolutely 
crushed out. 

The singular feature of the case, that is of the oppression 
of the clans by the Amils, is that the numerical strength 
of the Rajpoots, their physique, and their early training to 
arms, ought to have enabled and led them to laugh at the 
efforts of the Amils. But, unfortunately, they were victims 
to an extreme type of feudal organization which checked 
combination, leading their chiefs instead to act independ- 
ently of each other, and to withstand, single-handed, the 
attacks of the Amils and their troops. They were thus 
liable to be beaten in detail when, if they had acted 
together, they must have been victorious by sheer superior- 
ity of force. The same tendency was probably the cause 
of the great states of Rajpootana not having been as 
successful as the Mahrattas in opposing the Mahomedan 
armies, during the Moghul and previous epochs. 

In the case of Oude, however, the persistence of the Raj- 
poot race in this system was all the more insane when they 
knew, on the one hand, that widespread, almost universal, 
misery was its result ; and, on the other, that their con- 
stitutional organization provided for such difficulties by 
grouping the clans into confederacies, where certain chiefs 
were entitled to summon the rest to join and act in concert 
against a common foe. All the clans, for instance, to the 
south of the Gogra were bound to respond to the call of 
the Rajah of Hussunpore, and those on the north to the 
summons of the Gonda Rajah. 

As it was, however, the custom was for each clan to act 
independently, to await the visit of the Amil, and to resist his 
extortions and onslaught single-handed. The chiefs rarely 
helped each other, but were generally supported by all 
their retainers and most of their own clansmen capable of 
bearing arms ; and they also from an early date materially 
strengthened their powers of resistance by the construction 



BEFORE THE ANNEXATION 55 

of strongholds, walled and fortified villages, surrounded by 
bamboo thicket fences, and situated in jungles difficult to 
penetrate. Eventually, there were some 1,600 of these 
strongholds scattered over the country, belonging generally 
to the more powerful Talookdars or chiefs, and many of 
them armed with artillery. 

In these they endeavoured to keep the Amils at bay. 
Where the clans were successful in their resistance, their 
strength was recognized and they flourished. But if the 
Amils won in the struggle, the landholders and their men, 
on being driven out from their strongholds and deprived 
of their lands, took to the jungles and became robbers and 
brigands. Their estates and villages were seized by the 
Amils, whose property they became ; the chiefs were them- 
selves ruined, and the peasantry were crushed and generally 
dispersed ; and long stretches of country were frequently 
depopulated and became desolate wastes. 

The cases would seem at first sight to be as bad as they 
could be when whole clans were destroyed or left the 
country ; when thousands of ploughs — 40,000 from one 
district alone — went over the frontier to Azimgurh and 
elsewhere ; when, as in Nanpara and Toolseepore and other 
districts, all was waste and desolation ; when the natural 
leaders of the people were lurking in the jungles at the 
heads of gangs of robbers and dacoits. But it was really 
worse, and the demoralization was felt to be greater 
because of a meaner type, when traitors appeared among 
their number, who by intrigue and court favour obtained 
means to harry and dispossess their own relations, to be 
in some instances guilty of parricide, and to use the power 
of the Amils to crush their countrymen and build up their 
own fortunes. 

Most of these, it may be here observed, such men as the 
chief of Doondeea Khera, the Mitholee Rajah, and others, 
came out in their true colours in the Mutiny, and showed 
themselves, either in a virulent or in a cowardly fashion, 
hostile to the English, and especially to the helpless fugi- 
tives. On the other hand, in contrast to them, and far 
more numerous, were the nobler men — such Talookdars as 
the Bys chiefs of Shunkerpore and Morarmow, Hunwunt 
Singh of Dharoopore, the chief of Amethee, Rajah Roostum 



56 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

Sah of Dehra, the Bulramporc Rajah, and the like, who 
maintained their character and position through all the 
troublous time, were true to their traditional Rajpoot honour 
whatever their straits, and afterwards played a part in the 
Mutiny which, when understood, cannot but redound to 
their credit ; and were nearly every one of them actively 
instrumental in succouring English families in their distress. 

Such were the Rajpoots whom the whole power of the 
Oude court and State had been used to harry and oppress. 
Of the Amils — who had been the oppressors — most were 
in the course of time ennobled into rajahs ; but no greater 
mistake could be made than that of placing them in the 
same category as the old hereditary rajahs of the Rajpoot 
clans. To the latter there could be no greater insult. 

Among the Amils only one family — Brahmins — had risen 
to real prominence, and chief among them were Durshun 
Singh, and two of his sons, Rughbeer Singh and Maun 
Singh. They all three accumulated wealth and property, 
and were unscrupulous in their mode of acquiring it. But 
Durshun Singh managed his estates sensibly, and made his 
people prosperous and contented. Rughbeer Singh, on the 
other hand, was a ruthless devastator and destroyer. His 
evil name will never be forgotten in the Gonda and Baraitch 
districts, which he laid desolate; while Maun Singh was a by- 
word for cunning and shrewdness, and ended, as the story 
will show, in taking skilful advantage of a critical opportunity 
to acquire an exceptionally favourable position in the eyes of 
the Rajpoots and other sections of the Hindoo community. 

Such then were the leading features of the misrule that 
was prevalent in Oude. Let us turn to some of its most 
important effects. 

Although one result of the state of turmoil and strife was 
to give rise occasionally to flagrant violation of feudal and 
family obligations, the general effect, paradoxical as it may 
sound, was to intensify the narrow feudal and clan system, 
and the feelings it inspired. For it was strongly recognized 
that the general welfare, and indeed the safety, of the clan, 
lay in a concentrated organization, in which all were to hold 
and work together — in which there was an identity of 
interests throughout all classes — and in which it was of 
moment that their chief and representative should be a 



BEFORE THE ANNEXATION 57 

territorial magnate, a man of power and position. With the 
better clans, the men were devoted to their chief; the chief 
was the veritable father of the clan : its welfare was his care, 
and his will was law. It will be seen presently in what a 
surprising manner this told on the Mutiny. 

Another result of the misrule was to create a favourable 
feeling towards the English. In the contests of the Rajpoots 
with the Amils, and their quarrels with the Lucknow court 
and its emissaries, they ever found sympathy and friendly 
advice and help from the English officers scattered about ; 
and they always knew that the Resident at Lucknow— as 
the British Minister there was called — was the truest friend 
they had ; ready to interpose, whenever possible, to relieve 
suffering and secure redress for wrongs. 

This feeling moreover was supplemented and strengthened 
by the fact that in every village there were men who were 
living on British pensions, and considered themselves identi- 
fied with British rule, and sharers in its prosperity and 
renown. At the same time, though the Talookdars were 
imbued as strongly as their followers with this good-will 
towards the English personally, they did not feel the same 
liking towards the policy in force with the British adminis- 
tration. They heard strange rumours of that policy, and 
of the action of the law courts ; of the families of position, 
and the natural leaders of the people, falling rapidly into 
decay, and being dispossessed of their estates — partly from 
the dead set made against them by the doctrinaire school, 
then in the ascendant, and partly by the intricate working 
of the law courts, and the chicanery and trickery of the 
usurer class, who had become all-powerful. The Oude 
men felt that they would be helpless against such foes ; 
whereas, under the existing regime, they might hold their 
own, though with the chance of much risk and suffering. 

Such then were the characteristics and the results of the 
misrule that had prevailed in Oude for the last century, and 
that seemed to be on the increase. The weaker clans and 
landholders had been crushed and ruined, and their posi- 
tions and estates had been usurped by the Amils, who had 
become more powerful than ever, and were pressing more 
strongly against those stouter clans and chiefs who had 
heretofore kept them at bay. 



58 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

The Oude Durbar continued provokingly deaf and callous 
to the remonstrances of the British Government. The 
Nuwabs believed, in their hearts, that these remonstrances 
were a mere farce, and that so long as they remained loyal 
and faithful to British interests, shortcomings in other 
respects were of no moment. 

The position was becoming intolerable ; and the British 
Government could no longer avoid facing the fact that, by 
its protection and support of the Oude rule, it was sharing 
in the responsibility for the shameful state of matters in the 
province. In 1854, therefore, when happily General Out- 
ram, who was noted for his generous sympathy with all 
classes of the native community, with princes as well as 
with peasants, was the British Resident at Lucknow, he 
was instructed to investigate the subject and report on it 
fully. This he accordingly did, and there could be but one 
tenor to the report. The misrule was so outrageous, so 
dangerous, so unjust to the people, so flagrant a violation 
of treaty engagements ; it entailed so serious a responsibility 
on the British Government, by whose protection only it was 
rendered possible ; that it could not be allowed to continue. 

The Government of India forwarded Outram's report to 
her Majesty's Government, and urged the necessity for 
removing the administration of Oude from the rule of its 
Nuwabs ; suggesting various alternative measures, and dwell- 
ing at the same time on the generous treatment which the 
unswerving loyalty of the dynasty merited at the hands of 
the British. The decision in England was for absolute 
annexation, and the orders and detailed instructions reached 
Lord Dalhousie on January 2nd, 1856. 

Meanwhile, during the latter half of 1855, events had 
been taking place in Oude which confirmed the necessity 
for the change contemplated, and also affected the state of 
public feeling. The city of Fyzabad, it has been already 
shown, was notorious as a centre of religious fanaticism and 
strife. And now a Moulvie, named Ameer AH, had started 
a story that the Hunnooman Gurhee, the great Hindoo 
temple, had been built on the site of a Mahomedan mosque ; 
having then collected a band of followers, he had attacked 
the temple, but had been repulsed by the Hindoos who 
had flocked in to its defence. The story was groundless, 



BEFORE THE AN.XEXAT10X 59 

and was proved to be so by reference to the archives at 
Delhi ; still the Nuvvab by his attitude encouraged the 
Moulvie ; and a religious war would have ensued had not 
General Outram stepped in and insisted on the maintenance 
of law and order. The Moulvie, however, continued his 
threatening attitude towards the temple, and eventually, 
trusting to the secret support of the Nuwab, advanced to 
its attack ; but was met by troops commanded by English 
officers, with the result that he was himself killed and his 
followers dispersed. 

This episode destroyed any latent reluctance that there 
might otherwise have been to remove the Nuwab from the 
rulership of the province ; but it had also two other notable 
results. One was that the Hindoos of Oude, including the 
Rajpoot chiefs, knowing the part played in the crisis by the 
English Resident, became especially well disposed towards 
the British. The other was that Rajah Maun Singh, 
hitherto one of the most detested of the Amils, having come 
forward with his followers to the defence of the Hunnooman 
Gurhee, and posed as the champion of Hindooism, lost much 
of his unpopularity, and acquired the respect of the Rajpoots 
to such a degree as to enable him to act during the Mutiny 
as the representative and leader of the country community. 

Such then was the state of affairs when, on January 2nd, 
1856, Lord Dalhousie received the orders from England for 
the annexation of Oude. The preparation of the detailed 
instructions and arrangements for carrying those orders into 
effect, occupied the greater part of the rest of the month. 
But at length Outram received these instructions, and was 
directed to depose the Nuwab and assume the administration 
of the province. 

While this was taking place, profound tranquillity ap- 
peared to prevail, and public attention was directed chiefly 
to the coming retirement of Lord Dalhousie ; one of the most 
brilliant of rulers, who had conferred inestimable blessings 
on the country, but whose iron rule and autocracy had closed 
the best safety-valves of government, and was leaving 
behind, hidden and suppressed, a weighty mass of wide- 
spread ill-feeling and disaffection. 

Before quitting this chapter, which is meant to give a 
description of the province of Oude, a few further remarks 



6o OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

may be made respecting its Rajpoot clans. They were very 
numerous, some much more powerful than others, some 
again only septs of others. Their mere names convey 
no meaning, and have no special interest. The most power- 
ful of them was the Bys clan, who were said to be proof 
against snake-bites : though of this I never heard any real 
evidence. They were not of such blue blood as the Buch- 
gotee clan, of which the chief was the Hussunpore Rajah ; 
but, like him, their head, the Rajah of Morarmow, had the 
privilege and right among Rajpoots of creating rajahs and 
conferring the Tiluk, or forehead mark of the rank. All 
rajahs were held to be spurious whose rank had not been 
derived through some such proper channel as this. 

It was a singular circumstance that the Hussunpore 
Rajah should have retained this right, for he had become 
Mahomedan. And the story goes that the noted Brahmin 
Amil Durshun Singh, having on some occasion made him 
captive, required of him, in vain, that he should confer the 
Tiluk on him. The Hussunpore Rajah was the supreme 
head of the confederacy of Oude clans between the Gogra 
and the Ganges. The Tiloee Rajah (chief of the Kanpoo- 
reas) had the seat on his right hand ; the Pertabghur Rajah 
(chief of the Sombunsees) sat on his left ; and the Ameythee 
Rajah (chief of the Bundelgotees) was the standard-bearer. 

The tales of the deeds of their men of mark were as 
numerous, and to the clansmen as exciting, as the tales of 
the Scottish Borders and Highlands ; the most prominent 
chieftain among them, at that epoch, being Hunwunt Singh, 
the head of the Biseyn clan. Their ladies, too, were not 
always in the background. The story runs, that the Amil 
Maun Singh was besieging Dehra, the fort of the Rajcomars, 
whose chief, Rustoom Sah, was at that time a boy. His 
widowed mother, when the garrison could no longer hold 
out, fastened a bundle of her garments over the gateway by 
which Maun Singh must enter ; and, on evacuating, left an 
epistle deriding him with the petticoat shelter under which he 
had effected his entry into the fort ! And during the Mutiny, 
when the chief of Morarmow saved Mowbray Thomson's 
fugitive party from Cawnpore, the rescue is believed to have 
been carried through mainly by the influence and energy of 
his dame, the Thakooranee, as she was called. 



CHAPTER II 

THE FIRST YEAR AFTER ANNEXATION 

On February 4, 1856, General Outram carried out his 
orders. He announced formally to the Nuwab that Oude 
and its revenues were to be brought under British adminis- 
tration ; while the Nuwab would retain his sovereign rank 
and title, and sundry privileges and estates, with an annual 
income of £1 50,000. The letter from Lord Dalhousie, 
which he received at the same time, gave the reasons for 
this decision of the English Government — that the Nuwab 
had forfeited the position secured to him under the existing 
treaty by his persistent violation of its most important 
stipulation, that he should establish and maintain a good 
government ; that his misrule had brought widespread 
misery on his subjects and become a standing reproach ? 
in which the British Government was involved, owing to 
its relations with the Nuwab ; that this state of matters 
would not be tolerated any longer, and the forfeiture of 
his position must therefore be enforced, and the treaty 
annulled and replaced by a fresh treaty. The loyalty of the 
Nuwab and his dynasty was recognized, and his status and 
provision for the future were settled on the terms proposed. 

The Nuwab, however, would have nought to say to the 
treaty. He was the servant of the English Government, 
while treaties were valid only between equals, But he 
protested against his deposition inasmuch as he had ever 
been faithful and loyal, the only obligation he recognized 
as real and binding. And he would go to the Governor- 
General, and if need be to the Queen of England, to plead 
his cause in person. 

Three days of grace were given him for consideration, 
but he remained unyielding, and so General Outram 
assumed the administration of the province, and issued 
his proclamation. The Nuwab, true to his attitude, 



62 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

discharged his troops and officials from their allegiance to 
himself, and enjoined on them implicit obedience and 
deference to the British rule. 

The assumption of the administration by General Outram 
was effected with perfect tranquillity. This was due, no 
doubt, in a measure, as regards Lucknow itself, to the 
bearing and injunctions of the Nuwab ; in the country it 
resulted largely from the prevalent feeling of good-will 
towards the English ; and everywhere it was materially 
influenced by the terms and tenor of the proclamation, of 
which a copy, with a separate letter, was sent to every 
chief and person of position. 

Under the proclamation, and the attendant measures 
which were immediately adopted, careful attention seemed 
to be paid to the welfare of every class, and to befriending 
the lot of those who were likely to suffer most from the 
change. Suitable provision was promised for the collateral 
members of the Royal Family — consideration and employ- 
ment for those who had lost office and position. The 
Nuwab's troops and retainers were to be recruited into 
the local forces and police, or to be pensioned. All classes 
were assured of protection and justice, and the full enjoy- 
ment of their rights. The land revenue was to be organized 
on a fair and clear basis, while its first settlement was to be 
for three years, on a moderate assessment, and to be made 
direct with those in actual possession, leaving proprietary 
rights an open question for future decision. 

At this juncture, then, there was general satisfaction and 
contentment, at any rate among the Hindoo community 
of the province. But the Mussulmans, not only of Oude, 
but of all Upper India, were embittered and angered by 
the suppression of one of the few Mahomedan reigning 
houses which had been left in power ; and they now 
sedulously fostered and propagated the work of sedition, 
so that the widespread disaffection described in the 
introductory general sketch presently developed in force. 

Outside the province, more than within it, the upper 
classes were confirmed in their belief in the selfish and 
greedy turn which was held to characterize British policy. 
Taking over charge of the administration and introducing 
a better government, as promised, was all right ; but why 



THE FIRST YEAR AFTER ANNEXATION 63 

absorb the revenues of the province, and why degrade a 
dynasty of which the loyalty was beyond dispute, when 
such steps were not essential to the mere improvement of 
the administration ? 

And so the disaffection of the influential classes was 
heightened by the annexation of Oude, although the 
province itself took the change quietly. 

But this contentment was not of long duration. At 
the end of April, Sir James Outram was forced by ill 
health to resign the rule of the province. While he was 
there, his conciliatory and generous measures had produced 
a most beneficial effect ; but, even during his time, a 
tendency had been shown by the revenue officers, in a 
degree which attracted the attention and drew down the 
disapproval of the Governor-General, to depart from the 
terms of the proclamation in respect of the land revenue 
arrangements ; to violate the promises that the assess- 
ment should be moderate, and that the settlement should 
be made direct with the persons in actual possession. 

After Sir James Outram's departure, the state of feeling 
grew rapidly worse. Except in the matter of employing" 
the Nuwab's Sepoys and retainers in the new local regi- 
ments and police, there seemed to be an entire cessation 
and disregard of the beneficent and conciliatory arrange- 
ments which had been promised, and in a measure started. 
As described in Lord Stanley's despatch of October 13, 
1858, the members and stipendiaries of the Royal Family 
were treated with discourtesy, and even reduced to great 
straits from their allowances being withheld ; while the ex- 
officials and men of influence were studiously kept out of 
the employment and position which they had been led to 
expect. All these combined to form the nucleus of a 
powerful malcontent party. Though thousands of the 
soldiery had been brought into British service, other thou- 
sands had been discharged without the means of subsist- 
ence ; and, in Oude, to discharge a Sepoy so was to create 
a bandit. 

On the top of this came the General Service Enlistment 
Act, which, besides its effect on the army, filled with dismay 
or grave anxiety the Sepoys' homes in Oude, and the hearts 
of their kinsmen and of the clansmen generally, who had 



64 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

habitually looked to the army as the great field for the 
employment of their sons, and who now felt that hence- 
forward the British service would be very materially 
changed, as if from a militia to a General Service Army. 
So the jungles came to be more and more infested with 
groups of dacoits or brigands. 

Moreover, most serious of all, the irritation among the 
Rajpoot community, chiefs and peasants alike, grew apace, 
owing to the increasing violation, already touched on, of 
the promises respecting the land revenue. Besides the 
matter of unduly high assessments, the bias shown in de- 
ciding on the parties to be dealt with as being in actual 
possession gave the most serious offence. For the officers 
usually put forward the villagers themselves, and ignored 
the Talookdars or chiefs. Now it was a well-known fact, 
that by whatever process they had obtained the position, 
the chiefs were usually the parties holding actual possession 
at the time of annexation, while their followers and the 
peasantry were virtually only their tenants ; and not only 
was this well known, but it was also universally recognized, 
that it was owing to this very position and these relations 
that the Talookdars had acquired that power and station 
which had cemented the clan organization, and enabled it 
to resist successfully the oppression of the Durbar Amils 
and troops. As a natural result, the clansmen were apt 
to feel that any diminution of the territorial or other wealth 
of their chief involved a lowering of his status and power, 
and injured the welfare of the community in general. When, 
therefore, by the action of the English revenue officers, 
such rajahs as those of Dharoopore, Amethee, and Dera, 
such chiefs as Beni Madho and other heads of the great 
Byswara clan, were mulcted of half their estates, not only 
were those magnates angered and embittered, but their 
clansmen sympathized, and joined in the resentment. 

Thus it was that after the middle of 1856 the whole of 
Oude was in a state of bitter disaffection, which the old 
malcontent party were not slow to foster to the best of 
their ability ; though the Rajpoot community seemed to 
nourish their own wrongs apart from all others, and to 
hold aloof from the general sedition. 

As the year advanced matters grew worse in Oude as 



THE FIRST YEAR AFTER AXXEXATIOX 65 

well as elsewhere. After the close of the Russian war 
rumours were sedulously spread about of the emasculation 
of the military strength of England, and the exhaustion 
of the army and its resources. An exceptionally severe 
epidemic of cholera had resuscitated an old trick of circu- 
lating or rather passing on small bannocks — chupatties 
they were called — from village to village, as if to speed 
away the plague. This was regarded as a mystery ; and, 
in the general state of unrest which prevailed, augmented 
the uneasiness, ending in being held as a signal for prepar- 
ation for popular commotion. 

As the year was about to close, it became known that 
there would be war with Persia ; and the Mahomedan 
community, already angered by the suppression of the 
Oude dynasty, became still more exasperated at hostilities 
with another Mahomedan power. 

And then in January 1857, as the fitting close and climax 
to the rapid succession of events and measures that 
effected so many breaches in the good faith and trust which 
formed the foundation of the British power, occurred the 
cartridge incident, with its startling and exciting effect on 
the Sepoy army. It was at once seized and used by the 
disaffected as the most powerful weapon for mischief that 
had yet come within their grasp. The whole of Upper 
India was now in a state of agitation and expectancy, and 
Oude was specially prominent. 

A new Moulvie, who has been named sometimes as 
Ahmed Oolla Shah, and sometimes as Sikundur Shah, 
openly raised the standard of revolt at Fyzabad, and 
proclaimed a jehad or religious war against the British. 
At the same time brigandage grew more vigorous, 
especially where led by a notorious desperado named Fuzl 
Ali ; and matters in this respect came to a crisis when his 
gang resisted and killed a British officer, named Boileau, 
who led a party against them. 

It was at this juncture, none too soon, that a change was 
made in the arrangements for the government of Oude, 
and Sir Henry Lawrence came over from Rajpootana to 
assume charge of the province. 



CHAPTER III 

UNDER SIR HENRY LAWRENCE 

In the state of matters that prevailed in March 1857, 
there could have been no more opportune or fortunate 
event than the arrival of Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow 
to assume charge of the administration of Oude ; for no 
one could be named who so thoroughly gauged and under- 
stood the disaffection that was at work ; or who was so 
competent to deal with it where it was most prominent 
and threatening, as was the case in Oude. 

How he realized the gravity of the crisis was obvious 
from his conversations whilst on his way from Rajpootana 
to Lucknow, from the measures he took immediately on 
arrival, and from his letters to Lord Canning and others. 
How such a crisis ought to be met he had shown in his 
writings, and especially in an article penned in 1843, which 
will be presently noticed. His special fitness to deal 
with the local irritation was marked by his previous success 
under equally difficult circumstances in the Punjab, and 
by the widespread reputation and character which he had 
thereby gained as a beneficent ruler and a staunch friend 
of all classes of the people. 

On the annexation of the Punjab, he had been placed at 
the head of its Government, when he had to deal with a 
fierce, proud, and gallant race, who were smarting under 
defeat, and embittered by the loss of independence. Hold- 
ing that the element most essential to sound government 
was the contentment of the people, he aimed with intense 
vigour and singleness of purpose at dissipating their resent- 
ment, their irritation and distrust, and securing instead 
their good-will and friendliness. While enforcing with a 
firm hand the steps necessary for the pacification of the 
province, the maintenance of law and order, and the satis- 
faction of the financial and other claims of the State, he 
adopted a policy of which the essence lay in a scrupulous 
regard for existing rights, and a liberal and generous 



UNDER SIR HENRY LAWRENCE 67 

revenue administration. Evincing transparently his recog- 
nition of the losses and sufferings of the conquered race, in 
the transition from wild independence to the restraints of a 
civilized government, and of their claim that that transition 
should be carried out tenderly, he established, as the method 
of his administration, a system of thorough accessibility on 
the part of the local officers, and a cordial and sympathetic 
bearing. The result sought for was not long delayed. The 
chiefs and people were soon satisfied that there would be 
no questioning of rights, no disturbance or spoliation of 
property, no despotic or aggressive attitude on the part of 
the Government. He was supported and his policy carried 
out by an unrivalled body of lieutenants, most of whom 
he himself selected, trained, and imbued with his own 
spirit, so that gradually the sense of bitterness and humili- 
ation disappeared from the province. A thorough trust 
and confidence in their rulers arose among the people. 
Their intercourse became singularly frank and hearty, and 
the very best relations were established. This contentment, 
regard, and good-will constituted the aim and essence of his 
administrative policy ; and, continued as it was after his 
departure by the school of officers whom he left behind 
him, it led our bitter enemies of 1849 to side with us in 
the struggle of 1857. 

Moreover, the character and repute which he had thus 
acquired in the Punjab made his name a household word 
throughout the land, and, preceding his move to Oude, 
caused his arrival there to have an immediate effect on 
the excitement in the province. 

His knowledge of the state of public feeling, and his 
insight into the causes that effected it, were unique ; both 
from his natural sagacity and instincts, and also from the 
varied opportunities which he had enjoyed and used. These 
had brought him into close contact with all classes of the 
country population, and also with the chiefs and people of 
native States, and of the old feudal races. In the one 
case he had been impressed with the grave injustice with 
which the upper classes — who were held to be effete, but 
were still the natural leaders of the people — were being 
treated, in the interests, as was assumed, of the peasantry. 
And, in the other, he had seen the dangerous feeling result- 
ing from the prospect of the possible extinction of the 



68 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

native dynasties by the attitude of Government in minimiz- 
ing the practice of the adoption of heirs. Adding to these 
the Mahomedans and other embittered classes, he felt that 
the grave disaffection of so many large and influential 
sections of the community tended towards a general com- 
bination against the State. 

As to the native army, he had long been outspoken about 
its treatment and want of discipline, its dangerous growth 
and preponderating strength ; and now he was appalled 
at the animosity roused in it by the General Service Act, 
and by the blunders of the cartridge business. 

He had written of it in 1843, that the true basis of the 
British power lay in the army being well paid, well dis- 
ciplined, and thoroughly reliant, from experience, on the 
good faith, wisdom, and energy of the Government and its 
leaders. And he had shown the danger that would arise 
if, quick-sighted as they were, they came to detect any 
shortcomings in our good faith or spirit, or otherwise to 
lose confidence in the British. 

He had pointed out that constant success had made us 
careless and blind to the dangers to which we were liable ; 
that it was necessary to be always on our guard as to the 
sufficiency of our military means, and the efficacy of our 
military arrangements and organization ; and that, above 
all, timely energy and resolute action would surmount 
grave and formidable dangers, while want of military spirit 
or soldierly bearing might lead to catastrophe under even 
trifling difficulties. 

It was under the influence of these convictions and this 
spirit that Sir Henry Lawrence acted on his arrival at 
Lucknow ; imbued as he was with a profound sense of an 
impending rising of the troops, and of a possible combina- 
tion of the whole native community against the State. 

He assumed charge of the province about March 20th, 
took immediate steps, first, for the enforcement of law and 
order ; next, for the reduction of the local discontent and 
disaffection ; and third, for inquiries and preparations to 
meet the coming crisis. 

Brigandage was on the increase, and Fuzl Ali had re- 
pulsed and killed the English officer who had tried to 
capture him. So Sir Henry attacked Fuzl Ali, killed him, 
and dispersed his followers. The Fyzabad Moulvie was 



UNDER SIR HENRY LAWRENCE 69 

ostentatiously preaching sedition, and proclaiming a jehad 
(religious war). He was therefore forthwith seized and 
imprisoned. 

To deal with the local discontent — the pensions and 
allowances so long withheld were immediately paid up, and 
all discourtesy and harshness were peremptorily stopped. 
Increased employment was given to the old officials and 
soldiery ; and last, but not least, the wrongs of the chiefs 
and Talookdars were dealt with. They or their representa- 
tives were met in Durbars or at private interviews, at which 
Sir Henry announced that the terms of the proclamation 
of February 1856 should be strictly adhered to ; that those 
at that time in actual possession of estates and property 
should remain in possession for the three years originally 
notified ; and that all classes, chiefs as well as peasants, 
should have justice secured to them, and be protected and 
assured in the enjoyment of their rights. As Sir Henry's 
character and antecedents were known throughout the 
province to be in accord with these avowals, an immediate 
change resulted. The Rajpoot leaders were not only 
appeased, but all sense of irritation and anxiety seemed to 
disappear. The country population settled down into con- 
tentment and tranquillity. Brigandage ceased, and the 
revenues flowed freely and fully into the district treasuries. 

Having thus cleared the ground in respect of local diffi- 
culties and opposition, he began his preparations for dealing 
with the impending crisis. He was not yet in military com- 
mand of the province. Brigadier Handscombe commanded 
the district, and Brigadier Gray was in special command 
of the Oude local force. But he procured an improved 
distribution of the force at Lucknow itself, and having 
decided in his own mind on the old Sikh fort of Mutchi 
Bhown as the best local place of refuge in case of an 
cmeute, he directed that it should be quietly cleared out, 
cleaned, and put in repair; dealing with it, however, 
not as a military work, but as part of the ordinary civil 
winter repairs. The Mutchi Bhown was a dilapidated 
building on a high site, and had long been used merely as 
a storehouse, being no longer thought suitable for any 
other purpose. Sir Henry examined the city and suburbs 
and surrounding country in respect of resources and capa- 
bilities for defence. He instituted inquiries into the 



70 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

defensive positions in other parts of the province. He 
summoned in the more intelligent officers from the out- 
lying stations for consultation. He inquired keenly into 
the character and capacity of the officers of all ranks in 
the province ; being, alas ! often told in reply, not of their 
intelligence, energy, resolution, and influence, but of their 
carefulness and punctuality in office routine. To get this 
knowledge at first hand as much as possible, he joined in 
rackets and at other games, exercised wide hospitality, and 
gave a large al fresco entertainment to the 32nd and other 
British troops. He saw as much as he could of the native 
nobles and gentry of Lucknow, and also had long and 
valuable conversations with various native officers. These 
conversations fully confirmed his impressions of the un- 
pleasant ideas these men had gradually formed ; of their 
dissatisfaction with their position under the British Govern- 
ment ; and of the active disloyalty to which they might be 
roused. 

Though thus profoundly impressed with the certainty of 
a crisis in the army, and with the probability that it would 
be supported by a general rising throughout the country, 
Sir Henry could see, as yet, no sign to indicate the shape 
or course of action which the disaffection would assume. 
Hence he could do no more at present for the interests 
entrusted to him than seek to minimize the local irritation 
and discontent, prepare for an emergency in an unknown 
form, and keep up a keen outlook. Needless to say, he was 
unflagging in his correspondence with the neighbouring 
authorities and with the Governor-General, urging pre- 
parations and improvements in the military positions. 

As yet, the ill-feeling in the troops had been shown only 
by the mutiny of two regiments in Bengal, and by in- 
cendiary fires at Umballa, where there was a large camp 
of exercise. But nothing else overt had occurred any- 
where when, on May 1st and 2nd, a local regiment, the 7th 
Oude Infantry, stationed in one of the suburbs of Lucknow, 
refused to obey their officers in regard to using their 
cartridges. Sir Henry next day surrounded the regiment, 
paraded and disarmed it, and imprisoned, tried, and 
punished the ringleaders ; at the same time promoting and 
rewarding those who had behaved with prominent loyalty. 

Meanwhile the country generally seemed to be fairly 



UNDER SIR HENRY LAWRENCE 71 

tranquil, and people were moving about the districts and 
travelling to the hill stations and elsewhere freely, and 
without serious anxiety. The English community were 
not yet so much alarmed, as vexed at the unusual feeling 
that had been evoked, and angry at the blunder that 
had evoked it. There was no idea prevalent of any real 
animosity having been aroused, or of any mutiny or revolt 
against the State being imminent. But at length, on May 
nth and 12th, it began to be rumoured that the telegraph 
was not working, that the postal service was disorganized, 
and that something unpleasant had occurred up-country. 
On the 1 3th and 14th, fairly correct intelligence was received 
of the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi. By May 14th, Sir 
Henry knew what had really occurred at Delhi : that the 
troops in its neighbourhood had broken out in aggressive 
mutiny, with signs of murderous animosity towards the 
British ; that they had concentrated on and seized Delhi, 
and made it the gage of battle with the British Power ; 
and that further, the Moghul party had there proclaimed 
the restoration of the old dynasty, and seated the Emperor 
on the imperial throne. There followed at once a cessation 
of the Pax Britannica all over the Upper Provinces. The 
civil administration was disorganized, and to Europeans 
especially there was no longer safety in travelling or 
security of life or property. Still, except round the im- 
mediate centre at Delhi, there was no sign of the mutiny 
itself spreading, nor of the rising being joined by any of 
the native States or chiefs, or any other classes except the 
predatory castes of the north-west. 

Sir Henry's immediate action was to place trusted troops 
and guns in the Mutchi Bhown, in order to hold it as a 
place of refuge ; and to divide his English force between 
the cantonments of Murriaon, where the Sepoys were 
mostly stationed, and the Residency position, where he 
desired the English families to assemble. The early morn- 
ing of May 17th saw Sir Henry holding these three 
positions — the basis of the plans which he had already 
formed, and was now about to carry out for defence 
against any contingency that might arise. 



CHAPTER IV 

LAWRENCE'S POLICY ON THE OUTBREAK 

The long-threatening storm had now burst; confined 
however to one spot, instead of being widespread, much 
less universal, as it might have been. But it was un- 
checked, and had full scope to ravage and devastate as it 
might list ; not a single step had the Government or the 
military authorities taken to meet it. Not even the chronic 
and obvious defects in the distribution of the troops and 
the security of the strongholds had been rectified. Except 
Fort William (in Calcutta), Agra was the only fortress 
which was garrisoned by English soldiers. Nowhere had 
any arrangement been made in the neighbourhood of 
British troops to have carriage available at hand to facilitate 
their movement. Yet in the marching season, which had 
only a few weeks before come to an end, both of these 
wants could have been remedied without trouble or excite- 
ment. It is needless to state more than these simple facts, 
or to dwell on the blunders or the studied neglect involved. 
But the result was that all the places of strength — Allaha- 
bad, the Cawnpore Magazine, Futtehgurh, Jhansi, and 
Delhi — were at the mercy of the mutinous army ; and the 
Commander-in-Chief was unable to move forward on 
Delhi at once, or for many days, even a single regiment 
efficiently equipped to answer the challenge there given to 
the British rule. 

Thus the outbreak there, although obviously immature, 
spasmodic, and destructive of any plans for concerted 
action that there may have been, was allowed to remain so 
long unopposed that the weakness of the British organiz- 
ation and power became too obvious ; and the general 
mutiny, though deferred for three weeks, was eventually 
able to burst and spread unchecked in full power. 

Nothing is more remarkable than the singular exactitude 



LAWRENCE'S POLICY OX THE OUTBREAK 73 

with which Sir Henry had forecasted the Delhi catastrophe 
in his article written in 1843, which has been already 
alluded to. After commenting on the habitual carelessness 
of the Government, and its disregard of ordinary military 
precautions and preparedness, he had shown how possible it 
consequently was that a hostile party might seize Delhi, 
and if it was not speedily dealt with, what grave con- 
sequences might ensue. " Let this happen," he said, " on 
June 2nd, and does any sane man doubt that twenty-four 
hours would swell the hundreds of rebels into thousands, 
and in a week every ploughshare in the Delhi States would 
be turned into a sword ? And when a sufficient force had 
been mustered, which would not be effected within a month, 
should we not then have a more difficult game to play than 
Clive had at Plassey or Wellington at Assaye ? We should 
then be literally striking for our existence at the most 
inclement season of the year, with the prestige of our name 
tarnished." Going on then to suggest that Meerut and 
Umballa and Agra might say that they had no troops to 
spare from their own necessities, or that they had no 
carriage, "should we not then," he said, "have to strike 
anew for our Indian empire ? " 

With such convictions and forebodings working on his 
mind for fourteen years, and doubtless confirmed and 
intensified by what he saw of the growing disaffection, of 
the increasing imprudence of Government, and its haughty- 
disregard of precautions, it can be readily imagined what 
Sir Henry's view of the position was when he heard of the 
catastrophe at Delhi. He knew that all the needful pre- 
parations had been neglected, that consequently the British 
troops could not move against Delhi for some weeks, and 
that all that the Government could now do was to summon 
and collect whatever forces they could manage to spare from 
elsewhere, and send them on eventually up-country from 
Calcutta. He knew that the whole of the north-west was 
in a state of anarchy ; but he hoped that his old friends — 
" his children " — of the Punjab would remain loyal, although 
he was not without misgivings as to the possible effects 
of the colder and harder rule of his brother John. He 
hoped also that the Rajpootana States would keep quiet 
under the guidance of his brother George. But it is 



74 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

doubtful whether he realized until after another month 
how the self-assertion of the Moghul party, and the procla- 
mation of the restoration of the Delhi empire, had discon- 
certed the leaders of the mutiny and of other sections of 
the revolt, and had upset their plans and unity of action, 
choking off the Mahratta and Rajpoot States from par- 
ticipation in the rising. 

The steps which Sir Henry took at Lucknow immediately 
on receiving authentic news of the outbreak have been 
already mentioned. He occupied with all his British and 
other trustworthy troops the Residency position, the Mutchi 
Bhown, and the southern end of the cantonments of 
Murriaon. He had been pondering the matter with the 
greatest care and utmost anxiety for some weeks past, so 
as to be ready for the crisis whenever it might arise, and 
his conclusions and plans, which developed in the seizure 
of these three posts, will now be briefly stated. I give 
them on my own authority at first hand. Sir Henry 
communicated them to me personally on the early morning 
of May 17th, when he placed me in charge of the defensive 
arrangements of the Mutchi Bhown ; I noted them then 
and there, and I need not say that they have remained 
ever since indelibly fixed on my memory. 

We must prepare, he said, for defence against a powerful 
force equipped with artillery, which was almost certain to 
attack us sooner or later. For the site of this eventual 
defence he had decided on the Residency position ; and 
he hoped to have its entrenchments sufficiently strong 
before being attacked in force. 

In the meantime we must be ready for local outbreaks, 
and try to keep the city quiet and under control, as other- 
wise the needful preparations at the Residency could not 
be carried out. For this purpose, the Mutchi Bhown was 
to be made a place of refuge, and so strengthened as to be 
impregnable against an ordinary emeute y and as to dominate 
and overawe the city. 

It was necessary lastly to hold the native troops in 
check, to separate them from the city, and to keep the 
country open so as to get in supplies. To this end, he 
would hold the southern end of the cantonments with 
British troops. 



LAWRENCE'S POLICY ON THE OUTBREAK 75 

The work of which the urgency was the most imme- 
diately pressing, was that at the Mutchi Bhown. When 
that had been really brought into the state he desired, then 
— and not till then — he would breathe more freely, and go 
ahead fully with his preparations at the Residency. But 
the Mutchi Bhown, from its small size and dilapidated 
state, was not to be thought of as a suitable place for 
permanent defence and shelter, or as capable of standing 
or being made fit to stand the attack of artillery. 

Such were the plans communicated to me confidentially 
by Sir Henry, and noted at once on May 17th. And there 
were other aims and ideas by which he was guided — " A 
resolute and bold attitude must be maintained ; the domin- 
ation of the position at Lucknow must be promptly secured ; 
the safety of the English community must be ensured ; the 
character and position of the ruling race must be maintained 
at all hazards." 

There does not appear to be any authentic record of the 
reasons for which Sir Henry decided on the Residency as 
the position for the eventual struggle. But his wisdom in 
the choice has been impugned, notably by Lord Clyde and 
by Havelock. Lord Clyde, however, does not seem to 
have suggested what Sir Henry should have done. Also 
when he wrote, it was from Lucknow, while he was with- 
drawing the families, and was specially impressed by the 
one idea of the difficulty of that operation. Havelock gave 
his opinion definitely that Lawrence should have moved to 
Cawnpore ; but when he wrote that opinion it was from 
Cawnpore, before he had realized at the Residency itself 
what the task and risk of such a movement would have 
been, with the families that had to be cared for. And it may 
be well to say a few words on the matter from the recollec- 
tions of Lawrence's occasional remarks and conversations. 

There is nothing on record to show that he had been 
empowered to quit Lucknow ; but, assuming that he had a 
free hand in the matter, was such a step in the first place 
possible ? To move his troops without removing the 
families was obviously not to be thought of. Putting aside 
the fact that there was no place at all accessible which 
afforded greater security than Lucknow itself, to move the 
families was practically impossible. After the local out- 



76 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

break it could not have been attempted. If attempted 
before, it would have precipitated the crisis, and led to a 
catastrophe worse than the retreat from Cabul. 

Supposing, however, that the families could have been 
removed or have found shelter somewhere and somehow or 
other, and the British force had been free to move, its re- 
tirement from Lucknow would have given the signal for 
revolt, and have so emboldened the enemy and added to 
their strength that we should never have succeeded in 
reaching and crossing the Ganges. 

Again, supposing that these impossibilities had been 
possible, was such a step as retirement from Lucknow 
advisable ? There is no doubt that Sir Henry thought it 
would have been fatal not only to the British in Oude, but 
to the British cause in India. The only mode or chance of 
surmounting the desperate crisis lay, he felt assured, in 
impressing and discouraging the enemy by showing an 
undaunted front, and everywhere nailing our colours to the 
mast. 

Hence such a proposal as withdrawal to Cawnpore was 
never, I believe, even mooted ; and Sir Henry resolved to 
hold on to Oude and its capital, and at the same time to 
do all that could be done to make the tenure of his position 
there possible and successful. Practically he found himself 
limited to the neighbourhood of Lucknow for the site of 
the position to be held and defended. For in choosing 
such a site, what were the essentials ? Its situation and 
the features of the ground should make it readily capable 
of being made defensible against a powerful force equipped 
with artillery. It must be large enough to contain the 
families and the garrison, as well as all the live stock and 
the supplies they would need. It must contain a sufficient 
number of buildings to shelter the families. It should have 
an ample water supply and be fairly healthy. Its site 
should be under protection during the period of preparation, 
and be fairly accessible to a force advancing to its relief. 

A glance at the map x of Lucknow is now necessary. As 

to the suburbs, open as it were to the country ; north of the 

Goomtee there were no sites at all that would answer to any 

of the requirements ; while south of it, Jellahabad, and the 

1 See Maps III. and V. 



LAWRENCE'S POLICY ON THE OUTBREAK 77 

Alum Bagh, and any others that could be made defensible, 
were not large enough, did not contain a tithe of the 
shelter that was necessary, and were distant from proper 
means of protection. 

Then, on coming more into the city, the palaces which 
were sufficiently large were not only weak against artillery 
attack except after very heavy preparation ; they were also 
too large and continuous ; the positions assigned for defence 
could not have been separated off sufficiently from the rest, 
and were not provided with suitable sites for batteries and 
protective works. 

On the other hand, with the one drawback that the 
earthwork portion of the circle of entrenchment would have 
to be improvised, the Residency site seemed to possess in a 
fair degree every qualification that was required. It was suf- 
ficiently extensive, healthy, and well supplied with water. 
It had an ample amount of house accommodation and shelter. 
It commanded the river face and the adjacent ground for 
half its circle. Nowhere was it commanded by artillery 
sites, and the higher portions of the buildings in its immedi- 
ate neighbourhood could be demolished, and so deprived of 
any command. The features along its trace allowed of 
good defensive sites and batteries. It was already one of 
the three posts that were being held in close connection 
with each other ; and lastly, it would be readily accessible 
to relief by a force advancing through the comparatively 
open country on the north of the Goomtee. 

Whether or not these are accepted as reasonable argu- 
ments in support of Sir Henry's selection of the Residency 
position, and whether or not he had still more cogent 
reasons for his choice, it does not appear to have ever 
been definitely stated or argued, or even suggested what 
other position or alternative measure should have been 
adopted in preference to it. 

The posts that Sir Henry was thus about to hold, 
his measures respecting them, and the positions and 
localities that are connected with the defence, will be 
more easily understood if a descriptive sketch be first 
given of the city of Lucknow and its prominent features. 
As shown in the sketch map, No. III., Lucknow is a city 
about five and a half miles long and two and a half broad, 



7 8 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

lying mainly along the southern (or right) bank of the 
Goomtee, and encircled on its other three sides by a large 
and deep canal. The western half is a dense city, and so 
is the southern portion of the eastern half; but its north- 
eastern quarter consists more of palatial and villa residences, 
enclosed gardens, and great mausoleums and tombs. An 
old stone bridge spans the Goomtee at the separating point 
of the eastern and western halves, and a new iron bridge 
crosses it about a mile lower down, /. e. eastwards. Roads 
from the two bridges communicate with the cantonments 
of Murriaon about two miles to the north, and the road 
southwards to Cawnpore starts from the iron bridge, skirts 
the Residency position, and crosses the canal at the Char 
Bagh. The Mutchi Bhown and the Residency position 
lie close to the river, on its north bank, immediately to the 
east of the stone bridge and of the iron bridge respectively. 
So that the three posts held by Sir Henry were in direct 
and easy communication with each other ; commanded the 
two great passages of the river; and interposed between 
the cantonment and the city. The outlines of the Mutchi 
Bhown and the Residency entrenchments, marked on this 
map, show what petty spots they formed in that huge and 
hostile city. But at the Residency Sir Henry hoped to 
hold additional ground and outposts down to the river's 
edge and to the iron bridge. And when the relieving force, 
under Havelock and Outram, arrived, the position was ex- 
tended eastwards along the river face, and included the 
whole group of absolutely continuous buildings there, 
bordering the street, by which they had advanced to the 
relief. 






CHAPTER V 
MEASURES BEFORE THE MUTINY AT LUCKNOW 

Sir Henry's plan, then, on the occurrence of the Meerut 
and Delhi outbreak, was to hold the Residency position, 
the cantonments of Murriaon, and the Mutchi Bhown, and 
to prepare the Residency position for the eventual defence 
against a powerful force ; the key to his plan being to 
prepare and fortify the Mutchi Bhown so promptly and so 
strongly that it should dominate and overawe the city ; 
keeping it quiet, and being at the same time available as 
a temporary place of refuge in case of need. 

The prominent feature of the Mutchi Bhown was an old 
massive-looking pile, of castellated appearance, about a 
hundred yards square, perched on a natural eminence about 
thirty feet above the adjacent streets and roads. The 
platform on which it was built was scarped and supported 
by stout revetment walls, broken at short intervals into 
the usual Oriental semi-circular bastions, with the city or 
western front pierced by a gateway in a double-storied 
guard-house, strengthened by flanking and other defences. 
All this was close to the masonry bridge and the river, and 
commanded the city to the west. Towards the east there 
were two courtyards at lower levels, lined with small 
buildings and store-rooms, with a gateway at the east end 
corresponding with the gateway already mentioned at the 
western face. There were large and airy arcaded halls 
along one side of the pile, but the remaining rooms were 
not suitable for use except by natives or for stores. Though 
much had been cleared out, the whole place was greatly- 
dilapidated, but its chief defect lay in the passages and 
communications. These and the doorways were so narrow 
that carts and guns could not pass through the square pile 
at all, or get from one end of the position to the other. 



So OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

All the roofs were flat, and, like the terraces, were lined 
with parapet walls. 

Sir Henry, accompanied by his chief engineer, Major 
Anderson, gave the detailed as well as the general orders 
and instructions to bring the position into the state which 
he desired. The first orders were given on May 17th, and 
by the 23rd the work had been carried out to his satisfac- 
tion. The city and the cantonments had kept quiet, and 
he breathed more freely. 

What had been done was this : the several halls and 
rooms had been cleared out, cleaned, repaired, and made 
habitable. One of the buildings had been prepared and 
fitted up as a powder magazine. The gateways, doors, 
passages, and stairs had been repaired and improved, 
and the successive plateaux connected by ramps, for the 
passage of guns and carts. The walls had been loop- 
holed, and the parapets heightened and made defensible. 
Breastworks, platforms for guns, and flanking defences, had 
been constructed. Six companies of Sikhs and other 
selected native troops, and one company of the 32nd, 
besides a complete field battery, were holding the post. 
Seven eighteen-pounder guns, eight nine-pounders, and 
eight eight-inch mortars were in position ; and some two 
hundred wall-pieces and small-bore guns (most of them 
absolutely worthless) had been ransacked out of the old 
arsenal and ranged along the higher parapets, appearing 
very conspicuously to threaten the adjacent roads and 
approaches. Native rumour had, it that the Mutchi Bhown 
was armed with three hundred guns ! The Mutchi Bhown 
fort, as it was now called, had in fact become proof against 
any attack from the city, and ready to shelter the English 
families in case of an outbreak, besides having further as- 
sumed so powerful and threatening an appearance that the 
city was overawed, and never once attempted seriously to 
rise or disturb the peace till the siege began. 

During these six days, nothing was done or had occurred 
at the cantonments, where no works of any kind were even 
attempted. At the Residency, operations were for the time 
confined to defining the trace of the position to be held, 
and erecting a continuous boundary of defence along that 
trace, by blocking up all the streets and lanes, when they 



MEASURES BEFORE THE MUTINY AT LUC KNOW Si 

crossed it, except at the points reserved for passage. But 
the several buildings were also barricaded and loopholed, 
in readiness for any immediate emergency. 

After May 23rd, local security having been obtained 
through the Mutchi Bhown, the progress of the Residency 
entrenchments, which were energetically pushed on, became 
the absorbing centre of interest. Batteries and defensive 
works were begun ; the parapets and breastworks along 
the outline of the position were steadily enlarged. The 
system of work adopted was to strengthen the whole posi- 
tion at an equable rate, so as to leave no gaps or unduly 
weak points in the circle of defence. Meanwhile the build- 
ings and rooms set aside for stores and supplies were being- 
cleared out and filled with the food and other requirements 
for the impending crisis. 

It must be understood that this was not a case in which 
a theoretically good trace could be adopted, and the works 
constructed so as to adapt the existing outlines of the 
position to that trace. For there was no knowing when the 
position might not be attacked, and the weak gaps in the 
line of defence, which would necessarily have been left during 
such adaptations, could not be allowed. The principle 
adopted was to have a clear line of defence from the outset, 
weak, of course, at first, but daily gaining in strength, though 
never so strong and effective as if time had been certainly 
available to admit of the adoption of a better outline. 

At the Mutchi Bhown work was for the time restricted 
to the storage of supplies, and to the simple improvement 
of the defences and of the shelter for the garrison. Here 
too were lodged six men who had been made State 
prisoners as a further matter of precaution. 

At the cantonments nothing special was done, except 
that the Sikh cavalry were employed in keeping the roads 
open to the country, from which food and other supplies 
came pouring in in a most cheering manner. 

Meanwhile the districts kept almost everywhere perfectly 
quiet, as well as the city itself, nor had the mutinies spread 
at all ; but still the challenge of the mutineers at Delhi 
had not, to all appearances, been taken up by the English 
army, and Sir Henry well knew what must ensue. Had 
he not foretold it ? 



8 2 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

Sir Henry took some further significant steps, in addition 
to those of the local defences, when after May 23rd, the state 
of the Mutchi Bhown had relieved him of his more acute 
anxieties. One of the first was to separate the Sikhs from 
the other Sepoys. Then, in order to increase the native 
force on which he could rely, he summoned in from 
their homes two bodies of pensioners ; one of old trained 
British Sepoys and one of Oude artillery men. Both 
these companies of auxiliaries gave staunch and loyal 
assistance throughout the siege. At this and at every 
stage of his preparations Sir Henry remained firm to his 
opinion and his policy, of the necessity and the practicability 
of retaining for the British the loyal support of a suffi- 
ciently numerous and valuable section of the native soldiery ; 
to which end it was needful not only to seek out for this 
active help, but also to avoid the broadcast disarmament 
which, though strongly urged on him, would have swept 
away the friendly as well as the hostile Sepoys. 

Further, he sent out detachments of troops, chiefly 
cavalry, into the country to keep it open. One of these 
detachments, under Captain Weston, was directed to the 
Mahomedan town of Mulhiabad, which had shown ex- 
ceptional tendency to disturbance. Another under Captain 
Gall, with two guns under Lieutenant Ashe, was sent 
towards Cawnpore. This had been already preceded, in that 
direction, on May 21st, by a party under Captain Fletcher 
Hayes. A wing of Harding's regiment of Sikh cavalry- 
was despatched towards Allahabad ; while a fifth body of 
regular cavalry and infantry was sent along the road to 
Futtehgurh. 

While all this was going on, and a bold and vigorous 
attitude was being maintained, there were daily and ever- 
increasing rumours of a coming outbreak of the troops at 
Murriaon, keeping the British force intensely on the alert. 
At length, on May 30th, a week after the Mutchi Bhown 
had made the position locally secure, the mutinous Sepoys 
broke out at evening gun-fire from their lines, and scattered 
over the cantonments ; searching out, gutting, and firing 
the officers' houses, and sending musket-shots in the direc- 
tion of the English camp, where the 32nd were drawn 
up with some artillery ready for action. At the main 



MEASURES BEFORE THE MUTINY AT LUC KNOW 83 

picket they killed the officer in charge of it, and one 
of their stray shots killed Brigadier Handscombe. 

The loyal men of the 13th N. I. and the 71st N. I. 
marched from their lines to the English camp and formed 
up on the flank of the 32nd, while another detachment 
of the 13th staunchly held the cantonment Government 
House, occupied by Sir Henry, who had moved over there 
from the Residency ; and he at once took part of his force 
to the road leading to the city, so blocking it entirely 
against any attempt of the mutineers to move in that 
direction. After which Captain Hardinge with his irregular 
cavalry patrolled the main streets of the cantonment to 
save officers and disperse the mutineers. 

During the night no further conflict occurred, but next 
morning the mutinous Sepoys, who were seen drawn up 
in front of their lines, were forthwith attacked. They im- 
mediately broke and fled, and were pursued some ten miles 
into the country. After this the 32nd, with the faithful 
men of the 13th and 71st N. I. and Hardinge's cavalry, 
returned to Murriaon ; where they remained encamped for 
the present, so as to maintain the communications with the 
country, and keep the neighbouring districts quiet. Not 
without a struggle, however, for the next day a large party 
of the bad characters of the city endeavoured to cross the 
river and advance to Murriaon, with the hope of joining 
and acting in concert with the mutineers. However they 
were promptly met by the city police, driven back, and dis- 
persed. No movement whatever was made against the 
Residency or the Mutchi Bhown, and the local regiment 
at the Dowlut Khana and the Moosa Bagh in the city 
remained quiet and faithful. 

Thus began with Lucknow, on May 30th, the spread of 
the mutiny over Upper India ; after an interval of nearly 
three weeks of lull since the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi. 
The only other rising before this had been at the remote 
station of Nusseerabad, on the western side of India. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE MUTINIES AT THE OUT-STATIONS 

ALMOST simultaneous with the rising at Lucknow 
were similar risings in or near Oude. On the following 
day, May 31st, Bareilly and Shahjehanpore mutinied in the 
adjacent province of Rohilkund on the western border of 
Oude. Then on June 3rd and the three following days, the 
stations in the districts on the other side of Oude, that is 
to its east and south, followed the example — Azimgurh on 
the 3rd, Benares on the 4th, Jaunpore and Cawnpore on 
the 5 th, and Allahabad on the 6th. 

The stations in Oude itself did not break out till stations 
on both sides of them had risen. The troops at Seetapore, 
between Lucknow and Rohilkund, mutinied on June 3rd ; 
those at Fyzabad and Durriabad on the 8th ; those at 
Sultanpore and Salone on the 9th, and those at Baraitch 
and Secrora on the 10th. 

The first and, in many respects, the most important and 
the most singular of the risings at the out-stations was that 
of Seetapore. The troops there were at first moved towards 
Lucknow to meet and attack its fugitive mutineers ; but 
as the latter had turned towards the Ganges, the Seetapore 
party returned to its own station, and then heard of the 
outbreak at Shahjehanpore. On the 3rd, the regiments 
there which had in reality been very gravely infected, threw 
off the mask. One faithful party of the 41st N. I. collected 
some of their officers and others, and escorted them into 
Lucknow. But many of the English residents, including 
ladies and children, were at once shot down ; while the 
rest scattered in flight in several separate parties. One 
of them, which included Mrs. Dorin, was sheltered and 
aided into Lucknow by villagers. Another party, led by 
Sir M. Jackson, and containing some ladies and children, 
found temporary but grudging shelter with the Rajah of 



THE MUTINIES AT THE OUT-STATIONS S$ 

Mitholec, where some families from elsewhere had already- 
joined. A third party, which also contained two ladies, 
moved towards Mullapore, and meeting a party of fugitives 
from Shahjehanpore, turned with them towards Dhowrera, 
where the chiefs family sheltered them for awhile. So 
that, of the residents of Seetapore, some were shot down 
by the mutineers ; two parties escaped into Lucknow aided, 
the one by Sepoys, the other by villagers ; and two other 
parties received shelter, though in a half-hearted fashion, 
from the Talookdars of Mitholee and Dhowrera. It may 
be added, that more parties from Rohilkund and from the 
smaller out-stations in the neighbourhood were met and 
destroyed by the Seetapore mutineers. 

The next rising in Oude was at Fyzabad, on June 8th. 
The Sepoys there, on the approach of the mutineers from 
Azimgurh and Benares, formally threw off their allegiance ; 
but they did not molest the English residents at all, and 
indeed helped their officers to escape. The English com- 
munity separated into two parties. One, which consisted 
of the civil officers and their families, turned for protection 
to Rajah Maun Singh, the notorious ex-Amil. He was 
able to shelter them for awhile in his fort of Shahgunge, 
but feeling that there was no real security there, he des- 
patched them in boats down the Gogra. After many 
adventures and escapes, they found protection from various 
Talookdars, especially those of Birhur and Gopalpore, and 
eventually reached Dinapore in safety. 

The other half of the Fyzabad community, chiefly mili- 
tary officers, formed into three parties. One made for 
Gopalpore, where they found shelter, and were passed on 
to Dinapore ; another reached Goruckpore in safety ; but 
the third was surrounded by the mutineers from Azimgurh, 
and destroyed. 

Simultaneous with the Fyzabad rising was that at the 
small station of Durriabad, where, however, a detachment of 
Sikh cavalry remained loyal, and escorted the residents into 
Lucknow. 

Most of the mutineers from Azimgurh, Jaunpore, and 
Benares had, as above described, moved on Fyzabad and 
spread the contagion there ; one party of them, however, 
marched instead towards Sultanpore, on the Goomtee, on the 



86 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

direct road to Lucknow. It was the one out-station, 
besides Seetapore and Fyzabad, where there were any of 
the old Bengal troops. The Bengal regiment there was the 
15th Irregular Cavalry, a gallant but very bigoted set of 
Mussulmans, who proved foremost in all the future opera- 
tions, not only in actual fighting, but in furnishing leaders 
to the mutineer army. Fisher, their colonel, was an ex- 
ceptionally popular and energetic officer, but he was at 
once shot down, though not by his own men. Other 
officers fell similarly under the fire of the Sepoys, but a 
few escaped, to find protection and escort into safety from 
Roostum Sah, the chief of Deyrah. Colonel Fisher had, 
some days before, sent off the ladies and families to the 
protection of the Rajah of Ameythee, who loyally sheltered 
them till he was able to escort them to Allahabad. 

On the day after the Sultanpore mutiny, the regiment 
at Salone, to its south, threw off its allegiance ; without, 
however, committing any atrocities. All the residents of 
Salone and of Roy Bareilly were protected and eventually 
escorted into safety by Hunwunt Singh, the brave old 
Rajah of Dharoopore, and by various chiefs of the great 
Bys clan. 

There remain the risings to the north of Fyzabad, at 
Baraitch, Gonda, and Secrora, on the 10th and nth. From 
all these stations the residents escaped. A few trying to 
reach Lucknow were met on the Gogra and shot down by 
the mutineers from Azimgurh. The rest found protection 
with the Rajah of Bulrampore until they were able to reach 
Gurruckpore in safety. At Secrora one artillery officer, 
Lieutenant Bonham, remained behind with his battery 
endeavouring to keep it loyal. But it was coerced by the 
other troops ; though his men provided him with horses and 
money, and a party of them escorted him into Lucknow, 
where they remained with him throughout the siege. 

It may be observed that the conduct of the native troops 
on rising ranged widely — from the atrocities of the Sepoys 
at Seetapore, and the shooting of their officers at Sultan- 
pore, to assisting and escorting them at Seetapore, Durria- 
bad, Fyzabad, and Secrora. 

The villagers on the Gogra were hostile, but elsewhere 
they seem to have been more or less helpful ; a singular 



THE MUTINIES AT THE OUT-STATIONS 87 

circumstance when it is remembered to what turbulence 
and bloodshed and evil deeds they had long been accus- 
tomed. 

As to the chiefs, one, the Rajah of Pudnaha, refused all 
assistance to the fugitives from Baraitch ; two, the Rajah 
of Mitholee and the Dhowrera family, gave but rough and 
grudging shelter to the English families from Seetapore ; 
while in bright contrast to them stand the Rajahs of Bulram- 
pore, of Birhur, and Gopalpore ; Roostum Sah of Deyrah 
and Hunwunt Singh of Dharoopore ; with the chiefs of 
Amethee and of the Byswara clans ; besides many others, 
who helped into security the fugitives from Gonda and 
Secrora, from Fyzabad and Sultanpore, from Salone and 
Roy Bareilly. 

Before leaving this subject, it may be noted, that besides 
the Oude fugitives themselves, refugees from the adjacent 
provinces found shelter in Oude, one of the most prominent 
cases being the kindness and protection given by Rajah 
Hurdeo Buksh to Mr. Edwardes and his friends. Again, 
the small party that escaped with Captain Mowbray 
Thomson from the massacre at Cawnpore, were sheltered 
by the burly old chief of Morarmow, the head of the great 
Bys clan, after having been first rescued from the clutches 
of the one malignant Talookdar in that neighbourhood, 
Baboo Ram Buksh, the detested chief of Doondea Khera. 

Nor will it be out of place to point out here, that the two 
nobles of Oude, who stand prominently marked out in 
contrast with all the rest in passive or active hostility and 
misconduct to English fugitives, were the Rajahs of Mitholee 
and Doondea Khera ; and that both of them had been 
equally in contrast to other Rajpoot chiefs, in former days, 
in their treachery and disloyalty to their own race. The 
Mitholee Rajah had swept away his relations, and made 
interest at the Lucknow court to obtain the succession to 
the headship and estates of his clan ; while Baboo Ram 
Buksh was at feud with all the other Byswara chiefs from 
having intrigued with the hostile Amils against them and 
against the common weal. 

Such were the characteristics of the outbreaks in Oude 
itself. But as the troops that mutinied in the adjacent 
districts on the east and south took part in the operations 



88 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

of this theatre, the incidents at those stations also may be 
here described. 

The first station to rise was Azimgurh. This step was 
prompted by the projected removal of a large sum from the 
Treasury to Benares. The 17th N. I., which garrisoned 
the station, rose, seized the treasure, and moved off with 
it towards Oude. 

On the next day, June 4th, the Sepoys mutinied at Benares 
(as fully described in the story of Neill's advance at page 
183), and then marched for Fyzabad, being joined by the 
Jaunpore regiment on the way. 

On the following day, June 5th, came the mutiny at Cawn- 
pore. The regiments there made no immediate move 
against their officers or the residents, but started off for 
Delhi. The Nana, however, who had heretofore played the 
7'dle of a friend to the English, sent his emissaries after them, 
and enticed them back to attack and destroy the families and 
the small detachment of British troops ; which had now 
betaken themselves to the hastily got up position that 
Sir Hugh Wheler had called his entrenchments, but 
where no adequate preparations had been made for 
defence, for shelter, or for food. 

Then on June 6th, the Allahabad troops mutinied ; all 
except the Sikh regiment that garrisoned the fortress itself. 
Whilst the regular native infantry were rising and shooting 
their officers, the Sikhs, held coolly in hand by their Com- 
mandant, Captain Brasper, who had singular control over 
them, kept the fort for the Government till relieved and 
supported in a few days by the advanced detachments of 
Neill's party. 

One other station must be mentioned, Futtehgurh, a 
fortress at the south-west corner of Oude on the Ganges. 
It did not revolt till June 18th, and its small English garrison 
Avas not attacked till the 27th. 

Now, of all the several regiments that mutinied in or near 
Oude, those in Rohilkund went to Delhi : some of those 
from Lucknow and west of it were also thought to have 
gone to Delhi; but most of them, it is believed, really 
lingered in Oude, and eventually joined the force that con- 
centrated from the east to besiege Lucknow. The Cawn- 
pore troops remained to besiege Cawnpore, and afterwards 



THE MUTINIES AT THE OUT-STATIONS 89 

to oppose Havelock's advance. They were joined by one 
regiment from the eastwards, the 17th N. I. from Azimgurh. 
It had, as above described, mutinied to secure the local 
treasure, but the mutineers from Benares and Jaunpore, and 
at Fyzabad, coerced them and made them give up the bulk 
of their booty. So the 17th, in high dudgeon and greatly 
embittered, moved off by themselves towards Cawnpore, 
attacking all fugitive parties that they met on their way. 

All the other mutineers of Oude, and from the districts 
to the east, kept hovering in the eastern districts of Oude, 
preparing for an eventual concentration and advance on 
Lucknow. 

On looking back a few pages it will be seen that, while 
the fate of all the other groups that had escaped from the 
out-stations has been described, two from Seetapore have 
been left, finding more or less shelter with the Dhowrera 
family, and in the Mitholee Rajah's country respectively. 
Their story may be fitly told here, though as regards time, 
it will be anticipating the course of events. 

The party at Dhowrera consisted of eleven persons, of 
whom three were ladies. They remained there, fairly well 
sheltered, for two months, when a detachment of troops 
from the rebel court arrived under the command of Bunda 
Hussun. The Dhowrera retainers joined this body and 
marched for Lucknow, taking the party of English refugees 
with them. Being apprised by friends of their danger, the 
party of English escaped and fled on the third night. The 
men gradually found their way into safety through Nepaul, 
but the three ladies were on an elephant, and in the dark- 
ness of the night they got separated from the rest, were 
pursued, re-taken, and were carried captive into Lucknow ; 
where they met with a cruel death on the day of Havelock's 
arrival at the suburbs. 

The other, the Mitholee party, which included, besides 
others, Sir Mountstuart Jackson, Captains Orr and Burnes, 
two ladies and two children, remained in the Mitholee 
jungles up to October 20th, suffering great privations. The 
Rajah was all along half-hearted about them, and never 
attempted to show them any kindness or civility. And 
when the Lucknow Durbar sent a body of troops to make 
prisoners of them and carry them off, he put no impedi- 



9° 



OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 



ment in their way, though Captain Orr, by the stories he 
spread of the desperate resistance they would encounter, 
actually managed to scare them and cause them to return 
— re infecta — to Lucknow. At length, however, an arch- 
villain named Zuhoor-ool-Hussun appeared on the scene, 
as an emissary from the Durbar, and persuaded Lonee 
Singh (the Mitholee Rajah) that the English in India were 
at their last gasp. So, with the help of three hundred of 
his retainers, the little band of refugees were made prisoners 
on October 20th, and carried off to Lucknow, the officers 
in fetters. There they remained in miserable plight till 
November 16th, when, on the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell 
to the relief, the men of the party were taken out and 
shot. The ladies and children then found concealment and 
shelter, through the instrumentality chiefly of Darogah 
Wajid Ali, assisted by Rajah Maun Singh and others, until 
the following March ; when, on Sir Colin's attacking and 
capturing Lucknow, some of his troops were guided to 
their place of shelter. Thus their lives were saved after 
some ten months of deadly peril and unspeakable misery. 



CHAPTER VII 

LUCKNOW FROM THE MUTINY TO CHINIIUT 

THE rising at Lucknow, followed as it was by the flight 
of the regiments that had mutinied, tended to reduce 
greatly the strain of anxiety in respect of local troubles. 
The most powerful of the hostile elements on the spot had 
disappeared. Sir Henry felt that he now had full control 
of the local situation, and he pushed on apace the work 
at the entrenchments. The work at the Mutchi Bhown 
was now only of secondary importance, and lay mainly 
in the receipt and storage of supplies, and their despatch 
to the Residency whenever room for them was ready. 
Meanwhile the roads to the districts remained open, and 
supplies came in freely. A detachment also of fifty men 
of the 84th, under Captain O'Brien, arrived on June 2nd 
from Cawnpore, sent on by General Wheler, as if not 
wanted there. 

In a few days, however, from June 3rd onward, the news 
began to arrive of the successive mutinies at Seetapore 
and elsewhere, and of the disastrous fate of Hayes and 
other officers who, as already described, had been sent out 
with detachments of troops to keep the country open. And 
then at length came the intelligence of the siege of the 
Cawnpore entrenchments. 

At Lucknow itself, the rising had been followed on 
May 31st by an attempt of a body of conspirators in 
the city to join the mutineers. These had been met, 
crushed, and dispersed. Many of the prisoners taken in 
the mutiny, and convicted of murder or of treason, were 
hanged or otherwise dealt with ; after which no further 
serious disturbance occurred in the city, while the safe 
arrival of successive parties of refugees from Seetapore, 
Durriabad, and elsewhere, seemed somewhat to mitigate 
the gloom that was settling down. 



92 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

All this work and anxiety, however, told so severely on 
Sir Henry's health, already much enfeebled, that, under 
medical orders, he gave over temporary charge of his 
duties, on June 9th, to a council, with Mr. Gubbins at its 
head. But only for two days! He then heard that his 
policy in regard to the retention of native troops was being 
over-ruled and set aside; so on the nth he resumed his 
command, in time to recall many that had been sent away ; 
although not in time to prevent the excitement which the 
proceedings had created, leading to an outbreak in the 
military police. 

By this date, June nth, Sir Henry knew that all the 
troops in the out-stations of Oude had risen ; but he had 
no means of judging as yet what further steps those troops 
would take ; whether they would move on Delhi or attack 
Lucknow. He had found the Lucknow mutineers neither 
able nor inclined to face British soldiers ; his own force 
had been strengthened by the return of the company of 
the 32nd, which he had sent over in the month of May 
to reinforce Sir Hugh Wheler at Cawnpore, as well as 
by the additional detachment of fifty men of the 84th, 
which, as already mentioned, Sir Hugh had sent on to him. 
For three precious weeks Lawrence had been pushing on 
the defences and other preparations of the Residency 
entrenchments, without their being molested. He felt 
satisfied of the support of an adequate body of native 
troops, and he was hopeful that his only contest would 
be with the Sepoys and not with the people of the province, 
so good had been most of the reports dealing with the 
conduct of the Talookdars and the villagers. He had 
therefore arrived at the conclusion that there was no longer 
any serious danger from the city, or any need for a place 
of refuge. At the same time he felt that, while the Mutchi 
Bhown and the cantonment posts must still be retained 
to keep the city and the roads under control, the prepar- 
ation of the Residency position for its final purpose must 
continue to be vigorously pressed on, so as to have it ready 
to meet the extreme emergency effectively whenever it 
might arise. It was at this juncture, therefore, when 
possibly he might soon be too unwell to retain the com- 
mand, that he definitely announced his military policy to 



LUCKNOW FROM THE MUTINY TO CHINHUT 93 

Brigadier Inglis in his letter of June nth; a policy, it will 
be seen, in strict accordance with what he had laid down on 
May 17th, about the Mutchi Bhown, but now become more 
precise and emphasized by the development of events. 

" I am decidedly of opinion," he said, " that we ought 
to have only one position, and that though we must hold 
all three (cantonments and Mutchi Bhown) as long as we 
can, all arrangements should be made with reference to a 
sudden concentration at the Residency." The treasure, 
the food, the mortars, the eighteen-pounder guns, the 
powder and ammunition — in short, " all the munitions and 
stores should be got into the Residency, and the nine- 
pounder field-battery with a few old guns be left to ac- 
company the troops at the last moment. The withdrawal 
will not be easy at any time, so the less there is left to 
bring away at the last moment the better." 

It has been shown that ever since the Mutchi Bhown 
was found to be ready on May 23rd, to fulfil its task of 
overawing the city, the preparations of the Residency en- 
trenchments had been pressed forward as the most essential 
and urgent work in hand. It has also been explained that 
those preparations were carried on in an equable manner, 
so as not to allow of gaps or exceptionally weak points in 
the defences, and thus the line of defence had been gradu- 
ally growing in strength. But it was not until towards 
the middle of June that the projected development of the 
defences began to be really seen ; when the gabions, fascines, 
sandbags, and other appliances for parapets and gun em- 
placements, were placed in position, and the batteries and 
other works assumed shape. These batteries and other 
details will be more suitably described in dealing with their 
condition at the beginning of the siege. Here it is sufficient 
to say that the full time and attention of all the engineer 
officers and their assistants, with the exception of the one 
engineer at the Mutchi Bhown, were strenuously devoted 
to the development of the defences, and the requirements 
of the Residency entrenchments. These included their 
fitness to check the attack of such an enemy as the Sepoy 
was likely to prove ; their adaptability for such extension or 
curtailment as might be found necessary or expedient ; and 
the collection and distribution of impediments— such as 
palisades, chevaux de /rise, crows'-feet, and the like, which, 



94 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

on the defences and ditches being completed, were to be 
fixed or laid down along their front. 

The events at Cawnpore and elsewhere were necessarily 
agitating Sir Henry's mind greatly ; but he came un- 
avoidably to the conclusion that assistance to Cawnpore 
from Lucknow with a huge river lying between, was out of 
the question. There was a feeble chance that a sufficient 
force from Allahabad might advance and create a diversion ; 
but, after all, such information as was received of the 
British troops on their way up, showed them to be in mere 
petty detachments, of no adequate strength for any real 
struggle. 

And, worst of all, there was no intelligence of any as- 
sertion of the English army at Delhi. Realizing as Sir 
Henry did that it was there that the site of the vital 
struggle lay, his heart sank with dismay at the blank news 
from that quarter. On the other hand, there was some 
comfort in the conviction that the enemy there were not 
receiving any support from the districts so far south as Oude. 
The quarter of a million of treasure that was stored in the 
Residency might turn the fate of the Empire, if it would 
serve as a bait to the hosts that were still hovering in the 
province, and keep them back from swelling the hostile 
ranks at Delhi. 

The districts were meanwhile remaining quiet ; food was 
pouring in from the country ; the Talookdars were either 
playing a friendly part or giving no trouble. Supplies 
were being received from the most unexpected quarters, 
such as the Mohunts of the Hunnooman Gurhee, and the 
family of the Bhow Begum. 

And then as the Lucknow entrenchments began to de- 
velope, as the meagre garrison at' Cawnpore contrived to 
hold the enemy at bay, as the English reinforcements kept 
creeping on up-country, and as the mutineer regiments 
kept holding aloof from any real concentration against 
Lucknow, Sir Henry began to hope that he might have an 
easier time before him than he had hitherto anticipated. 

But a serious misfortune had occurred in the appearance 
of cholera about June 12th. It gradually spread, and 
played havoc among English and natives alike, causing the 
loss of many most valuable lives. Still Sir Henry never 
relaxed in his vigour in new directions as well as old ones. 



LUCKNOW FROM THE MUTINY TO CHINHUT 95 

About June 18th, some fresh steps for the furthering of 
the coming defence were taken. At the Redan and other 
sites, breastworks were enlarged into batteries ; officers and 
men and volunteers were trained to artillery work. The 
troops and inmates of the Residency were told off to their 
future posts. The surplus guns and mortars at the Mutchi 
Bhown were gradually transferred to the Residency. And, 
in accordance with his suggestions to Brigadier Inglis a 
week before, arrangements were contemplated and discussed, 
though they never appear to have taken any practical shape, 
for holding extended positions, on the first advent of the 
enemy, and avoiding concentration within the actual 
entrenchment, so long as the foe could be held at bay. 

The development of the Redan Battery, of Innes's post 
and of the Post-office Battery, all on commanding ground, 
held out hopes of such power over the river-face as to 
admit of the occupation of the Captan Bazar, and of the 
control, in combination with the Mutchi Bhown, of the 
passage of the iron bridge, especially in the event of the 
enemy proving half-hearted and wanting in enterprise. 

On June 23rd came rumours, which soon proved to be 
false (although supplemented by letters on the 26th), of the 
capture of Delhi by a British force ; and on that day Sir 
Henry ordered the construction of two batteries, which had 
been already lined out, at the Mutchi Bhown, on an elevated 
site, to command the neighbouring buildings more effectively, 
as well as the stone bridge and the opposite bank of the 
river. " The enemy," he said, "were showing such singular 
backwardness both as to facing the handful of English at 
Cawnpore, and as to making any move against Lucknow, 
that he thought it might be worth while, if only it deferred 
the evil day of close investment, to put on every appearance 
that could be suggested of our determination to make a 
vigorous and forward defence." 

Time he knew to be still all-important, although in fact, 
at this particular juncture, a week before our actual defence 
began, there had arisen a certain degree of vigorous re- 
animation, of recovery so to speak from the gloom produced 
by the news that had daily been reaching us of disasters. 
It was obvious that complete success was attending Sir 
Henry's plans. The defences were close on full develop- 
ment. The very swarms of workmen at the Residency 



96 OUDE BEFORE THE SIEGE 

and at the new batteries of the Mutchi Bhown were en- 
livening and exhilarating. So were the continuous strings 
of carts and elephants bringing in supplies; so also the 
stories that were current of the bold defence at Cawnpore ; 
the advance of reinforcements at Allahabad ; the friendly 
attitude of the Talookdars ; the rumours of success at 
Delhi ; the halting movements of the enemy, and so forth. 
Still more so was the sudden discovery, at an old arsenal 
in the city, of a large store of heavy guns, which were 
forthwith transferred to the Residency, and placed in 
position or parked. One of the pieces, an eight-inch 
howitzer, was handed over to the artillery to be equipped 
for work in the field. One important feature of the work 
during the last fortnight was the demolition — down to the 
lower, but not of the actual lowest stories — of such build- 
ings as skirted the outside of the position. The reason for 
leaving the lower stories undemolished, but only in ruins, 
was that they were expected to form a barrier against the 
impact of any artillery fire that might be aimed low at the 
defences in order to breach them. It will be seen that this 
object was fulfilled, but that, on the other hand, the ruins 
gave the enemy excellent starting ground for their mining 
operations. 

On the 27th came the last piece of good news. Troops 
were about to push forward from Allahabad, and might 
reach Cawnpore in eight or ten days. This was imme- 
diately communicated through our spies to Sir Hugh 
Wheler. But, alas ! too late. He had come to terms with 
the Nana — terms of which the meaning and the sequel are 
but too well known. Of course the intelligence of this 
surrender at Cawnpore spread like wildfire through the 
province, and altered the whole aspect of affairs. It at 
once roused to action the regiments that had been hovering 
on the north-east beyond Nuwabgunge ; and on the 28th 
and 29th, first of all rumours, and then authentic intelli- 
gence, reached Sir Henry of the concentration of the enemy 
at Nuwabgunge, and of their sending on an advanced force 
to Chinhut. On the evening of the 29th, the troops in 
cantonment were drawn in and divided between the Mutchi 
Bhown and the cantonment. And next morning saw the 
beginning of the siege in the fight at Chinhut. 



Plate I. 

Hospital or East Anglf. 



[This is the first of a series of Eight Views of tlie Luck now Residency 
Position, looking into it from the outside. They are meant to be panoramic, 
circling round from left to right, beginning and ending at the Baily Guard 
Gate, and each view being connected with the one p7-e ceding it and the one 
that follows it. 

In the Key Sketch which faces each view, the names are entered of the 
more important buildings and points, and a thick black line shows the 
boundary separating the besieged from the besiegers. 

On the diagram which faces this page is shown the position of the circuit 
included in each of the eight 7>iews.] 







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BOOK II 

THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

CHAPTER I 
CHINHUT AND THE CONCENTRATION 

IT has been shown that so long as Cawnpore held out, 
the mutineer regiments had kept hovering and wavering in 
the direction of Fyzabad ; but that as soon as they heard 
of Wheler's capitulation, they sent on a detachment to 
Xuwabgunge, and arranged to concentrate there. This 
they did on the 29th, their advanced guard moving forward 
to Chinhut on the same day ; and it was on the receipt of 
the intelligence of this move that Sir Henry withdrew from 
the cantonment, and ordered a reconnaisance for the morn- 
ing of June 30th, to feel for and check the enemy's van. 

It does not seem to be accurately known what the 
strength of the enemy's force actually was ; but there can 
be little doubt that it comprised the several regiments 
belonging to the eastern half of Oude, and those, with the 
exception of the 17th N. I. from Azimgurh, which had 
advanced into Oude from Jaunpore and Benares. There 
were probably — Two regular N. I. regiments ; eight Oude 
local regiments; the 15th Irregulars and detachments of 
other cavalry ; two complete batteries of field artillery ; 
and the contingents of three of the Oude Talookdars — one 
the Mahomedan chief of Mahomedabad, and the other two 
petty chiefs near Lucknow itself. Their counsels were 
divided, and there was no recognized commander; but 
after much wrangling and differences between the choice of 
the Mahomedans and of the Hindoos, the command even- 
tually devolved on Burkut Ahmed, an officer of the 15th 
cavalry. The Talookdars' men, however, held aloof under 
their own leader, Khan AH Khan, the lieutenant of the 
chief of Mahomedabad. 

II 



98 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

It has been shown that Sir Henry, on the evening of the 
29th, hearing of the approach of the enemy, ordered out a 
force to check their advance. It is quite certain that the 
information he had received was not definite, while he had 
not sufficient cavalry to reconnoitre and ascertain correctly 
the position and strength of the enemy. He believed that 
they had no real heart for a fight, and he hoped that he 
would encounter only their advanced guard, and be able to 
punish them sufficiently to cause their further advance to 
be slow and cautious. The troops were to stop short 
under Brigadier Inglis at the Kokrail bridge on the road 
to Chinhut and Nuwabgunge, and there to rest and get 
their early meal, while Sir Henry himself and his staff 
reconnoitred ahead. Major Anderson was not with him, 
nor had he been told of or consulted about the expedi- 
tion, which, as every sign indicated, was not expected to 
be more than an affair between advanced detachments, 
certainly not a battle with the whole force of the enemy, 
with the consequences it might involve. 

The force, about a third of the whole garrison, with which 
Sir Henry meant to meet the mutineer vanguard, consisted 
of three hundred of the 32nd regiment ; thirty-six volunteer 
cavalry ; two hundred and thirty native infantry ; one 
hundred and twenty native cavalry ; four guns European 
field artillery ; six guns native artillery ; and one eight-inch 
howitzer. This party did not form up at the iron bridge 
and start for the appointed halting-place, the Kokrail bridge, 
till long after the hour named ; nor did it, when halted, get 
the food which Sir Henry had ordered to be served out to 
it. Sir Henry had meanwhile gone forward to reconnoitre, 
accompanied by some of his staff, but not by Brigadier 
Inglis, who remained with the troops. 

After coming in sight of Chinhut, and seeing no sign of 
the enemy's advance, Sir Henry at first decided on retiring ; 
but presently he heard that the rebel scouts had fallen back 
on their supports. Gathering from this that they held 
back from the contest, and that he still had only the 
advanced party to deal with, and also learning from 
Brigadier Inglis (through his aide-de-camp) that the 32nd 
were ready for the combat, he ordered the force to advance 
to a point half-way between the Kokrail bridge and Chin- 



CHIN HUT AND THE CONCENTRATION 99 

hut, where the road, after passing between Ishmailgunge 
on the left and another village on the right, lay in ground 
which was impeded and protected against the enemy by a 
large jheel (shallow lake) in its front. Holding these two 
villages, he trusted to give the enemy a telling lesson, to 
check their advance, and retard the commencement of the 
siege, and especially of a close investment. 

But, it need hardly be said, his expectations were 
bitterly disappointed. The enemy were seen almost im- 
mediately, advancing and deploying or deployed, and 
evidently in great force. The native infantry of Sir Henry's 
column went forward vigorously on the right and seized 
and held the village assigned to them ; but the 32nd, who 
were similarly to have occupied Ishmailgunge on the left, 
were exhausted by heat and want of food, and never 
reached that village. The enemy's skirmishers, instead, 
anticipated them, seized Ishmailgunge, and receiving the 
32nd with an effective fire, stopped their further advance. 
Avoiding the road, where they were checked by the fire 
of our eight-inch howitzer, they began circling round out- 
flanks in two bodies, each of them of greatly preponderat- 
ing strength. On the left, the 32nd had been expected to 
check any such movement ; and the direct result there, as 
it was the outer flank in respect of the route for retirement, 
was not of so great moment. On the right our Sikh 
cavalry should have acted on the enemy's flank movement ; 
instead of which they allowed themselves to be repulsed, 
and so left our right flank unprotected and our line of 
retreat in danger. But besides this, the overlapping on 
both flanks led to a most fatal cross fire on the head of 
the column ; forcing our Sepoys to fall back from their 
village, causing great loss, and leading to the desertion of 
Alexander's gunners, and the capture of his two guns ; 
as well as of the eight-inch howitzer, the elephants that 
drew it having turned restive. The enemy's cavalry then 
threatened to cut across towards the iron bridge and 
intercept the retreat of our force, but this attempt was 
frustrated by the resolute conduct of our handful of volunteer 
cavalry, and of some detachments on the right flank ; as 
also by the fact that the guns of the Residency commanded 
that ground, and that the front of the iron bridge was held 
by Edmonstone's company of the 32nd from the Residency. 



ioo THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

The fire of the enemy pressing on caused great loss, but 
many of our men, it is feared, dropped down from sheer 
exhaustion, the 32nd on its return being found to have lost 
in men killed, besides four officers, and as many more 
wounded. One pleasant fact in the midst of so much 
misery in that retreat was that the natives who occupied 
the houses along the road helped the exhausted troops with 
water and milk. 

Whilst the fight was going on at Chinhut, the works and 
operations were being carried on as usual at the Residency 
and the Mutchi Bhown. Carts were still bringing in 
supplies, and the defences swarmed with labourers. It 
was clear that the approach of the Sepoy army was not 
exciting the ordinary city population. The Mutchi Bhown 
was, by this time, cleared out of nearly all its supplies and 
of all the spare guns ; but not of the guns at the west end 
of the position, nor of a large store of powder and small- 
arms ammunition, for which room had not yet been found 
or made in the entrenchments. All of a sudden, the work- 
people disappeared as if by magic, both at the Residency 
and at the Mutchi Bhown, and in the next few minutes the 
first fugitives from the fight made their appearance with 
the announcement of the defeat of the British force. 

At both positions the necessary steps were immediately 
taken to make the gates and entrances secure, and to man 
the outposts and batteries. By degrees the troops of the 
Chinhut force rejoined, the city meanwhile keeping quiet. 
Sir Henry had ordered out Captain Edmonstone's company 
to hold the iron bridge till the force rejoined, and the guns 
on the river-face at both posts were now directed on the 
two bridges to prevent their passage by the enemy. As 
they had therefore to cross the river lower down, the latter 
took some hours to come close to the Residency, and they 
did not get any guns across that day (June 30) at all, nor 
did they then reach the Mutchi Bhown. They planted 
their guns on the north side of the river, and sent round- 
shot and an occasional shell into the Residency buildings ; 
and later in the day their infantry, more or less surround- 
ing the place, fired into the windows, causing a few 
casualties. 

The Mutchi Bhown was hardly molested. The parapet 
along the near side of the iron bridge had been removed, 



C&INHUT AND THE CONCENTRATION 101 

so that no one could cross it without coming fully under the 
fire of the Mutchi Bhown. Hnece it was, in fact, late before 
the victorious Sepoys got access to the city : within which 
two regiments of the Oude local force were still quartered. 
These after a few hours rose in mutiny, but escorted their 
Commandant, Brigadier Gray, and other officers to the 
Mutchi Bhown. 

In the afternoon, efforts were made to signal between the 
two posts, but the semaphore at the Residency was so 
damaged by the enemy's fire that it could not be worked 
successfully. 

All that day, the efforts of the defence were directed to 
making everything as secure as possible, and to repelling 
the enemy's attempts at close investment. 

Fortunately all the supplies, beyond the requirements for 
three or four days, had been removed from the Mutchi 
Bhown and stored in the Residency ; and, except the guns 
at the west end and the ammunition (which have been 
already referred to), nothing had been left in the Mutchi 
Bhown save some round-shot for the guns and a few 
shells for the mortars. 

During the night of the 30th nothing of moment occurred. 
Next day musketry fire was poured in from all sides, and 
shot and shell from the north of the river, but without 
any serious result. And then the semaphore having been 
repaired, Sir Henry signalled a message to the Mutchi 
Bhown, " Retire to-night at twelve. Blow up well." One 
note had been received during the night, written in Greek 
characters, asking if the Mutchi Bhown party were able to 
evacuate, but the answer, which said " Yes," never reached 
Sir Henry. In fact, it was known that from the previous 
evening the enemy had swarmed into the ground inter- 
vening between the two posts, and cut off all ordinary 
means of communication. 

On the receipt of the message to withdraw, Colonel 
Palmer of the 48th N. I., who was left the senior officer, 
summoned all the commanding and departmental officers, 
and arranged in complete detail for the evacuation. The 
native artillery drivers had fled during the previous night ; 
so officers had to drive the gun-teams. The State prisoners 
were to be secured on the artillery wagons, as also the sick 
and wounded. The guns that were to be left behind were 



102 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

to be spiked at the last moment ; and, as the rear-guard left, 
Lieutenant Thomas, the ordnance officer, was to fire the 
train that was to explode the magazine. 

Meanwhile there was to be absolute silence on the move- 
ment, and there was no cessation of the intermittent mortar 
fire, which, both from the Residency and from the Mutchi 
Bhown, kept on shelling the ground lying between the two 
posts. At last at ten o'clock the sentries were strengthened, 
and the actual preparations began. As midnight ap- 
proached, the troops were formed on parade, in the lower 
plattan or court-yard, and every inmate of the Mutchi 
Bhown was placed in the exact position in the line of 
march. At twelve o'clock, Lawrence's company of the 32nd, 
heading the column, marched out of the Eastern gate, the 
whole column following closely, the rear being brought up 
by Lieutenant Thomas, who had fired a twenty-minute fuse 
for the magazine train. The whole force marched on 
rapidly, expecting every moment to be obstructed and 
attacked ; but it reached and concentrated in the Residency 
without meeting an enemy or having a single shot fired at it. 
Then, as the rear-guard got within the gates, a great quake 
of the earth, a thunderous report, and a brilliant glare 
announced that the Mutchi Bhown magazine had been 
successfully exploded. 

Thus the first hours of Jul)- 2nd saw the whole of the 
Lucknow force concentrated in the Residency entrench- 
ments, and prepared to hold it to the death ; with an ample 
store of food and of ammunition, with more guns than they 
could man, and with defences which the results showed to 
be adequate for their purpose against the enemy investing 
the position. And so, save for the disastrous episode of 
Chinhut, Sir Henry's plans had been brought to a successful 
completion. 

The defence thus begun lasted to September 25th, the 
date of Havelock's and Outram's relief of Lucknow, a 
period, including the two days of June 30th and July 1st, 
of eighty-eight days, or nearly three months. It was 
marked off into four stages of about three weeks each, by 
the all-round attacks of July 20th, August 10th, and 
September 5th. The account of the defence will be dealt 
with under each of these periods separately. 



CHAPTER II 

DESCRIPTION OF THE ENTRENCHMENTS 

The Residency entrenchments 1 in which the force was 
n >w concentrated, lay on the edge of the high bank, from 
which the ground sloped down, somewhat sharply, to the 
river Goomtee, on the north. Its shape was approximately 
a square, with sides about a quarter of a mile long, and en- 
closing an area of between thirty-two and thirty-six acres. 
Its longer diagonal was about 700 yards, and the shorter 
one 450 yards. 

For practical purposes, the face which looked on to the 
Goomtee may be called the North or River front ; - then 
circling round with the sun came the East or Baily Guard 
front ; 3 then the South or Cawnpore front ; 4 and lastly 
the West or city front.' 3 

Owing to the fall of the ground above-mentioned, the 
northern half of the position commanded all the adjacent 
ground, but the southern half was on a level with the neigh- 
bouring roads and buildings. The nature of the ground 
outside the position, as regards facilities for attacking it, 
varied greatly on each front. 

On the North front ,} lay the only clear space where the 
enemy could be massed in force and sweep up to storm the 
position, or where they had sites for batteries at effective 
range to breach the defences, fully exposed to them. 

On the other three fronts the intervening buildings and 
ruins protected the lower defences from being touched by 
artillery fire, and prevented the movement of large bodies 
of troops. 

On the Northern face" the high-road to Cawnpore ran 
about 100 yards in front of the position, and was lined by 

' See Map IV. and the Plates. - Plates III. and II. 

3 Platesl.and VIII. 4 Plates VII. and VI. 5 Plates V. and IV. 

r Plates II. and III. : Plate II. 



104 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

walls and shops abutting on them, forming a street called 
the Captan Bazar ; but on reaching the east end of the 
North front, it turned sharp to the south, and skirted close 
along the whole of the Baily Guard or Eastern front, till, 
leaving the site of the entrenchments altogether at the 
Cawnpore Battery, it wended its way southwards to 
Cawnpore. 

On this, the Eastern front, 1 the road was lined on the off 
side by the walls of large enclosures, within which were 
large buildings that could be utilized in various ways for 
aggressive purposes ; though troops for an attack or rush 
could advance only in columns from comparatively narrow 
passages. 

On the South or Cawnpore front, 2 a narrow street ran 
close along the boundary walls, and beyond was a mass of 
ruins or debris of buildings which would effectually prevent 
the movement of troops in any numbers. 

On the Western face 3 was a stretch of broken ground 
some 1 50 yards wide sloping down to a ravine, across which 
the enemy never made any serious efforts to advance. Any 
of the sites beyond it, which might otherwise have answered 
for artillery, were well within musketry range ; effectually 
stopping their use for that purpose save at one spot. 

Such was the nature of the ground and of the positions 
held by the enemy opposite our several fronts. We turn 
now to the posts we held along each of these fronts, and it 
will be convenient to preface this by naming the posts at the 
four angles or corners, connecting these points. 

At the north-west corner, 4 connecting the northern and 
western fronts, was Innes's post. At the north-east 5 corner 
was the Hospital post, with the Baily Guard post, in 
advance, below it ; at the south-east corner 6 were the Cawn- 
pore Battery and Anderson's post ; and at the south-west 
corner 7 was Gubbins's post. These were naturally the 
weakest points in the quadrilateral position. 

The North front 8 then lay between Innes's post at its 
west end, and the Hospital and Baily Guard posts at its 
east. Innes's post was really on a very advanced site, on a 

1 Plates I. and VIII. 2 Plate VII. 3 Plate IV. 

4 Plate III. ' Plate I. 6 Plate VII. 

< Plate V. 8 Plate II. 



DESCRIPTION OF THE ENTRENCHMENTS 105 

spur that projected from the Western front, on the alignment 
of the Northern front. The whole of the Northern front was, 
as it were, one continuous curtain with the Redan Battery 
thrown forwards from its centre, and flanking it right and 
left, while the Residency House lay behind it in support. 

It had been hoped that the whole of the ground in its 
front down to the river would have been held by the garrison, 
or at any rate have remained neutral. But the disaster of 
Chinhut had destroyed this chance. The losses there had 
gravely reduced the strength of the garrison, leaving none 
available to hold the Captan Bazar, and the exultant 
enemy had swarmed in on the first evening, seized that 
street, and completed the investment on that front without 
opposition. 

No post, except the Redan Battery, lay between Innes's 
and the Hospital posts at the two ends of the front. 

We now come to the Eastern front, 1 which was on two 
tiers, the high level and the low level in front of it. The 
posts on the high ground, 2 lying between the Hospital post 
and Anderson's, were Fayrer's, the Post-office, and Germon's, 
while in front of them were the Baily Guard post, Saunders's, 
and Sago's. The road to Cawnpore skirted the walls of 
these front posts, leaving no neutral ground except the 
width of the road itself. The Post-office position, from its 
projecting trace, not only provided a strong frontal defence 
but also enfiladed the face of the Baily Guard post, and in 
combination with the Redan on the North front, powerfully 
protected the north-east angle of the position. 

The South front 3 had at its two ends, Anderson's and 
Gubbins's posts ; but the whole of the intermediate part 
of the front was thrown well forward in advance of the 
extremities, and contained, in a straight curtain, the Cawn- 
pore Battery, Deprat's, the Martiniere, the Brigade mess, 
and the Sikh square posts. 

It was on this front that the enemy really lay closest to 
our position, not being more than thirty or forty feet dis- 
tant from it along its whole length ; but the ground was so 
entirely covered with ruins, that though they were sheltered, 
they had no facilities for movement. These ruins protected 
the foot of the buildings from artillery fire. 

1 Plates VIII. and I. 2 Plate VIII. 3 Plates V., VI., and VII. 



106 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

In rear of the posts I have named was a second line 
of posts which supported them, and contained garrisons 
for their assistance, serving as retrenchments ", but not like 
those on the Eastern front, on higher ground. 

Lastly, the Western front 1 lay between Gubbins's and 
Innes's posts, and consisted of three ranges of Residency 
outhouses, viz. the slaughter-house, the sheep-house, and 
the servants' quarters, and then the church and cemetery, 
with Evans's Battery on the high level behind it. This 
battery flanked the south side of Innes's post, and provided 
a good frontal defence as well; 2 and Innes's post flanked 
the whole of this Western front, which, except at that post 
itself, was never seriously attacked. Two batteries had 
been started, but had not made much way when the siege 
began, one at either end of the slaughter-house range. 

These then were the several outposts and supporting 
posts that lay at the angles and along the faces of the four 
fronts of the position. Their defensive features have now 
to be described. 

Along the whole of the North front, 8 the line of defence, 
following as it did the edge of the high bank, had been 
scarped down. The earth obtained thence, and from a 
small ditch dug along the foot of the scarp, had been used 
to form a sort of crest of the glacis formed by the sloping 
ground in front. Ordinary obstacles had been placed along 
the ditch and the glacis to hamper the rush of the enemy, 
but they never came into play. The charge, or attack of the 
enemy, on this front never advanced as far as these obstacles, 
although it was the only front where there was sufficient 
open space to admit of a large force being collected for 
a rush. These were the defences on the outside, so to 
speak. On the line itself, along the crest of the high bank, 
and in continuation upwards of the escarp, was a stout, 
strong, seven-foot-high parapet, revetcd with gabions and 
fascines, topped with sand - bags, and finished with a 
banquette for musketry. 

The Redan Battery flanked the whole of this front with 
artillery fire, and also, in combination with the guns along 
the curtain, afforded a powerful frontal defence. 

1 Plate IV. 2 Plate III. :! Plate II. 



DESCRIPTION OF THE ENTRENCHMENTS 107 

Some buildings left on the low ground below were not 
utilized by the enemy, and were eventually demolished. 

Beyond Innes's post, the spur on which it was built pro- 
jected for a considerable distance into the enemy's ground, 
and at its end was a small mosque ; but neither the ground 
nor the mosque was used by the enemy. The roof of 
Innes's post being parapeted, and commanding all the 
adjacent ground, was the most valuable feature of the 
defensive arrangements in that direction. 

At the eastern end of the Northern front the line of 
parapet, which was high at the Hospital, descended gradu- 
ally as it formed the flank of the Treasury or Bail)- Guard 
post in the eastern front of the Hospital. 

The defences of the Eastern front 1 were quite different 
from those of the Northern. They did not run along the 
edge of the high ground that could be scarped, nor, on the 
other hand, was there any wide spread of ground in front. 
The whole of this front had as its first line of defence the 
high boundary-wall of the grounds of the Residency and of 
the buildings attached to it. Along the northern half of 
this front, that is along the Treasury or Baily Guard post 
and Dr. Fayrer's, this wall was lined and strengthened 
inside by a musketry parapet ; along all the southern por- 
tion it was merely loopholed, but its trace, except before 
Saunders's and Sago's posts, gave strong cross-flanking de- 
fence. Behind the boundary-walls the front walls of the 
verandahs of the buildings were continued right and left up 
to the partition-walls of the grounds ; the archways were 
bricked in, and the whole was loopholed so as to give a 
second line of frontal fire. Behind the advanced or out- 
posts there were, it will be remembered, the supporting- 
posts with parapets and loopholes in front, and numerous 
flanking bends in the walls. 

At the north-east angle of the Post-office position- was 
a battery which flanked the whole of the immediate front 
of the Baily Guard post. 

The expectation of the defence on this front was that 
there could be no strong artillery attack which would not 
be subdued by musketry, and that without artillery any 

1 Plates I. and VIII. 2 Plate VIII. 



10S THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

attack would have a succession of barricades to capture, 
which would probably prove beyond its power. 

Its weakest point was at the angle where the Eastern 
and Southern fronts met, 1 at the Cawnpore Battery and 
Anderson's post, liable as it was to attack by a quarter 
circle of the enemy's surrounding position. 

So the obstacles at this site were made specially strong 
with palisading, chevaiix-de-frise, stakes, crows'-feet, and 
the like, while the parapets and walls of the buildings were 
pierced by loopholes, and otherwise prepared for all the 
musketry defence possible. 

Along the southern advanced front 2 the position was 
unique ; it was formed by a continuous line of buildings 
which had been strongly loopholed for frontal musketry 
defence, its flanking defence being entrusted to the Cawn- 
pore Battery. There was no protection or defence to these 
buildings against artillery fire beyond musketry range ; but 
the debris on the other side of the road which ran close 
along our outline was expected to shield them from low- 
aimed breaching fire. They were also lined by a continuous 
row of small shops, of which no account seems to have 
been made at first. 

As has been mentioned already, one building, Johannes' 
house, which it had been meant, if not to utilize, then to 
blow up at the last moment, was not brought into use, but 
was left at its full height at the beginning of the siege. 
This was at once found to command and paralyse the 
Cawnpore Battery. It became the object of sorties, and the 
cause of much anxiety till it was eventually blown up by 
our mine. At the west end of the South face there was 
a re-entering angle of ground covered with the ruins of 
native houses, which was protected by the cross fire from 
the Sikh square and Gubbins's front. But all these debris, 
including those in front of the South face, were found to 
be the most dangerous starting-points and shelters for the 
enemy's mines. 

At the angle of the South and West fronts, 3 the salient 

of Gubbins's post was one of the weakest points. of the 

position, being inadequately flanked on the west, and was 

the object of ceaseless attack by the enemy. Otherwise it 

1 Plate VII. - Plates VI. and VII. 3 Plate V. 



DESCRIPTION OF THE ENTRENCHMENTS 109 

was well defended, being lined by outhouses well parapeted 
and loopholed. The Western face, between Gubbins's and 
Innes's posts, consisted of a continuous line of outhouses, 
which were loopholed and parapeted. There was no real 
flanking defence ; two batteries, which were meant to flank 
it from near its middle, having only been begun ; while the 
fire from Innes's post was only musketry, though there was 
frontal artillery fire from Evans's Battery at its neck. But 
the ground before this face was broken and rugged, sloping- 
down roughly to a ravine which ran along, about 200 yards 
in its front, towards the river. 

The weak feature in the design of the defences was the 
want of flanking fire except on the Northern front and 
before the Baily Guard. Elsewhere it was too slight, or 
actually wanting. As to the artillery of the defence, it may 
be briefly stated, that there were more guns than could be 
manned, and that guns were, from the first, placed at every 
point except one, which seemed to afford a suitable site 
for a battery for either frontal or flanking fire. That one 
point was Innes's post. The reason for the omission was 
that the post was held to be too exposed and dangerous, 
while the placing of guns there would give the enemy 
too tempting a reason for a powerful assault. In fact, a 
gun was placed in position there one night in August and 
withdrawn the next night. 

It may be observed that many of the guns, especially the 
field-guns, were moved about from time to time. Besides 
eight mortars at convenient spots, guns were permanently 
placed in position as follows — 

Along the North face, some seven guns, besides three in 
the Redan. Three in rear of the Baily Guard gate, and 
one or two in Fayrer's post. Four in the Post-office 
grounds, two of them to enfilade the front of the Baily 
Guard post, and two for defence to the east. Three in the 
Cawnpore Battery. Two at the Sikh square and Gubbins's 
post. Three, called Evans's Battery, at the high bank over- 
hanging the cemetery, at the neck of the spur leading to 
Innes's post. 

The batteries and gun positions formed during the siege 
will be described at the proper time. The whole force, 
English, natives, and volunteer civilians, with the exception 



no THE EIRST DEFENCE OE THE RESIDENCY 

of the company of the 84th Foot, which was held in reserve, 
were distributed permanently, as their garrisons, to the 
different posts. That reserve of the 84th was lodged in the 
Residency building, and was only once called out, on the 
occasion when a breach was made by a mine in the rampart 
of the Sikh square. 

The posts to which only English soldiers were attached 
were — 

The Redan, the Cawnpore Battery, the slaughter-house 
post. 

The following posts were held entirely by Sepoys — 

The Hospital post. 71st and 48th N. I. ; the Baily Guard 
Post, 13th N. I. ; Germon's post, Sikh Infantry; Sikh 
square, Sikh Cavalry. 

All other posts, supports as well as outposts, were held 
by a combination of English and native soldiers and 
volunteers, generally in equal proportions, about thirty to 
each post. 

Such, then, were our several posts, their defences, their 
artillery, and their garrisons. The buildings that did not 
form defensive posts will be dealt with later on. 

These entrenchments were by no means finished and 
ready on July 1st; that is, they had not developed into the 
full strength hoped for ultimately. But the essential prin- 
ciple that had ruled their construction was that they must 
grow by degrees, as time and circumstances permitted ; 
and the fact must not be forgotten, that during that con- 
struction, though there had been no actual stoppage, there 
had been constant interruptions, interferences, and changes 
in details, owing to the alarms from the city, the mutiny in 
the cantonment, the rising of the police, the threatenings 
from every direction, and the need of safeguarding the 
families all the time. Further, the work involved was not 
confined to the defences, but to the storage of supplies, of 
cattle, and of ammunition, and the housing and the sanitary 
conservancy arrangements of the families and garrison, 
Christians, Mahomedans, and Hindoos. 



CHAPTER III 



ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEFENCE 

WHEN the morning of July 2nd saw the whole force con- 
centrated in the Residency entrenchments, there was some 
of the defensive work requiring immediate completion ; 
much confusion still prevailed ; and many of the existing 
arrangements needed prompt rectification, owing to the 
pressure with which the investment had begun. 

It may help to give an insight into that pressure if the 
distance of the enemy's line of sharpshooters from our walls 
and parapets be described. These distances were — 
Along the North face, the Captan Bazar ... 120 yards 



On the Eastern face, opposite the Baily Guard 
On the Eastern face, more to the south 
Along the Southern face 
Alone the Western face 



50 yards 
25 to 50 yards 
13 yards 
not close 



The total number of souls in the garrison was 3,000, of 
whom the combatants were 1,720, and the non-combatants 
1,280. 

The 1,720 combatants included — 

British officers (including medical) ... ... ... 133 

British N. CO. and men 671 

Christian drummers ... ... ... ... ... 51 

Volunteers (being all civilians capable of bearing arms) 153 

Total Christians ... ... ... ... ... 1,008 

Native Troops ... ... ... ... ... ... 712 

Grand Total 1,720 



The 1,280 non-combatants were :- 

Christians — Women' 
Children 

Boys 

Others 

Total ... 

Natives 

Grand Total 



240 

270 

5o 

40 

600 

680 

[,280 



The distribution of the combatants among the several 
posts along the four fronts and in the Residency has been 
already described. 



ii2 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

Many of the English families were sheltered in the lower 
storeys of the following outposts — Fayrer's, the Post-office, 
the Martiniere, the Brigade mess, and Gubbins's. They 
were also housed in the lower storeys of the interior build- 
ings, such as the Residency, Ommanney's house, the 
Begum Kothi, and those in the rear of the Brigade mess. 
The boys were in the Martiniere. The native non-com- 
batants were almost all in the sheds and yards of the out- 
houses of the Western front. The general hospital was 
arranged in the lower storey of the large double-storeyed 
building called by that name, at the north-east angle of 
the position. This and the minor local hospitals were fully 
organized, though there was a serious want of chloroform 
and anaesthetics generally. 

Except the Staff and the Engineers, the whole body of 
the inmates of the position, combatants or non-combatants, 
were distributed among the several posts ; a commandant 
was appointed to each, and all its garrison and occupants 
were under his orders, and not allowed to stir from it 
without his leave. Each commandant was responsible for 
full knowledge of all the details and arrangements of his 
post ; for its defence if it was an outpost, for a thorough 
and vigilant watch of all that went on in it and in its front, 
for prompt report of any dangerous or unusual occurrence, 
and for taking any immediate action that might be 
necessary. 

Most of the servants had deserted, and consequently the 
cooking and other household duties for the families de- 
volved frequently on the ladies. The native non-combatants 
were all assigned specific duties — mostly in connection with 
the Commissariat department. 

Thanks to Sir Henry's forethought, a very large amount 
of live stock had been collected, and a vast quantity of all 
essential food supplies had been stored, through the agency 
and exertions mainly of the Commissariat officer, Captain 
James, and the district officer, Simon Martin, supplemented 
by friendly help from Talookdars and others. But, as it 
had to be stored away at once wherever room for it was 
found available, doubts, and eventually mistakes, arose as 
to the amount that had really been collected. This was 
owing mainly to the fact that Captain James, the Com- 
missariat officer, was wounded in the knee at Chinhut, and 



ARRANGEMENTS EOR THE DEFENCE 113 

thus debarred from that personal supervision and investi- 
gation which would otherwise have been a matter of course. 

As it was, however, a few officers were told off as assist- 
ants to the Commissariat, for the distribution of the food ; 
a scale was fixed (and altered from time to time) of the 
supply of each class of food — meat, vegetables, bread-stuff, 
and so on — to every inmate of the position, combatant 
and non-combatant, man and woman, adult and child, 
Christian, Mahomcdan, and Hindoo. Early every morning 
the commandant of each post sent to the Commissariat a 
list of his garrison ; and the full authorized supply of food 
was sent over accordingly for each garrison, which had 
to make its own arrangements for the cooking and for 
distribution, to a common mess or to individuals as the 
case might be. 

Thus it happened that throughout the whole course 
of the siege no one had to search for food, no one felt 
any actual dearth of food ; though all were affected by its 
poverty and meagreness, and especially by the want of fresh 
vegetables, and consequently suffered in health. 

A few messes, a few individuals, and two or three shop- 
keepers, had laid in small stocks of wine, beer, spirits, and 
comforts and supplies of various kinds ; but most of them 
were soon exhausted. The British troops had their regular 
ration of rum throughout the siege. 

It seems almost needless to say that, during the siege, 
no fresh supplies of any kind were or could be introduced. 

A look-out was kept up, as part of the duty, at every 
post ; but a specially important post of observation was 
established at a high storey of the Residency, whence every 
movement of the enemy's troops could be seen and reported ; 
and the actual result of this vigilant watch was that every 
attack and aggressive step of the enemy was anticipated ; 
every attempt, except one, to effect a breach in our 
defences was foiled and checkmated. 

What has been described will, I hope, answer fully the 
question so frequently asked — How did we get food ? 

And what has been shown as to the residents of each 
house and post being strictly confined to it, and not allowed 
to stir from it, as also respecting the small size of the 
position, the closeness of the investment, and the fact that 
every bit of open space was under the converging fire of 

I 



ii4 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

sharpshooters in the upper storeys of the more distant 
buildings around us, will answer another question — less 
frequent but grimly ludicrous — Were we not able to drive 
about in the evenings ? 

It has been already mentioned, that most of the servants 
had deserted, and that ladies had consequently to under- 
take household duties. They were also valuable as nurses, 
and for the sewing work required for powder-hose and the 
like appliances. 

Except a very few of the soldiers who had been artizans 
in their younger days, we had no smith or carpenter except 
two natives, who proved invaluable. 

The British regiment which formed the backbone of the 
defence, the 32nd, was the Cornwall regiment ; and fortu- 
nately contained in its ranks a sufficient number of Cornish 
ex-miners to form the nucleus for the guidance and train- 
ing of the men of the several posts when the time arrived 
for taking to mining defence. 

The water supply was fortunately very good and abund- 
ant, and sanitation had been provided for by the storage 
and distribution of large quantities of charcoal and lime, 
over the whole area of the position. 

It is impossible to over-estimate the prevision and fore- 
thought by which all essential wants had thus been antici- 
pated, in the very midst of the storm of mutiny and alarms 
and wild anxiety. 

Sir Henry, alas ! lived barely sufficiently long to see that 
there was hope that his efforts might end in a successful 
defence. The concentration was complete by one o'clock 
on the early morning of July 2nd. He went round, a few 
hours later in the dawn of that morning, inspecting every 
post and garrison, and impressing on it what it had to do, 
and steadying them all to their duty. One shell had 
already burst in the room in the Residency which he had 
selected for himself, and now, on returning there after his 
round, another burst about eight o'clock, wounding him 
mortally. On the 4th he died, amid the grief of those who 
felt that they owed their lives to him. Having previously 
received the assent of the Government, he named Major 
Banks as his successor in the civil administration, and 
Brigadier Inglis in the military command, associating with 
them, to form a council, his chief engineer, Major Anderson. 



ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEFENCE 115 

Major Banks's diary tells of Sir Henry's injunctions for 
the conduct of the defence : to check and control the 
firing ; to spare and shelter the Europeans ; to organize 
working arrangements for the hours of night ; to entrench, 
to retrench, to traverse the enemy's fire ; to enroll all native 
non-combatants for employment and pay them liberally ; 
to make an inventory of all ammunition and supplies, and 
watch carefully the daily expenditure ; to turn out all 
horses not needed for military contingencies ; to keep up 
all possible communication with British authorities else- 
where. 

These injunctions were of course subsidiary to the one 
great principle kept in the foreground from the first, never 
to yield or to show any other than a resolute front and 
bold heart. 

And it may be said, without fear of challenge, that his 
spirit and example inspired the garrison ; though the 
universal sense prevailed that the ship was now left 
almost without captain or rudder. So many officers of 
standing and repute, whose presence had been hoped for, 
had fallen : Handscombe in the mutiny at Murriaon ; Fisher 
in the mutiny at Sultanpore; and Case at Chinhut. Brigadier 
Gray had fallen into ill-health. Even Major Anderson — 
wisest and shrewdest of counsellors — who had served at 
Ghuznee and in the Afghan War, was suffering from a 
mortal complaint, which carried him off in another six 
weeks. And, singular to say, with this abnormal dearth 
of officers of experience, the one man who had shown 
marked capacity, coolness, and resolution, who had planned, 
guided, and carried out the concentration from the Mutchi 
Bhown, Colonel Palmer, was passed over in absolute silence, 
and never heard of more either for an adequate command 
or for Staff duty. It may be safely assumed that had Sir 
Henry Lawrence survived sufficiently long to learn how 
Colonel Palmer had played his part in the withdrawal from 
the Mutchi Bhown and the concentration in the Residency, 
a position of suitable responsibility would have been allotted 
to him. But, as has been shown, a few hours of the early 
morning, spent in hard and anxious work, were all the 
time that elapsed between the concentration and the hour 
of Sir Henry's mortal wound. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENEMY 

WHILE the garrison of the Residency was thus settling 
down to its defence, what were the enemy about ? 

The regiments that had fought at Chinhut followed up 
the retreating troops, and gradually crossing the river 
lower down, reached and surrounded the Residency, and 
pressing its defenders hard, invested it closely by the night 
of June 30th. They were accompanied by the three bodies 
of Talookdars' men who had been present at Chinhut — 
Khan Ali Khan's from Mohomedabad, and the followers 
of the chiefs of Ramnugger Dhumeyree and of Mahonah. 

After the arrival of the Chinhut force, they were joined 
by the two local regiments in the west of Lucknow, the 
military and the city police, and also the Afreedies 
(Afghans) of the town of Mulhiabad. 

It would appear that their success at Chinhut was 
unexpected — was in fact a surprise to the mutineers, 
especially in respect of its completeness ; for which not only 
they but the whole of the rebel party and their leaders 
were quite unprepared. The troops, as has been said, 
followed on sharp and pressed the investments at once and 
closely, but they were without guidance, and lost heavily 
both on June 30th and July 1st. Thence it was that, some- 
what sick of fighting, they left their posts on the night of 
July 1st for a bout of revelry in the city, and so let the 
Mutchi Bhown garrison march in and concentrate without 
molestation. Their leaders, instead of commanding them, 
were engaged in court intrigues, and, beyond assigning 
the western front of the attack to the Talookdars' men, did 
not organize the military arrangements till June 7th. 

These court intrigues and the organization of the new 
native Court and Government were matters of considerable 
moment, for until they were settled, the military oper- 



THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ENEMY 117 

ations against the British entrenchments were somewhat 
chaotic. 

At first there were three candidates for the chief power. 

I. The Fyzabad Moulvie, Sekunder Shah, also known 
as Ahmed Oolla Shah. 

II. Suleiman Kudr, a relative of theOude Royal Family. 

III. Birjis Kudr, a son of the King of Oude by one of the 
most energetic of his wives, the Huzrut Mahul, generally 
known henceforward as the Begum. 

The Moulvie had no powerful supporters. The cavalry, 
including Burkut Ahmed, who had commanded at Chin- 
hut, were in favour of Suleiman Kudr ; while the infantry 
and the old Durbar officials and courtiers seemed to 
espouse the cause of Birjis Kudr; who was at length, on 
June 7th, selected and proclaimed Nuwab in the place of 
his father, now a State prisoner in Calcutta. 

Ressaldar Shahabut Deen, of the 15th Cavalry, installed 
Birjis Kudr on the throne, and proclaimed the conditions 
of his elevation. All orders from Delhi were to be obeyed 
implicitly. The army was to select the Prime Minister 
and the commandants of regiments. The Government 
was not to interfere with the army in regard to the treat- 
ment of the English and of their friends. The pay of the 
troops was to be doubled. 

In full accord with the tone of this farcical arrangement 
was the selection of the Ministry. The Prime Minister 
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were the ex-officials 
Sharf ood Dowlah and Maharaja Balkishen, who had held 
those posts under the late Nuwab. The Chief Justice was 
Mummoo Khan, the Begum's favourite. The War Minister 
was Rajah Jeylal Singh, a Lucknow courtier ; while the 
men put in command of the troops and the charge of the 
siege, were not Burkut Ahmed and others who had shown 
some fitness to lead the troops, but two Lucknow courtiers, 
Meer Mehndee and Mozuffur Ali, a nephew of the Prime 
Minister, and Ressaldar Kasim Khan, of the 12th Cavalry. 
So much the better for the defence ! As was certain to 
result from such ludicrous appointments and such subser- 
vience to the troops, the latter threw off all semblance of 
discipline or obedience to authority. 

When on July 7th the new commanders proceeded to 



u8 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

assign the various regiments to the posts surrounding the 
Residency, the troops would have naught to do with orders 
or control. They would hold only such posts as they 
selected for themselves, and placed their artillery where 
they chose. But the three bodies of Talookdars' men 
obeyed orders. The posts which the Sepoys avoided 
were filled by former retainers of the Court, and by men of 
the aboriginal race, called rPasees, noted as spies and as 
miners, many of whom were armed with only bows and 
arrows. 

It may be here stated at once, that the siege was 
marked throughout its whole duration by this want of 
organization, of discipline, of military spirit, and of courage, 
and also by the absence of any sign of military knowledge 
or skill or leadership on the part of the investing force. 
Some crude devices which they occasionally adopted 
showed glimpses of ingenuity. But they never, except at 
the end of the siege, formed a battery, or maintained a 
continuous fire, or attempted to breach the defences with 
their artillery. They kept their guns in isolated and 
sheltered nooks and corners, and fired them at random, 
hitting mainly the upper parts of the buildings and 
defences ; their shots going in large numbers clear over 
the entrenchments, and plunging into their own posts 
beyond. The most effective and mischievous step which 
they took was to excavate shelter-trenches, from which 
and from the buildings they occupied they rained a cease- 
less fire of bullets into the grounds and buildings ; their 
marksmen systematically making our loopholes and em- 
brasures their special aim. It was to this feature of their 
attack more than to any other cause that our continuous 
daily loss of life was due. And it was because they were 
sheltered in the lower storeys and in the inner courts of 
the buildings, where bullets could not penetrate, and from 
which they were ruthlessly prevented from stirring, that 
the women and children had practically complete immunity 
from the dangers of the fire of the enemy. 

Besides guns more or less worthless, the enemy had two 
good light field batteries (twelve guns), and also the eight- 
inch howitzer which they had captured at Chinhut. These 
they moved about from place to place, and used when the 



THE PROCEEDINGS OE THE ENEMY 119 

desire seized them. Their store of ammunition for these 
guns was small, and after a while they had no shells to use 
for the howitzer except those that, thrown from our own 
mortars, had failed to burst. 

The indiscipline of the enemy has been described. Both 
before and after the rebel Government was formed, they 
occupied only such posts as they chose ; keeping up, how- 
ever, a heavy and continuous fire, but doing very little 
harm in proportion. On the 9th some 300 men made a 
show of attacking the Baily Guard gate, but were easily 
repulsed. And then on the 12th and for the next few days 
they showed signs of occupying and fortifying a position 
facing Gubbins's at a distance of about 100 yards. 

It was to such measures as these that the efforts of the 
enemy were restricted during the first stage of the siege. 
They had not as yet been joined by any other regular 
troops either from the Cawnpore direction, or from those 
who, after mutinying, had hovered in the western districts 
of Oude, instead of going either to Cawnpore or to Delhi. 

From Delhi they heard that fighting was going on, but 
from Cawnpore they heard of the successive steps and 
victories of Havelock's advance ; and as he gradually 
approached Cawnpore, it behoved the besiegers of Luck- 
now to take more vigorous action. So they resolved on a 
bold stroke ; and set the Pasees, who had joined them in 
the investment, to construct a mine from the Captan Bazar 
against the Redan Battery. The Pasees were an aboriginal 
tribe, skilled in the use of the bow, and expert miners. 

At this point we will leave the besieging troops and turn 
to the British garrison. 



CHAPTER V 



FIRST STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 

To revert to the defence ; on Sir Henry Lawrence's 
death, the important charges, civil and military, were thus 
held— 



Chief Commissioner ... 

His Secretary 

Brigadier- General Commanding ... 
Head of his General Staff ... 
Head of the Commissariat ... 
Chief of the Defensive arrangements 
Commanding the 32nd Regiment ... 
In command of the Artillery 
Garrison Engineer ... 
Commissary of Ordnance ... 

Senior Surgeon 

Surgeon of the General Hospital ... 
Residency Surgeon ... 



Major Banks 
Mr. Cooper 

Brigadier-General Inglis 
Captain Wilson 
Captain James 
Major Anderson 
Major Lowe 
Captain Simons 
Captain Fulton 
Lieutenant Thomas 
Surgeon Scott 
Surgeon Boyd 
Surgeon Fayrer 



The outposts and their supports were at first commanded 
by the following officers, but changes afterwards occurred 
in these commands owing to casualties and other causes : — 



Innes's post 

The North curtain 

The Redan Battery 

The Hospital post 

The Baily Guard post 
Fayrer's post ... 

Saunders's post 

Sago's post 
Germon's post 

Post-office 

Anderson's post 

Cawnpore Battery and Deprat's post 

Martiniere post 

Brigade mess ... 
Sikh square 

Gubbins's post 

Outhouses' post 
Evans's Battery 



Lieutenant Loughnan 
Colonel Palmer 
Captain Lawrence 
Lieutenant Langmore 
Lieutenant Aitken 
Captain Weston 
Captain Saunders 
Lieutenant Clery 
Captain Germon 
Lieutenant McCabe 
Lieutenant Robert Anderson 
Relief of Captains 
Mr. Schilling 
Colonel Masters 
Lieutenant Hardinge 
Captain Forbes 
Captain Boileau 
Captain Evans 



Before the siege began some of the officers and men 
may have had occasional nights off duty, but from the 



FIRST STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 121 

first da) r of the investment tin's ceased. No soldier ever 
had what is eallcd a night in bed ; every one slept in his 
uniform, and with his weapons beside him. 

From the first day of the concentrated defence, under 
the spirit roused by Sir Henry Lawrence, the fiercest energy 
marked the efforts of the garrison to place the position and 
the arrangements in order, and to secure the gaps and 
strengthen the weak points in the defences. The cattle 
and the horses had, many of them, got loose in the first 
confusion. These were collected and sheltered. The cattle 
were then driven over to the sheds which had been 
prepared for them ; a certain number of horses were 
selected and picketed in the Sikh squares or elsewhere ; 
while the rest were turned out at night and driven off. Most 
of them, however, straggled back, wandered about close 
under the parapets, and were shot down, creating a horrible 
stench for several days. The greater part of the wheat had 
been stored in the church, and from the first its removal by 
degrees to the exposed positions was steadily carried on. 

The river front, it had been hoped, would for a while 
at least remain a part of the defence, and consequently a 
large portion of the powder and ammunition had been 
stored in pits in the ground there outside the Hospital 
post ; but its removal, though a matter of grave necessity, 
was not attempted till July 22nd. Close to this magazine 
some tents had been left standing, and near the tents a 
large quantity of Bhoosa (fodder for cattle) had been stacked. 
The enemy managed to set this stack on fire on the night 
of July 3rd, and a party of officers, under Lieutenant Fletcher, 
went out and cut down the tents, levelling them, to prevent 
their getting fired ; otherwise terrible disaster might have 
resulted from their closeness to the magazine. 

But of course more important than all else were the 
defences themselves ; and working parties, that took up 
nearly the whole garrison, were for the first few days kept 
sedulously employed all night on them, and on the 
obstructions attached to them. 

The weakest points in the trace of the position, in 
consequence of gaps being left in the work in progress, 
were at Gubbins's post and at the Cawnpore Battery. Both 
of these were at once worked at vigorously. At Gubbins's 



122 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

post, not only were the parapets completed, but the ground- 
work was started of a valuable battery at its salient angle. 
At the Cawnpore Battery, the line of parapets and obstruc- 
tions connecting it with Anderson's post to its left and 
Deprat's shop to its right was finished, and made continuous, 
leaving the whole circle and trace of defences without a gap 
of any kind. 

More than this, these defences were, throughout the 
whole line of the position, worked at in respect of repairing, 
heightening, and strengthening them, and increasing the 
obstructions and the facilities for free defensive movement, so 
as to satisfy the requirement, which the engineers had decided 
to be essential. It was this. The obstructions and impedi- 
ments must be such that they would of themselves check 
the rush of an enemy, and keep him at a standstill for the 
few minutes that would ensure the full fire of the front, 
both direct and enfilade, coming into play, and the full 
strength of the local garrison being collected to repel the 
efforts of the assailants to break through the defences into 
the entrenchments. 

Most of the external obstructions — trenches, palisades, 
abattis, crows'-feet, trous de loup, and the like — had been 
finished before the investment began ; but where they were 
found to be wanting, they were completed at each post by 
a few of its garrison in the darkness of night. Then the 
parapets were raised by sandbags, some of the weaker 
points were supported by shelter-trenches, loopholes were 
multiplied, the sites of the gun emplacements were improved 
and drained, and traverses were erected at the Baily Guard 
gate, at the Hospital gate, and in the street facing Johannes' 
house — the start of a system of retrenchments to meet the 
chance of any successful attempt of the enemy on the first 
line of defence, and also to protect the passage of the roads 
behind them. 

By the end of a week, that is by the 8th or 9th of July, 
the improved condition of the defences, the organized 
vigilance which had been established, the conduct of the 
enemy, and the increased spirit which the men of the 
garrison were now showing, combined to confirm the hope 
of a successful issue to the defence. 

The enemy had confined their efforts to a ceaseless but 



FIRST STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 123 

aimless fire of musketry, and they had shown no serious 
signs of any intention to use their artillery for breaching 
the defences, or for any really effective purpose. 

On the other hand, two or three instances had occurred 
of a few bold men at the outposts (notably at the Redan 
and at Innes's post), stealing out, attacking and inflicting 
loss on the enemy's pickets, and spiking their guns. 

On July 7th there had been an organized sortie. This 
sortie was made against Johannes' house, which, as has 
been already mentioned, had been left standing opposite 
the Martiniere post, without its upper storeys having been 
demolished like those of the other buildings on the same 
alignment. It had consequently been found to command 
the Cawnpore Battery, and so it was decided to capture and 
destroy it. A body of some fifty men charged out from a 
door in the side wall of the courtyard of the Martiniere, 
broke into the building, and killed its garrison. But 
before the engineers could arrange the powder-bags for its 
demolition, the enemy showed in such force that the 
Brigadier recalled the party, and the object of the sortie 
was left unaccomplished. This episode, however, brightened 
up the garrison, as the enemy had suffered severely, and our 
loss consisted of only three men wounded. Still Johannes' 
house remained, encouraging the besiegers, and forming 
a thorn in our side for some time to come. 

The rains began on this day in full force, and cooled the 
air for a day or two, but only for a day or two. Intensely 
muggy heat then ensued ; the constant wet increased the 
discomfort of the men exposed to it, and cholera and 
sickness increased. The rain too did considerable damage 
to the parapets and defences, and made incessant work 
necessary to keep them in repair. One of its effects was to 
bring down a wall of the racket court, in which fodder for 
the cattle had been stored ; and it took many days to 
remedy the mischief thus caused. 

Minor attacks and threatenings of the enemy, both by 
night and day, kept the garrison on the alert. On the 
9th, and again on the 12th July, they charged up, about 300 
strong, towards the Baily Guard gate, but retired again 
after a very few minutes. On the 12th they threatened 
Gubbins's post, and were seen to be preparing emplacements 



i2 4 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

for guns round all the south-eastern angle of the position. 
On the 14th they began firing a gun for which they had 
prepared a site opposite the Brigade mess, damaging its 
upper storey and roof parapets. At this date, too, it was 
observed from the Redan that an earthwork of some sort, 
conjectured — and, as it proved, correctly — to be mining, 
was in progress in the Captan Bazar, near the end adjacent 
to the mosque that lay immediately below the Redan. 
The engineer of the post stole out in the dark and listened 
all over the ground near the apex of the Redan, but heard 
no sound. 

Meanwhile, there was not a word of news from the outer 
world ; a few spies had gone out, but none as yet had come 
back. And this was the state of matters when the first 
general attack on the position was made on July 20th. 

During the early morning, the officers on duty at the 
look-out in the Residency had sent in repeated reports of 
much movement of troops along the surrounding streets 
and roads ; and consequently the several garrisons had 
been warned to be on the alert, and the whole force was 
under arms and expecting an attack. 

At a quarter past ten it opened simultaneously round 
the whole position ; the signal being the explosion of the 
mine which had been aimed at the Redan, and of which 
the signs had been "seen, as already described, for several 
days. But the point at which it was blown up was 140 
feet distant from the Redan, which fully accounted for the 
sounds of its mining not being heard. The length of the 
gallery up to that point was 160 feet (as found by actual 
measurement taken by me on September 30), and the 
starting-point of the mine was 270 feet in a direct line from 
the apex of the Redan. The direction of the mine was 
about 20 degrees out of its proper bearing. 

This was the longest mine that the enemy ever attempted, 
and nothing occurred subsequently to indicate that they 
possessed the skill or the appliances necessary to enable 
them to carry out a mine which could have reached the 
Redan from the Captan Bazar, or any other shelter ground 
in that neighbourhood. 

On the signal for the attack being given by this explosion, 
a furious fire of musketry and artillery was begun all round ; 



FIRST STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 125 

and two large bodies of the enemy charged or rushed 
forward rapidly as if to storm the position, one at the 
Redan (where the mine had been exploded), and the other 
at Innes's post. 

The storming party at the Redan found themselves, 
obviously to their surprise, confronted by the battery whole 
and sound, instead of in ruins. They were received with a 
heavy fire from the Curtain as well as the Redan, both of 
grape and musketry, and, being in a mass, suffered severely. 
They faced the fire for only a few minutes, and then retired 
precipitately, never having really approached — much less 
reached — the obstructions through which they would have 
had to struggle. 

At Innes's post the attack was more prolonged and 
resolute, and at one time that post seemed to be in danger 
of being cut off in the rear, as the enemy pressed on 
towards the neck of the spur near the church. But the 
further they advanced, the more they were overlapped by 
the flanking fire from Innes's post on the one side and the 
western front on the other; and the more telling was the 
grape, at short range, of Evans's guns. So they, too, after 
a fairly brave effort, retired precipitately. A few of them, 
who had gone at the obstructions, got entangled in the 
abattis, could neither go forward nor withdraw, and were 
all shot down. 

Two comparatively minor assaults were made at the 
same time at the south-eastern and the south-western 
angles of the position. At the former, the enemy advanced 
against the group of three contiguous posts, the Cawnpore 
Battery, Anderson's, and Germon's. And at the latter, 
they attacked Gubbins's Bastion. 

The charge on the Cawnpore Battery was led by a 
standard-bearer, who was shot down as he reached the 
palisades, and none of his supporters ever advanced further. 
They were effectively checked by the obstructions, and 
finding themselves under a close and heavy fire, soon 
retreated as rapidly as they had advanced. Similarly a 
resolute fire and an unbreached line of defence speedily 
repulsed the attack at Anderson's and Germon's posts. 

The same success attended the defenders of Gubbins's 
post under Captain Forbes and Mr. Gubbins. 



126 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

Whilst these several assaults were being delivered, and 
indeed for some hours after such attempts had ceased, a 
furious fire of guns and of musketry was maintained over 
the whole circle of the position ; aimed, however, mainly 
at the crests of the parapets and the upper walls of the 
buildings. It damaged these considerably, but inflicted 
singularly slight loss on the garrison. The resulting 
casualties amounted only to four killed and twelve wounded, 
most of these occurring in the jubilant carelessness that 
ensued when the attack was felt to have been defeated, and 
to be subsiding. During the attack itself the men had 
behaved well, obeyed orders, kept under cover, and fired 
only at clear objects. By three o'clock the enemy's fire 
began to slacken ; by four o'clock the attack was at an 
end ; and the garrison was in the highest spirits. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE SECOND STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 

WE left the Lucknow garrison on July 20th, naturally 
jubilant over their repulse of the first great attack ; but this 
feeling of elation soon gave place to the enhanced anxiety 
arising from the mining tactics of the enemy coming on the 
top of the old chronic dangers, and the continued want 
of all intelligence from the outer world. The usual form of 
this new anxiety was the dread of being personally hurled 
into the air ; a dread quite reasonable in the occupants of 
those outposts that formed the outer line in the defences, 
such as the Brigade mess and the Martiniere. Our real 
danger, however, lay in the practicable breaches that the 
mines might make suddenly in the defences ; through which 
the enemy, duly prepared for the explosion, could rush 
forward in overwhelming numbers. 

This terrible risk and chance was, of course, specially 
present before the minds of the engineers ; and, under 
Major Anderson's direction, the following steps were im- 
mediately taken to meet it. 

I. The commanders of the several outposts told off some 
of their most intelligent men to listen, at short intervals, for 
sounds of mining, by laying their ears to the ground, and 
to report at once if they heard any suspicious sounds. 

II. The 32nd, being the Cornwall regiment, fortunately 
contained a few more or less skilled miners. So Sergeant 
Day and seven men — Hunter, Abel, Cummerford, Bonatta, 
Kitchen, Cullimore, and Farran — were selected to guide and 
instruct the several garrisons in their mining work, and 
to take part themselves in the more serious and urgent 
operations. 

III. In addition to counter-mines being immediately 
started wherever the enemy were found to be at work, 



128 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

shafts were at once sunk, and galleries begun at the most 
dangerous points, in the more exposed posts, such as 
Deprat's, Anderson's, Sago's, and Saunders's. 

IV. The system of retrenchments, already begun, was 
sedulously continued. These were works in rear of the 
front entrenchments, and commanding them ; and were de- 
signed to check any rushes or interruptions the enemy 
might make after a successful explosion and breach. 

At first the situation seemed desperate, as the enemy had 
unlimited labour at command, especially in the men of the 
Pasee tribe, known to be expert miners — while the garrison 
were very much pressed for labour of any kind, much more 
skilled labour — and the line they had to protect was more 
than a mile in length, half of it being close to sites held by 
the enemy, who could thence start their mines of attack 
unseen. Not only were we short of labour, but we were at 
first almost destitute of entrenching tools ; as the labourers 
had carried most of them off on June 30th, on the news of 
Chinhut suddenly arriving. But fortunately a search led 
one night to a valuable supply being found on the roof of 
Deprat's shop. 

These were the measures adopted under Major Anderson's 
orders to meet the further attacks expected in this new 
description of warfare ; Captain Fulton, aided by Sergeant 
Day, fixing on the details for the several posts, and the 
garrison of each post having to carry out whatever work 
was required there. These measures were initial and pre- 
cautionary. The enemy's attacks and efforts were, of 
course, to be met and foiled as they became known. 

As it was, they began at once at a few points. The fear 
was that they might take to mining all round, or at least 
at a large number of points, far beyond what we could 
effectually oppose or check. 

They continued their starting efforts of July 20th, by six 
fresh attempts on the 21st, three of them being lodgments 
at the foot of our defences, and the other three regular 
mining galleries driven underground from their own position 
against ours. 

The three lodgments were — 
No. 1, at the foot of the Redan. 
No. 2, in the shops lining the outside of the Martiniere. 



THE SECOND STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 129 

No. 3, at the foot of the stockade of Gubbins's post, 
where it approached the Sikh square. 

No. 1 was begun by a small party crawling up at night. 
They were detected in the morning, and forthwith driven 
off by musketry and grape from the Hospital post, and b.y 
grenades from the Redan itself. 

No. 2 was attempted by a party of Sepoys, who broke into 
the shops outside, and began to undermine the wall of the 
Martin iere, the floor of which was higher than the floor 
level of the shops and the street. But the garrison inside 
loopholed those walls immediately below the roofs of the 
shops, and dropped down hand-grenades into them, killing 
some of the enemy and driving the rest away. One of the 
loopholes was then enlarged into a hole, through which the 
garrison broke into the shops, barricaded them effectually, 
and so included them within the defences of the position, 
instead of their being merely neutral ground as heretofore. 

At Gubbins's post the enemy's effort was made by a com- 
paratively strong party, and was first met by a cross 
musketry fire ; after which the garrison made a sortie and 
drove the enemy from the position, which they never 
attempted to re-occupy. 

This was the fate of the three attempts to make lodg- 
ments for mines. 

The three galleries driven by the enemy and detected by 



sounds and signs were aimed at- 



1. The Cawnpore Battery. 

2. The Brigade mess. 

3. The Sikh square — 

all on the South face. They were started from behind 
walls or debris at points distant from thirty to sixty feet 
from our defences. 

At all the three posts that were threatened, shafts were 
at once sunk, and short galleries driven out to meet the 
enemy. The work was done by the 32nd for the Cawnpore 
Battery at Deprat's ; by the 71st N. I. at the Brigade mess ; 
and by the Sikh sowars at the Sikh square. 

At the two latter posts, the enemy's efforts seemed to 
cease at once, for some time at least, on hearing our men 
at work. At the Cawnpore Battery, though there too they 
stopped very soon, it was from a different cause ; for a 



130 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

peculiar incident occurred. The enemy as it turned out 
were driving their gallery at too high a level — in other 
words, at too shallow a depth below the surface — so that 
the ground gave way at some points and showed the site 
of the mine. On this, Lieutenant Bonham lobbed an eight- 
inch shell on to it with great precision from a mortar only 
a few yards off, laid it entirely bare, and so destroyed it. 
Thus for a time all these three mines were checked. 
A fourth mine had been started by the enemy without 
attracting our attention, directed against Sago's post on the 
East face. It was discovered, but not till the 29th, by its 
roof collapsing like that of the mine against the Cawnpore 
Battery ; only more completely, so as not to require any steps 
on the part of the defence. 

These two galleries — that is, those against Sago's and the 
Cawnpore Battery — were never proceeded with, or started 
afresh ; but in the case of the other two — those at the 
Brigade mess and the Sikh square — the enemy began 
working at them again after a short lull. 

Meanwhile, as all these three points that had been 
threatened on the South face were dangerous, Major Ander- 
son caused our countermines there to be driven well outside 
our line of defence to a length of at least twenty-four feet. 

The Deprat's Cawnpore Battery gallery was thus driven 
out thirty feet, and protective branches were then driven 
right and left, so as to intercept any mine the enemy might 
try to push forward there ; the extremities of the branches 
being charged and kept prepared for explosion in case of 
the enemy making a wider detour. 

The Brigade mess mine was driven out thirty-eight feet, 
and there halted, the enemy having by that time entirely 
ceased working. 

The Sikh square countermine met with some excitement. 
On reaching the distance originally ordered, of twenty-four 
feet, the enemy were again heard at work, and the gallery 
was turned so as to intercept them, and was there halted. 
Their miners at length reached our gallery ; when Captain 
Fulton broke down the thin film between the two mines, 
and drove our opponents out from their own gallery through 
their shaft from which it had been started. He then laid a 
charge at their end, and exploding it, destroyed that further 



THE SECOND STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 131 

part of it. The portion of their gallery in our direction 
remained uninjured, and this he retained for our own 
purposes. 

In fact, by August 1st all mining contests ceased for a 
while on both sides ; our work for the next few days lying 
in the continued sinking of shafts, and the starting of 
galleries at the exposed points, in anticipation of attack. 
One important fact, specially important to the defence, had 
been established. The soil was so stiff that the galleries 
needed no casings or supports of any kind. 

During this second stage, then, of the siege, the mining 
warfare which had been inaugurated may be thus sum- 
marized. The enemy had attacked the South face at three 
points and the East face at one. Two of these attacks had 
collapsed from the subsidence of their galleries ; and of the 
other two mines, one had been checked and the other captured 
by our countermines. We had begun a larger number of 
precautionary mines at the most exposed points ; and 
during the last of the three weeks of this period, no further 
signs had been seen of any fresh attempts of the enemy ; 
though, as the sequel will show, they were really hard at 
work. Our opponents' mines were well constructed, but 
they showed neither skill in managing nor courage in 
fighting them. 

During the whole of this stage there was a lull in ordinary 
fighting, and in assaults on our posts on the enemy's part ; 
but we made three small sorties — from Gubbins's on the 22nd, 
and the Redan on July 24th, and from Innes's post on August 
8th, chiefly to explore and to drive away lurking parties of 
the rebels. In the last of these, one of the enemy's guns 
was spiked ; the sorties were not attended with any loss, 
and they kept up the spirits of the garrison. 

The only step taken by the mutineers of sufficient import- 
ance to attract attention, was to plant a heavy gun opposite 
Innes's post, in the street leading southwards from the iron 
bridge, at a point called Hill's shop, where it could range 
across the whole Residency position. That gun was thought 
to have caused more loss of life than all the rest of the 
enemy's artillery, and it also occasioned many ludicrous and 
singular incidents. It first opened fire on July 31st; and 
the harm it did led to a battery being improvised for an 



132 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

eighteen-pounder at Innes's post ; the parapet being of earth, 
filled in between a brick wall on the outside, and a revet- 
ment of a double row of piles on the inside. This was made 
on the night of the 6th. The gun was placed in position 
in it on the night of the 7th. On the 8th, it entirely silenced 
the enemy's gun ; but General Inglis thought the position 
a dangerous one, as being a temptation to the enemy, and 
withdrew the gun the same night, August 8th. 

Besides the mining and the construction of this battery, 
engineer operations of other kinds were ceaselessly going 
on. Defensive works, new traverses, and retrenchments 
were erected ; the parapets on the north face were height- 
ened, all were being kept in repair and improved — a matter 
of urgent necessity owing to the damage done by the heavy 
rains, as well as by the desultory but unceasing fire of the 
enemy. Lastly, a new magazine was constructed in the 
underground rooms of a building in the centre of the 
position, called the Begum Kothi. Hitherto a very large 
quantity of the powder — 240 barrels — had been left x in an 
underground magazine which had been made in the grounds 
immediately at the foot of the eastern end of the Northern 
face ; and had remained covered by the debris of the tents 
that had been cut down on July 3rd, when the Bhoosa stack 
caught fire. Now, however, the officers of the garrison 
were formed into a working party, and on the nights of 
July 22nd and 23rd, removed the whole of the powder from 
that old magazine into the new one in the Begum Kothi. 

As regards the general state of the garrison, they were 
losing men daily from sickness, cholera fever, and small-pox, 
as well as from the continuous rain of desultory fire which 
the enemy kept up. There was one white-letter day during 
this stage. There was no death or burial on August 8th. 

It may be noted as a singular fact, that each of the four 
stages of the defence was marked by one death of special 
importance. During the first stage was the greatest loss 
of all, Sir Henry Lawrence. In the second stage, Major 
Banks, who had succeeded him as the head of the Adminis- 
tration, was killed on July 21st by a bullet while examining 
the enemy's position through a loophole. His death was 

1 Vide p. 121. 



THE SECOND STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 133 

felt to be a very serious loss, though he had not had time 
to make his mark on the defence. 

There remains to be mentioned the most exciting- 
feature of this stage — the first receipt of intelligence from 
the outside world. The news, however, told of little more 
than Havelock's presence at Cawnpore, and his intention to 
move on towards Lucknow. It was brought by a pensioned 
Sepoy named Ungud, who had been sent out with messages 
to our friends, and who now reappeared on July 22nd, 
two days after the first attack. He entered at Gubbins's 
post, and was at once taken to Mr. Gubbins, who had been 
in charge of the Intelligence Department. He brought no 
letter, but gave full tidings of Havelock's force and victories. 
Mr. Gubbins sent this information to General Inglis, and 
asked if he wished to send any letter by Ungud, who was 
anxious to start back at once. The General replied that 
he would not write ; on which Mr. Gubbins wrote a letter 
from himself to the Governor-General under cover to 
General Havelock, giving the particulars of the present 
situation of the garrison, and sent it off by Ungud. The 
reason for Ungud's desire to start at once was that the rain 
was heavy, which gave him the most favourable condition 
for evading the enemy's watch. 

Presently a letter for General Havelock reached Mr. 
Gubbins from General Inglis ; but it was too late ; Ungud 
had started. On the 25th, however, Ungud returned, this 
time bringing a letter from Colonel Tytler, A.O.M.G., which 
ran thus — 

"Your letter of the 22nd has reached us. We have 
two-thirds of our force across the river, and eight guns in 
position already. The rest will follow immediately. I 
will send over some news to-night or to-morrow. We have 
ample force to destroy all who oppose us. Send us a sketch 
of your position in the city, and any directions for entering 
it or turning it that may strike you. In five or six days 
we shall meet. You must threaten the rear of the enemy 
if they come out, and we will smash them. 

"(Signed) B. Frazer Tytler. 

"P.S. — We have smashed the Nana, who has disap- 
peared, and destroyed his palace, Bithoor. No one knows 
where his army has dispersed to, but it has disappeared." 



Now the letter to which this was a reply had been de- 
spatched exactly three days before, in which interval there- 
fore Ungud must have covered about one hundred miles 
of direct route, besides communicating with Colonel Tytler. 

The excitement on receipt of this news was intense. 
A reply was sent off on the following night, the 26th, to 
Colonel Tytler, giving a plan of the place, and such inform- 
ation as the General possessed, as well as suggestions for 
the route to be taken by the relieving force. 

It was confidently hoped that that force would appear 
in a few days. But day after day passed, and nothing was 
seen or heard of it, till on August 6th another of our spies, 
Aodhan Singh, the orderly of Brigadier Gray, returned, 
but without any letter ; reporting, however, that Have- 
lock's force had fought two successful engagements on 
the Lucknow side of the Ganges, but had been obliged 
to halt at Mungurwar owing to cholera and other causes 
of loss. 

To the garrison generally, this intelligence was very dis- 
heartening, though it was obvious that the check was no 
worse than was to be reasonably expected ; whilst all, save 
a few, were depressed from the constant watching and want 
of rest, besides suffering from the dread of the enemy's 
success in their efforts at undermining our position. 

This was the state of matters when the second stage of 
the siege was brought to a close by the second general 
all-round attack on August 10th. The same signs were seen 
from our look-out station as on July 20th ; so the posts were 
ready manned when the attack was opened. It began with 
the explosion of two mines, directed respectively against 
the Martin iere on the South face, and Sago's on the East 
face ; the explosions, which were practically simultaneous, 
being the signal for the commencement of a vigorous can- 
nonade and musketry fire all round, and for efforts to rush 
the two posts against which the mines had been directed. 
But those mines had fallen far short of the mark, though 
they had damaged the stockading of the Martiniere fifteen 
feet in front ; the distance accounting sufficiently for their 
not having been detected by the defence. The assailants 
were, as before, foiled and checked by not finding any 
breach; and being heavily punished by the fire of the 



THE SECOND STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 135 

defence, retired precipitately and did not renew their 
efforts. 

The attack, however, was not restricted to these two 
points in the line of defence. Avoiding the north-east 
angle, at the Hospital post, where they would have had 
a much longer distance to go over, besides being subjected 
to flanking fire from the Redan on one side, and from 
the Post-office Battery on the other, the enemy attempted 
to storm the other three of the four salients of the position 
— Innes's post on the north-west, Gubbins's on the south- 
west, and the Cawnpore Battery and Anderson's post on 
the south-east. All three parties were accompanied by 
scaling-ladders, but they were stopped by the obstacles in 
front, and never passed them ; they suffered heavily from 
the fire while thus checked, and then fled back to their 
own posts. Only at the Cawnpore Battery a few men 
penetrated as far as the ditch, and there finding themselves 
subjected to hand-grenades, speedily followed the example 
of their comrades. The attack did not last long ; but in 
the evening there was some fresh excitement, owing to a 
few adventurous Sepoys suddenly appearing inside the outer 
defences of Saunders's post ; where they were promptly 
shot down. 

It was ascertained afterwards that the enemy had lost 
more heavily on this occasion than on July 20th. Our casu- 
alties were seventeen, five being killed, of whom three were 
English. 

Before leaving the story of this second stage of the de- 
fence, it may be as well to explain its peculiar feature — the 
lull in the general fighting, while the mining attack was 
vigorous and pertinacious. Its cause was this : the bulk 
of the Sepoys were engaged up to about the 6th in 
watching and opposing Havelock, the local troops mainly 
continuing the investment ; while the Pasees, not being 
soldiers, but only workmen, were kept sedulously employed 
on the mines, working them excellently, but proving failures 
when it came to fighting. 



CHAPTER VII 

THIRD STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 

THE MINING 

After the second great assault the state of the garrison 
was this — 

Besides those who had been killed at Chinhut, we had 
lost ioo men of the 32nd and 84th since the beginning of 
the siege ; and many officers and faithful Sepoys had also 
fallen. The women and children were suffering terribly, 
not merely from losses of life and health, but from the 
reduction of shelter ; for many of the buildings were crumb- 
ling away, so that some had to be partly and others 
altogether abandoned as places of shelter for families. The 
Residency was nearly uninhabitable, and on the day after 
the assault, August nth, a large part of it fell in. Ander- 
son's and Deprat's, the two posts on the flank of the 
Cawnpore Battery, were nearly in ruins. On the other 
hand, the garrison had gained confidence in their ability to 
keep the enemy at bay in their attacks. They had thrown 
out defensive mines at three important posts on the south 
face — Deprat's (for the Cawnpore Battery), the Brigade 
mess, and the Sikh square ; shafts had been sunk and 
galleries started at Saunders's, Sago's, and other posts ; and 
the besiegers were showing no sign of making a simultaneous 
mining attack all round. 

This was the state of matters when the third of the four 
stages of the siege began. It was the longest of the stages 
by four or five days, and was marked by its ceaseless series 
of contests, and by the exciting incidents with which it was 
crowded. For this reason it will be expedient to devote 
two chapters to this stage, confining the present chapter to 
an account of the mining warfare. 

The greater part of this mining contest lay in the 



THIRD STAGE OF THE DEFENCE: MINING 137 

enemy's mines of attack and our countermines. Excluding 
those which developed on September 5th, the closing day of 
the stage, the besiegers attempted fourteen mines during 
this stage : seven on the Eastern face, viz. four at Saunders's 
post and three at Sago's ; three at Anderson's at the south- 
eastern angle ; and four on the southern face, viz. two at the 
Brigade mess and two at the Sikh square. In addition to 
these were two others which were still in progress when the 
third attack occurred ; viz. one on the West face at the church, 
and one on the North face towards the Redan. Omitting 
these two last, the other fourteen were serious efforts to 
breach the defences, carried out to the best of the enemy's 
power. They succeeded in one, the west mine at the Sikh 
square : the one at its east end was neutral in its effects. 
They were foiled in all the other twelve. 

It will be most convenient to describe these several 
efforts, and the countermines and other means by which 
they were defeated, post by post, rather than by order of 
date. 

Saunders's post was not known to be threatened till a 
comparatively late period, August 23rd, when the enemy 
were heard at work opposite the left corner (next the Baily 
Guard gate), where a shaft had been already sunk, and a 
gallery started. On the sounds being heard, the gallery was 
advanced towards the enemy till the 26th, when it was 
stopped, as by that time all sound of work had ceased. 
On the 31st, however, five days afterwards, they were again 
heard ; but as if they had started more to the right, and 
were driving from right to left slantwise across the front of 
the post and of our mine ; so our gallery was continued 
from where it had before stopped, but with a bend in an 
intercepting direction, till the enemy came close ; it was 
then loaded and fired, the explosion rendering that imme- 
diate neighbourhood unfit for further hostile mining. This 
occurred early on September 1st. But on the same evening, 
the pick was heard again at a third mine coming direct 
towards the middle of the post, where fortunately we had 
already as on the left sunk a shaft and started a gallery. 
We advanced this gallery to a length of twenty feet, and 
then diverged it to the right, to which the enemy had bent. 
There, on the afternoon of September 2nd, as we got close, 



133 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

we loaded and fired our mine while the enemy were still 
at work, again destroying all the ground. 

But this did not stop the rebels. We heard them a 
fourth time, on September 3rd. They were now evidently 
working from their old gallery, at right angles to it, towards 
our right, and parallel to our front, skirting the loosened 
ground. So a third shaft was sunk, this time at the right 
corner of the post, and a gallery driven outward. By the 
evening of September 4th, we had driven twenty-two feet, 
reached brickwork, and pierced through it. We heard 
the miners driving onwards in our direction, so we halted ; 
and then it appeared shortly that they were not coming 
quite straight, only very close to us. It then struck our 
engineer that the enemy on reaching this brickwork would 
think it was the wall of the post, and would immediately 
stop work, in order to arrange to load and explode the 
mine. This proved to be the case. On meeting the wall 
they ceased working. We picked quietly into the mine, 
enlarged the opening, and found the gallery full of light at 
the other end, with one of the miners seated in it. Before 
he could be shot or captured, one of our party sneezed ; the 
lights were at once put out, and the miner had disappeared. 
But we had gained possession of the mine ; as, however, the 
enemy commanded its entrance, we exploded it, using a 
double charge to destroy more of the ground ; a safe opera- 
tion, as it was at a considerable distance from our own line 
of defence. Thus, on the night of September 4th, ended 
the fourth attempt of the enemy to breach Saunders's post. 
It will be seen in the next chapter that this frustrated one 
of the main designs of the enemy in their plan of attack for 
the following day, September 5 th. 

We next come to Sago's post. It will be remembered 
that one of the features of the attack of August 10th was 
the springing by the enemy of a mine, directed against this 
post, but harmless from having fallen short of it. Next 
evening, August nth, the enemy returned to work at this 
mine. The first step taken against this renewed effort was 
a sortie next morning by twelve men of the 32nd led by 
Lieut. Clery, who commanded the post. This sortie failed, 
however, and had to return at once ; as it found itself met 
by a very strong covering party, all ready and on the alert 



THIRD STAGE OF THE DEFENCE: MINING 139 

to protect their miners. Our sortie was fortunate in return- 
ing without loss. A countermine was immediately begun, 
or rather a gallery was driven from a start which had been 
previously prepared. Both the mine and the countermine 
advanced rapidly towards each other ; and on their approach- 
ing sufficiently close, Lieut. Hutchinson, who was in charge, 
loaded the mine and exploded it, while the enemy were 
still heard at work with the pick. 

From this time the enemy avoided further molestation of 
this post till August 29th, but sounds having been then 
again heard, a second gallery was started, from its extreme 
salient; and on September 3rd, a third from its north-east 
end. Both mines were still in hand when the attack of 
September 5th took place. 

The next post to be dealt with is Anderson's. As it was 
exposed to the enemy's attack both on its eastern and its 
southern front, a shaft had been sunk early at its south- 
eastern corner. The signs and sounds on the eastern front 
led, on August 13th, after the contest at Sago's was ended, 
to a gallery being driven from that shaft eastwards ; which 
on the 1 7th had reached a length of thirty-six feet, and was 
then halted, for the time, as all hostile sounds had ceased 
But on the 23rd, the miners being again heard, though 
more to the left, a side gallery was driven from the first 
one, northwards, parallel to the face of the position, starting 
from a point twenty feet distant from the shaft. On the 
27th this too was stopped, and next day a third gallery was 
driven southwards from the shaft as sounds were heard in 
that quarter ; this was carried on for five days, till further 
work was not required for the time. At this post, therefore, 
three galleries had been driven to counteract the enemy's 
efforts, and had stopped them all without any actual 
contest. 

We come next to the Brigade mess. A countermine had 
been carried forward by us, before August 10th, from its left, 
to a length of thirty-eight feet, and then stopped and held 
for listening purposes. On August 20th, the miners were 
heard at work opposite the right of the post. On the 21st, 
therefore, a gallery from that end was started, which had 
reached a length of thirty-three feet by the 27th, when it 
was halted; while the progress of the enemy, who were 
still driving onwards, was watched. On the 29th they passed 



140 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

the head of our gallery, and then our miners working 
vigorously to the flank broke into their gallery, seized and 
held it as far as their shaft, and then loaded and exploded 
it at that end, destroying the shelter from which it had 
started. 

The rebels, however, seemed to be as determined here as 
against Saunders's post. For on September 3rd they were 
heard at work opposite the middle of the post, between the 
two galleries which had been already carried out and were 
still extant. To meet this new attack, Lieut. Hutchinson 
drove an intercepting gallery, parallel to the face of the post, 
from the left mine, starting from a point in it thirty feet 
from the shaft, so as eventually to meet our right mine, and 
form an underground road which should intercept any 
approach of the enemy between the two existing galleries. 
This countermine or listening gallery was still in progress 
on September 5 th. 

We now come to the Sikh square, which was the only 
post in which our opponents succeeded in effecting a breach ; 
a success due to their not having been detected ; owing, it 
was believed, to the noise made by the stamping of the 
Sikh cavalry horses picketed close at hand. 

The Sikh post consisted of three squares, one behind the 
other, the front facing the south ; its right or eastern flank 
being separated by a narrow lane from Gubbins's post, the 
front of which, as already described, was thrown further 
back than the front of the Sikh square. This lane, it may 
be [here mentioned, was swept by a gun which we had 
placed in position at its inner end. 

The enemy had begun two mines from their position 
before the Sikh square ; one directed at our left (the western), 
the other at our right (the eastern) end of its face. Since 
the horses were picketed along the eastern side of the 
square, bordering the lane above-mentioned, it was the 
eastern mine which was not discovered, and which effected 
the breach. The western mine had been detected, and on 
the 1 6th a gallery had been started, from the west end close 
to the Brigade mess, to meet it. These two mines, the 
enemy's and ours, had come quite close to each other, and 
preparations to load them for explosion were begun 
simultaneously by the enemy and ourselves on the morning 
of the 1 8th. Lieut. Hutchinson had laid his charge, and 



THIRD STAGE OF THE DEFENCE: MINING 141 

was tamping when the mutineers began a vigorous musketry 
fire on the post — evidently an attack — and our Sikh party 
of miners had barely time to clear out of their gallery and 
shaft when the enemy sprung both their mines. The one 
at the east end was effective, and made a large breach thirty 
feet wide in our line of defence ; the other had evidently 
not been tamped at all, and expended its force along both 
their own gallery and ours, but chiefly their own ; laying in 
ruins the shelter from which they had started. 

This explosion was, for the moment, expected to prove, 
as on July 20th and August 10th, the prelude to an all-round 
attack. But a few minutes sufficed to show that such was 
not the case, and that no such attack had been prepared. 
A rush was made by a small party of the enemy at the 
breach ; but they were at once shot down by our musketry 
from the Brigade mess, and from the second Sikh square 
(in the rear), which acted as a retrenchment. Another party 
made a lodgment at the outhouse at the end of the lane, 
to loophole the wall so as to fire along the inside of the 
breach. But our gun (a twenty-four-pounder howitzer) 
at the inner end of the lane quickly opened upon them 
and drove them off; another gun was now run down into 
the Sikh square so as to face the breach ; the reserve 
company (the 84th) appeared to reinforce the post ; and all 
available hands were set to work at both ends of the breach, 
carrying planks and doors and setting them upright in the 
opening, each in succession overlapping the preceding one ; 
till eventually the whole thirty feet of breach was barri- 
caded. This barricade was strengthened and finished off 
by earthwork and sand-bags during the following night. 

But in the course of the same afternoon (the 18th) we 
retaliated on the enemy by making a sortie from Gubbins's 
post, attacking and taking the shelter from which they had 
begun their mines, and destroying them all by hasty 
demolition. 

In fact the day which had begun so inauspiciously ended 
almost gleefully. Three officers and a few men had been 
blown up by the explosion, but had escaped almost un- 
harmed. Five men, however, were buried in the debris of 
the breach. It may be added that this was the solitary 
instance when the reserve had to be called out. 

During this stage therefore our antagonists had successfully 



142 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

driven and exploded one mine ; a second had been ex- 
ploded without any damage to us ; we had checked twelve 
other mines by our twelve countermines ; and had destroyed 
five of them by our explosions. 

As already mentioned, the besiegers had also been at 
work at two other mines, directed respectively against the 
Redan and the church, which came to nothing. 

It remains to describe the one mining operation in which 
we took the offensive. This was directed against Johannes' 
house, the one house which, as has been mentioned, was left 
close to our position without its upper storey having been 
demolished. Owing to this, the enemy's marksmen in it 
were able to play havoc from it in two or three directions, 
but especially with the Cawnpore Battery, which they 
practically silenced. It was, therefore, decided to under- 
mine and blow it up; and to me this exciting duty was 
assigned on August 17th. The mine had to be started from 
some point in the shops which we had barricaded, abutting 
on the wall of the Martiniere. Johannes' house could not 
be seen from within these shops, and the first step to be 
taken was to make a survey and plan of the essential points 
of the two positions, our own and the enemy's, to admit of 
a proper design for the operation. The survey was made 
by climbing on to the roof of the building, crawling along 
behind the shelter of its parapet wall, and taking (1) the 
positions of the sites of some shot-holes in that wall, and 
(2) bearings, through those shot-holes, of the chief points 
of the edifice to be attacked. I thus ascertained that the 
building was fifty feet long ; and distant forty feet from our 
wall, and thirty-four feet from where the edge of our shaft 
must be. The exact proper site for our shaft was also thus 
fixed. The plan decided on was to drive a gallery out for 
a length of fifty feet, which would bring us sixteen feet 
within the face of the building ; and then to drive branches 
right and left, each twelve feet long, which should end at 
thirteen feet from the side walls. At the ends of these 
branches were to be short returns, to form the chambers in 
which the charges should be laid. 

This plan was proposed and approved on August 17th, and 
the shaft was sunk and the mine started the same after- 
noon. It was kept as secret as possible for obvious reasons ; 
and the 32nd miners were the only men employed on it, 



THIRD STAGE OF THE DEFENCE: MINING 143 

with orders to work with as little noise as possible. To 
make its roof secure, casing was used for that portion of 
it which passed underneath the ditch and palisade outside 
the position. On the fifty-foot gallery being finished, two 
parties were set to work at the two branches. On the 
evening of the 20th the mine was finished, and it was 
arranged to fire it earl)- next morning. During the night, 
the four charges were laid, of one hundred pounds each ; 
and the hose by which they were to be fired was laid along 
the whole length of the gallery up to the shaft. The tamping 
was peculiar ; the long gallery was not tamped at all, but 
the junction of the branches at its end was tamped for a 
length of some ten feet, and their ends at the immediate 
neighbourhood of the charges were closely tamped and 
packed. 

It was arranged that on the mine being sprung, two sorties 
should be made right and left of the site of the explosion. 

At the earliest dawn of the 21st all was ready; not 
a sign had ever appeared of the enemy having suspected 
our design. A brisk fire of musketry was opened from 
our loopholes and that part of the position generally on 
Johannes' house, and the houses behind it. The enemy 
were aroused; they swarmed into Johannes' and the other 
houses, which were soon seen to be filled with lights ; then, 
when it began to grow sufficiently light, the hose was fired 
direct — without the usual intervention of a fuse — from the 
shaft, and in about a minute one shock was felt ; the whole 
of Johannes' house opened outwards, and collapsed like 
a house of cards. In the midst of the turmoil that ensued 
the two parties made their sortie, attacked and captured 
the adjacent houses, and lodging charges in them, destroyed 
them by hasty demolition. 

Thus fell what had been the great thorn in our side ; 
and on its fall, our Cawnpore Battery resumed its proper 
role of protecting the south-eastern angle of the position 
with its adjacent faces. The intensity of this mining con- 
test so strained the powers of the few engineers, that 
Lieutenant Hay of the 48th N. I., like Lieutenant Tulloch 
before him, had to be added to their strength, to relieve 
them of the supervision of the ordinary defences ; and most 
valuable was the aid the)- afforded. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THIRD STAGE: GENERAL INCIDENTS 

HAVING described the mining operations of this the 
third stage of the siege, we turn now to the contests and 
incidents of other kinds. 

The sortie that was made from Sago's post on the day 
after the second general attack has been already dealt with 
in connection with the mine there. A similar sortie was 
made on the 13th from Gubbins's post, against the shelter 
from which the enemy had made their effort at that point, 
on that second attack, three days before. The mutineers 
were driven off, but no mine was found, only a deep trench ; 
which, it was afterwards said, had been intended to act 
as a shelter-trench from musketry and artillery fire. 
Similar sorties were made into the same position on the 
1 8th and 19th (August), immediately after the enemy had 
breached the Sikh square ; but on these two latter occa- 
sions our parties took powder with them, and demolished 
the shelter that had been left, so as to make it useless for 
any hostile purposes. 

Then two sorties were made on the 21st simultaneously, 
to the right and left of Johannes' house, immediately on 
its being blown up. They were led by McCabe and 
Browne of the 32nd, and have been described in connection 
with that mine. 

Except at Sago's, in connection with the mine there, and 
at the Sikh square on the occasion of the breach (both of 
which events have been already described), the enemy 
entered on no contest with us at close quarters ; but they 
silenced the Cawnpore Battery on August 12th by their 
fire from Johannes' house, and they constructed batteries 
opposite the Baily Guard gate and Gubbins's post. 

Their action on the Cawnpore Battery led to the removal 
of one of its guns, and to the reduction of the garrison that 



THIRD STAGE: GENERAL INCIDENTS 145 

occupied it ; the men removed from it going into the 
adjacent posts, Dcprat's and Anderson's, though of course 
remaining on the alert for any possible attack on the 
battery. The silencing of the Cawnpore Battery was 
regarded by some as a disgrace. " We " (the besiegers) 
" were never silenced at Mooltan — we silenced many of 
the enemy's batteries " (the besieged) " instead," was the 
remark of a gallant major. He did not see that the correct 
inference was the reverse of his conclusion, and that our 
defence, in which only one battery, instead of many, had 
been silenced, was entitled to the sweater credit. But the 
answer of the Lucknow garrison to this success of the 
enemy was the mining and destruction of Johannes' house, 
and the removal with it of any command on the part of the 
besiegers over the Cawnpore Battery. 

The battery begun by the enemy opposite the Baily 
Guard gate was at the gateway facing it, called the 
Lutkun Durwaza. It was for two heavy guns, and was 
started at the very end of August, simultaneously, and in 
co-operation with, the mining attack on Saunders's post on 
the right flank of the Baily Guard gate. The reply to 
this step was the construction of a counter-battery in the 
Treasury post, on the left of the gate, by Aitken's Sepoys, 
who held it ; its armament was an eighteen-pounder gun, 
and a twenty-four-pounder howitzer. The sequel will 
appear on September 5th. 

The enemy's battery opposite Gubbins's was a mis- 
chievous one. The first step was to improve the bastion 
at the salient of the post, but the most important and 
effective measure was the employment there of an eight- 
inch mortar, mounted as a howitzer by the ingenuity of 
Lieutenant Bonham. This arrangement was at once called 
" the ship," and was taken all over the position, to be used 
wherever most needed ; at Gubbins's it immediately silenced 
the opposite battery referred to. 

The only other effort on the part of the enemy that need 
be mentioned was an attempt, on August 20th, to burn down 
the Baily Guard gate. The few men who were engaged 
in the attempt crawled carefully to the gate, laid their 
combustibles, and were not detected till they had set the 
gate on fire ; but they were speedily driven off, and the 

L 



146 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

fire was extinguished by our native water-carriers. To 
prevent any renewal of the attempt, the walls immediately 
flanking the gate were loop-holed. 

The continued rain had meanwhile tended to wear away 
our defences, which had consequently required incessant 
work to keep them in due repair. The most prominent 
mischief it had accomplished was to the buildings ; assisted 
as it was by the artillery fire, which was constantly kept 
up on them. Such buildings as Anderson's and Deprat's 
were now practically in ruins, the upper rooms of the 
Brigade mess had fallen in, and a portion of the Residency 
itself collapsed on August nth, burying four men of the 
32nd in the ruins. 

One other very serious danger that now developed, owing 
to the heavy rains, was the growth of long grass all over 
the neutral ground up to the foot of our defences, giving 
new opportunities to the enemy of stealthy approach. The 
need of vigilant watch on the part of the sentries was much 
increased, and explorers had constantly to steal out and 
search the immediate outskirts of the defences. 

As to our losses during this stage, they were heavy 
among the families. But the officers who were killed or 
mortally wounded were much fewer than in the previous 
stages, and one of these, Lieutenant Birch, was shot, 
through error of course, by our own sentries, while ex- 
ploring outside. The principal loss in this stage was that 
of Major Anderson, the Chief Engineer, who succumbed on 
the nth to dysentery. His loss was more serious than 
was generally realized, less as an engineer, invaluable as he 
had been in that capacity (for Captain Fulton who suc- 
ceeded him won the admiration and enjoyed the confidence 
of the whole garrison), than as a wise counsellor of the 
General in command. Sir Henry Lawrence when dying 
had urged reliance on his counsel ; and it may be safely- 
surmised that, had he lived to be consulted through the 
remainder of the siege, some grave mistakes that were made 
(as will be presently shown) would probably have been 
averted. 

The last subject to be dealt with in ordinary- course 
before describing the third great attack, is that of the 
communications with Havelock; but it is necessary, as a 



THIRD STAGE: GENERAL INCIDENTS 147 

preliminary, to refer to the question of the state of the food 
supply of the garrison. 

The whole of that supply had been collected and stored 
though not fully arranged before the siege commenced. 
Two bodies of officers, the Commissariat Department 
under Captain James, and the District Civilians under Mr. 
Martin, had been the principal agencies for the purpose. 
They had been truly indefatigable ; and all these supplies 
had been stored, before the siege began, wherever room 
could be found or made for them. While this storage was 
going on, the subordinate officials, doubtless, kept the usual 
records of the location of the supplies. On the day of 
Chinhut, however, nearly the whole of this subordinate staff 
disappeared, and Captain James was grievously wounded 
in the knee. A staff of officers was appointed to act under 
him for the control and distribution of the rations ; but it 
seems to be certain that, although it was quite well known 
where all the stores were, neither he nor they nor anybody 
knew at this period what qtiantity of food of various kinds, 
except live stock, was ever actually available ; no one seems 
to have ever been directed to inquire ; no stock was taken ; 
no inventory ever existed, so far as records can show, or 
inquiries have been able to elicit ; although there can be no 
doubt that this was a matter which Sir Henry Lawrence 
referred to in his dying hours, as one of the most urgent of 
our necessities. Blame for the omission can hardly attach 
to Captain James in his wounded state, and certainly not 
to his newly-appointed and inexperienced staff, whose whole 
time and attention were required for the supervision and 
distribution of the rations. But there were plenty of 
officers available for any such special task as ascertaining 
and registering the use made of all the available shelter and 
accommodation, and then "measuring up and taking stock 
of all the food supply stored. This, however, does not 
appear to have been done, or perhaps even suggested. 
This subject is here referred to as a preliminary — an im- 
portant one as it will be seen — to the correspondence with 
Havelock, to which we will now turn. 

It will be remembered, that by the end of the second 
stage of the siege, on August 10th, the latest intelligence 
which the garrison had received was of Havelock's actions 



1 4 8 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

of July 29th, and his subsequent retirement to Mungurwar. 
After that, Tytler had, on August 4th, written a letter to Mr. 
Gubbins ; intimating Havelock's intention to advance im- 
mediately towards Lucknow, and advising the garrison to 
be prepared to co-operate on his arrival, even to cutting its 
way out if need be. But this letter did not reach the 
Residency till August 15th. Ungud, who brought it, had 
been for a time a prisoner with the enemy, and had then 
had to go back to Cawnpore, so tha f he now brought, not 
only this letter, but the much later news of Havelock's 
withdrawal from Oude and return to Cawnpore. 

These tidings, of course, caused the deepest anxiety, and 
the following letter was the reply sent by General Inglis on 
the following night, the 16th — 

"A note from Colonel Tytler to Mr. Gubbins reached 
last night, dated at Mungurwar, the 4th inst. The latter 
paragraph, which is as follows — ' You must aid us in every 
way, even to cutting your way out if we can't force our way 
in,' — has caused me much uneasiness, as it is quite impossible, 
with my weak and shattered force, that I can leave my 
defences. You must bear in mind how I am hampered ; 
that I have upwards of one hundred and twenty sick and 
wounded, and at least two hundred and twenty women and 
about two hundred and thirty children, and no carriage of 
any description, besides sacrificing twenty-three lakhs of 
treasure and about thirty guns of sorts. 

" In consequence of the news received, I shall soon put 
the force on half rations, unless I hear again from you. 
Our provisions will last us then till about September lot/i. 

" If you hope to save this force, no time must be lost in 
pushing forward. We are daily being attacked by the 
enemy, who are within a few yards of our defences. Their 
mines have already weakened our post, and I have every 
reason to believe they are carrying on others. Their 
eighteen-pounders are within one hundred and fifty yards of 
some of our batteries, and from their position and our 
inability to form working parties, we cannot reply to them, 
and consequently the damage done hourly is very great. 
My strength now in Europeans is three hundred and fifty, 
and about three hundred natives, and the men are dread- 
fully harassed ; and owing to part of the Residency having 
been brought down by round shot, many are without 
shelter. Our native force having been assured, on Colonel 
Tytler's authority, of your near approach some twenty-five 



THIRD STAGE: GENERAL INCIDENTS 149 

days ago, are naturally losing confidence, and if they leave 
us, I do not see how the defences are to be manned. Did 
you receive a letter and plan from me from this man 
Ungud ? Kindly answer this question." 

There may be differences of opinion as to whether this 
picture of the situation was not overdrawn or too highly 
coloured, and whether an appeal of this sort was necessary 
or desirable. But there can be no question of the astound- 
ing error in the description given of the state of the food 
supply. Not merely was it here laid down at only a small 
fraction — about an eighth — of what it really was ; but the 
relieving general received an utterly false idea of the 
desperate condition, in the matter of starvation and inani- 
tion, into which the garrison must sink deeper and deeper 
after September 10th. 

The above was a reply to Tytler's letter of August 4th. 
For a fortnight no other letter was received from Have- 
lock, though he had written on August 8th to Inglis, men- 
tioning the unavoidable necessity for his return to Cawn- 
pore. This letter never seems to have reached Lucknow. 
Then on August 29th, a fortnight after the receipt of 
Tytler's letter, one arrived from Havelock himself, dated 
from Cawnpore on the 24th, which ran thus — 

" I have your letter of the 16th inst. I can only say, 
do not negotiate, but rather perish sword in hand. Sir 
Colin Campbell, who came out at a day's notice to com- 
mand, upon the news arriving of General Anson's death, 
promises me fresh troops, and you will be my first care. 
The reinforcements may reach me in from twenty to 
twenty-five days, and I will prepare everything for a march 
on Lucknow." 

Such tHen was the position of affairs within the Resi- 
dency, and such the outlook, when the third general attack- 
was made on it on September 5th. 

It began in the same way as on the two former occasions. 
The enemy sprang two mines, one aimed at Gubbins's, the 
other at the middle of the Brigade mess ; this being the 
mine which had been checked by the last gallery we drove 
at that post with the express object of intercepting it. 
Both mines were far short of their mark, and proved harm- 



150 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

less. The enemy had also obviously intended to spring a 
third mine at Saunders's post — the one we had destroyed 
during the preceding night. This had clearly been meant 
to act in concert with the battery they had constructed at 
the Lutkun Durwaza. So, when the attack began, putting 
up with the failure of the mine, they opened out from 
their battery on the Baily Guard gate. The new eighteen- 
pounder counter-battery, which our Sepoys of the 13th 
N. I. had made at the Treasury post, 1 was thereupon 
unmasked, opened out, and at once silenced it. The attack 
at this quarter forthwith collapsed. 

The enemy came on with fair boldness, however, at the 
Brigade mess and Sikh square, and tried to storm Gubbins's 
post with some real dash ; but they were so steadily and 
resolutely met and so severely punished that they soon 
retired, and the whole attack ceased at an early hour. Our 
loss amounted to three Sepoys killed and one English 
soldier wounded ! 

The special feature in this fight was the first appearance 
among the enemy in any numbers of the Talookdars' 
retainers, who were evidently placed in front, and lost 
heavily. 

1 Vide, p. 145. 



CHAPTER IX 

FOURTH STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 

After the utter and speedy collapse of their attack of 
September 5 th, the enemy never showed any heart. They 
never attempted an assault nor a close attack on any single 
post ; but they did not desist from mining, nor from their 
constant artillery and musketry fire. 

In mining, their efforts were now more easily foiled, 
because there was less ground left available for mining, 
and at most points we were already at least half prepared 
to meet them. 

On September 9th they were heard at work opposite both 
the Cawnpore Battery and the Sikh square. At the Cawn- 
pore Battery our countermine for its protection from Deprat's 
shop had been kept loaded ever since the end of July ; 
and now, on September 9th, when the enemy were judged 
to have come sufficiently close, its charge was fired and 
the enemy's gallery destroyed. 

At the Sikh square, two galleries were driven out to 
meet the enemy's approaches. Opposite one they ceased 
working, but at the other they continued to advance ; so 
on the nth our mine was loaded, and fired with complete 
success. 

Then on the 10th and 12th there appeared signs of the 
enemy being at work opposite the following posts ; where, 
consequently, we began and continued defensive galleries 
up to September 20th. 

I. At the middle of the front of the Brigade mess, 
where we completed an intercepting gallery. 

II. At the Cawnpore Battery, along the only firm ground 
left there. 

III. From the Treasury post outward, and then across 
the front of the Baily Guard gate. 

IV. Outward and then across the face of Germon's post. 



152 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

By these countermines and protective galleries, and from 
the effects of the mines that had been already exploded, 
the following stretch of the line of entrenchment was now 
practically nearly secure against the enemy's mines ; viz. 
from the Treasury post, by the Baily Guard gate, Saunders's 
post, Sago's, Germon's, Anderson's, the Cawnpore Battery, 
Deprat's, the Martiniere and the Brigade mess, up to the 
Sikh square. 

In fact, the only part of our position then left really 
assailable by mines was Gubbins's post ; for opposite all the 
rest of the line of the entrenchment, the positions now held 
by the enemy were too distant to give them, with their 
crude knowledge and appliances, any chance of success 
against the experience we had now acquired in the methods 
for detecting and dealing with their efforts. 

During the remaining days of the siege, or at its end, 
we found the following mines which the enemy had been 
driving. 

I. Towards the church : this was discovered in a sortie, 
made on the nth in order to explore and guard against 
such efforts. It had only been begun ; but we destroyed 
it, and the shelter from which it had been started. 

II. A gallery driven by the enemy towards the Baily 
Guard gate fell in, while it was still a long distance off from 
our line. 

III. A second attempt at mining towards the church 
was detected and stopped by a sortie on September 21st. 

IV. A mine, which we had long felt certain was being- 
directed against the Redan, was found, and blown up by 
ourselves after September 25th. It had not come so near 
the Redan as the mine that was sprung on July 20th, and 
would, in fact, have passed its front or apex at a long 
distance. 

Such then was the mining warfare during the last stage 
of the siege. The enemy's efforts had become feeble, 
whereas our defence was now practically assured ; a result 
due partly to our unremitting exertions during the last eight 
or nine weeks, and partly to the enemy's failures helping 
to make the ground impracticable for further mining. It 
was an absolute mistake to suppose, that so long as we held 
our outposts we were any longer in imminent danger from 



FOURTH STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 153 

their mining attacks, or that an)' mines were discovered 
from which we ran any serious risk, or, in fact, any risk at 
all. Still, though the engineers knew this, the garrison did 
not — and their anxiety about it was undiminished. 

The only vigorous steps taken by the enemy during 
these three weeks lay in the concentration of artillery fire 
on the Cawnpore Battery and on Gubbins's bastion. Opposite 
the former they planted guns in two positions, one on its 
east, the other to the south : while against Gubbins's they 
established a battery on higher ground, in what was called 
the Bolund Bagh ; doing much damage from it till they 
were answered by the eight-inch mortars mounted as howit- 
zers, which have been already described as Bonham's ships. 
They also again tried to place combustibles at the Baily 
Guard gate, but were detected and shot down. 

Still, though they never once made any serious or close 
attempt at an attack during this last stage, they harassed 
the garrison greatly by constantly starting furious cannon- 
ading and musketry all round, as if preluding an attack. 
Such alarms, lasting only for half-an-hour or so, occurred 
nearly every day, and also at night ; always making- 
necessary a turn-out of the several garrisons. 

On the part of the defenders, there were occasional 
sorties. Two were made, as already mentioned, to explore 
for mines in front of the church ; and a third was made (on 
September 6th) from Innes's post, to blow down some small 
houses which had been left on the low ground just outside 
the position. Captain Fulton led this sortie. The exit 
to the low ground was by ladders : and Fulton, having 
laid his charges, gave the word for the party to retire. He 
then fired his fuse, but was delayed in return by the party 
not having retired and cleared off as rapidly as they should. 
The explosion consequently took place while he was still 
on the ladder, and he was considerably bruised and con- 
tused by the flying debris. 

There had meanwhile been very heavy rain, which 
damaged the defences greatly, compelling the garrison to be 
constantly at work repairing the parapets and embrasures. 

Moreover, for reasons which will presently appear, 
additional work had then to be undertaken in extending the 
system of retrenchments, i. e. of having defensive works in 



154 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

rear of outposts and exposed points ; and further, two 
batteries, of which the sites only had been started, at the 
heads of lanes in the Commissariat position on the Western 
face, were now worked at from September nth. 

Besides injuring the parapets and defences, the rains, 
assisted by the enemy's cannonading, had been more and 
more injuring the buildings, and reducing our habitable 
shelter. Two sides of Innes's house were now in ruins ; so 
was one of the walls of the Brigade mess ; so were Deprat's, 
Anderson's, and a part of the Martiniere ; and the verandah 
of the Residency had fallen. 

Cholera still continued ; Captain Mansfield had died from 
it ; scurvy was developing seriously, and the physical 
strength of the defenders was very sensibly reduced. They 
had lost in muscle, activity, and vitality. They, that is, the 
fighting men, had been put on half rations since August 
25th, and all others on still smaller rations. 

Besides Captain Mansfield, who died of cholera, other 
officers succumbed to wounds, fever, and other causes — 
Captain Simons, and Lieutenants Graham, Fullerton, and 
Cunliffe. But our great loss during this last stage of the 
siege — our greatest loss, many thought, after Sir Henry 
Lawrence — was that of Captain Fulton of the Engineers, 
who was killed by a round shot in Gubbins's bastion. Fulton 
had succeeded to the Engineer command on Major Ander- 
son's death ; but long before that he had, in consequence of 
the Major's serious ill-health, been in practical charge of 
the Engineer operations ; and had won the confidence of the 
garrison by his skill, energy, and fertility of resource, 
besides his exceptional coolness and intrepidity as a soldier. 
He had realized the great gravity of our position when the 
enemy exploded their first mine, and had started our 
defence in mining warfare with almost desperate energy, 
born of anxiety. Now, before we lost him, he was almost 
jubilant in the knowledge that we had not lost an inch of 
ground ; that we had stopped every mine of the enemy save 
one ; that we had not only been thoroughly victorious in the 
mining contest against tremendous odds, but had practically 
made the position safe against the enemy's further efforts. 
And with his shrewd and resolute face, and his cheerful 
bearing, he did more than any other twenty men to keep 



FOURTH STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 155 

up the spirits of the garrison. Wherever he appeared, it 
was the signal to be up and doing. 

Besides his other merits, Fulton was a crack shot, and 
occasionally, especially if the enemy had been worrying 
any particular post by their sharpshooters, he would get 
hold of the rifles there and fire severals rounds into the 
opposite line of loopholes till he had silenced their fire. 
He sometimes got a friend to guide him in these cases by 
the use of a telescope or binocular. On one occasion his 
friend called out, " There are two people at the loophole," 
on which he fired. And next day there was a report 
among the Sikhs of the Sikh square, that two men had 
been killed by one shot at that morcha, i. e. post of the 
enemy, one of them being the officer of the 15th Cavalry, 
who was commanding it. 

The enemy were very close round the Sikh square, and 
conversations, more or less bantering, between the two 
parties on the opposite sides were of constant occurrence. 

By this time, in fact, all was going on well as regards 
efficiency of defence, except in one respect ; and this it was 
that made further mining attacks possible, causing the 
necessity for pressing on the retrenchments. I mean the 
generally growing impression among the natives of the 
garrison that our position was hopeless ; that the story of 
the approach of a force to our relief was mere moonshine, 
a falsehood concocted by Ungud to curry favour and get 
heavy rewards. There was no doubt whatever of the 
existence of this feeling, and it was impossible to say what 
shape it might not take. I was told about September 10th by 
my servant that the tendency was, to hold on till October 1st. 
And two days afterwards, on September 12, at one of the 
night-working parties at the new Sheephouse Battery, I 
had a conversation with the native officer on duty, who 
told me that the current belief, in which he himself shared, 
was that all Ungud's stories were untrue, and that there 
was no British force in our neighbourhood. Fortunately 
he was startled out of these doubts by some plain facts that 
I mentioned — the letters Ungud had actually brought in ; 
the handwriting of their writers, which had been recognized ; 
the numbers he had stated of the regiments, and the names 
of many of the officers ; peculiarities in the uniforms, such 



156 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

as the square buttons of the Highlanders, and their bagpipes. 
All these details, I pointed out, could not be concoctions ; 
Ungud must have seen them, and must have received the 
letters from some one. I believe that this conversation, 
including as it did a sketch of what had probably been 
occurring, had a material effect on the minds of the Sepoys. 

These men had, doubtless, expressed their sentiments 
pretty freely to Ungud. But he had his revenge. On 
September 25th, there was no more prominent or excited 
figure than his, watching the advancing troops, dancing 
and leaping before his hitherto incredulous comrades, 
jeering and snapping his fingers at them, pointing to the 
troops in the distance and crying out, "Who is the liar 
now ? Who has been inventing tales, and telling lies about 
Havelock Sahib, and Tytler Sahib, and Neill Sahib, and 
Barrow Sahib ? " 

Had no relief arrived soon, there were, doubtless, many 
that would have remained with us staunch to the death. 
There is no braver man than the Rajpoot when his sense 
of pride and honour are fairly enlisted. Still, many would 
have disappeared. And with their disappearance, and with 
our own dwindling numbers, it might have very soon 
become necessary to draw in our horns, give up some of 
our outer posts and defences, and hold on to the inner posts, 
which commanded them and served as retrenchments. 

At the same time, it ought to be mentioned that the 
Sepoys did not stand alone in their distrust of any relief 
being really imminent. There were officers in the garrison 
— and they were among the most thoughtful, intelligent, 
and bravest of all — who, while they, of course, fully believed 
the information brought by Ungud, did not believe in the 
possibility of relief. I had casually mentioned the above 
conversation to one of our very best officers ; one of much 
experience in frontier warfare, and of exceptional intrepidity 
and vigour. His reply was, " Havelock may come near, 
but how can he make his way against the large force 
hemming us in, through the streets or other routes which 
they are certainly barricading ? Also he will probably have 
other forces to tackle ; we hear nothing of Delhi. Ten to 
one, our small army there has been wiped out, and the 
enemy may pour down an army from there onto Have- 



FOURTH STAGE OF THE DEFENCE 157 

lock's, or any other British troops that may be keeping the 
field here." Such were the thoughts in his mind. We 
had no knowledge of the support the force on the Delhi 
ridge was receiving from the Punjab ; and without that 
knowledge he had sound reasons for his views and his 
anxiety. 

Fortunately, however, the siege was now really drawing 
to its close ; to its succour, that is, by the force whom we 
had been expecting for nearly two months. There were 
signs daily, in spite of the continuous heavy rain, of move- 
ments of troops, especially after September 18th, and of 
greater activity among the enemy ; and, at length on the 
22nd, Ungud returned bringing a letter which announced 
that Havelock's force had again crossed the Ganges into 
Oude; and there was much rejoicing. 

Next forenoon we heard cannonading in the Cawnpore 
direction, and there was much movement in the more 
distant streets, but the garrison was not much molested. 

On the 24th, the commotion in the streets and the 
cannonading towards Cawnpore were continued, and in the 
evening the Cawnpore angle of the position was subjected 
to heavy fire, though nothing further came of the threat. 
All that day, however, the garrison remained in a state of 
much anxiety. If the relieving force had arrived so close 
on the 23rd, why were there no nearer signs of it on the 
24th ? Could it have been successfully checked ? 

Then, during the following night, there were repeated 
alarms, and the whole garrison practically stood to its arms 
all night. Then the cannonading was again heard towards 
Cawnpore, i. e. towards the Char Bagh and the Alum Bagh, 
on the morning of the 25th. Before noon it seemed to 
cease; then after about an hour, artillery and musketry 
also were heard, not to the south, but to the east. There 
could now be no doubt that our friends had worked round 
the south-eastern quarter of the city, and were approaching 
us, not through the narrow streets, but across the ground 
between the Kaiser Bagh and the river, which was com- 
paratively open, though dotted over by detached buildings 
and walled gardens and enclosures. So the garrison pro- 
ceeded to aid this advance by shelling its flank from our 
mortars, continuing this fire till the evening. 



158 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

Early in the afternoon it was seen that a great exodus of 
the city people had begun, and that with them Sepoys and 
troopers were crossing the river and streaming along the 
road towards cantonments, and also towards Fyzabad. 
And it was further observed shortly afterwards that the 
bridge of boats had broken down, as the fugitives, including 
cavalry, were swimming across the river. 

By four o'clock we saw our troops near the Motee 
Mahul. Then the sound of heavy musketry was suddenly 
heard ; it approached nearer and nearer ; and at length 
the head of the column was seen entering the street that 
formed the direct approach to the Residency. In a few 
minutes more the leading men, including Generals Outram 
and Havelock, were within the entrenchments ! 

The most imminent danger of the garrison, the danger 
of a great catastrophe from the successful irruption of 
overwhelming numbers of the enemy, was at an end. The 
arrival of Havelock's force may not have been a relief in 
the technical military sense ; but it saved us from certain 
disaster, as will be shown later. 



CHAPTER X 

PROMINENT FEATURES OF THE DEFENCE 

The heroic entry of Havelock's and Outram's force, on 
September 25th, into the Residency entrenchments not only 
marked the relief of the garrison, but brought its single- 
handed defence of the position to a successful close. And 
it is fitting at this stage, before proceeding with the nar- 
rative, to touch on what seem to be some of the prominent 
features and characteristics of that defence. 

The first point to be noticed is that, weak and slight as 
the defences were, their style, combined with the obstacles 
and impediments which lined their front, was thoroughly 
effective against the enemy with whom we had to contend. 
None of our adversaries ever succeeded — and many of them 
tried, though never in large numbers — to break their way 
through them. Such adventurous spirits as made the 
attempt, at the Cawnpore Battery, at Innes's post, and 
elsewhere, got entangled and caught in them ; and were 
either destroyed, or so punished by musketry or hand 
grenades, that they gave up such endeavours ; until the last 
attack, when the Talookdars' men (Rajwara troops) ap- 
peared on the scene. At the same time, it may be re- 
marked that the efficacy of these obstructions, thorough 
and fortunate as it was at the beginning of the siege, had 
probably disappeared towards the end of it ; for the con- 
tinuous rain must have beaten them down or covered them 
with mud ; especially the abattis and small stakes and 
crows'-feet. 

Next, in consequence of the difficulty they found in 
surmounting these obstacles, and the certainty of the 
desperate resistance of the defenders behind the defences, 
the enemy's efforts were persistently directed to the form- 
ation of a practicable breach in them. Never once, from 
first to last, did they attempt to storm the position, except 
where they had expected to find an opening made by their 



160 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

mines ; and, practically, the essence of the struggle lay in 
their efforts to make such an opening, and our efforts to 
prevent it. They attempted from the first to breach — if 
not by artillery, then by mining. 

The third feature of the contest is their utter failure to 
breach by artillery, and the reason. At first they tried to 
plant some of the guns at sites near our boundary ; but our 
own artillery fire and our sharpshooting speedily stopped 
this. On moving back to safer spots, their fire was foiled by 
their own buildings and enclosures and ruins, which screened 
from them the foot of our defences, where alone that fire 
could have had any real effect. In the later days of the 
siege, they renewed their efforts at sites which they had 
carefully selected, such as the Lutkun Durwaza, Phillips's 
garden, and opposite Gubbins's bastion ; but they were 
again defeated, not only by the same fire as at first, but by 
the new and superior metal then brought against them by 
Bonham's ingenious adaptation of eight-inch mortars to 
howitzer work. 

One feature in the attack that was most fortunate for 
us was the absence of vertical fire. The enemy had no 
mortars ; and the carcases and other such missiles with 
which they occasionally favoured us were hurled from 
cylindrical chambers dug in the ground. 

Another great feature of the contest, the most important 
of all in my opinion, was the effort to breach our defences 
by mining. The mining attack always lay with the enemy ; 
with the one exception of our attack on Johannes' house, 
which requires no additional notice at this point. The 
enemy's attack, however, may be usefullysummarized. It 
has been described at length in the narrative, and detailed 
by date and site, and it has been tabulated further on. 
From this it may be seen that the enemy made thirty-seven 
distinct and separate attempts to undermine and breach 
our outer defences ; the mass of their attempts being along 
two fronts, beginning at the Baily Guard gate, and attack- 
ing these successive posts — Saunders's, Sago's, Germon's, 
Anderson's, the Cawnpore Battery, the Martiniere, the 
Brigade mess, the Sikh square, and Gubbins's. Of their 
thirty-seven attempts, one was successful — that at the Sikh 
square on August 18th — and thirty-six were failures. Of 






PROMINENT FEATURES OF THE DEFENCE 161 

the thirty-six failures, eleven were due to the enemy's own 
blundering, and not to our stoppage of them. The other 
twenty-five were all of them contested by us ; and were 
either checked and stopped before they could injure our 
defences, or blown up by us and destroyed. This success 
was due to the vigilance of the outposts in detecting the 
sounds of mining ; and to the genius of Fulton in antici- 
pating the intentions of the enemy, and combating their 
efforts where detected. The great difficulty on our part 
arose from the want of labour. The men of the garrisons 
concerned could dig the shaft or well, and drive out the 
first few feet of a gallery, but the rest of the work required 
special labour. But for this want, there would have been no 
great delay in enveloping the exposed fronts with inter- 
cepting galleries, which would have practically averted all 
serious danger. Towards the end, we were gradually 
getting more secure ; but the garrison did not know or 
understand this ; and the feeling, and indeed the fact 
throughout, was that at no moment were we secure against 
the grave chance of a sudden explosion ; which might form 
a practicable breach through which the enemy, fully pre- 
pared, could make an irruption in the next five minutes in 
irresistible numbers. This was the danger that transcended 
all others, and caused such intense anxiety ; and to the way 
in which it was met and foiled was mainly due the success 
of the defence. 

Another feature of, the defence was that the garrison 
never lost a foot of ground. On the other hand, it ex- 
tended the neutral ground, driving the enemy farther off at 
many important points. 

Again, there was only one of our batteries that was ever 
silenced — the Cawnpore Battery — and that was only for 
nine days, from August 12th to the 2ist, when it resumed 
its duty after the destruction of Johannes' house, which had 
commanded it. With that single exception our artillery 
held its own against both the artillery and the sharp- 
shooting of the enemy, becoming strongly in the ascendant 
after the development of Bonham's ships. 

The trace of the position was weak in respect of flanking 
defences. The North face was well flanked by the Redan ; 
but only half the Eastern front was flanked, viz. by the 
battery at the corner of the Post-office post. The Western 

M 



1 62 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

face was to have been flanked by the sheep-house and 
slaughter-house batteries ; but these were only in embryo 
when the siege began, and Innes's post performed that duty- 
only in part. The Southern face was only slightly, if at 
all, protected by the Cawnpore Battery, as that was itself so 
much and so long in difficulties. But I have reason to 
believe that it had been seriously intended to make a 
flanking position or outwork of Johannes' house ; and that 
it was this idea which prevented the demolition of the upper 
storey before the siege began. 

It was a marked characteristic of the enemy's sharp- 
shooting, that its deadliest effect was at our loopholes. An 
extraordinary proportion of the victims were officers who 
wished to examine the enemy's position ; and after a short 
time it became recognized as a proper precaution to darken 
the loophole by a hat or other impediment, thus drawing 
the enemy's fire, and then to have a good look-out while the 
enemy was re-loading. 

Another prominent feature lay in the sorties. These 
would have been much more numerous but for the restraint 
placed on them in accordance with Sir Henry Lawrence's 
dying injunctions, based on the necessity of averting all 
needless loss of life. The sorties were of two kinds : 
(i) those undertaken at outposts without orders from the 
central authority, and (2) the organized sorties for some 
specific purpose. The local sorties were made generally 
by parties of not more than half-a-dozen men. These 
would creep out through the obstacles, crawl down close to» 
the site of some gun or picket, dash in on it, spike the gun, 
kill a few of the enemy, create a brief panic, and then 
return to their own post. In such sorties there was rarely 
any casualty; and in fact they were generally less in 
danger from the enemy than from sentries on our own 
side, who had not received due warning. The larger sorties 
were generally organized in order to seize and destroy 
some posts of the enemy ; such as Johannes' house, the 
buildings beyond it, those opposite the Sikh square and 
Gubbins's, and those outside Innes's post. These were 
organized from the first on a carefully considered plan. 
There would be a small storming party, followed by the 
main body, and supported by the fire from our own posi- 
tion. Usually an Engineer officer and a sergeant dashed 



PROMINENT FEATURES OF THE DEFENCE 163 

out first by themselves, carrying means of explosion. They 
made straight for the left of some door. If it were open 
they threw in a grenade. If it were shut they drove in a 
bayonet or screwed in a gimlet, and suspended on it a bag 
of gunpowder, which they then exploded, bursting in the 
door. In either case, on the grenade or the powder being 
heard to explode, the stormers charged into the building, 
and were followed by the main party, sometimes charging 
also into other buildings right or left. Powder-bags specially 
prepared would be rapidly placed in the houses and ex- 
ploded, demolishing them more or less. In each such 
sortie there would generally be two or three casualties ; fre- 
quently caused, until we learnt better, by the men going not 
to the left but to the right of a doorway or passage, and so 
having to expose the whole person on firing into it. 

But, in truth, one of the most astonishing features of the 
defence was the small number of casualties compared with 
the ceaseless fire, besides actual fighting, to which the 
garrison was exposed. The most apposite indication of 
this lies in the case of the 32nd Regiment, which con- 
stituted the backbone of the defence. Exclusive of officers, 
their death casualties at Lucknow up to the arrival of 
Havelock's force on September 25th were — 

Killed at Chinhut in 

Killed outright during the defence 29 

Died of wounds or accidents during the defence ... 52 

Died from disease 52 

And of the twenty-nine killed during the defence, the 
number who fell in the three all-round attacks of July 20th, 
August 10th, and September 5th, was only six. This com- 
parative immunity from loss was due to (1) the absence of 
any command of the enemy over our position except from 
Johannes' house, so that (2) our parapets and other ar- 
rangements successfully sheltered and defiladed the garri- 
son from the enemy's fire ; (3) the stern suppression of 
needless exposure and aimless sorties ; and (4) the enforced 
restriction of the men to the posts to which they belonged, 
and the stoppage of all unauthorized wandering over the 
more open and exposed positions. 

I have given these figures for the 32nd, both because 
the only details and nominal lists I have are those of that 
regiment ; and because, forming, as I have said, the back- 



1 64 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

bone of the defence, their figures are typical for the 
garrison in general. 

After the loss of 1 1 1 men at Chinhut, their strength at the 
beginning of the siege (excluding officers as before) was 
520, of whom probably 100 were at that time wounded ; 
and during the siege their death casualties were 133 (or 
about one-fourth), while 154 were wounded. 

After losing four of their number at Chinhut, there were 
twenty-one officers left of the 32nd (besides its two surgeons) ; 
of these twenty-one, four were killed or died during the 
defence, and eight were wounded. One of the two officers 
of the 84th was wounded. Of other combatant officers, the 
Staff lost two out of eleven ; the Artillery lost five out of nine, 
besides three others wounded ; the Engineers lost two out 
of five ; the officers of the native troops lost twenty out of 
seventy-two, besides twenty-two being wounded. The non- 
combatant officers lost eight out of thirty-four, besides nine 
wounded. Of our Sepoys I do not know the losses, but 
the casualties of the Hindoostanees of the 13th N. I. 
amounted, I believe, to more than their whole strength, 
owing to the number that were wounded more than once. 

This is one fact illustrative of the staunch and loyal conduct 
of our native troops, whose fidelity has become proverbial, 
and of whom, therefore, I need say nothing more now. 

But the subject of our losses brings me to those in our 
families. At the beginning of the siege there were 240 
women and 270 children. Of the 240 women, three were 
killed and eleven died ; of the 270 children, fifty-four died ; 
of the 240 women and 270 children, sixty-nine and sixty- 
eight respectively belonged to the families of officers of the 
army or of the Government. Their losses were eight and 
twenty-three respectively ; so that one-third of their chil- 
dren perished. These losses were due to the exposure and 
hardships, and want of comforts, but not to want of actual 
food ; Sir Henry Lawrence's care had provided against that. 

The steady supply and distribution of food and regular 
rations, so that no one in the entrenchments, at any time, 
lost life, or suffered from want of sustenance, is one of the 
most prominent characteristics of the defence. 

But the greatest of all, overshadowing all else, was the 
wisdom of the preparations and the foresight of Sir Henry 
Lawrence. 



PROMINENT FEATURES OF THE DEFENCE 165 



MINING TABLE NO. I. 

TABULAR STATEMENT OF THE ENEMY'S MINES. 

Arranged approximately by date. 



General 




Post Attacked, 


Nature of 
Attack. 




Serial 
No. 


Page. 


and Serial 
Number in it. 


Particulars. 




FIRST 


ATTACK, JULY 20, 1 857. 


I 


124 


j Redan 


1 


Explosion 


Short : harmless. 




SECOND ST/ 


iGE, JULY 2 


I TO AUGUST 9 


2 


128 


Redan 


-•> 


Lodgment 


Dislodged by artillery and 
musketry. 


3 


128 


Martin- 
iere 




•>•> 


Dislodged by grenades. 


4 


129 


Gubbins's 




i") 


Dislodged by sortie. 


5 


129 


Cawnpore 
Battery 




Gallery 


Collapsed : too shallow. 


6 


129 


Brigade 
Mess 




11 


Stopped, on hearing our left 
Brigade Mess mine. 


7 


129 


Sikh 
Square 




55 


Broken into and destroyed 
by our countermine. 


8 


130 


Sago's 




5) 


Collapsed : too shallow. 




SECONE 


> ATTACK, i 


AUGUST 10. 


9 


134 


Martin- j 2 
iere 


Explosion 


Short : damaged stockade. 


10 


134 


Sago's 2 


55 


Short : harmless. 




THIRD STAGE, 


AUGUST II 


TO SEPTEMBER 4. 


11 


138 


Sago's 


3 


Gallery 


Fought and blown up. 


12 


139 


11 


4 


n 


August 29 : stopped on hear- 
ing ours. 


*3 


139 


11 


5 


» 


Sept. 1 : stopped on hearing 
ours. 


M 


137 


Saunders's 


1 


» 


August 23 : stopped on hear- 
ing ours. 


15 


137 


?> 


2 


»j 


August 31 : blown up by out- 
countermine, Sept. 1. 


16 


137 


)» 


3 


" 


Sept. 1 : blown up by our 
countermine, Sept. 2. 


17 


138 


•>■> 


4 


V) 


Sept. 3 : blown up by our 
countermine, Sept. 4. 


18 


139 


Ander- 
son's 


1 


5> 


August 1 3 : stopped on hear- 
ing ours. 


*9 


139 


11 


2 


» 


August 23 : stopped on hear- 












ing ours. 



[66 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 



TABLE NO. I. {Continued). 



General 




Post Attacked 


Nature of 
Attack. 




Serial 


Page. 


and Serial 


Particulars. 


No. 




Number in it. 




20 


139 


Ander- 
son's 


3 


Gallery 


August 18 : stopped on hear- 
ing ours. 


21 


139 


Brigade 
Mess 


2 


?> 


August 20 : first stopped on 
hearing ours ; then con- 
tinued, broken into and 
blown up by us, August 29. 


22 


140 


11 


3 


55 


Sept. 3 : first stopped on 
hearing ours ; then 




149 






Explosion 


Short : harmless in third 
attack, Sept. 5. 


'23 


140 


Sikh 
Square 


2 


Gallery 


Met our gallery : both gal- 
leries destroyed by hasty 
explosion. 


24 


HI 


11 


3 


Explosion 


Successful : simultaneous 
with 23, on August 16th ; 
made a breach in wall 30 
feet long. 






THIRD 


ATTACK, SEPTEMBER 5. 


25 


149 


Gubbins's 


2 


Explosion 


Short : harmless. 




149 


Brigade 
Mess 


3 


11 


Short : harmless. (See 
No. 22.) 




FOUI 


ITH STAGE, F] 


R.OM SEPTE 


\IBER 6 TO SEPTEMBER 25. 


26 


151 


Cawnpore 
Battery 


2 


Gallery 


Sept. 9 : destroyed by our 
mine ready since July. 


27 


151 


Sikh 
Square 


4 


11 


Sept. 9 : stopped on hearing 
ours. 


28 


151 


Sikh 
Square 


5 


11 


Sept. 9 : blown up by our 
mine. 


29 


151 


Brigade 
Mess 


4 


11 


Sept. 10 : checked by our 
middle Brigade Mess mine. 


30 


151 


Cawnpore 
Battery 


3 


11 


Sept. 10 : checked by our 
mine. 


31 


151 


Baily 
Guard 
Gate 


1 


11 


Sept. 10 : checked by our 
mine. 


32 


151 


Germon's 
Post 


1 


11 


Sept. 10 : checked by our 
mine. 


33 


152 


Church 


1 


11 


Sept. 11 : destroyed by 
sortie. 


34 


152 


Church 


2 


11 


Sept. 21 : destroyed by 
sortie*. 


35 


152 


Baily 
Guard 
Gate 


2 


11 


Collapsed about Sept. 23. 






FOUND AFTEI 


\ RELIEF 


F SEPTEMBER 25. 


36 


152 


Redan 


3 




Far short. 


37 


I 7 8 


Church 


3 




Far short. 



PROMINENT FEATURES OF THE DEFENCE 167 



MINING TABLE NO. II. 

TABULAR STATEMENT OF THE ENEMY'S MINES. 
Arranged under the posts attacked. 



Po<t Attacked. 


Serial 
No. 


Approximate 
Date. 


Nature of 
Attack. 


Particulars and Result. 


Redan . . 


1 


1 


July 20 


Explosion 


Far short. 


55 


2 


2 


July 21 


Lodgment 


At foot, dislodged by 
fire. 


55 


3 


36 


After 

Relief 

Sept. 10 


Gallery 


Far short. 


Baily Guard 


31 


55 


Checked by counter- 


Gate . . 


1 








mine. 


11 n 


2 


35 


Sept. 23 


„ 


Collapsed : too shallow. 


Saunders's 




14 


August 23 


„ 


Checked by counter- 


Post . . 


1 








mine. 


55 11 


2 


l S 


August 31 


55 


Blown up by us, Sept. 1. 


55 11 


3 


16 


Sept. 1 


55 


„ „ Sept. 2. 


11 '1 


4 


17 


Sept. 3 


55 


„ „ Sept. 4. 


Sago 




8 


July 29 


55 


Collapsed : too shallow. 


Garrison . 


1 










11 11 


2 


10 


August 10 


Explosion 


Short : harmless. 


11 11 


3 


11 


August 11 


Gallery 


Blown up by us. 


11 11 


4 


12 


August 29 


55 


Checked by counter- 
mine. 


•1 11 


5 


13 


Sept. 1 


55 


Checked by counter- 
mine. 


Germoirs 




32 


Sept. 10 


55 


Checked by counter- \ 


Post . . 


1 








mine. 


Anderson's 




18 


August 13 


55 


Checked by counter- 


Post . . 


1 








mine. 


11 11 


-> 


19 


August 23 


55 


Checked by counter- 
mine. 


11 11 


3 


20 


August 28 


55 


Checked by counter- 
mine. 


Cawnpore 




5 


July 25 


55 


Collapsed, under shell 


Battery . 


1 








fire. 


5) 55 


2 


26 


Sept. 9 


„ 


Blown up by ours ready 
since July. 


•1 55 


3 


30 


Sept. 10 


» 


Checked by our counter- 
mine. 


Martiniere 


( 


3 


July 21 


Lodgment 


Dislodged by grenades. 


55 


2 


9 


August 10 


Explosion 


Short, but damaged 
stockade. 


Brigade 




6 


July 25 


Gallery 


Checked by counter- 


Mess . . 


1 








mine. 


55 55 


2 


21 


August 20 


55 


Checked by counter- 
mine, and then blown 
up by us August 29. 


55 


3 


22 


Sept. 3 


Gallery 

and 

Explosion 


Checked by counter- 
mine, then exploded, 
short, harmless, on 








Sept. 5. 



1 68 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 
TABLE NO. II. {Continued). 



Post 
Attacked. 


Serial 
No. 


Approximate 
Date. 


Nature of 
Attack. 


Particulars and Result. 


Brigade 




29 


Sept. IO 


Gallery 


Checked by counter- 


Mess . . 


4 






and 
Explosion 


mine. 


Sikh Square I 


7 


July 25 


Gallery 


Checked by counter- 












mine, then blown up. 


» 11 


2 


23 


August 1 6 


ii 


Met ours : both de- 
stroyed. 


ii ii 


3 


24 


11 


Explosion 


Successful : made 30 
feet breach. 


ii ii 


4 


27 


Sept. 9 


Gallery 


Checked by counter- 
mine. 


ii ii 


5 


28 


15 


ii 


Blown up by counter- 
mine. 


Gubbins's . 


i 


4 


July 21 


Lodgment 


Dislodged by sortie. 




2 


25 


Sept. 5 


Explosion 


Short : harmless. 


Church 


I 


33 


Sept. ii 


Gallery 


Destroyed by sortie. 




2 


34 


Sept. 21 


J5 


11 11 11 


ii 


3 


37 


After 
Relief 


11 


Short : harmless. 



MINING TABLE NO. III. 

TABULAR SUMMARY OF MINING ATTACKS. 









E 


nemv's Mines. 






Ours. 




Failures. 




T3 
to 

-a 






it 




T3 


>* 


Attack directed on 


en 
O 


"in 
en 


ex 

1 




•0 

Jos 


£0 


IS 2* 

»n >« 


< 

O 

H 


en 

(A 

V 
(J 




CO 


4> 

s 




1 

JO 







.a* 

'E 

<u 

1 


.a w 

jo 
O 


.a* 

JO 

O 




CO 


Redan .... 




I 




I 


I 




3 




Baily Guard Gate . 






I 


I 






2 




Saunders's Post . 








I 




3 


4 




Sago Garrison . . 






I 


2 1 


I 


1 


5 




Germon's Post . . 








I 






1 




Anderson's Post . 








3 1 






3 




Cawnpore Battery 






I 


1 




1 


3 




Martiniere . . . 




I 




1 


I 




2 




Brigade Mess . . 








2 


I 


1 


4 




Sikh Square . . 


I 






1 


I 


2 


5 




Gubbins's . . . 




I 








I 




2 




Church .... 










I 




2 


3 




Johannes' House . 
Total. . . . 

Grand Total. 


















■ 


I 


3 


3 


12 


2 


6 


10 


37 j 1 


I 






! 




, 


1 






36 






37 


I 



PROMINENT FEATURES OF THE DEFENCE 169 



TABLE NO. IV. 

MINES GROUPED UNDER THE CHARACTER OF 
THEIR ATTACK AND OUR DEFENCE. 

Total. 

Enemy's Lodgments to start Galleries. 

1 at Redan, 1 at Martini ere, 1 at Gubbins's 3 

Enemy's Galleries Collapsed. 

1 at Baily Guard Gate, 1 at Sago's, 1 at Cawnpore Battery 3 

Enemy's Galleries Stopped on Hearing Ours. 

1 at Baily Guard Gate, 1 at Saunders's, 2 at Sago's, 1 at 
Germon's, 3 at Anderson's, 1 at Cawnpore Battery, 2 at 
Brigade Mess, 1 at Sikh Square 12 

Enemy's Galleries Discovered after the Relief. 
1 at the Redan, 1 at the Church ... 2 

Enemy's Mines Exploded Short. 

1 at Redan, 1 at Sago's, 1 at Martiniere, 1 at Brigade Mess, 
1 at Sikh Square, 1 at Gubbins's ... ... ... ... 6 

Enemy's Mines Destroyed by us. 
3 at Saunders's, 1 at Sago's, 1 at Cawnpore Battery, 1 at 
Brigade Mess, 2 at Sikh Square, 2 at Church 10 

Enemy's Successful Mine— at Sikh Square 1 

37 

Our Mine, Successful— at Johannes' House i_ 



CHAPTER XI 

MINOR INCIDENTS OF THE DEFENCE 

In dealing with Sir Henry Lawrence's policy and mea- 
sures, for the defence and the preparations for it, I have 
been guided by my own direct and personal knowledge. 
The facts on this point are as follows — 

On Saturday, May 16th, we were all in a state of grave 
anxiety, and I for one had no knowledge of Sir Henry's 
intentions. Early next morning I dressed in uniform for 
early morning church, and was about to stroll over to the 
service, when Major Anderson, with whom I was living, 
asked me to take a drive first with him. He took me to 
the gate of the Mutchi Bhown, got out of his buggy, desired 
me to remain in it, and joined a small group inside the 
court-yard. Presently I was beckoned in, and saw Sir 
Henry Lawrence, who told me that I was forthwith to take 
Engineer charge of the Mutchi Bhown. When he began to 
give me his instructions, I produced my note-book, wrote 
the instructions down on the spot, and then read them 
out to him. This was my daily practice throughout that 
period ; with the result that my note-book was very con- 
stantly referred to, by Sir Henry, and by Major Anderson 
and Major Francis, as the authority for the instructions and 
their date. In the entries for May 17th was the statement 
of the policy as described (p. 74), respecting the use and 
purpose of the Mutchi Bhown ; the essential need being to 
construct a properly defensive position at the Residency, 
and, till this should be completed, to overawe the city and 
gain time by means of the Mutchi Bhown. 

That note-book I retained for many years, till it was 
lost, with many of my own plans of the campaign, by an 
accident in 1871. But it had been, meanwhile, the basis 
for my letters of that period, the fullest of which have now 
come back to me. The note-book, in those days of intense 



MINOR INCIDENTS OF THE DEFENCE 171 

pressure, carried the weight of orders ; and was accepted 
and used in that light both by Major Francis and Major 
Anderson ; and never, from first to last, was there question, 
or doubt, or misunderstanding respecting its entries. 

Here I desire, while dealing with this point, to pay my 
tribute of respect and regard for my dear friend, Major 
Francis, who commanded at the Mutchi Bhown ; and to 
whose support, countenance, and help I owed so much. 
Imperturbable in temper, of the kindest disposition, resolute 
and indefatigable, he kept the varied needs of the fort in 
thorough order ; and with his sound knowledge of the Sepoys 
and his perfect demeanour to them, retained throughout 
the loyalty of the natives of the garrison. I shall never 
forget how his orderly, Anokh Singh, told him, on the 
night of May 30th, that the mutiny in the cantonment 
was beginning; how Runjeet Singh, the havildar (sergeant) 
of the pensioners, reported on June 30th that our party 
at Chinhut was returning defeated ; how calmly Francis 
received the news, and how promptly he proceeded to take 
the necessary action. 

While at the Mutchi Bhown, from May 17th to the night 
of July 1st, I left it only twice ; both times by Sir Henry's 
orders, to have a look at the defences in progress at the 
Residency. In one of these visits he took me over the 
circuit himself, and it was on this occasion that I suggested 
the inclusion of Johannes' house in our own defences as a 
flanking work on the South face, similar in principle to the 
Redan on the North face. 

Towards the end of June, when Sir Henry had ordered 
the construction of the two batteries at the west end of the 
Mutchi Bhown, and was looking on at the progress of the 
work, I said to him, with a laugh, "Of course, these batteries 
will never be used." On this he turned round on me sharply. 
" What ! you think we will not be besieged." " Not so, sir," 
I said, " but when they come near enough to be under our 
fire, we should have concentrated in the Residency." " Quite 
right, my boy ! Their movements depend upon Cawnpore. 
A siege there will certainly be, and a long siege ; and it 
will be months before aid can reach us." 

While the works were in progress at the Mutchi Bhown 
and at the Residency, there was no attempt or affectation 



172 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

about keeping them secret. On the contrary, people were 
allowed (under guidance) to see freely whatever it was ad- 
visable for them to see, with the result that the tale was 
spread broadcast of the powerful position and armament 
that were being prepared. 

Of course, strangers were carefully but easily kept away 
from whatever was more fictitious than real. 

Well-wishers constantly turned up and gave suggestions 
more or less valuable. It was an old native officer, on leave 
from a regiment in the Punjab which a relative of mine 
had commanded, who gave me a hint to remove the nearer 
parapet of the stone bridge, so that there might be no 
cover for any one trying to cross over it. It was the same 
native officer who told me that the athletes were the princi- 
pal agents for the guidance of the Mutiny ; and that as a 
matter of policy, the best and most popular and influential 
officers of regiments would, as a rule, be shot when the rest 
might go unscathed. 

It may not be amiss to note some of the minor and 
lighter features in addition to the graver and more mo- 
mentous characteristics of the siege ; and also some sup- 
posed circumstances about which incorrect ideas have been 
spread, or which did not occur. It has been occasionally 
alleged in England with emphatic declamation, and with 
indignation at any denial of it, that the enemy who were 
investing us did not do so closely and sternly ; and that, for 
instance, the children of the garrison could go outside into 
the enemy's posts and play with the Sepoys there ! Need 
I say how absolutely ludicrous any such supposition is ? 
Doubtless, the children were made much of by the natives 
of our own garrison, and only to such a cause as this can 
the mistaken idea be attributed. 

Much of our discomfort and sickness arose from so many 
refugees from out-stations, as well as the garrison of the 
Mutchi Bhown, concentrating in the Residency without 
any spare clothing, and from the difficulty of procuring it, 
or of washing and changing it when requisite. Many 
had managed to get their white clothing dyed a dust colour 
called " khakee." At first I had only two or three changes, 
and these were white ; hence, as this would have been fatal 
when stealing out at night from the Redan or elsewhere in 



MINOR IXC I DENTS OF THE DEFENCE 173 

order to explore the ground for sounds of mining or other 
purposcs, I had to change garments with a friend on such 
occasions, with a grim apology for the possible chance of 
not being able to return them. Towards the end of the 
siege my pith helmet was in pieces, merely resting on the 
top of my head, and it was not till the very end that I 
could procure another. 

I was fortunate enough to retain my servants. The Post- 
office mess to which I belonged contained twenty-two mem- 
bers at first ; and since the others had not kept any of their 
attendants, my two (father and son) became the cook and 
table servants for the whole party. Their service was one 
of no small danger. The boy had to carry everything to 
the Post-office from the Commissariat yards where the 
father cooked the meals. One evening the father presented 
himself looking positively white, and depositing fragments 
of copper at my feet, gasped out, " My life has escaped ! " 
A shell had burst beside him while he was cleaning his 
cooking pots, sparing him, but smashing the pots ! We 
generally knew when any shells would thus plunge into 
our position ; as they could only be some of our own, which 
on being fired from our mortars had failed to burst — a 
chance for which we were always on the watch. 

The only gun of the enemy's which continuously did us 
serious harm was that at Hill's shop ; as it fired straight 
over the long diagonal of our position, striking either Innes's 
post, the Residency, Fayrer's, or the Post-office. It seemed 
to have done most mischief at the Residency. One case 
there was very singular. The shot caught the end of the 
punkah fringe, tore down most of it, was checked by it 
while doing so, and thus getting a circular motion, whirled 
round a young officer of the 32nd ; its eventual impact 
breaking his leg and causing his death. At the Post-office 
it played pranks as well as doing serious damage. One of 
its shots broke the leg of a chair on which a lady was 
sitting, brought her to the ground, got caught in her dress, 
and then unrolled itself, out and along the floor, without 
doing her further harm. Another grazed the forehead, or 
rather the temples, of a young Engineer as he lay asleep, 
breaking the skin, and plunging against a treasure-chest 
beyond, but doing no further harm ; and, later, one cut 



174 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

through the pillow on which Montagu Hall of the 1st Fusi- 
liers lay asleep, and then broke the leg of the bed next 
him. 

The strain and exhaustion from the ceaseless work, the 
tension of anxiety, and the want of sleep, led every now 
and then to an absolute collapse of some sort or other. 
With me it twice took the form of sleepy stupor, from 
which I could not be awakened for a couple of days or 
more. The first occasion was on July 2nd, after hearing of 
Sir Henry's mortal wound. Doubtless it resulted from 
the combination of the shock thereby produced with the 
reaction on the cessation of the responsibilities of the 
Mutchi Bhown. The other was, I think, after the blowing 
up of Johannes' house, when I had remained on watch 
over the progress of our mine for three days and nights 
without sleep. 

It was this ceaseless exposure and work, and the absolute 
want of rest, that so wore out the men of the garrison ; for 
there was little to enliven them except an occasional sortie, 
which would be followed by much jubilation and excited 
talk. In one of these a specially intrepid soldier of the 
32nd was so struck with the gorgeous kincob costume of 
some native of rank who had fled before him in the Captan 
Bazar, that he saw, and could talk of, nothing else. Of 
course there were nicknames and jokes without end, jokes 
among the officers also. 

Scene. — Cawnpore Batter)- ( a comrade arrived from 
Deprat's shop). 

" Well, Bill ; anything up ? " 

" No." 

" Jack been here ? " 

"Yes." 

" What did he do ? " 

" Oh, he looked through this here keek-hole, and then 
through that there keek-hole." 

" And then ? " 

" He said we must trust to the British bayonet only." 

"And then?" 

" Why, then he hooked it." 

Passing officer to his friend. — " Judicious Hooker ! " 

But the wearied state of the men sometimes carried them 



MINOR INCIDENTS OF THE DEFENCE 175 

past the joking stage. One evening, at the Post-office, a 
man whose turn it was for sentry, utterly worn out, threw 
down his musket and would have no more of it. 

" Put him to bed," was McCabe's order to the sergeant 
of the guard. 

It is impossible to imagine anything more perfect than 
the management of the men and the example set to them 
by their officers — McCabe always in spirits ; Sam Lawrence, 
the beau-ideal of manly beauty, always genial and smiling, 
whether leading a sortie or waiting in quiet expectation of 
being blown up at the Redan. When, at the explosion 
there on July 20th, the men made a dart out of the way of 
the falling shower of earth, " Well, lads, when you are tired 
of running away, perhaps you'll come back again," was all 
the)' heard from their stalwart commander, MacFarlan. 

One peculiar feature in our Sepoys, was the sound estimate 
that they took of the strength and probable result of the 
enemy's attacks. When Innes's post was attacked, on July 
20th, they and the men of the 32nd were on the roof of the 
house, firing on the column moving up on the left. The 
32nd began to think they would get up to the neck of the 
position and so cut them off; but the Sepoys, understanding 
what they said, remarked, " No fear of that, they will never 
get so far." 

As an instance of their profound loyalty ; when, on the 
arrival of the relieving force, Aitken took out a few of his 
men to clear away the enemy's battery at the Lutkun 
Durwaza, some of the 78th, seeing them suddenly in the 
turmoil and the dusk, bayoneted two of them, supposing 
them to be the enemy. " Never mind," said one of them, " it 
was fated. Victory to the Baily Guard (Kooch punva nahin. 
Kismut hai — Baily Guard kijye)." 

Whatever excitement there may have been in the other 
episodes of the struggle, it could never approach the keen- 
ness of the mining contests ; and the most ludicrous incidents 
every now and then occurred. I do not think that we ever 
once hit or captured an enemy's miner in any of the 
numerous cases in which we seized their galleries ; either 
one of our party sneezed or coughed, or the pistol was wet 
and missed fire. At Sago's mine, while we were tamping 
to blow them in, we distracted their attention by starting 



176 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

almost a playful game, the two sides pelting each other with 
clods over the intervening wall. On one occasion, when we 
had seized a long gallery of the enemy's, two officers heard 
the earth falling in behind them. Said one of them, whose 
merriment was irrepressible, " What fun ! they are cutting 
us off ! " Fortunately they escaped ; since the earth did 
not block up the gallery, though much of it fell, and the 
enemy standing over the spot failed to catch them as they 
passed back, though they tried to do so. 

To describe a good instance of seizing an enemy's gallery, 
I will here anticipate events and relate my last contest, 
when I was on the verge of succumbing to the prevalent 
scurvy. A message had been sent to me to say that some- 
thing was going on at one of our Chuttur Munzil mines 
which our miners did not understand ; so passing along our 
intercepting galleries, I came at last to the point nearest the 
noise they had been hearing. It sounded to me quite close, 
but very feeble, certainly not like the blows of a pick or 
shovel. After a while, I formed the idea that the earth was 
being scraped, and planted myself opposite the spot, direct- 
ing the sergeant to stop at the next bend, and to keep a 
chain of men, one at each turn, up to our shaft. The noise 
continued, but only at intervals ; at length, on turning round 
gently, I saw a speck of light on the reverse side of the 
gallery in which I was squatting ; whereupon, feeling sure that 
that speck came from a light in the enemy's gallery, I moved 
my eyes about till I found the hole. It was too small for me 
to see through, but I waited patiently, remaining quite still. 
Then the scraping began again very cautiously; then it 
stopped, and I heard whispering ; presently more scraping ; 
soon a larger hole was formed, and then I heaved down the 
film of earth that separated us ; but the miners had at once 
" dowsed the glim," and though I fired shot upon shot after 
them, there was no reason to suppose that I hit either of 
them. Of course I followed them up to the shaft from 
which they had started the gallery, my sergeant speedily 
joining me. The enemy kept firing down their shaft — a 
harmless proceeding. A few minutes' work with the pick 
made a little mound close to the shaft by which we could 
be protected if the enemy should try to rush the gallery in 
force, but they did not attempt to do so. Their clamour 



MINOR INCIDENTS OF THE DEFENCE \-]l 

was uproarious, and then presently skinful after skinful of 
water was poured down the shaft. They thought we had 
been loading a charge of powder to blow them up ! Our 
response was shouts of laughter and banter ; to which their 
reply was more firing. In the end we kept the gallery as a 
listener, so preventing any further attempts of the enemy 
against us from that house. 

For significant instances of the peculiarity of mining war- 
fare and the first impressions it created, I have again to 
anticipate events. After the first few days of the joint 
defence, one of the most gallant of our relievers, a man 
whose enterprise had marked him out even in that band 
of heroes, had penetrated a mine for the first time ; and 
presently he re-appeared, as if upset. Some concussion 
had caused the earth to tumble about him and so he 
returned somewhat quickly. " What did you think ? — that 
the enemy were coming at you ? " " I suppose so." " Well," 
quoth his chief, " no one knows better than you that if you 
think the enemy are there, you should go at them and not 
back from them." " Quite so, sir, but I didn't think at all ; 
down below is very different from up above ! " 

Again, a day or two later, one of the best known men in 
Upper India, a noted wit and a consummate actor, appeared 
at the mess dinner, after having been down a mine for the 
first time. He was carefully prepared with a set expression 
of dismay and horror, and proceeded to dilate on his ex- 
periences till all the novices were in a tremor. When the 
others proceeded to chaff, he resumed his description, finally 
offering to put a bottle of brandy at the end of a mine, 
and to bet ioo rupees that no one who had not before 
entered a mine would go in and bring the bottle out. The 
challenge was not taken up ! Of course in a few days nearly 
every one had made the experiment ; but it was always felt 
that the underground contests involved special promptitude, 
skill, and risks, beyond those of ordinary warfare. 

Perhaps I have not made it sufficiently clear, that in these 
mines and mining contests, the Engineers were left absolutely 
unfettered, and the Garrison Engineer was free to act without 
orders. Many a mine against the enemy was exploded, 
under the exigency of the case, without intimation to the 
general staff; and not unfrequently our countermines, 



178 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

destructive of the enemy's galleries, caused as much anxiety 
and perturbation as the enemy's mines of attack. Beyond 
the Engineer circle, and the officers of the outposts, they 
were little understood ; our constant success seemed to 
inspire no confidence ; the rumoured existence of an enemy's 
mine invariably caused intense alarm ; and the mysterious 
dread respecting them may be best exemplified by the 
remark of an otherwise intelligent officer, that nothing 
would persuade him that the mine in the Captan Bazar, 
of which he saw merely the mouth, did not pass below the 
Redan. 

In his subsequent despatches, Sir James Outram spoke 
of six mines having been found, on his arrival, which 
threatened serious danger to our defences. He certainly 
never examined or saw those mines personally, or made 
that statement of his own knowledge. Nor do I know of 
any authentic source from which he could have received 
such information. I fear it was on a par with the inform- 
ation sent to Havelock about the food supply. There were 
plenty of the enemy's mines found and known of at that 
date, which they had been working at, but which had, so 
far, been harmless. To ascertain their details, in respect of 
the danger with which they threatened us, it was necessary 
to examine or break into them ; and neither I, nor any 
other Engineer who examined and dealt with these mines, 
found that any of them was approaching a dangerous stage. 
There was one at the Redan, which I blew up, and a second 
at the church ; two others were known of at the Baily 
Guard gate, two at Sago's, one at the Cawnpore Battery, 
three at Anderson's, and one at the Brigade mess ; but 
they were all far short of our boundary, and harmless. 

I have mentioned in the course of the narrative that we 
were at one time in anxiety about mining tools, and that 
we were fortunate in finding some on the roof of Deprat's 
shop. It came about in this way. All that part of the 
defence lay within my beat, and I was mentioning the 
matter to an officer there, when one of the civilians of the 
garrison said he had heard that Deprat used to keep a lot 
of his hardware and other stores on the roof. I immediately 
desired a ladder to be fetched ; but as there was some delay 
about it, and I knew that there was a staircase outside, with 



MINOR INCIDENTS OF THE DEFENCE 179 

a small door opening on to it, fairly screened by its parapet, 
I crawled up on the roof by that staircase, and found a 
quantity of most valuable articles, picks, spades, tarpaulins, 
and the like ; on which, causing first a soft floor of straw to 
be made on the ground inside, to deaden any noise, I gradu- 
ally threw all these things over, cleared the roof, and then 
got down by the ladder. No shot was fired at me, nor 
was I aware of having even been observed by the enemy, 
though they should have seen me from Johannes' house. 

When in actual contact with the enemy, as in sorties, I 
personally never found them show either determination or 
malignity. If brought to bay, they fought; but they were 
much more inclined to avoid close quarters. In the sorties 
that took place after we were relieved, this came to my 
notice prominently. In those in which we destroyed the 
enemy's houses by hasty demolition, the powder charges 
were laid as we advanced, and blown up as we retired. On 
retiring, I, as the Engineer, was necessarily the last man, 
having to fire the mine and overtake the party after they 
had withdrawn sufficiently far from the site of the explosion ; 
yet I never found the enemy pressing too closely on me, 
either collectively or singly, or shooting very straight. 

For instance : on the morning of September 26th, when 
I had to guide a party from Innes's post, into the ground 
that lay river-wards ; after scrambling through the long 
grass into the open, I was absolutely alone, when a large 
party of the enemy (whom I supposed to be our own men), 
ran past me, not a couple of yards off, with bayonets fixed, 
but never attempting to touch me. They continued running 
for about fifteen or twenty yards ; when, on their then turn- 
ing to the left, I called out to them to turn to the right 
instead. Then only did one or two of them begin firing at 
me; on which our party, who had been rather dawdling 
through the grass, dashed out and charged them. I fired 
my own revolver in vain. Every barrel snapped ! It had 
got damp during the night work which I had just left. 

I know of no occasion in which the enemy resolutely 
faced one of our sorties in the first defence, except at Sago's 
mine on August nth. 

They held aloof, in fact, from meeting men who they knew 
were desperate, while they were themselves, as a rule, acting 



180 THE FIRST DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

without any set purpose. In fact they retained throughout 
the old sense of our superiority, and they trusted for success 
in the contest to their numerical preponderance. 

The men investing the Residency varied greatly. Some- 
times they were Sepoys of the regular army, or of the Oude 
local force ; sometimes nujeebs or troops of the dethroned 
nuwab ; and occasionally, as on the West face, they were 
Talookdars' men, armed with matchlock, sword, and shield. 
Every now and then Pasees appeared among them, whose 
weapons were the bow and arrow, reminding one of Dugald 
Dalgetty. I remember one of our men on being struck 
by an arrow, tearing it out of his body, and dropping down 
dead. 






BOOK III 

BAVELOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

CHAPTER I 
N KILL'S ADVANCE UP TO ALLAHABAD 

OUR narrative, so far, has brought us to the close of the 
first defence of the Residency on the arrival of Havelock 
and Outram, and the heroic force which they had led to our 
relief. During the whole of that defence, but preceded by 
Neill as pioneer in still earlier days, had Havelock been 
persistently struggling to advance to the rescue. To that 
advance our story must now turn. 

A glance at any ordinary map of India will show that 
there are two routes from Calcutta to Cawnpore — one by 
the Ganges, the other by the trunk road — which meet at 
Benares, and then go on, side by side, to Allahabad and 
Cawnpore. Between Calcutta and Benares the route by 
road is straight and direct, passing through no important 
city or station ; but the river route touches the large 
city of Patna, with the cantonments of Dinapore beside it, 
where the ioth was quartered, the only British regiment 
between Calcutta and Lucknow. 

Benares is a large city, the head-quarters of Hindooism, 
with a native garrison, but with no fortified post ; at Alla- 
habad, however, between Benares and Cawnpore, there is a 
fortress of the European type, which, being situated at the 
junction of the Ganges and the Jumna, is essentially a 
strategical position of the very first importance, in fact the 
key of the Upper Provinces ; nevertheless, at the time of 
the Meerut outbreak it was garrisoned only by native 
troops, and was absolutely at their mercy. 

Hence in the first days of the Mutiny, while the main 
general object of the Calcutta Government was to send 



182 HAVELOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

forward troops to protect the country to the utmost, its 
most urgent military need was to prevent Allahabad from 
falling into the power of any hostile party, and to secure it 
instead as the basis and key of our own operations up- 
country. This was a specific step of incalculable import- 
ance to the whole conduct of the war; and it was the 
primary and immediate objective of the British advance 
from Calcutta, to be effected, if possible, before any general 
spread should begin of the Mutiny, which was as yet 
confined to the Delhi districts. 

The story of the advance to Cawnpore naturally, there- 
fore, divides itself into two stages, the first up to Allahabad, 
the other beyond it. 

To -proceed with the first stage. When shortly before 
the middle of May, the Government heard of the Meerut 
rising, they began immediately to send up-country what- 
ever troops they had to spare, and to follow them up with 
others as fast as they arrived. At first these troops were 
forwarded only by the road route (which was the quickest), 
being conveyed either in horsed vehicles or by the Govern- 
ment bullock train — an organized train of wagons drawn 
by relays of bullocks, which were picketed at regular stages 
all along the road. Afterwards they were also despatched 
on steamers by the river route. Those sent on at first 
were in detachments. The 84th led the way ; then came 
the Madras Fusiliers on their arrival from Madras ; and 
after them the 64th and 78th on their rejoining from the 
Persian Expeditionary Force. A detachment of 150 men 
of the 10th was also sent forward from Dinapore to 
Benares. 

For three precious weeks the native army in these Lower 
Provinces, as well as elsewhere, delayed in following the 
example set them at Meerut and Delhi ; and during these 
three weeks there was a constant but thin stream of these 
detachments of British troops flowing northwards from 
Calcutta without let or hindrance. As they reached 
Benares they were sent on to Allahabad ; as they reached 
Allahabad they were sent on to Cawnpore ; and even the 
party of the 84th that reached Cawnpore was sent on by 
Wheler to Lucknow. So long as the Sepoys refrained from 
breaking out, so long did the local authorities shut their 



NE ILL'S ADVANCE UP TO ALLAHABAD 183 

eyes to the need of securing the fortress of Allahabad — the 
dominant influence being apparently a chivalrous desire 
to aid those whose need was thought to be the greatest. 

But on June 3rd the spread of the Mutiny, where it could 
affect this advance, began at Azimgurh, which lay off the 
road near Benares. The news of it reached Benares next 
afternoon ; by which time, however, fortunately, the detach- 
ment of the 10th from Dinaporc had arrived, and also a 
small party of the Madras Fusiliers under Colonel Neill ; 
raising the British force at the station to some 220 men, 
including half of Olpherts's battery, the other half of which 
was at Dinapore. Now the native garrison consisted of 
the 37th N. I., the Loodianah Sikh regiment, and a part of 
a regiment of Irregular Cavalry. It was thought that the 
Loodianah regiment would remain staunch ; but it con- 
tained a large proportion of Hindoostanee Sepoys, which 
affected its loyalty, or at any rate gave scope for excitement 
to disaffection. On the receipt of the news of the Azim- 
gurh mutiny, a general parade was, at the instance of 
Colonel Neill, of the Madras Fusiliers, ordered at Benares 
for five o'clock that afternoon, with the object of disarming 
the 37th N. I. But when the time arrived, that regiment, 
instead of yielding, broke out in mutiny, and began firing 
at the British line of infantry and artillery. While they 
were being driven off and dispersed, the cavalry broke out 
and shot their commandant ; which seems to have excited 
the Sikh regiment. They had remained passive, and had 
not acted against the 37th N. I. ; and now they fired on their 
officers and wounded them, and proceeded to fire on the 
British line, and to move as if threatening to charge the 
artillery. Olpherts, however, having scattered the 37th, now 
swung his guns round on the Sikhs ; and, not caring to 
allow them to bayonet his gunners, received them with a 
fierce shower of shot and grape, which checked them 
thoroughly, and then drove them and the cavalry into 
precipitate rout ; whereby Benares was saved. The infantry 
following up drove the mutineers out of cantonments, and 
the British remained masters of the field. This was a 
matter of the highest moment, not merely from its se- 
curing Benares itself as a temporary base, but also from 
its clearing the way onward, and helping towards the 



iS4 HAVELOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

retention of the infinitely more important position at 
Allahabad. 

Neill had now succeeded to the command, and to secure 
that position was his great aim. Next morning, therefore, he 
sent off his own men, under Lieutenant Arnold, towards 
Allahabad to do what he could to seize and hold the for- 
tress ; remaining behind himself in order to push the other 
troops forward to his support, on their arriving, from time to 
time, by driblets from Calcutta. Neill had already attracted 
great attention from his exceptionally resolute and vigorous 
bearing ; and here his fierce energy and impetuous action 
startled and leavened the authorities. After a few days, 
when he had done all he thought necessary to put arrange- 
ments on a sound footing, he finally went on in person on 
the 9th, taking such additional men as he could with him 
in horsed vehicles, and reached Allahabad on June nth. 

The garrison there consisted of two regiments — one, the 
6th N. I. in the cantonment, the other an irregular regiment 
of Sikhs under Captain Brasyer in the fortress. On June 
6th (five days before) the Sepoy regiment had mutinied, and 
tried to seize the fort. But the Sikhs, under Brasyer's 
stern influence, had remained loyal, would not admit the 
Sepoys, and, supported by a few English volunteers and 
pensioners, had held the fortress for the State. Next day 
they were reinforced by Arnold's party; and on the nth, 
Neill's arrival secured the position. The day after, the 
mutineers were attacked and driven across the river into 
Oude, and British administration was quickly re-established 
in Allahabad. 

This was the first point of primary importance scored in 
the war, though it never attracted a tithe of the public 
attention that was due to it. This was owing partly to its 
having been effected without much fighting, and partly to 
the more sensational events that were taking place at Delhi, 
Cawnpore, and Lucknow. 

But of the paramount importance of the operation there 
can be no serious question ; nor of the gravity of the crisis. 
The loss of the fortress was desperately imminent, and, if 
lost, what the consequences would have been are beyond 
conjecture. It is enough for practical purposes to point 
out that by securing it, our virtual base of operations was 



NEILVS ADVANCE UP TO ALLAHABAD 1S5 

transferred from Calcutta to an impregnable position 500 
miles ahead. It is of interest to note that this turning- 
point of the war was coincident in date (June 12th) with the 
decision at Delhi to give up the thought of immediate 
assault, and to undertake the prolonged siege from the Ridge. 

With this all-important success at Allahabad the name 
of Brasyer must ever be associated ; for, on the crisis of 
June 5th, and until supports arrived, the saving of the fort 
would have been hopeless except for his personal weight 
with the Sikh soldiery, and his resolute and undaunted 
bearing. On the other hand, in the bold and rapid move- 
ment of the handful of men that sufficed for the support 
needed for that purpose, and in the advance generally 
during that critical period, Neill was the moving spirit, the 
leading personality, and chief actor. 

After June 12th the advance enters on its second stage. 
For nearly three weeks, even with Neill's fiery and im- 
petuous energy, no further forward movement was found 
possible. Troops from Calcutta had continued to arrive, 
but only in driblets, and frequently in entire want of 
equipment. Thus Maude with his gunners from Ceylon 
had to improvise a battery from the Allahabad arsenal, get 
bullocks for its draught, and fit them with harness. Before 
June 30th Neill had not been able to send on a man to the 
front. On that day, however, he had succeeded in com- 
pleting the equipment of a sufficiently strong party, under 
Major Renaud of his own regiment, for a move towards 
Cawnpore ; and this was his last act in chief command. 
On that very day, June 30th, his senior officer, Henry 
Havelock, who had been appointed to the command, 
arrived to take it over. Warmly appreciating Neill's 
energy and supporting his views, he at once confirmed his 
proposal, and sent forward Renaud and his party towards 
Cawnpore. 

One coincidence of dates has already been mentioned. 
Here is the second. June 30th saw, on the one hand, the 
defeat of Lawrence at Chinhut and the beginning of the 
siege of the Lucknow Residency ; and, on the other, the 
start from Allahabad of the pioneer party of Havelock's 
advance, which was eventually to end in the succour of 
that garrison. 



1 86 HAVELOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

General Havelock, who thus displaced Neill, for the 
future, from the leadership of the advance, had, on returning 
from the Persian Expedition, been appointed to that 
command, had left Calcutta on June 25th, and, as above 
shown, joined the front at Allahabad on the 30th. His 
qualities and career are too widely known to call for more 
here than a passing tribute of homage ; but it will not be 
out of place to say that, besides the great and pertinent 
experience he had acquired in serious fighting, such as in 
Burmah, Afghanistan, and the Punjab, he was unique in 
those days as a student of his profession, learned in 
military knowledge, and skilled in the art of war. And he 
was now about to bring all this experience, knowledge, 
and skill, to bear on one of the most desperate undertakings 
ever entrusted to a soldier. 



CHAPTER II 

ADVANCE TO CAWNPORE 

WHEN Havelock, on June 30th, sent forward Renaud's 
party towards Cawnpore, he had not heard of the surrender 
of its hapless garrison, and the catastrophe of June 27th. 
In a few hours, however, messengers and spies arrived tell- 
ing of it ; and the searching inquiry that was at once made 
destroyed any possible doubts of its truth, or of the new 
state of affairs that had to be faced. 

One result was that the whole of the Cawnpore rebel 
army was now free to move downwards towards Allahabad 
and attack Renaud's party, which was advancing in 
front, isolated, and consisted of only four hundred English 
and three hundred Sikh troops with a couple of guns, and 
a few native cavalry. Havelock therefore sent cautioning 
orders to Renaud, allowing him to continue to advance, 
but only slowly and warily, instead of expeditiously ; and 
on July 7th he followed on himself with his main force ; 
leaving Neili behind at Allahabad with a sufficient garrison, 
to organize and complete the arrangements there for the 
security of future operations. 

The force that Havelock thus led out of Allahabad, 
together with the party under Renaud, amounted to 1,965 
men all told, and included Maude's field battery of artillery 
from Ceylon. Of the 1,965 men, 1,404 were English and 
561 were natives. The English consisted of 98 artillery, 
20 volunteer cavalry, and 1,286 infantry (Madras Fusiliers, 
64th, 78th, and part of the 84th). Of the natives, 18 were 
gunners, 95 were cavalry, who proved worthless and were 
disarmed and dismounted after the first flight, and 448 
were Sikhs under Brasyer. 

A further source of anxiety respecting Renaud's party 
was that, large as the rebel force at Cawnpore had been 
at first, there was no knowing to what extent it might 



1 88 HAVE LOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

not have now been swelled by the mutineers from Azim- 
gurh, Jaunpore, Benares, and Allahabad ; or whether these 
mutineers might not, possibly, be hovering on Renaud's 
flank and rear instead of pushing forward to Cawnpore. 

When Havelock started on July /th, and in fact all 
throughout this month, the heat was intense ; and he wisely 
avoided pressing his men for the first couple of days, till 
they began to get inured to the marching and the heat ; 
but, afterwards moving more rapidly, he overtook Renaud 
on the night of the 1 ith, and on the 12th fought the action 
of Futtehpore. 

He had halted four miles short of the town of Futteh- 
pore ; and the Cawnpore rebels, who had been marching- 
south to check the British advance, thinking that here 
they would only have Renaud's party to deal with, came 
gaily on to the attack with a swarm of cavalry in front. 
Their force consisted of some 3,500 regulars and a mass 
of raw levies. On sighting the British it developed its line, 
with the artillery in the centre, which opened fire. Sud- 
denly it realized that it was in the presence of a much 
stronger array than it had expected. Maude's guns first 
replied direct to its artillery, and then took its line in flank 
at point-blank range ; while the British infantry advanced 
to the front, preceded by skirmishers. In ten minutes the 
issue was no longer doubtful. It was the first taste the 
enemy had of the Enfield rifle, and the)' fled in rout ; 
eleven guns were taken, and Futtehpore was stormed. The 
victory was thorough, and almost bloodless. Our chief loss 
lay in twelve men killed by sunstroke. 

On the next day there was a halt. On the 14th, the 
native cavalry which had misbehaved were disarmed and 
dismounted, and the force again advanced. On the 15th, 
it fought in succession the two actions of Aong and of 
Pandoo Nuddee, about twenty-eight and twenty-two miles 
short of Cawnpore. At both of these sites the enemy had 
made careful preparations. 

At Aong they had entrenched the face of the village, 
and also held a hamlet in its front ; and, on Havelock's 
approach, they threw forward their cavalry on both his 
flanks, threatening his rear. Havelock kept together two- 
thirds of his force to hold the cavalry at bay, and to act 
as supports where necessary ; sending only the remaining 



ADVANCE TO CAWNPORE 189 

third forward in skirmishing order for the actual fight. It 
was soon over. The Madras Fusiliers stormed the hamlet ; 
the rest of the skirmishers and the artillery attacked the 
entrenchment, captured it and the village, and drove the 
enemy out of it pell-mell. Their cavalry had made several 
fruitless efforts to assail our main column ; but being every 
time badly repulsed, at length fled precipitately to the rear, 
and the fight was over. 

A very sad loss marked this combat. The intrepid 
Renaud, the leader of the advance, was mortally wounded. 
Brief, however, was the time for sorrow — short the spell of 
rest — for Havelock learnt that the enemy was in force in 
his front, bent on contesting the passage of the Pandoo 
Nuddee, and prepared to blow up the bridge, if need be. 
This was to be prevented, whatever the hazard or toil, 
as the river was in flood, and the destruction of the bridge 
would amount to a catastrophe, from the serious delay it 
would certainly involve. So, on again to save the bridge, 
and secure the passage of the stream ! 

The enemy had been reinforced by a party of the Nana's 
followers under his brother Bala Rao, and were sanguine 
of success. But their position was faulty. They were 
massed close behind the bridge, which was at the apex 
of a bend in the ravine ; which here formed the course of 
the stream, the bend being towards the British, while the 
arms of the ravine lay slantwise along the enemy's flanks. 
The ravine was lined on the British side with high and 
steep cliffs, through a passage in which the road led down 
to the bridge. 

There was no halt in the British advance. The skir- 
mishers partly occupied the cliff above the bridge, and 
partly drew up in the passage leading to it, prepared to 
charge; while the main force, with the guns, ranged right 
and left on the cliffs along the arms of the bend, bring- 
ing an overwhelming cross-fire to bear on the bridge, 
and on the enemy massed behind it for its defence. This 
fire took all the heart out of them. They essayed to blow 
up the bridge when their mine was not yet ready ; Stephen- 
son, with his Madras Fusiliers in the passage leading to 
the stream, saw the failure, seized the opportunity, dashed 
over the bridge, captured the guns, and, being rapidly 
supported by the rest of the force, drove the enemy in 



190 HAVELOCK' S CAMPAIGN 

precipitate flight towards Cawnporc. And so ended the 
contests of July 15th. 

The success that had thus attended the careful and 
skilful handling of the troops (the loss in action did not 
exceed thirty killed and wounded) was all-important ; for 
it was well that the men should be eager for combat and 
full of confidence in their leader, when their spirit and 
strength and endurance were to be put to the severest test. 

On that afternoon, Havelock learnt that the whole of 
the Cawnpore English community had not been destroyed 
on June 27th as had been supposed, but that a large party- 
were held captive by the Nana, and might still be saved. 
So no time was to be lost. They must be rescued at all 
hazards. There could be no rest till this had been effected, 
or, at least, every possible effort made towards this end. 

In the early moonlight, therefore, of the next morning, 
July 1 6th, the force again moved forward some fifteen miles ; 
till they reached a village, Maharajpore, where their rear- 
guard was to be halted and the baggage massed. The 
outskirts of Cawnpore, where the enemy were prepared to 
meet them, were now only about six miles ahead ; so after a 
rest and breakfast, the force advanced about noon to the con- 
flict ; which, as will be seen, involved three successive fights. 

The rebel force was said to consist of 5,000 regular troops 
and eight guns, four of which were twenty-four-pounders, 
besides a mass of irregulars and the Nana's own retainers. 
But the latter were not present in the first of the three fights. 

They were found to be drawn up about half-a-mile behind 
a point, or fork, where the road to the cantonments branched 
off from the trunk road along which Havelock was ad- 
vancing. They were in a curved line, about one and a 
quarter miles long, crossing and extending beyond both the 
roads, with both of their flanks and their centre resting on 
villages. Their cavalry and three of their heavy guns were 
on their left. Three nine-pounders were on their right. 
Their other two guns were in the centre. All the guns and 
the fire of the whole army were arranged to bear on the 
bifurcation of the roads. 

Now the force that Havelock had with him to the 
front for the fight numbered only 1,100 British and 300 
Sikhs ; so a direct frontal attack was out of the question ; 
manoeuvring was necessary. 



ADVANCE TO CAU'NPORK 191 

Fortunately, at about half-a-milc short of the fork, the 
ground to the British right (and in front, therefore, of the 
enemy's left, where his greatest strength lay) was covered 
by a line of mango groves. Havelock took advantage of 
these as a screen ; and, while placing his cavalry with a 
force of skirmishers about the fork to attract or distract 
the enemy's attention, caused his main force to sweep in 
column to the right, behind and around the mango groves, 
till it emerged on the enemy's left flank, at right angles to 
his general alignment (a manoeuvre in imitation of the 
Great Frederick at Leuthen exactly a century before). On 
gaining the enemy's flank, the column rapidly deployed, 
and while the enemy was trying to change his formation, 
swept down his line from its left to its right, taking all his 
guns and driving him in flight to the rear. At the first, the 
artillery under Maude took the enemy's position in enfilade, 
but the contest soon became an infantry battle. The 
advance was in echelon, the 78th Highlanders leading, then 
the 64th, the 84th, and the Sikhs, the whole covered by the 
Madras Fusiliers as skirmishers. The 78th moved down, 
silently at first, on the heavy battery at the enemy's left 
flank ; and then, when eighty yards short of it, charged it, 
the men cheering, and pipes playing. That impetuous 
charge carried them through the enemy's left, rolling up 
their line close up to their centre ; where halting for only 
a few moments to pull themselves together, the Highlanders 
again charged onwards, the General himself with them, and 
captured the centre position and guns ; the enemy through- 
out being bayoneted and driven in precipitate flight to the 
rear. On reaching the centre, the 78th, utterly spent, were 
halted, while the 64th, 84th, and Sikhs took up the running, 
and sweeping on, carried the enemy's position and guns on 
their right flank ; thus in the end routing the enemy from 
the whole of their position with the loss of all their guns. 

While this last portion of the fight was in progress on 
the enemy's right, a brilliant feat was being performed at 
the centre, Barrow's volunteer horse (about twenty sabres) 
charging and cutting up the rear of the enemy, though 
their cavalry, a whole regiment, was present to cover their 
flight. 

This closed the first, but only the first, of the three fights 
or phases of the battle of Cawnpore. 



192 HAVELOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

For, exhausted though the troops were by the heat, the 
long march, and then the battle, they had more work cut 
out for them. The infantry, on re-forming in order, con- 
tinued its advance, but had to leave the guns behind, as the 
teams were too spent, for the time, to draw them. After 
marching about a mile, it was found that the fugitives of 
the left and centre of the enemy's line had rallied, and were 
drawn up with a couple of guns in a village to oppose us 
again. As the wearied British advanced but slowly, they 
were roused by Havelock's challenge, " Which regiment is 
going to take that village ? " on which they raced for it, 
two of them driving the enemy out of it, and a third clear- 
ing the ground to its right. 

Again the enemy fled, and this finished the second fight. 

But even now the day's work was not yet at an end ; 
for, as the British force continued its march, it found its 
front checked by a mass of troops, of which a large propor- 
tion were fresh levies of the Nana's, who was now command- 
ing them in person. The situation was somewhat desperate ; 
the men were utterly spent, and they had no artillery with 
them ; while a twenty-four-pounder was playing on their 
centre, and the enemy's cavalry, which had rallied, had got 
to the rear and were attacking the wounded. So, while 
Maude's guns had not yet come up, Havelock ordered the 
line to advance, although under a heavy fire of grape and 
musketry ; and at length, when they had covered some 
1,400 yards, he sent the 64th charging at the twenty-four- 
pounder. This finished the day's struggle, with its three 
distinct actions. The enemy lost all heart, and fled in total 
rout ; the victorious army halting for the night on the plain 
skirting that end of Cawnpore. 

This splendid success had, however, failed in one, and 
that the most prominent, of its objects. On the previous 
day, the 15th, after hearing of his defeat at the Pandoo 
Nuddee, and the certain advance of Havelock's column, 
the Nana had destroyed his captives. The British force 
did not know, and Havelock did not learn till the small 
hours of the 17th, that their successive conflicts of the 16th 
at Cawnpore could no longer save those whom they had 
been hoping to rescue. 

The simple and obvious preparations and precautions 
that, with the occupation of the Magazine, would have 



ADVANCE TO CAWNPORE 193 

placed the Cawnpore part)- in a position to hold out for 
the twenty further days which brought succour, had been 
neglected. To that fatal error of judgment we owe the 
ghastliest and the saddest lesson of the Mutiny. 

On June 17th, the morning after the battle, the British 
arm)- entered and occupied Cawnpore ; when they learnt 
and realized the miserable story of the massacre. On that 
same day, Havelock received Ungud, the one thoroughly 
successful spy from the Lucknow Residency ; heard the 
story of the death of Henry Lawrence; and at once turned 
all his thoughts and energies to the passage of the Ganges 
and an advance to Lucknow. 

During the next three days he worked vigorously at 
constructing an entrenched position on the bank of the 
Ganges, to enable a small force of three hundred men to 
hold its own against all comers. He also sent out a recon- 
noitring force to Bithoor, the Nana's seat a few miles off, 
which they burnt and destroyed. They found that he 
himself had fled, and his army had scattered, so escaping 
further immediate punishment. Then on the 20th, the day 
of the first attack on Lucknow, Neill rejoined him from 
Allahabad with a reinforcement of two hundred and twenty- 
seven men. Yet even with this addition, his effective 
strength at Cawnpore was less than that with which he 
had started from Allahabad. This was owing to the heavy 
losses from the combined results of casualties in action, 
from the sun, from sickness generally, and specially from 
cholera ; which had now appeared and carried off, besides 
other victims, his principal Staff officer, Stuart Beatson. 

Still the circumstances were wholly altered. Every 
struggle had issued in success. The men had acquired 
perfect confidence in themselves and their leader, and were 
eager for action ; while the enemy had lost all heart, finding 
it a vain task to contend against the British soldier ; so that 
in entering on any conflict, there was the assurance of success 
on the one side, the conviction of certain defeat impending 
on the other. 

Such was the result which Havelock had achieved by 
July 20th, when he was preparing to cross the Ganges into 
Oude, and when the garrison he desired to relieve were 
repulsing the first general attack on their position. 

O 



CHAPTER III 

HIS FIRST ADVANCE INTO OUDE 

On July 20th, General Havelock had occupied Cawnpore 
for three days ; during which he had been arranging for an 
efficient entrenchment — some 400 yards by 200, at the 
debouchure of the canal — for the protection of the station, 
and also preparing to cross the Ganges and advance on 
Lucknow. After deducting the garrison, 300 men, needed 
for the entrenchment, the force he had available for the 
advance was under 1,500 men, with thirteen field-pieces; the 
Europeans of the force not amounting to 1,200, all told. 

His anxiety was intense, for he knew by this time that 
the enemy lying between him and Lucknow were in over- 
whelming numbers, whatever their spirit ; that they com- 
prised three separate armies — (1) the force that had from 
the first been besieging the Residency ; (2) the mutineer 
regiments that had flocked into Oude from the side of 
Benares and Azimgurh ; and (3) the Sepoy troops whom 
he had defeated on his march from Allahabad. The only 
regiment that might have been present with this large 
hostile array, but was missing from it, was the 6th N. I. ; 
which after rising at Allahabad and collecting much 
plunder, had been driven off by Neill, and had gone away 
to their own homes ; only, it is said, to be robbed and 
maltreated by the villagers on the way. And besides 
this force in his front, Havelock was beginning to hear 
rumours of the approach of mutineer troops from the south 
of the Jumna ; but not as yet of any disturbance below 
Allahabad. On the other hand, reinforcements were on 
their way, so, on July 20th, the day of the first attack 
on the Residency, a start was made of the passage of 
Havelock's men to the Oude bank of the Ganges. The river 
was in high flood for a breadth of 1,500 yards, with shoal 



HIS FIRST ADVANCE INTO OUDIl 195 

water for another 1,000 ; and the passage was effected entirely 
by the use of ferry-boats, which were either sailed, or rowed, 
or towed across by a steamer. Guns had been placed in 
position to cover the passage, but they were never needed. 
The crossing was never contested or checked. It was 
managed entirely by Colonel Frazer Tytler and Lieut. 
Moorsom, taking up eight days, six for the troops and 
two for the baggage. Each trip involved a passage of six 
miles, and occupied four hours. As the men landed, they 
bivouacked about two miles further on, and then gradually 
concentrated at Mungurwar, a strong and elevated position 
about six miles from the river. The force was very lightly- 
equipped, carriage or transport being difficult to get. As 
they gradually cleared out of Cawnpore, Havelock's heart 
grew lighter in one respect. The men were freed from the 
temptation to drink with which they had been beset at 
Cawnpore, and which had threatened to demoralize that 
heroic band. At Mungurwar there were no liquor-shops, 
no relics of " Europe stores." 

During the eight days of the passage, there had been 
almost continuous communication with the Residency. 
As already mentioned, Havelock had seen our emissary, 
Ungud, on reaching Cawnpore. Ungud had then returned 
to Lucknow, told its garrison of Havelock's victories, and 
come back again to Havelock with Mr. Gubbins's letter, but 
with none from General Inglis. Then he had a second time 
returned to Lucknow on the 25th with Colonel Tytler's 
letter, and had now a third time presented himself to 
Havelock, bringing on this occasion the letter from General 
Inglis with enclosures from the Engineers, respecting the 
road or access to the Residency. 

Havelock crossed in person to Mungurwar on the 24th. 
There was an accession of cholera on the 26th. On the 
28th all the preparations were finished. Next morning 
the force advanced, and in the course of the day fought two 
actions, one at Oonao and the other at Busherut Gun^e, 
respectively four and ten miles ahead. 

The peculiar feature of this advance was that it passed 
along a raised causeway through swampy or marshy 
ground, which made any extended or flank movement — or 
in fact any movement except along the causeway — very 



196 HAVELOCtCS CAMPAIGN 

difficult ; while in addition the enemy had prepared both 
Oonao and Busherut Gunge for defence. 

The Oonao position was a double one. In advance was 
a village that lined the two sides of the road, and was 
strengthened by walled gardens and enclosures ; and in rear 
was the town of Oonao. Neither position could be turned. 
Nothing was possible except a straightforward advance. 

On approaching the village and finding it held, Havelock 
attacked it with his skirmishers. Then, before the gfuns 
came up, the Madras Fusiliers and the 78th charged the 
enclosures and the village, fighting from house to house. 
The 64th, coming up to their support, enabled them to 
clear out the position and form up on a dry stretch of 
ground on the Oonao side of the village. 

Here, after a brief interval, Havelock joyfully found the 
enemy playing into his hands, and coming in mass along 
the causeway to attack him. Our guns were laid to 
enfilade them as they came on, while the infantry moved 
more to the flank, some advancing into the swampy ground 
so as to catch the enemy actually in flank. The Sepoys 
advanced gaily, until they came sufficiently near, when 
they halted and opened fire. Then Maude replied with 
his grape at point-blank range. The enemy suffered 
heavily, tried to deploy, but failed, and then finding them- 
selves caught on the flank as well as in front, broke and 
fled precipitately. The British followed up ; pursued and 
captured their artillery, fifteen guns, and the town ; and 
then halted to rest. 

After a halt of three hours, and a meal, the force advanced 
again, marching six miles to Busherut Gunge, of which 
they found the entrance protected by a battery of four guns 
and some entrenchments. As the ground here admitted it, 
Havelock sent the 64th forward on the left flank to turn 
the town and get at the causeway in rear, while he attacked 
the town in front. In due time, the frontal assault was 
made by the 78th and the Madras men, and succeeded ; 
but the enemy on retreating escaped along the causeway, 
instead of being caught by the 64th as had been hoped. 

Still we had won two victories ; though at a loss of 
about a sixth of the force (half of it from cholera and the 
sun), and with much exhaustion of the ammunition. The 



HIS FIRST ADVANCE INTO OUDE 197 

prospect, to the General, was very gloomy, almost hopeless. 
It was obvious to him that his present force was wholly 
inadequate to win through the difficulties ahead ; where the 
enemy were evidently reserving their strength, and would 
meet him in positions carefully prepared for defence. 

Then, on the following morning, came the disastrous 
news from Neill (which had reached him by telegraph), that 
the Sepoys at Dinapore, on his communications south of 
Benares, had mutinied ; and that no further reinforcements 
were to be counted on for a couple of months ! For, not 
only had those Sepoys mutinied, but the leading chief in 
that neighbourhood, a very fine old Rajpoot, named Kon- 
wur Singh, had risen in rebellion ; and, as his influence 
extended from the river to the trunk road, not only was 
the safety of the communications threatened, but those 
districts had thrown off the British rule, and troops that 
would otherwise have gone on to the front had to be 
detained for the protection and restoration of order of those 
districts. Hence it was that the regiments such as the 5th, 
37th, and 90th, which Havelock had been counting on for 
the increased strength necessary for the conflict at Lucknow, 
were kept back ; and he was now warned that they might 
not be available for a couple of months. This news was 
crushing — heart-breaking, when added to the cholera that 
was devastating his force. On July 30th, therefore — a 
singular sequel to his victories of the preceding day — he 
made up his mind, not only not to continue his advance 
towards Lucknow, but instead to retire to his position at 
Mungurwar. At this stage, however, he had no thought of 
quitting Oude territory or retiring further to the rear than 
Mungurwar. 

His intention was to remain there as his temporary head- 
quarters, diverting and withdrawing the enemy as much 
as possible from Lucknow ; and thereby to diminish the 
pressure on its garrison : at the same time taking every 
possible opportunity of dealing effective blows at the 
enemy. His reason for selecting Mungurwar as his 
temporary position was twofold ; first, it was fairly close 
to the river, and in touch with Cawnpore, whither he could 
send his sick and wounded ; and second, the site was high 
and advantageous for defensive purposes. 



198 HAVELOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

It may also be mentioned that no sign whatever had yet 
appeared during those ten days (nor in fact at any time 
afterwards) of any Talookdars with their followers joining 
in the fights or harassing him ; but he had heard rumours, 
though all was quiet to the east, that there was an inclination 
towards some turbulent gatherings at Roya, on the western 
or left flank, where the Nana was said to be sheltered. 

Such was the state of matters, and such were Havelock's 
intentions when on July 31st he retired to Mungurwar. 
This narrative is meant to be mainly one of military 
operations ; still it is reasonable to dwell for a moment 
on the bitterness which the brave old General must have 
suffered when he turned his back on Lucknow; on his 
sense of the censure and outcry which the step would raise 
against him ; on his sympathy for the almost irrepressible 
mortification and anguish of his gallant troops at the 
thought of retreat; and on his noble and resolute firmness 
to do the right thing, in spite of all such obstacles. 

On retiring to Mungurwar, he wrote of it to Neill, and 
caused a telegram to be sent to the Commander-in-Chief in 
Calcutta, saying that without another 1,000 men and a 
battery he could not possibly move on Lucknow. 

And now harassed as he was to the extreme of endurance, 
he was to be further worried by Neill's bearing at Cawn- 
pore. Incidents had occurred previously, pointing to 
Neill's readiness to criticize and condemn Havelock's action ; 
and he now wrote to Havelock condemning his retrograde 
movement in terms which may be justly described as 
unprecedented and unmeasured from a subordinate to the 
General in command. Havelock's reply was brief, peremp- 
tory, and conclusive ; but the incident, of course, altered 
permanently the relations between the two men. 

Neill was now sending Havelock intelligence of the 
approach of the 42nd N. I., a mutineer regiment from 
Saugor, and of the threatened gatherings on the banks of 
the Jumna. But he also sent him over a few reinforce- 
ments, a company of the 84th, Olpherts's half batter)-, two 
heavy guns, and two field howitzers. 

On the 31st, Havelock had been able to put only 850 
men in line, after providing for his guards and such other 
requirements, out of a total strength of 1,350 men. Four 



HIS FIRST ADVANCE INTO OUDE 199 

clays later, i.e. on August 4th, he still had only 1,400 men, 
all told, including his Sikhs ; with whom, having heard ot 
the Sepoys again collecting at Busherut Gunge, he marched 
against them there a second time, in pursuance of his plan 
to deal them effective blows whenever an opportunity 
occurred. 

He adopted the same plan of action as before, sending 
the 78th, the Sikhs, and Maude's Battery to make the 
turning movement. The enemy saw it, would not face it, 
and fled before it could be completed, though not without 
losing some 300 men ; while our loss was but two men 
killed and twenty-three wounded. Seventy-five men, how- 
ever, went down with cholera and fever. Havelock was 
thereby confirmed in the hopelessness of an advance with 
his present force, and under present circumstances ; so he 
here consulted his three principal Staff officers on the matter, 
and found that they all agreed with him, excepting only his 
ardent and intrepid son, who would hardly be convinced. 

One peculiar feature in this second fight at Busherut 
Gunge was the presence among the enemy of some 
Talookdars' men. But, as their chiefs had not joined, it is 
thought that they belonged to these districts, and had been 
coerced by the Sepoys, and forced to accompany them to 
the scene of action. If this was not the case, the men were 
probably those of Doondiakhera from the east, and Nirput 
Singh's from the west. 

On August 5th, the day after the fight, Havelock had not 
900 men present to put in line, yet he now received still 
more pressing intelligence of the approach of the enemy to 
Cawnpore. So he returned again to Mungurwar, to be 
ready to recross if necessary ; though not yet proposing to 
give up his hold on Oude territory. 

If this date be compared with the events already described 
at Lucknow, it may be gathered that, after their second 
defeat at Busherut Gunge, the rebels were still aware of 
Havelock's weakness and difficulties, and of the extent to 
which Cawnpore must engage his attention ; and that con- 
sequently the bulk of the Sepoy force that had been fighting 
him returned to Lucknow, helping to press on vigorously 
the measures which culminated in the second general attack 
of August 10th. 



200 HAVELOCK >S CAMPAIGN 

At Mungurwar during those next few days, the letters 
received from Neill became more and more anxious, 
describing his straits as likely to be desperate, with 4,000 
men and numerous artillery threatening him close at hand. 
So Havelock having first written on August 6th to the 
Commander-in-Chief, intimating his intention to hold on to 
Oude, now wrote on the 9th saying that he would probably 
have to return to Cawnpore. 

On August 4th, the day preceding the second march to 
Busherut Gunge, Colonel Tytler had written the following- 
letter to General Inglis — 

"We inarch to-morrow morning for Lucknow, having 
been reinforced — we shall push on as speedily as possible 
—we hope to reach you in four days at furthest. You 
must aid us in every way, even to cutting your way out if 
we can't force our way in. We are only a small force." 

This letter, however, did not reach General Inglis till the 
15th; after, as will be seen, Havelock had evacuated Oude. 

But now on the 8th — four days after Tytler wrote the 
above letter — Havelock wrote to Inglis stating — 

" Imperious circumstances compel me to recross the 
Ganges. When further defence becomes impossible, do not 
negotiate or capitulate — cut your way out to Cawnpore. 
Blow up your fortifications, trenches, etc. by constructing 
surcharged mines under them and leaving slow matches 
burning." 

But there seems to be no record or trace of this letter 
having ever reached its destination. 

It is to be remembered that meanwhile the last news 
Havelock had of the garrison was by Inglis's letter of July 
26th, now a fortnight old. In fact there was singular delay 
(felicitous delay, it may be held) in the interchange of receipt 
of grave intelligence between Havelock and Inglis. 

He remained at Mungurwar till the nth, two days after 
reporting to the Commander-in-Chief his probable return to 
Cawnpore. For the last three or four days he had been 
preparing for his re-passage of the Ganges ; his actual move- 
ments, when the time for it arrived, having of course to be 
guided by the attitude and position of the enemy. And on 
August 10th (the day of the second general attack on 



HIS FIRST ADVANCE INTO OUDE 201 

Lucknow), Havelock learnt that the force of the enemy at 
Busherut Gunge was sufficiently strong to require to be 
defeated and driven to the rear, before he could safely 
attempt the crossing of the river. He therefore determined 
on that day, the 10th, to attack the enemy at Busherut 
Gunge on the morrow, and then to turn back to Cawnporc. 

August 10th then saw — 

At Lucknow, the repulse of the second general attack. 

With Havelock; his preparation for his last fight in 
Oudc for the present, as a preliminary to his return to 
Cawnporc. 

At Cawnporc ; Neill seriously threatened by the Nana's 
followers and the mutineers from Saugor, and by the 
Gwalior Contingent at a somewhat greater distance. 

At Furruckabad, on the west ; the Nuwab with some 
12,000 men threatening the flank. 

South of Allahabad ; reinforcements checked in their 
advance ; being detained by the disturbed state of the 
country consequent on the Dinapore mutiny, and Konwur 
Singh's rebellion, although these mutineers had been 
defeated and Arrah relieved a week before by Major 
Vincent Eyre. 

As to Oudc itself, the strength and composition of the 
enemy's forces has been already described, and there is no 
reason to suppose that they had changed. The court were 
engaged with Durbar intrigues and with endeavours to get 
hold of English fugitives, rather than with military arrange- 
ments ; and the mass of Talookdars were still holding aloof 
and keeping in touch with the authorities at Benares. 

From Delhi, and up-country generally, there was no 
authentic intelligence ; and the information received by the 
natives was probably neither fuller nor more authentic than 
ours. It was known that the British force was still facing; 
Delhi, but that all Central India was disturbed, and that the 
people at Agra considered themselves in peril. 



CHAPTER IV 

HIS WITHDRAWAL TO CAWNPORE 

We left Havelock on August ioth at Mungurwar, pre- 
paring for an immediate return to Cawnpore consequent on 
the threatening aspect of affairs there, the stoppage of 
reinforcements, and the absolute impossibility, with his 
present force, of his affording any aid to the Lucknow 
garrison. 

For his re-passage of the Ganges, as speedy a mode of 
transit as possible was essential, owing to the probability that 
the enemy would press on him during his withdrawal ; and 
in view of this, his Staff and Engineers — Colonel Tytler 
with Lieutenant Moorsom, and Captain Crommelin with 
Lieutenant Watson — had been taking advantage of the 
gradual lowering of the flooded water to improve the 
means of transit. The plan adopted was to confine the 
ferry portion to the main channel, 750 yards wide ; to 
span three minor channels by bridges of boats ; and to 
construct a causeway of planking and timber, overlaid with 
grass and earth, along the remaining 1,300 yards, all more 
or less inundated, of the whole stretch of a mile and a 
quarter, which lay between the high banks on the two 
sides of the river. 

By the nth these arrangements had been carried out; 
Havelock had sent all his sick and wounded, his stores 
and baggage, across to Cawnpore ; and was left with only 
his fighting force in light marching order, free for rapid 
movement. In the evening he advanced to Oonao, and 
next morning, the 12th, he moved forward for his third 
fight at Busherut Gunge. The enemy were entrenched. 
Havelock first used the heavy guns, by which he had been 
recently strengthened, to pound their position ; and then, 
with the same manoeuvre as formerly, sent the Madras 
Fusiliers to turn their flank, and the 78th to charge them 



HIS WITHDRAWAL TO CAWNPORE 203 

in front. The enemy were soon routed, and fled in dis- 
order with a loss of some 200 killed and wounded ; after 
which Havelock took his force back to Mungurwar the 
same evening, preparatory to recrossing to Cawnporc next 
morning. 

Let us pause for a moment and consider Havelock's 
situation and attitude on August 12th. He was 640 miles 
from his base, and confronted by an enemy 30,000 strong, 
with at least forty guns, intervening between him and 
the Lucknow garrison, in ground which he knew they 
had been preparing for defence. His own force was now 
reduced by casualties and disease to only 900 men, including 
Sikhs, available to place in line of battle. 

It was with such means as these that, relying on the 
support of the promised reinforcements, he had dared to 
advance so far in the hope of rescuing Lucknow. Is there 
in the annals of our history of which we are so proud — in 
the wars of Give, of Wellesley, of Lake, or of any other of 
our famous leaders — any record of odds so overwhelming, 
so undauntedly and brilliantly faced ? 

And now his reinforcements were stopped, his communi- 
cations with his base below Allahabad were intercepted ; 
various hostile forces, amounting to fully 20,000 men, were 
hovering on his flanks and on his rear within striking 
distance of Cawnpore ; and rumours were rife of the active 
hostility of the whole fighting population of Oude under 
its Talookdars, who had hitherto remained quiescent. 

Still, in this desperate plight, he stood calm and resolute, 
with his judgment clear and unclouded. Regardless of aught 
save his duty and his discharge of his trust, he crushed the 
bitter disappointment and anguish that were gnawing at 
his heart, and turned his back on the goal for which he 
had been striving, to start on one of the most dangerous of 
operations — a retreat across a huge river with a powerful 
enemy close on his heels. 

It may not be amiss to add a word of thankfulness 
that his letter of the 8th had not reached the Residency, 
and that he did not at this most trying crisis receive any 
such thrilling appeal as Inglis penned to him four days 
afterwards. 

On the evening then of August 12th, Havelock was back 



204 HAVELOCK' S CAMPAIGN 

at Mungurwar. Next day he stood on the bank of the 
Ganges. His force marched along the new causeway and 
the bridges of boats, and then, at eight o'clock, began the 
passage by ferry. By two o'clock all, excepting the rear- 
guard, had crossed into Cawnpore. That rear-guard broke 
up the bridges, and bringing with them the boats and the 
gear of the bridges, overtook their comrades safely by the 
evening. The blow last struck at Busherut Gunge had 
effectively stopped any close pursuit. 

Thus it was that, with rare skill and care, Havelock 
carried out one of the most difficult and dangerous of field 
operations, and placed his whole force, without loss, in the 
Cawnpore position. It was not till four days later that 
the enemy were found to have followed up in strength, and 
to be occupying the opposite bank of the river. 

But before he had started on his return to Cawnpore, the 
insurgent leaders had already begun to adopt fresh tactics, 
of which he was not aware till some days later, probably 
not till the 20th. With their overwhelming superiority in 
numbers, they were now wisely taking advantage of it to 
employ large detachments in operating on his flanks and 
communications, instead of, as heretofore, only in his front. 

Moreover, now that he had retired from Oude, that 
step produced a political result which probably had never 
crossed his imagination. Hitherto all the Talookdars, with 
trifling exceptions, had remained passive ; now, however, 
there arose a general consensus that they must regard 
Havelock's return to Cawnpore as an evacuation of the 
province, and a surrender of its rule to the Lucknow 
Durbar ; and from this time the Talookdars, as the Benares 
authorities heard from some of them direct, were con- 
strained to send contingents of their clansmen to take part 
in the operations at Lucknow. 

As yet Havelock had not communicated more to Cal- 
cutta than a brief announcement of his return to Cawn- 
pore. He had on the 9th, as already mentioned, written 
of his intention to make that move. His letter had shortly 
given the reason for it ; viz. his inability, with his diminished 
numbers, to make head against 30,000 men and forty guns, 
and the demand for his presence at Cawnpore consequent 
on the critical state of matters there. Nor did he write 



HIS WITHDRAWAL TO CAWNPORE 205 

more at length on reaching Cawnpore. He was weighted 
with matters of intense gravity, more than sufficient to 
occupy his full time and attention ; nor did he yet know 
that Outram had been appointed, on the 5th, to the 
command which superseded him and would check the 
independence of his operations. Also he was specially 
preparing, whilst giving his force a couple of days' rest, to 
attack the enemy at Bithoor ; where they were said to be 
4000 strong, and entrenched. It was expedient to dispose 
of them before the other bodies of troops that were threat- 
ening him could combine with them and make the task 
more difficult. This party at Bithoor was said to be made 
up of three groups ; half of them were the Nana's re- 
tainers ; another detachment comprised some of the regi- 
ments that had been all along opposing him, and had now 
crossed back from Oude to operate against Cawnpore ; and 
the third were the 42nd N. I. and other mutineers from 
Saugor, who had been repulsed from the fort there by the 
loyal 31st N. I. 

Havelock's whole force at Cawnpore consisted of 
Brasyer's Sikhs and some 1,400 British soldiers, of whom 
about 350 were already disabled by wounds or sickness, 
while cholera was raging at a rate that would leave no 
fighting men available in another six weeks. 

Such were the circumstances under which Havelock 
moved out on August 16th to attack Bithoor. Having a 
great superiority in artillery, he began by cannonading the 
entrenchment for a while, and then sent his infantry to 
storm it. The enemy fought as they had never fought 
before ; especially the 42nd N. I., who came forward from 
their position, charging and crossing bayonets with the 
Madras Fusiliers. They were of course repulsed, leaving 
sixty men dead on the ground ; and the British following- 
up drove the enemy out of Bithoor, and thoroughly routed 
them with the loss of 250 men and their guns. Our 
casualties were seventy, twelve of them being from 
sunstroke. 

Next day Havelock returned to Cawnpore, where he 
learned two things. First, the rumour which there had 
been of the Oude troops proposing to act on his communi- 
cations with Allahabad was proving true ; and the situation 



206 HAVELOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

was growing critical, as they were apparently massing at 
Dalamow, and preparing to cross over to Futtehpore, the 
scene of Havelock's first battle. So the steamer that had 
been waiting at Cawnpore was despatched down the river 
with 1 20 men and three guns, under Captain Gordon of the 
6th N. I., to do whatever was possible to stop the passage. 

The other thing he heard of was the appointment of his 
old friend and commander in Persia, General Outram, to 
supersede him. He did not learn this by letter, but by 
seeing it in the Calcutta Gazette. 

Severe as the blow must have been, he accepted it 
loyally, and set about such preparations as were necessary, 
knowing that his independence was now checked, and he 
must await orders, except for emergencies. 

Then, on August 19th, he wrote two letters to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, not yet knowing that that post had been 
taken over the day before from Sir Patrick Grant by Sir 
Colin Campbell. , 

In one of these letters he gave a full statement of the 
situation in Oude and at Cawnpore, and of the reasons for 
his return to Cawnpore. He showed how his force would 
have been a mere skeleton on reaching only the outskirts 
of Lucknow ; how the issue must have been its annihilation, 
the loss of Cawnpore, and the abandonment of all that 
part of the country to the enemy ; and he added that if 
he had prolonged his operations in Oude, there would have 
been a danger of Neill being overpowered and Cawnpore 
lost. Reinforcements were indispensable. 

In the other letter he told of the expedition to Dalamow. 

By next day, August 20th, he had received and answered 
Inglis's letter of August 16th, as already described. He 
was also relieved in a measure by the success of Gordon's 
expedition, which had had some skirmishing with the 
enemy on the bank of the river, but had effected its object 
by capturing and removing all the boats in that neighbour- 
hood ; thus precluding the possibility of any passage of the 
river by the rebels in force. 

He heard too of the steamer having been fired at from 
forts on the Oude side of the Ganges ; which, as it had 
not occurred before, confirmed the rumours of a change of 
attitude on the part of the Talookdars. 






HIS WITHDRAWAL TO C AWN PORE 207 

Intelligence had also arrived of Major Eyre's defeat of 
Rajah Konwur Singh at his fort of Jugdecspore, and the 
consequent improvement in the aspect of affairs in the 
disturbed districts there. Havelock was therefore now in 
hopes that some of the seven battalions which he knew to 
be present to the south of Allahabad would soon be arriving 
to reinforce him. 

Hence it was with feelings little short of dismay that he 
now learnt that Outram was proposing to stop the advance 
of these troops to the front, and to divert them instead to 
a separate movement, under his own leading, on Lucknow ; 
starting from Jaunpore, and marching through Oude be- 
tween the rivers Sye and Goomtee ; part of this scheme 
being that Havelock should advance again as before into 
Oude, and co-operate with him on his nearing Lucknow. 

On examining dates, Havelock saw at once that Outram 
must be entirely in the dark as to the situation at Cawn- 
pore, and that he was at that time, August 20th, steaming 
up the Ganges and practically inaccessible. So he forth- 
with telegraphed to the Chief, information and particulars 
which he felt certain would ensure the despatch to Cawnpore 
of the reinforcements of which the stoppage had been thus 
threatened. 

His first telegram was on the 20th, briefly intimating 
that he was now threatened by the Gwalior Contingent with 
its twenty or thirty guns, and soliciting reinforcements. 

To this he received a reply from Sir Colin, and tele- 
graphed back to show him matters fully and clearly. But 
the communication being by telegraph and not by letter, 
has, from the curtness of its wording, been misconstrued. 
His message was to this effect. He was threatened by 
three forces ; the Gwalior Contingent from Kalpee ; a body 
of 1 2,000 men at Furrackabad ; and the Oude troops 
opposite Futtehpore, who might at any moment become 
20,000. Prompt reinforcements were needed to avert what 
seemed otherwise an unavoidable alternative — the with- 
drawal from Cawnpore to Allahabad. He requested reply 
by return of telegraph. 

This has been construed as an inclination and a proposal 
to withdraw. The real case was precisely the reverse. He 
had no intention whatever of withdrawal. On the contrary, 



2o8 HAVELOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

he was determined that the crisis should be averted which 
was threatening to bring about either the retreat or the 
annihilation of his force. He knew as a certainty that, 
with a man like Sir Colin Campbell, the exposition of the 
situation would lead to his being reinforced. And, as a 
fact, he was promptly promised reinforcements ; whereupon 
he wrote on the 24th to Inglis the letter which, as already 
mentioned, reached him on the 29th ; expressing the hope 
that reinforcements would reach him about September 18th, 
and enable him to advance again to the relief. 

Havelock had been perfectly correct in his conviction 
that Outram was ignorant of his real situation. Sir James 
had been wrongly informed that the cause of Havelock's 
failure to reach Lucknow was the destruction of the bridge 
over the Sye, and his inability to force its passage against 
the swarms of the enemy. So when intelligence reached 
him of the actual circumstances and of Sir Colin's views, 
he at once abandoned the scheme he had been devising, 
and ordered the 5th and 90th regiments forward towards 
Cawnpore, telegraphing and writing to Havelock of it, and 
intimating at the same time his intention to leave to him 
the command of the advance to Lucknow. 

Thus happily ended this phase of anxiety. Meanwhile, 
Outram's proposals had not been the real cause of the 
delay that had occurred. He had not halted such troops 
as were most to the front. He had meant that they should 
cross over and join his march higher up ; the troops he had 
proposed to take with himself via Jaunporc were lower 
down. There were altogether at that time between Alla- 
habad and Calcutta, the following regiments : — the 5th, 10th, 
29th, 35th, 37th, 53rd, and 90th, besides drafts for the 64th, 
78th, and 84th, and these were all being kept in those lower 
districts instead of being sent on to the front ; not from 
any orders of the Chief, but from the want of any local 
authority recognized as in command ; which led to their 
being detained by the interference of local officers, diverted 
from their proper course, and so frittered away broadcast. 
Thus, while Havelock's force could barely muster 1,100 
men, some 6,000 men, who might have been on their way 
to the front, to the real seat of operations, were kept 
pottering in those lower districts south of Benares. 



HIS WITHDRAWAL TO CAWNPORE 209 

Meanwhile, although he was losing men, Havelock was 
not molested seriously by the enemy ; his successive blows 
and victories had evidently disheartened them, making 
them loth to attack him ; and he kept on doing all he 
could to prepare for the next advance. 

Outram reached Allahabad on September 1st. On the 
3rd and 4th, the 5th Fusiliers and the 90th Light Infantry 
also arrived there, and were at once sent on without halting. 

Such was the state of matters with the British advance 
on September 5th, the day of the third general attack on 
the Residency, the close of the third stage of its siege. 

Meanwhile, there was no special news from Delhi ; nor 
in Oude was there any important change, beyond what has 
been already mentioned — the submission of the Talookdars 
to the rebel government, and their supporting it with their 



CHAPTER V 

HIS FINAL ADVANCE TO LUCKNOW 

BEFORE Havelock started on his final advance into 
Oude, Sir James Outram reappeared on the scene. He 
has already played a prominent part in our story ; chiefly, 
however, as a civil administrator carrying out the annex- 
ation of Oude. Now, however, he comes forward as a 
soldier and a general ;• a noble exemplar of high-minded 
and generous bearing, worthy of the Bayard of India, 
towards an old friend and comrade whose career of ex- 
ceptional distinction might otherwise have been checked. 
Outram had shown his capacity as a commander in the 
recent campaign in Persia ; but he had been less noted as 
a general in important operations, than as a brilliant and 
daring soldier in partisan warfare ; with the eye and in- 
stincts of a sportsman, full of resource, enterprise, and 
boldness verging on rashness. How these qualities came 
into play will be seen presently. 

After September 5 th, Havelock's chief anxieties and efforts 
were in respect of the preparations for an immediate ad- 
vance towards Lucknow on the arrival of the reinforcements. 
The state of the river was at that date at its very worst for 
any arrangements for its passage ; since the floods were at 
that stage of subsidence when the inundations were not yet 
getting cleared ; while shoals were forming which impeded 
the use of the steamer and of ferries, without being them- 
selves fit for bridging or for causeways. Hence he was in 
constant correspondence with Outram on the matter, and 
about September 10th it had been very nearly decided that 
Outram, with most of the reinforcements, should cross into 
Oude about a day's march lower down, where he would 
be less likely to meet with opposition ; and should then 
advance along the bank to attack and clear off the enemy 
opposite Cawnpore and at Mungurwar, Havelock crossing 
and joining him during the operation. 



HIS FINAL ADVANCE TO LUCKNOW 211 

However, the reports during the next few days of the state 
of the river, and of the enemy's position, showed so much 
improvement as to lead to this scheme being abandoned. 

By some singular coincidence, the threatening of the 
enemy's musters towards Kalpee, and at Furrackabad, which 
had been so serious about August 20th, seemed to subside 
almost suddenly a fortnight afterwards, when the reinforce- 
ments began to move upwards from Allahabad to Cawn- 
pore. And as a matter of fact Havelock remained there 
practically unmolested till he finally left it for Lucknow. 
Only on the Oudc side did the enemy show any activity, 
and seem inclined to give trouble. 

Havelock's Engineers were meanwhile steadily at work 
preparing, from such timber-yards as they could find, the 
appliances and gear for any boat-bridges which might be 
wanted ; and at the same time a close watch was kept up, 
it seems needless to say, on the movements and proceedings 
of the Sepoys on the opposite bank. But they never, after 
all, threw up on it any batteries or works of any moment, 
though they held it for a length of some four miles in 
considerable force. 

Further down the river, however, the Oude troops were 
more aggressive. On September 9th, a party of 400 men, 
intended to be only the advanced guard of a larger force, 
crossed over to the right bank with four guns, with the 
intention of raising the country between Futtehpore and 
Allahabad. Vincent Eyre was thereupon sent against 
them with a detachment of 5th Fusiliers and others of the 
reinforcements. After marching fort)' miles, he caught 
them on the early morning of the nth, drove them into 
their boats, and preventing the boats by his fire from being- 
unloosed, destroyed the whole party. 'A small number of 
loyal men of the 12th Irregular Cavalry, who were with 
him under Lieut. W. T. Johnson, then went in pursuit of 
another detachment of which they heard, but which escaped 
before they could be reached. After this lesson, the enemy- 
did not repeat the attempt. This little party of the 12th 
had been detached under their bright and gallant young 
adjutant, Charles Havelock ; and while their comrades 
were murdering their Commandant, Holmes, they had 
remained staunch, and kept down the Azimgurh and 
Cawnpore districts. 



212 HAVELOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

On September 15th, Outram joined Havelockat Cawnpore 
with the first half of the reinforcements. Next day the 
rest of them arrived, and Outram issued his famous order 
waiving his rank and position, arid handing over to Have- 
lock the command of the relief operations. 

No one can contest the noble and chivalrous feeling that 
prompted the act ; but the actual position and the dilemma 
that resulted must be recognized. Outram' s object was to 
ensure to Havelock the honour and credit and renown of 
the relief; but at the same time to do his utmost to aid 
him, and if need be to sway him into adopting his own 
plans, thus fulfilling his own trust. Hence he never really 
gave Havelock a free hand ; while the keenness, persistency, 
and masterfulness with which from the first he pressed his 
own views and plans sjiowed that, though giving over the 
nominal command, he expected his advice to be implicitly 
followed, and so to exercise the real guidance of the opera- 
tions. Under the unique circumstances of the case, it was 
practically as impossible for Havelock to contend against 
this, as it was repugnant to his regard for Outram to question 
his views. The result was that, throughout the ensuing 
advance, much was done nominally under Havelock's orders 
which was not in accordance with his judgment and inclin- 
ation, but for which the responsibility remained with him. 

Now that he was maturing his arrangements for the 
relief, Havelock was, as a matter of necessity, greatly 
guided by Inglis's letters describing the state of affairs in 
the entrenchments. The letter of August 16th, already 
cited, had threatened that provisions would give out by 
September 10th ; and a second letter had reached Havelock 
early in September, in reply to his note of August 24th 
mentioning the prospect of reinforcements. In this second 
letter, which was dated September 1st, Inglis said — 

" In consequence of your letter, I have reduced the rations, 
and with this arrangement, and our great diminution in 
numbers from casualties, I trust to be able to hold out from 
the 20th to the 25 th inst. Some stores we have been out of 
for the last fifteen days, and many others will be expended 
before the above date. I must be frank, and tell you that 
my force is daily diminishing from the enemy's musketry 
fire, and our defences grow weaker daily. Should the enemy 
make any determined efforts to storm this place, I shall 






HIS FINAL ADVANCE TO LUCKNOW 213 

find it difficult to repulse them, owing to my paucity in 
numbers, and the weak and harassed state of my force." 

This, the last letter Havelock received before crossing 
the river, led him to the unavoidable conclusion that by 
September 25th the food supply would be wholly exhausted, 
and the garrison reduced to a state of desperate weakness, 
almost to inanition, from prolonged starvation. Hence his 
plans included the provision (1) of forty days' rations to be 
thrown or brought into the entrenchments for the benefit 
of the garrison, and (2) of transport for the withdrawal of 
the families by detachments. 

It may be added here, though it deals with a somewhat 
later matter, that on September 19th, when he again stood 
on the soil of Oude, he was greeted by a third letter from 
Inglis dated the 16th, three days before, in which the situa- 
tion is thus described — 

" The enemy have continued to persevere unceasingly 
in their efforts against this position, and the firing has 
never ceased either day or night. On the 5th, they made 
a very determined attack after exploding two mines, and 
almost succeeded in getting into one of our batteries. . . . 
We have been long on reduced rations, so I hope to be 
able to get on pretty well until the 1st proximo. If you 
have not relieved us by that time, we shall have no meat 
left. ... I am most anxious to hear of your advance, to 
reassure the native soldiers." 

The only change in the state of affairs which this indi- 
cated to Havelock, was that the food was being made to 
last a little longer by the lowering of the rations, and that 
consequently the strength and vitality of the troops must 
have been terribly reduced ; while the enemy, on the other 
hand, seemed to be bolder in their assaults. 

So his view of the desperate straits of the garrison 
remained pretty much as before ; gloomier, if possible, from 
an impression of the besiegers showing signs of increased 
vigour and boldness, both in their attacks and in their 
mining. Hence, with all his outward calmness, he was 
intensely anxious and nervous respecting the security of 
the garrison, and was bent on joining them on the earliest 
day he could. At the same time, he bore in mind that the 
straightest route is not always the shortest, and that 



214 HAVELOCK' S CAMPAIGN 

massive buildings and barricaded streets, if well held, 
might block the way against the bravest troops. Hence, 
feeling convinced that he would have to face an enemy 
that had never yet shown their real strength, but had wisely 
reserved it for contest in ground of their own selection and 
preparation, he meant, on reaching Lucknow, to avoid any 
entry into it ; and instead to march through open country, 
approaching the Residency by the north bank of the 
Goomtee and the iron bridge, after circling the city and 
crossing the river to the east. And, in accordance with this 
purpose, he arranged to convey with him the means of 
bridging the Goomtee. 

Outram, on the other hand, of a more sanguine tempera- 
ment, had heard stories, native reports, of the success of 
our mine against Johannes' house, and of the consequent 
elation and improved spirits of the garrison ; and he 
believed that their straits were not at all so desperate as 
Havelock supposed. He held that the success of the 
impending advance would drive off the enemy, would open 
the country, attract food and carriage, and lead to a 
restoration of some sort of government. 

Such seem to have been the views and plans, somewhat 
divergent, of these two noble-hearted and heroic leaders ; 
both of them thoroughly single-minded, and having but 
one, and that the same, object in view. 

It has been already described how the idea had been for 
a while entertained, but afterwards dropped, of Outram 
crossing the Ganges a day's march below Cawnpore. 
Havelock had prepared all the arrangements for crossing 
the whole force over on the morning of the 17th by 
boats aided by steamers. But Outram, on his arrival at 
Cawnpore, negatived this plan ; and bridging operations 
were begun, which were only now becoming practicable. 
As it was, a deep channel 700 yards wide had to be bridged 
up to an island which had been formed in the course of the 
subsidence of the floods ; and between this and the high 
bank beyond lay a stretch of ground about equally wide, and 
more or less swampy. Havelock proposed to occupy this 
island with a strong detachment to cover the construction 
of the bridge ; Outram, however, thought that the detached 
troops would certainly suffer from the swampy nature of the 
ground, and that they might effect the same object by 



HIS FINAL ADVANCE TO LUC KNOW 215 

placing heavy guns so as to command the island, and the 
ground beyond, from the Cawnpore bank. As the bridge 
progressed, however, it was attacked, and a party of Brasyer's 
men had first to : be sent over to hold the island ; and next 
day they had to be supported by some British troops and 
four guns. On the night of the 1 8th, however, the bridge 
was finished, and on the 19th the force crossed over to 
the Oude side of the river. 

The reinforcements that Outram had brought with him 
were about 1,450 men. 

Havclock now left behind him at Cawnpore only a very 
small force, as there were no present signs of any enemy 
threatening it, while reinforcements of infantry, artillery, 
sailors, and Madras Sepoys were advancing upwards from 
Benares and Allahabad. 

The Division with which he advanced towards Lucknow 
was thus composed — 



Artillery 


\ 1 heavy and 2 light Batteries 




J 282 British 


Total 282 


Cavalry 


109 „ Volunteers and 59 Natives .. 


„ 168 


Infantry 


2388 „ 341 Sikhs .. 


„ 2729 


Total 


2779 „ 400 Natives .. 


„ 3179 



The artillery consisted of Eyre's heavy battery and 
Maude's and Olpherts's field batteries, all under the 
command of Colonel Cooper. Olpherts had managed by 
great exertions to convert the draft of his battery from 
bullocks to horses, and to pick up and train men to drive 
them — an invaluable increase to the efficiency of the column. 

The cavalry consisted of English Volunteers and of loyal 
men of the 12th Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Captain 
Barrow. 

The infantry were in two brigades — 

Right brigade under Colonel Neill, composed of 5th 
Fusiliers ; 64th Regiment (detachment) ; 84th Regiment, 
and 1st Madras Fusiliers. 

Left brigade, under Colonel Hamilton — 78th High- 
landers ; 90th Light Infantry, and Brasyer's Sikhs. 

On the 19th this force, all, save the heavy guns and the 
rear-guard, crossed to the left bank of the Ganges and took 
up a position there, driving the enemy off to Mungurwar, 
after a merely nominal resistance. On the 20th, the rear- 
guard and Eyre's guns joined the column, and all was 



216 HAVELOCK' S CAMPAIGN 

prepared for the start for Lucknow. On the morning of the 
2 1 st, the force began its march in heavy rain. Its first 
move was, of course, against the enemy at Mungurwar. It 
is not certain what the troops were that held that position ; 
but it is known that part of them were the Native Infantry 
that had been at Cawnpore, the 1st, the 53rd, and 56th. 
The 2nd Cavalry that had been at Cawnpore was the only 
part of that mutineer brigade which did not cross into 
Oude. 

On nearing Mungurwar, Havelock sent part of his force 
to the left to turn the enemy's right, and after cannonading 
their position, advanced to attack their front. On this 
they broke and retreated, their retreat turning into a flight, 
which was continued, with only occasional halts and checks, 
on through Oonao and Busherut Gunge. Our cavalry, 
which had been leading the turning movement, kept up a 
steady pursuit, playing havoc with the fugitives all through 
the pelting rain, and capturing their guns, and the colours 
of the 1st Native Infantry. 

The impetuous Outram, here thoroughly in his element, 
was ever in the fore-front, and twice owed his life to the 
younger Havelock, to whom his father had entrusted the 
watch over the General's safety. By the evening, the force 
was collected about the Serai on the Lucknow side of 
Busherut Gunge ; where it bivouacked for the night. The 
next day's march was absolutely unopposed, and brought 
the force across the Sye ; the bridge over which at Bunnee, 
instead of being destroyed as Outram had been told six 
weeks before, had not even now been tampered with. On 
halting, the force heard the guns in Lucknow, and fired a 
royal salute, in hopes of its proving a signal to their friends ; 
but the distance was sixteen miles, and the signal, being 
against the wind, was not heard. 

Next morning, however, September 23rd, Havelock ad- 
vanced, and his guns were heard at the Residency before 
the day was over. For the first ten miles there was no 
opposition ; but as they came in sight of the Alum Bagh, a 
large enclosure on the road about four miles short of the 
Residency, they saw the enemy, about 12,000 strong, 
drawn up to block the way ; with their left resting on the 
Alum Bagh, and their right protected by a swamp. The 
battle here was to be the first part of the contest for the 



HIS FINAL ADVANCE TO LUCK NOW 217 

actual entry into Lucknow, and the junction with the 
Residency. 

It will be expedient at this stage to study the map of 
Lucknow. It will be seen that on the south it is girt and 
enclosed by a canal, which is large and deep, and is crossed 
by the road from Cawnpore at the Char Bagh. The 
Char Bagh is two miles from the Residency, the road between 
them passing through dense city. Nowhere else on the 
south is there any tolerable passage of the canal. The 
Alum Bagh is two miles short of the Char Bagh on the road 
from Cawnpore, and is an obligatory point to hold, whatever 
the route selected for access to the Residency. The battle 
for its possession was now to come off. 

Havelock again adopted his turning manoeuvre. Neill's 
brigade was halted on the road with the heavy guns, to 
pound the enemy and the Alum Bagh in front, while the 
left brigade with Olpherts's battery moved along the swampy 
ground on the left till it overlapped the enemy's line, 
then turning to attack it on the flank and roll it up. At 
the same time the first brigade made their advance. The 
combined attack in front and flank routed the right and 
centre of the enemy, but their left held the Alum Bagh ; and 
this was at length charged and stormed by the 5th Fusiliers, 
who on entering found that the 78th, one of the flanking 
brigade, had almost simultaneously forced their way in 
through the main entrance of the enclosure. In ten minutes 
not one of the defenders was left within its walls, and the 
pursuit of the routed force was taken up by our handful of 
cavalry and Olpherts's guns, and continued nearly up to a 
building called the Yellow House, close to the Char Bagh 
bridge. All this fighting had been done under heavy rain. 
And now, as the cavalry halted and turned back from their 
pursuit, there came the brightest augury of success. A 
messenger brought up a letter to Outram, on opening 
which, he rapidly sent its message down the line of troops. 
The)- heard and received it with ringing cheers, for it 
brought the news of the storm and capture of Delhi, nine 
days before. A joyous ending to an exciting day ! 



CHAPTER VI 

THE SUCCOUR OF THE RESIDENCY 

Havelock's force then, having driven the enemy out of 
the Alum Bagh on September 23rd, halted there the next 
day in order partly to prepare it for retention as a defensive 
post in rear of the advance, and partly to mature the plans 
for the final move. 

There was a choice of four routes a — 

No. 1. First to the Char Bagh Bridge, over the canal, on 
the main road, and thence straight on by that road direct 
to the Residency. This was the direct route. 

No. 2. To the Char Bagh Bridge, as in No. 1 ; and after 
forcing it, to turn to the right, circle round the city on the 
hiside of the canal till reaching open ground ; then to turn 
to the left, and advance to the Residency by the plain 
between the Kaiser Bagh, and other palaces, and the river. 
This was the Inside Canal route. 

No. 3. Avoiding the road altogether, to strike from the 
Alum Bagh at once to the east (or right), and circle outside 
the canal till reaching the Dilkoosha ; then turn to the left, 
and crossing the canal by the bridge there, take thence 
the same course as in No. 2. This I call the Outside 
Canal route. 

No. 4. The same route as No. 3 up to the Dilkoosha ; 
after reaching which to continue the advance to the river, 
bridge it, cross to the other side, and then turning to the 
left, march westward, seize the iron bridge and the Badshah 
Bagh facing the Residency on the other side of the river, 
and so relieve it. This was the Trans-Goomtee route. 

Havelock was still desirous of adopting No. 4, which 
would avoid street-fighting; but Outram held that the 
route should be changed, as the ground had become too 



Sec Map V. 



THE SUCCOUR OF THE RESIDENCY 219 

swampy after the recent heavy rain to admit of the move- 
ment of artillery and carriage ; and also that the news of 
Delhi would lessen the opposition, and make the advance 
easier. He thought route No. 2 the preferable one, as 
beyond the Char Bagh Bridge he did not expect any serious 
fighting. To this course, then, Havelock gave his consent, 
though with reluctance ; as he believed that all could go on 
by No. 4 except perhaps the heavy guns. It was arranged 
that, on the force advancing, Major Maclntyre should 
remain behind in command of the Alum Bagh, with a 
garrison of 300 men, in charge of the sick and wounded, 
the baggage, and the reserve of food and ammunition. 

The force started on September 25th at half-past eight, 
after breakfasting; Neill's Brigade leading, headed by 
Maude's Battery and some of the 5th Fusiliers. The first 
opposition met with was from some guns placed at the 
building called the Yellow House, which were soon silenced 
by Maude's Battery ; and then the column advanced, but 
all the time under fire, to a bend in the road, where it turned 
for a straight run of 200 yards to the bridge ; while on the 
right were the enclosed gardens from which the bridge 
received its name, and still further to its right some rising 
ground, which flanked and commanded the bridge. Outram 
guided a party of the 5th to this rising ground, while the 
skirmishers of the Madras Fusiliers under Arnold lined the 
canal bank to the left of the road, the rest of the regiment 
remaining under the cover of the garden wall. 

It was found that the bridge was blocked at the Lucknow 
end by a battery of six guns, including a twenty-four- 
pounder, with a breastwork in its front ; while behind it 
was a cluster of high buildings, loopholed, and held with 
musketry. 

Two of Maude's guns were brought up to the bend of 
the road, and opened fire on the battery and the buildings. 
The enemy replied, and soon swept down the gunners. As 
our skirmishers were making no impression, and matters 
were looking too critical to wait for Outram' s flank move- 
ment to develope, Neill was directed to carry the bridge, 
and ordered his men to form up. But before they could 
do this, Arnold anticipated them, dashing forward with his 
skirmishers over the bridge, accompanied by Colonel Tytler 



220 HAVELOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

and Captain Havelock. The whole of this party, except 
Havclock and Corporal Jacques (who was afterwards 
killed), were swept down by the hurricane of fire from the 
battery and from the loopholed buildings ; but before the 
battery could reload and fire a second round, the Madras 
Fusiliers, who had followed and charged over the bridge, 
cleared the breastwork, stormed the battery, and won the 
passage of the Char Bagh canal. 

The loopholed buildings that supported the battery were 
then stormed and held ; and the road was clear for the rest 
of the column. 

Meanwhile, a body of the enemy, with a couple of guns 
which had been driven off from the Yellow House, had re- 
tired eastward instead of over the Char Bagh Bridge ; and 
re-forming in some enclosures, where they were well 
sheltered, had opened fire, from their guns in the road 
which they covered, on the flank and rear of the second 
or left Brigade (Hamilton's). The rebel position was 
strong ; but the 90th charged it and captured the guns ; 
which Olpherts, who with Colonel Napier had accompanied 
the charge, carried off in triumph, horsed by some of his 
own batter)-. 

The 78th Highlanders were now told off to hold the 
bridge and the rear till everything had passed ; while the 
main column itself, with Outram and Havelock at their 
head, turned to the right, and advanced along the road 
which skirted the canal till it reached the Begum's palace, 
near the bridge by which the road from the Dilkoosha 
enters the city. This palace was a strong building, and 
might threaten the flank of the march. So its entrance 
was blown open in order to make it indefensible, and the 
column then passed on, heading forward towards the river 
so as to get into the more open ground ; and on reaching 
the Secundra Bagh, turned sharp to the left, bearing straight 
on the Residency. 

Up till now the column had not met with any serious 
opposition since leaving the Char Bagh. The reason was 
obvious — the enemy had not thought of the British column 
adopting any other than the direct route ; nor was it till 
late in the day that they realized the circuitous line that it 
was taking, and collected in force to oppose it. 



THE SUCCOUR OF THE RESIDENCY 221 

In fact Havelock found the Sccundra Bagh, the Shah 
Nujeef, and the Motee Mahul quite empty ; such fire as 
opened on him was from the left on his attaining the Motee 
Mahul, and also from the Badshah Bagh on the other side 
of the river. The fire from the left was mainly from a 
battery at the eastern corner of the Kaiser Bagh, but partly 
also from musketry from the 32nd mess-house. 

At the Motee Mahul the column was halted ; partly to 
rest it and let it recover its formation, partly to enable 
the rear to join it safely, and partly to give the chiefs an 
opportunity to discuss the final step. 

The Residency was now only 1,100 yards off, the Chutter 
Munzil group of palaces blocking the way along the river 
for a length of about 800 yards ; its nearest enclosure, a 
garden, being about 300 yards distant, while the intervening 
ground was occupied by only a few empty buildings. 
The road to the Residency began with a street on the left 
of this enclosed garden, running between it and the Hirun 
Khana (or deer yard) ; thence by a sheltered space to a 
gate known thereafter as Neill's Gate ; where it turned to 
the right, and aimed for the Residency. 

At the Motee Mahul, the generals resolved to leave a 
strong rear-guard there, to make with the main force 
for Neill's Gate, and there decide on the further line of 
route. As the rear took some time to come up, the force 
remained halted at the Motee Mahul till late in the after- 
noon, and as even then there was still no sign of the 78th, a 
party was told off to return and meet and guide them on. 
Presently, however, the regiment was seen marching along 
the road in front of the palaces on the left flank. So the 
force emerged from the Motee Mahul ; Lieutenant Moorsom 
being sent forward to reconnoitre the palaces, and ascertain 
whether they were held by the enemy. On emerging, the 
force was assailed with a very heavy fire of artillery and 
musketry from the Kaiser Bagh on the left, but not from 
the Chutter Munzil buildings, which Moorsom had been 
sent to reconnoitre ; and they continued to be under fire 
till they reached the space between the buildings or en- 
closures at Neill's Gate, where they found themselves 
comparatively sheltered, and remained halted for a short 
time. Meanwhile, as had been decided, the Motee Mahul 



222 HAVELOCK'S CAMPA1GX 

was not evacuated. The wounded and baggage and heavy 
guns were left in it under the charge of Colonel Campbell 
of the 90th with one hundred men. 

While halted at the space which may be called NeilPs 
enclosure, the generals were anxiously awaiting Moorsom's 
return, for if the palaces were found unoccupied, the route 
through them up to the very ramparts of the Residency 
would be safe. Otherwise the route must be by the streets, 
which, it w r as now clear, the enemy were prepared to defend, 
though they w r ould hardly have had time to prepare any 
barricades or material obstructions. This short length of 
street fighting was unavoidable. There had been none 
heretofore — all the previous loss had been at that brilliant 
feat, the forcing of the Char Bagh Bridge. 

While halted at Neill's enclosure, the force was joined 
by the 78th Highlanders, who had been left behind at the 
Char Bagh Bridge to hold it till all had passed on. They 
had been having their own share in the fighting, to which 
we will now turn. So long as the main column was still 
within hail, the 78th were at first unmolested at the 
Char Bagh ; and they employed the interval in throwing 
into the canals the guns which they had just captured, as 
there was no means available for their transport. But, 
after a very short respite, the enemy came down the 
Cawnpore road again on them in force, and a combat ensued, 
of which the 78th stood the whole brunt for some hours. 
The contest was one of musketry for most of the time, but 
at the end the Highlanders charged and stormed a temple 
which formed the enemy's strongest post. On this the 
Sepoys brought up three field-pieces, and continued the 
fight for another hour. While this was going on, all the 
rear, with the companies of the 90th that formed its guard, 
had come up and passed on ; so the task allotted to the 78th 
was over. They therefore charged the enemy afresh, drove 
them back, and, capturing the guns, ran them back to the 
canal, hurled them in like those taken at the bridge itself; 
and then started on their march to overtake the main 
column. 

This last hour of fighting, however, had given the rear- 
guard such a start that the 78th never recovered touch with 
it, and hence, on reaching the bridge where the open ground 



THE SUCCOUR OF THE RESIDENCY 223 

began, instead of going onwards to the Secundra Bagh as 
the rest tiad done, they turned sharp to the left, following 
the road — at first a street called the Huzrutgunge, which 
skirted the face of the Kaiser Bagh and led to Neill's Gate 
— and thence onwards towards the Residency. Up till now 
they too had had no serious fighting during the march ; 
but as they ncarcd the Kaiser Bagh they heard the firing 
to the front and right. Then, while seeing the main column 
emerging from the Motee Mahul, they came on the flank 
of an enemy's battery at the Kaiser Bagh, stormed it, and 
then passed onwards, edging somewhat to the right to- 
wards the street which the main column had just entered. 
Thus was its junction effected ; and not only so, but this 
regiment became the head of the column which now com- 
prised the whole force, excepting the men left in the 
Alum Bagh and the Motee Mahul. Brasyer's Sikhs were 
immediately behind the 78th. 

While they were thus being drawn up in position for a 
rapid advance, a discussion on the route to be taken was 
going on between the two generals. They had been 
anxiously awaiting Moorsom's return from his reconnais- 
sance, and Outram, impatient at the delay, had gone him- 
self to reconnoitre, but had come back not able to find any 
opening or means of entrance into the Chutter Munzil, 
though not attacked from it. As it was now getting dusk, 
Havelock wished to move on at once and take his chance 
through the streets, through which his course would after 
all be now less than half a mile. He was strengthened 
in this view by hearing from Olpherts (who being asked 
had expressed himself warmly in favour of an immediate 
advance) that he would have no difficulty in placing one of 
his guns in position on the other side of the gateway, firing 
down the street towards the Kaiser Bagh, and so protecting 
the rear of the march. Outram, however, urged a further 
halt (by which, as his written statement shows, he meant 
only a short halt), while seeing with Moorsom whether there 
was not really a practicable route through the Chutter 
Munzil. But Havelock, as his official report states, thought 
he meant a halt for the night, and to this he demurred. 
Any sign of the force being effectively checked and foiled 
in its efforts to reach the Residency might, he felt, affect 



224 HAVELOCK'S CAMPAIGN 

the natives of the garrison so as to lead to fatal results. 
It was essential, therefore, he said, that troops should be 
thrown into the Residency at once ; otherwise it was possible 
that the worst might happen to the garrison. But while 
he himself led the head of the column by the open streets, 
Outram, he pointed out, might remain where they were 
standing, and bring on the rest of the column by any better 
way he might discover. 

Outram, however, though he had given over the command, 
would not surrender the post of honour ; and so waiving 
further discussion he placed himself at the head of the 
column, crying, " Let us on then in God's name." On this 
Olpherts moved his gun out through NeilPs Gateway into 
position, and then — the Highlanders leading, with Brasyer's 
Sikhs immediately behind them — the force also emerged 
with Outram and Havelock at the head and started on its 
zigzag route to the Residency. First it turned to the right 
for a few yards till it reached the Khas Bazar; when it 
turned to the left, and found itself under a hot fire sweeping 
down the long narrow street. Before reaching the Khas 
Bazar it had been under fire only from the rear ; but this 
was a very telling fire, though answered by Olpherts's gun. 
Tytler, the Quartermaster- General, was at once dangerously 
wounded, and a few minutes afterwards Neill was shot 
dead. 

On turning up the Khas Bazar, and finding themselves 
attacked from the front, the 78th charged up the street and 
overshot the point at which they should have turned towards 
the Residency. Outram, however, quickly halted the leading 
companies, and ordering them to draw back, took off the 
centre companies as the new head of the column, followed 
by the rear companies and by Brasyer's Sikhs, straight 
down the road ; till they debouched on the Residency 
position, opposite Saunders's post, and there found their 
way in, first through an embrasure at Aitken's post, and 
then through the Baily Guard gate itself. And thus did 
Havelock and Outram, and the heroic column which they 
had been leading, effect amidst ecstatic cheers and shouts 
that junction with the garrison for which there had been so 
long and fierce a struggle. 

Almost immediately after Outram had guided the centre 



THE SUCCOUR OF THE RESIDENCY 225 

companies of the 78th over the direct road to the Residency, 
Moorsom, who had been unable to find any route through 
the Chutter Munzil, overtook the column, and guided the 
rest of it and the guns by another street ; which ran behind, 
but close and parallel to Outram's route, till it crossed the 
Pyne Bagh, and went straight down on the Baily Guard 
through the Clock Tower; where the enemy slewed their 
guns round and gave them a parting shot. 

Although the loss sustained by Havelock's force is to be 
deplored, it was trifling in proportion to the difficulties to 
be overcome, and the strength of the opposing army. A 
desperate feat cannot be accomplished without loss ; nor 
had there been, as alleged by some, any confusion or bung- 
ling. That the rear-guard (the 78th) lost touch of the main 
column, and joined it by a shorter route, involved no demerit, 
and entailed no difficulty nor loss. 

Without any regard whatever to what was still to follow, 
what had still to be done, and what was not done, this junc- 
tion on the evening of September 25th, though it may not 
have been a relief of the Lucknow Residency in the technical 
military sense, was a relief of the garrison in all essentials 
from a common-sense point of view. It was a succour in 
the direst straits. It was a rescue from a situation of the 
most imminent peril. It was a relief from the most harrowing 
and agonizing dread of the ever-impending chance of a 
breach in the defences, without a moment's warning, through 
which the enemy, all ready prepared, might rush in over- 
whelming numbers which nothing could withstand. Further, 
when the imminent accession of the Sepoys from Delhi is 
remembered, as well as the sceptical feeling that existed 
in the minds of Sepoys in the entrenchments, there can be 
little doubt that Havelock's arrival saved the garrison of 
Lucknow from the fate of Gordon at Khartoum. 



BOOK IV 
THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 
CHAPTER I 

EFFORTS TO WITHDRAW THE GARRISON 

THE 25th of September, when Havelock and Outram 
entered and succoured the Baily Guard, marked also the 
close of the first stage of the war in Oude ; for it proclaimed 
in favour of the British garrison the issue of the contest for 
the Residency entrenchments ; which had constituted the 
gage of battle in Oude, as Delhi had done in the Upper 
Provinces. These two great operations, the capture of 
Delhi and the succour of Lucknow, were both of them 
effected without aid from England, and about the same 
date. 

From this turning-point, when Havelock's great task 
had been accomplished, and the rescuers and the rescued 
had joined hands, our story will deal with the operations of 
the combined force, of which Outram now assumed the 
command. 

His first task was to pull that force together ; for though 
the junction had been effected, the relieving force had 
itself become somewhat dispersed and scattered, owing to 
the nature of the struggle of that day. The enemy had not 
been, as always heretofore, driven back, defeated, and 
dispersed in rout. Our troops had on this occasion been 
obliged, in order to effect their special and immediate object, 
to charge through the enemy in a column, leaving the rear- 
guard behind at the Motee Mahul. Moreover, the column 
itself, while its head had reached the Residency, was 
lengthened out and advancing but slowly with its guns and 
wounded, checked and impeded by the trenches and other 
obstacles on its route. 



EFFORTS TO WITHDRAW THE GARRISON 227 

The most impervious and effective of these obstacles was 
the battery with which the enemy had blocked up the Lut- 
kur Durwaza, facing the Baily Guard gate. But Aitken, 
who commanded at that post, on seeing the relievers ap- 
proaching, promptly led out a party of his men, Sepoys 
of the 13th N. I., with entrenching tools; and proceeded to 
demolish and clear away the earthwork of that battery. 
Having accomplished this, he broke into and seized the 
adjacent posts right and left — the jail buildings on the one 
side and the Tehree Kothee enclosure on the other. This 
position, the Tehree Kothee, had hitherto been held in 
force ; now, however, only a few of the enemy were found 
in it, and they were taken prisoners without a shot being- 
fired. During the greater part of the night, the troops, 
the wounded, and the guns that had been checked by the 
obstacles and so delayed on the road, were being guided 
into the Residency and into the Tehree Kothee enclosure 
just seized. Hence, by the morning, part of the relieving 
force were inside the entrenchments, part were in the 
grounds of the Tehree Kothee, and part were still in the 
street from the Pyne Bagh, while the rear-guard were half- 
a-mile behind in the Motee Mahul. 

As I have said, Outram's first task was to collect these 
several parties and to hold a compact position. The rear- 
guard, in the Motee Mahul, with the hospital and the heavy 
guns, was found to have practically lost touch with the rest 
of the force ; and 250 men of the 5th Fusiliers and a detach- 
ment of Brasyer's Sikhs were sent back on the morning of 
the 26th to reinforce and help them in. 

But the fire from the Kaiser Bagh was found to be too 
strong to admit of the rear-guard convoy being moved out. 
Accordingly the reinforcing party seized and occupied 
the gardens and buildings lying adjacent to the Motee 
Mahul, between it and the Chutter Munzil Palace, the 
advanced garden of which was also partially held by the 
90th Regiment. 

While this was being done, Outram proceeded to carry 
out his second object, the occupation in one direction at any 
rate of an extended and compact position. He specially 
desired to hold the whole river-face from the iron bridge to 
the Chutter Munzil ; and to start this extension, a party of 



228 THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

150 men of the 32nd under Major Lowe, made a sortie from 
Innes's post down to the river. They encountered a consider- 
able body of the enemy, and swept them off to the left up 
to the iron bridge ; but they failed to get beyond the build- 
ings at the near side of the bridge, or to seize and hold the 
end of the bridge itself. The rest of Major Lowe's party 
swept on to the right to the Tehree Kothee, which they 
entered, and then joined hands with Aitken's detachment, 
which, as before described, had made a lodgment there during 
the night. In the course of this clearance of the river-face, 
an eighteen-pounder and several light guns were captured. 
Later in the day these two parties, with others that joined 
them, felt their way on through the rest of the Tehree 
Kothee, and then penetrated into the Furhut Buksh Palace 
and enclosure ; which thus, by the evening, came fully into 
our hands, leaving only the Chutter Munzil buildings and 
gardens between the position held by our main force, and 
the posts held by our rear-guard with its reinforcements. 
But these Chutter Munzil buildings were, it was known, 
occupied by the enemy, though their strength was uncertain. 
On the river-face they had kept quiet, though they had 
blocked all the outlets there. The advance eastwards from 
the Residency had not penetrated beyond the Furhut Buksh, 
and all efforts to enter it from other directions had failed or 
ended in disaster. No member of the old garrison was 
familiar with the ground, which was known to be a veritable 
labyrinth ; and by a very sad mistake a party of the wounded 
had, during the day, been guided into what proved to be 
almost a cul-de-sac ; and had become exposed toa murderous 
fire, from which few of them escaped. 

It had also been planned early in the day to continue the 
extension of the position along the southern face of the 
Residency, but this was postponed owing to the need, now 
become obvious, of concentrating all efforts on the extricat- 
ing of the rear-guard from the Motee Mahul, and bringing 
it into our own position. 

This task was entrusted to Colonel Napier, afterwards 
Lord Napier of Magdala, who henceforward plays a lead- 
ing part in our story. He had accompanied Outram as 
his chief of the Staff, but, from Outram's surrender of his 
command, had until now been serving as a volunteer. The 



EFFORTS TO WITHDRAW THE GARRISON 229 

party he led out consisted of 100 men of the 78th, with a 
few additional officers. Guided by Cavanagh, afterwards 
distinguished by his feat of carrying plans and despatches 
to Sir Colin Campbell through the beleaguering host, they 
debouched from the Furhut Buksh on to the narrow bank 
along the river, and advanced by it ; skirting the Chutter 
Munzil and the minor posts held by the 5th Fusiliers, till 
they joined the rear-guard in the Motee Mahul. 

The position was under a strong fire from the direction 
of the Kaiser Bagh ; and one at least of the heavy guns, 
which had been planted at an opening in the face of the 
Motee Mahul to answer that fire, had got into difficulties. 
Three of the senior officers of artillery were killed, but 
Olpherts, who had accompanied Napier's party, succeeded 
in extricating the last of the guns, and then, warned by 
the weight of the enemy's fire, urged Napier to withdraw 
at once during the darkness of night, while he would be 
unseen, instead of waiting for the early dawn as at first 
intended. Accordingly the hospital, the reserve ammu- 
nition, and all that could be transported by camels or 
doolies, were brought into the Furhut Buksh by the route 
which Napier's party had taken. The rear-guard itself 
with the heavy guns, which required a wider road than the 
narrow bank, were brought into that part of the advanced 
gardens of the Chutter Munzil which the 90th were already 
holding. But hardly had this been effected when an 
opening was found, or made, into the adjacent Chutter 
Munzil enclosure, which was then attacked from both 
sides. It was strongly held ; but the attack was impetuous, 
the enemy were annihilated, and a continuous position along 
the river-face was thus secured during the dark hours of 
the night of September 26th. 

The force being thus collected, Havelock took command 
of the new portion of the position ; which was generically 
known as the Chutter Munzil, and consisted of the group 
of buildings and enclosures extending from the Tehree 
Kothee through the Furhut Buksh to the Chutter Munzil 
Palace and its advanced garden. Napier was, for a time, 
appointed to aid him in widening and strengthening it for 
contest, if need be, in the Kaiser Bagh direction. Mean- 
while Inglis remained in command of his old entrenchments ; 



230 THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

and Outram set himself (from the morning of the 27th) to 
his task of opening out from this combined or extended 
position, and getting into touch and communication with 
the city. As yet he had been greatly disappointed at the 
fierce opposition he had encountered on reaching the city, 
and the stubbornness of the enemy in clinging on to their 
fighting behind walls. 

And now on September 27th the first sortie was ordered, 
in view of seizing the posts the enemy held opposite our 
south-eastern front from the jail to the Cawnpore road. But 
this sortie was not successful ; that is, it did not extend 
our position, nor secure any result of importance. The 
experience gained by the old garrison of the effective way 
of managing these sorties had been set aside ; the troops 
having, after their first irruption into the enemy's position, 
dashed forward without guidance, went off the proper 
track ; and, though they stormed batteries, took guns, and 
killed many of the enemy, were unable to retain their 
ground, and eventually returned into the entrenchments. 

The necessity of careful preparation and definite schemes 
of operations was so obvious that the whole of the next 
day, the 28th, was spent in organizing the sorties for 
the 29th. 

These sorties of September 29th did not touch the site of 
the sortie of the 27th. They were in three columns, two 
of which operated on the South front from the neighbour- 
hood of the Brigade mess, and the third from Innes's post 
on the north-west towards the iron bridge. 

The two from the Brigade mess cleared the whole of that 
front ; taking, blowing up, and destroying such houses and 
batteries as had been attacking that face of the position, 
including those that had done so much mischief to Gubbins's 
bastion. The breadth of the range thus cleared was about 
300 yards, and the results were invaluable to that front of 
the position for the rest of the siege. 

But the most really important of the three sorties was 
that from Innes's post. Outram was intensely anxious to 
secure the iron bridge, as the most likely means of opening 
communications with well-wishers in the city. The sortie, 
however, never reached the iron bridge nor occupied the 
houses leading on to it. It only got as far as Hill's shop, 









EFFORTS TO WITHDRAW THE GARRISON 231 

near it, where it captured and destroyed the gun which had 
played such havoc during the first siege by its fire over the 
long diagonal of the entrenchments. 

The force employed in these sorties of the 29th was 
700 men, and the loss in killed and missing was three 
officers and fifteen men. The failure, however, to get the 
iron bridge was a bitter disappointment to Outram ; not 
only for the reasons which have been stated, but also from 
his rapidly increasing anxiety about the food supplies. 
He resolved on one more effort to open out his communi- 
cations, and summoned up Napier from the Chutter Munzil 
to organize and carry it out. 

Next day, September 30th, while the preparations for it 
were being made, he caused the various mines of the enemy 
which had been found to be examined and destroyed ; and 
in the evening he ordered out the cavalry to endeavour 
to make their way through the enemy to Alum Bagh. 
But they found the investment so close and strong 
that all their efforts failed, and they had to return to the 
entrenchments. 

Next day, October 1st, the final sortie began. Its real 
object was to secure possession of the Cawnpore road to a 
sufficient distance to admit of troops forcing their way to 
the Char Bagh, with several other and ulterior objects in 
view. But during October 1st and 2nd no direct sign was 
shown of this intention, the operations having apparently 
the same object as before, the widening out of the position. 
The enemy's attention was first of all distracted, in the 
dawning hours of October 1st, by the commencement of a 
battery (a mere feint) indicative of an attack on the Kaiser 
Bagh, in the east, from the Pyne Bagh ; and then in the 
middle of the day the real sortie charged out, taking the 
route that should have been adopted on the 27th. Its 
objective was to capture Phillips's house and garden, with 
its battery, which faced our Cawnpore battery on the 
south and flanked the Cawnpore road. The party worked 
close up to the garden, occupied the houses commanding 
it, and loopholed the walls so as to obtain the requisite 
fire on the desirable points. The sortie of the 29th had 
already cleared the flank on the other side of the Cawnpore 
road ; and accordingly next morning a detachment was sent 



over there ; Phillips's garden was attacked by infantry 
on both flanks, and by the artillery in the entrenchments 
in front ; and was then stormed and taken with a loss of 
only two men killed. All the guns in the garden were 
destroyed, and the house itself was blown up. Positions 
having been thus secured on both sides of the Cawnpore 
road, the additional preparations were carried out on 
October 2nd, to make them serve as a base for operating 
along the road. Accordingly on the 3rd the sortie turned 
down it, attacking, seizing, and securing house after house 
on both sides, and by its own artillery fire preventing any 
obstruction by the enemy's guns. This advance was con- 
tinued till the evening of the 4th ; when a bend of the road 
was reached which seemed favourable for still further 
progress. 

Now, however, the operation was suddenly stopped, no 
fresh advance was made, and the evening of October 4th 
marked an entire change in the apparent aspect of affairs 
and in Outram's plans. For it had now been ascertained — 
but only now — that the ideas about the exhaustion of the 
food supply had been all along incorrect, and founded on 
some entire misconceptions ; and that there was no reason 
for any present grave anxiety about it. 

It will be remembered that Havelock had forced his way 
through all obstacles into the Residency in what might be 
thought a desperate if not reckless manner, under the belief, 
founded on Inglis's letters, that the food of the garrison 
must be exhausted and its inmates starving. On reaching 
the Residency it had at once become obvious that their 
plight was not really so severe, and that rations, howbeit 
meagre, were forthcoming for every one. Still, the convic- 
tion remained in the minds of the generals that they " were 
coming to their last biscuit " ; hence Outram's intense anxiety, 
and his persistent and desperate efforts to open communi- 
cations with the city and the country. But this belief, or 
idea, was confined to the generals and a few of their most 
trusted Staff. When, however, Napier joined Outram from 
the Chutter Munzil on October 1st, he had become sceptical 
on the subject, and now, as chief of the Staff, personally 
inspected the several stores. He had expected to have a 
search, but he found that no search was necessary. The 



EFFORTS TO WITHDRAW THE GARRISON 233 

Commissariat officers in charge of the supplies knew where 
all the stock was, and pointed it out. Instead of its being 
exhausted, there was an ample supply for all for some time to 
come; the mist on the subject was thus cleared off at once, on 
proper inquiry being instituted. Those officers had never 
known or surmised the false impression that had been con- 
veyed to Havelock and Outram, nor had they ever given or 
been asked for any returns on which it might have been based. 
I do not know how the misconception arose, or how it 
was ever explained ; but it would appear that Sir Henry's 
dying orders, to have an inventory taken of the supplies, 
were not carried out ; and that those officers in charge were 
never called on to measure up their stock, or to report 
specifically how it stood at any time — the only process for 
arriving at a trustworthy or responsible estimate. All the 
supplies, I need hardly remark, had been laid in before the 
siege began. For six weeks they had kept pouring into 
the Residency through the agency of Captain James, the 
local Commissary-General, and of Simon Martin, the civil 
officer in charge of the Lucknow district ; as well as in the 
form of gifts from well-wishers from various quarters. 
James and Martin had been indefatigable beyond all praise, 
and the test of their ability and energy lay in the broad 
fact of the huge actual accumulation which they made — so 
huge that it left a surplus after supporting the combined 
garrisons till November 20th. While they were collecting 
these supplies their storage and its records lay in the hands 
of the native subordinates ; but on the day of Chinhut all 
these natives fled ; with them the lists disappeared ; while 
Captain James was laid up, incapable of moving, through- 
out the defence, from a very severe wound received at 
Chinhut. Hence when once the siege began, a few officers, 
wholly new to the work, had to be appointed to the direct 
charge of the supplies and their distribution as rations ; 
the only guidance or supervision that James could or did 
give them being by way of advice and instruction in those 
particular duties ; while he reserved to himself the general 
control, though really disabled for such responsible work, 
or for any personal watch of the state of the stock in 
hand. Possibly it was thought that others could make an 
equally good estimate ; and the only explanation I can 



234 THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

suggest of the misleading announcement to Havelock in 
August is, that perhaps General Inglis meant to allude 
only to his supply of meat, in which case his estimate was 
a just one ; or that the information or inspection by which 
he was guided had overlooked, or not been aware of, some 
of the large storages in which the grain supply was kept. 
There were at least four, one of which, a large swimming- 
bath, had hitherto remained untouched. 

Now, however, the inquiry made elicited the fact that 
there was an ample supply for immediate wants, although 
it took a few days to measure and calculate what the actual 
quantities were, and a few days more to decide on the 
reduced rations that should be issued, and to estimate the 
duration of the supply. 

This discovery, then — or rather the knowledge resulting 
from this inquiry — altered, as I have said, the whole aspect 
of affairs, and caused an entire change in Outram's plans. 
It altered the aspect of affairs, because there existed no 
longer any immediate, or even early, necessity to procure 
fresh supplies, and the danger of starvation was distant 
instead of acute. It affected Outram's plans, because 
their primary cause and aim was in connection with this 
danger, the removal or reduction of which enabled him to 
draw in from the somewhat desperate schemes he had meant 
to adopt in order to meet it. 

Outram at once stopped making further efforts to seize 
the Cawnpore road, or otherwise open out his communica- 
tions. The struggle and difficulty with which the bend of 
the road had been reached showed him that any advantage 
we might gain by a further advance would not compensate 
for the losses which it would certainly involve; and accord- 
ingly, two days later, on October 6th, the sortie drew back 
into the eventual position, the 78th being left to occupy the 
new post which had been formed on the site outside the 
old entrenchment which the sortie had first captured. This 
post was henceforward known as Lockhart's, from the name 
of its commandant. 

The successive changes which Outram had to make in 
his plans, consequent on the difficulty in opening out his 
communications, and the pertinacity of the enemy, are 
matters of importance. 






EFFORTS TO WITHDRAW THE GARRISON 235 

When advancing to the relief, he had hoped to come 
into touch at once with the city, and perhaps to establish a 
sort of provisional Government in British interests ; at any 
rate to throw supplies into the garrison, strengthen it with 
part of his own force, and withdraw the rest of it, taking 
with him the sick and wounded, and the 470 women and 
children whom the garrison had been protecting. 

Then his letters of September 30th and October 2nd show 
that he had already abandoned the idea of withdrawing 
the families, and proposed to fight his way out with the bulk 
of his troops to the Alum Bagh, leaving the 90th behind 
with the old garrison to strengthen it and continue the 
defence. 

After finding on October 4th that there was a sufficient 
supply of food for present wants, he wrote that he would 
hold on to the position with his whole force ; and began a 
long and sustained correspondence with the Commander- 
in-Chief and others, respecting the proper measures for the 
advance of fresh troops to the relief of Lucknow. 

Meanwhile the new or extended portion of the position 
at the Chutter Munzil had been getting expanded and 
consolidated, as will be more suitably described in the next 
chapter. 

But whilst all this had been going on at the Residency, 
the force that had been left isolated in the rear at the Alum 
Bagh had been in a critical position, though it had escaped 
serious attack to a wonderful degree. It consisted of 280 
Europeans, a few Sikhs, and four guns, and had charge of 
some 130 sick and wounded, the baggage, a quantity of 
cattle, and some 4,000 camp-followers (natives). Supplies 
and reinforcements were daily expected from Cawnpore, 
but they did not come till October 7th, when a convoy 
arrived with a party of 250 men and two guns. No attack 
had been made on the position, but the enemy's cavalry 
had kept hovering round and cutting up any of the camp- 
followers whom they found straggling about. With the 
supports thus received, and the defensive works they had 
constructed, the force at the Alum Bagh felt fairly secure 
at the time that Outram settled down for a prolonged 
defence of his position. 

Meanwhile the enemy were being greatly reinforced in 



236 THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

numbers. At first — that is, on September 24th and 25th 
— a large proportion of the Sepoys had cleared out of 
Lucknow, so that in the first few days after Outram's 
arrival the hostile force seemed to consist more of the old 
Durbar retainers and Talookdars' men than of Sepoys. 
On the other hand, at the end of September those Sepoys 
who had fled, returned, and the fugitive troops from Delhi 
also began to swarm in ; so that practically the army 
which was now beleaguering the British position was a 
very powerful one ; containing moreover a new element of 
great importance, in the experienced troops who had been 
in daily conflict with the British force on the Delhi ridge. 
Lastly, the Talookdaree troops were under the sway of the 
ablest and most unscrupulous and false of the Oude Amils 
— the Brahmin Rajah Maun Singh ; who was playing a 
double game, trying in insidious correspondence to assume 
with Outram the role of a secret friend, while aiming all 
the time at supreme influence with the rebel force. 

We can now estimate properly the true importance of the 
succour of Lucknow, and of the dangers which it averted. 
There was no longer any immediate danger from mining ; 
and fear of starvation was groundless. On the other hand, 
the danger of the natives of the garrison deserting was very- 
serious ; and serious also the consequent risk of our out- 
posts being captured, owing to the weakening of the garrison, 
as well as from the fresh mining which would then have 
ensued. Yet although neither the relievers nor the garrison 
were then aware of it, the Relief was in fact but just in 
time to save us from another positively overwhelming 
danger, far more serious than these. For just at this time, 
the ranks of the enemy were swelled by large bodies of 
veteran troops pouring in from the mutineer forces which 
had been besieging Delhi ; men who could fight. A very 
few days later, they would have intercepted Havelock's 
attempts at a junction, as they did thwart Outram's at a 
withdrawal ; but for our reinforcements, they would certainly 
have captured our outposts and overwhelmed the garrison. 
This was the imminent peril that Havelock's Relief averted ; 
and by averting it, he saved the Residency and the lives of 
the garrison. 



CHAPTER II 

THE BLOCKADE 

The preceding chapter dealt with Outram's efforts to 
open out his communications with the city and the country, 
and to extricate the families of the old garrison ; and related 
the circumstances that, on October 4th, brought about his 
decision to cease from those efforts, reverting instead to 
a pure defence in an extended position. Annoying and 
humiliating as the change of plan and attitude may have 
been, right glad he was, it can hardly be doubted, that he 
was able to adopt it ; and it will not be out of place to quote 
here extracts from the successive letters which he wrote, 
showing the gradual fluctuations in his views from the 
sanguine and impulsive ideas that were seething in his 
fertile brain before he reached Cawnpore ; dominating the 
operations of the advance to the relief in September, until 
he had to recognize the futility of his efforts and of his 
schemes, and the practical superiority and success of the 
enemy. 

September 7th. — " Our present object is merely to with- 
draw the garrison after forming a provisional government 
of influential inhabitants to maintain the city on behalf 
of the British Government until we can conveniently re- 
occupy it." 

September 17th. — " The moral effect of abandoning Luck- 
now will be very serious, as turning against us the many 
well-disposed chiefs in Oude and Rohilkund who are now 
watching the turn of affairs, and would regard the loss of 
Lucknow as the forerunner of the extinction of our rule. 
Such a blow to our prestige may extend its influence to 
Nepaul, and will be felt all over India." 

September 30th. — " It was evident that there could be no 
possible hope of carrying off the sick, wounded, and women 
and children (amounting to not less than 1,500 souls). Want 



238 THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

of carriage alone rendered the transport through five miles 
of disputed suburb an impossibility. 

"There remained but two alternatives, one to reinforce 
the Lucknow garrison with three hundred men, and leaving 
everything behind to retire immediately with the remains 
of the infantry upon the Alum Bagh, thereby leaving the 
garrison in a worse state than we found it . . . while it 
would have been impossible for any smaller force than the 
remainder of our troops, diminished by these three hundred 
men, to have any hope of making good their way back, 
and that not without very serious loss. I therefore adopted 
the second alternative, as the only mode of offering reason- 
able hope of securing the safety of this force, by retaining 
sufficient strength to enforce supplies of provisions, should 
they not be open to us voluntarily, and to maintain our- 
selves even on reduced rations until reinforcements advance 
to our relief." 

October 2nd. — " Insurgents are too strong to admit of 
withdrawing from the garrison. Sick, wounded, women and 
children amount to upwards of 1,000. The force will retire, 
therefore, after making arrangements for the safety of the 
garrison by strengthening it with all but four of our guns, 
and leaving the 90th regiment. . . . The remainder of our 
force will make its way back to Cawnpore." 

October 6th. — " I have been obliged to abandon the inten- 
tion of withdrawing any portion of this force for the present, 
the obstacles to communicating between the Residency and 
Alum Bagh being too formidable. . . ." 

Outram, then, having resolved to continue on the defensive 
in an extended position, it has now to be shown what that 
extended position was ; how it was obtained and secured ; 
and how, after that, it was held and defended. His decision 
was made on October 4th, but the full position was not 
secured until the 8th. The portion that was effected by 
the sortie which was in progress on the 4th, was not defined 
and occupied till the 6th, nor was it brought permanently 
into the boundary alignment till a few days later. 

The position into which Outram withdrew on October 6th 
consisted of (1) the old Residency entrenchments extended 
down to the river ; (2) the Chutter Munzil extension, from 
the Tehree Kothee through the Furhut Buksh to the 



THE BLOCKADE 239 

Chutter Munzil and its advanced gardens ; and (3) the new- 
post, outside the junction of those two positions, now held 
by the 78th under Lockhart, which had just been secured 
on the termination of the efforts described in the last 
chapter. It will be best understood by examining the 
map. 1 (1) The Residency entrenchments need no explan- 
ation or description, nor does (2) the addition to them of 
the ground on the river-face acquired on the day after the 
arrival of the Relief. No other addition was made to it ; 
but the neutral ground on its southern face had been much 
expanded by the sortie of September 29th. (3) The new 
post held by the 78th was absolutely new, and its prepara- 
tion for defence forms a special episode which will be told 
presently. It filled up a gap between the southern face of 
the Residency and the jail buildings of the extended 
position. The continuous extended position (2) along the 
river-face, had been secured on September 27th, when it last 
appeared in our story, but at that time it consisted only of 
the buildings and enclosures which bordered the river-face ; 
whereas now, that is by October 6th, it had been widened out 
southwards up to the streets by which Moorsom had guided 
the relieving force into the Residency. 

The operations by which this had been effected have now 
to be described. The Tehree Kothee, the jail buildings, 
and the Furhut Buksh had been very promptly secured and 
assigned for occupation to the regiments that were to hold 
them. But the contest at the Chutter Munzil and the 
buildings and gardens on its outer boundary was severe 
and prolonged. The advanced garden was first secured, 
not without a series of efforts. The attack on the outer 
Chutter Munzil buildings was carried on step by step from 
September 27th to the first days of October, the houses at 
the junction of the Cheenee Bazar and the Khas Bazar 
being captured on September 30th. In these operations 
the 90th were on the left, or the advanced garden side ; 
Brasyer's Sikhs were on the right, and held eventually the 
projecting position bordering the Pyne Bagh ; while the 5th 
Fusiliers were in the middle. 

While this was being done, a good communication was 
made from end to end of the position, by which the heavy 

1 Map IV. 



2 4 o THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

guns that had been parked in the advanced garden on 
the morning of September 27th, were conveyed into the 
Residency entrenchments. 

As soon as the boundary that we meant to hold was 
reached, the enemy began to have recourse to their old sub- 
terranean warfare. Being comparatively experts, they at first 
had the advantage over the new garrison, of which the com- 
manding Engineer, Captain Crommelin, had unfortunately 
been seriously disabled by a wound. On October 3rd and 
5th, they blew up mines directed at the wall of the advanced 
garden. The first one failed, being short of its mark ; the 
second was successful, and made a large breach, which a 
column of the enemy then essayed to storm ; but they were 
forthwith repulsed with heavy loss, and fled precipitately 
under the fire of the 90th. They then made a second breach 
by burning down one of the gates of the garden. These 
breaches and the commanding fire from the adjacent build- 
ings called the Hirun Khana, led to the construction of 
trenches in the garden to serve both for shelter and for 
communications. 

Then on the 6th, the day on which the sortie of the 
1st was drawn in, the enemy blew up our picket at the 
junction of the Cheenee Bazar and the Khas Bazar, and 
penetrated in considerable numbers into the building ; but 
were soon driven out again, with a loss of some 450 men. 
They continued, however, to hold a mosque which threatened 
that post, and, in fact, attacked it on the 8th, when they 
were repulsed with loss ; after which we worked into a 
vault underneath the mosque, and blowing up a portion of 
it, barricaded and secured the rest, gaining a clear command 
of the two bazars or streets. 

With this, the consolidation of the new position was 
practically effected ; and with Lockhart's post at the same 
time added to the old entrenchments, as already described, 
the defence of the extended position, as a whole, was now 
practically begun. These operations had caused a loss of 
fifty men killed to the relieving force (in addition to the 
196 killed previously since leaving Cawnpore), and of nine- 
teen men to the 32nd (of the old garrison). 

During the defence of the extended and consolidated 
position — the second defence, as I venture to call it — that 



THE BLOCKADE 241 

position was as closely invested as before along a large part 
of its circuit, but not everywhere. On the whole river- face 
the enemy were cleared off, and were entirely on the opposite 
bank ; and on that part of the old Residency entrenchments 
which was continued as part of the boundary of the second 
position, (viz. the South and West faces from the Cawnpore 
Battery, round by Gubbins's, to Innes's post,) the rebels now 
kept more at a distance. The neutral ground had been 
greatly widened out, partly by the results of the sortie of 
September 29th, and partly by the mining operations of the 
first defence. 

During this second defence, the old position was never 
seriously, if at all, attacked, even by mines ; and the defen- 
sive operations were confined to repairing and strengthen- 
ing or sometimes extending the defences. The Cawnpore 
Battery was almost entirely reconstructed. The sheep-house 
and the slaughter-house batteries were completed ; and the 
mound that stretched out from Innes's post was secured by 
a series of zigzag trenches, which also gave an effective 
command over the end of the iron bridge. 

In (3) the new post — Lockhart's — held by the 78th High- 
landers, the contest was one of mines ; which, on our side, 
were constructed by the men of that regiment under the 
guidance of Lieutenants Hutchinson and Tulloch. The 
enemy began their underground work at once, opposite our 
left corner, while the garrison were strenuously engaged in 
barricading and strengthening the post; exploding their 
mine while the 78th were still at their first shaft, but with 
only slight damage to the post, as it was ten feet short 
of the outer enclosure. From that time up to about the 
20th, this warfare at Lockhart's post was incessant. Our 
galleries aggregated a length of 500 feet. Every effort of 
the enemy was defeated ; and two of their galleries were 
captured and held by us as listening galleries. One of 
them was very long, and its capture, which was attended 
by some amusing episodes, was followed by other enter- 
taining but fruitless attempts of the enemy to find its 
course or alignment from above ground, in order to break 
into it. 

In the Chutter Munzil position also the contest was now 
practically confined to mining warfare of the most persist- 
ent kind. The enemy made sixteen fresh efforts besides 



242 THE SECOXD DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

those made up to October 8th ; but now they were always 
defeated ; seven of their mines being destroyed, and seven 
others captured and held by us for our own purposes ; 
besides which, we also attacked three and destroyed two of 
the enemy's posts with our own galleries. It will be seen on 
comparing the figures, that the number of attacks by the 
rebels was not so numerous as during the first siege ; but 
the amount of mining involved was much greater and much 
more arduous. In the first defence, a great many more 
mines were exploded, and by this means much ground was 
made impracticable for further adjacent mining. But in the 
new position, the whole front became protected, not so much 
by the explosion of mines, as by being covered by intercept- 
ing and other galleries, aggregating nearly 1,100 yards in 
length. Moreover, as the soil was looser, the actual construc- 
tion of the galleries was much more laborious, by reason 
of its involving the use of supports and casings, which 
were never needed in the first siege. 

Added to this ; after their successive defeats, the enemy's 
miners had become very wary, and had taken to digging 
with the trowel instead of with the pickaxe, which prevented 
their being heard till they were quite close. 

Further, many of the listening and attacking galleries 
were very long, and the ventilating arrangements were 
necessarily crude, making the work specially irksome and 
difficult, owing to the foulness of the air. 

Such was the nature of the warfare from October 8th 
— almost entirely mining — for about a month ; when pre- 
parations were started for measures to assist or act in 
concert with the second relieving force, whose advance and 
approach were then becoming imminent. 

Meanwhile, in spite of the closeness of the investment, 
the practical safety of the garrison had become and con- 
tinued undoubted, and the shelter of its inmates was much 
more secure than of old. All anxiety as to any successful 
attack or irruption of the enemy was at an end ; and there 
was a material relaxation of the former strictness about 
leaving one's own garrison or residence. There was 
altogether a great reduction of discomfort, as there was 
now a large number of natives — camp-followers of Have- 
lock's force — available for general service. To the old 
garrison the relief was very material and sensible. 



THE BLOCKADE 243 

During the six weeks which this second defence lasted 
after the last sortie was drawn in on October 6th, the dangers 
and loss of life from conflict with the enemy and from then- 
Are was very greatly diminished, as well as the discomfort 
which has been already dealt with. The only exact inform- 
ation I have is respecting the 32nd Regiment, of which the 
losses in killed (exclusive of those who died from accidents 
and wounds) stand thus — 

July 2, to September 25 29 

September 26, to October 6 9 

October 7, to November 16 o 

During this period also, the work devolving on the 
generals was comparatively slight. The outpost officers 
and garrisons were holding their posts, and, with the aid 
and guidance of the Engineers, were countermining the 
enemy or blowing up their posts ; but Outram personally 
was keeping up an energetic correspondence with the outer 
world, as has been described. Of course the whole garrison 
was suffering from the poverty of rations, and the troops 
were longing to be again at open combat with the enemy. 

Throughout this month the detachment at the Alum Bagh 
under Major Maclntyre continued to hold its own success- 
fully. As already mentioned, it had been strengthened on 
October 7th, by 250 men and two guns from Cawnpore ; and 
on the 25th, 500 more arrived with a convoy, thus making 
the force secure and able to extend its foraging expeditions. 
After this, detachments of 100 men went backwards and 
forwards on various escort and other duties from time to 
time. The enemy tried to place guns in position at various 
points, but they were all silenced by the battery which Major 
Maclntyre had constructed ; and the garrison practically- 
met with no losses. 

Meantime the communications were much more open 
and easy than before, so that the garrison at Lucknow was 
being constantly cheered by the news which arrived almost 
daily of the approach of strong reinforcements. About 
the 10th, intelligence came of the advance from Delhi of 
Greathed's column (afterwards Hope Grant's), of which the 
ultimate destination was Lucknow ; and it was at one time 
thought that it had come as near as Futtehgurh on the 



244 THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

8th. This idea, however, .was incorrect, as the column had 
turned aside to Agra instead of coming on direct. There 
were reports also of the advance of various regiments up- 
country towards Cawnpore from the China Expeditionary 
Force. 

Though the communications between General Outram 
and the outer world were so much more frequent than 
during the first defence, there was no real increase in 
private letters. I was the fortunate recipient of one letter ; 
and I never heard of any other letter reaching any one. 
Mine was brought by a soldier of the 78th, who, seeing it 
at the Post-office at Cawnpore, had brought it away with 
him in the hope of delivering it to the addressee. In this he 
succeeded, meeting me in the lane between the Post-office 
and Fayrer's, and showing me the tiny document, with- 
out knowing at first that he was giving it to the proper 
person. 

Up to the middle of October there was no intelligence 
received of any threatening of Cawnpore by the Gwalior 
Contingent or other troops from the south of tfye Jumna ; 
but the defeated Sepoys from Delhi had been reaching 
Lucknow, and had also been disturbing the country in other 
directions, such as at Bithoor. The gathering there, in 
which the Nana Sahib was present, was attacked and dis- 
persed on the 1 8th. 

Outram sent to the Alum Bagh two letters of advice and 
suggestions for the officer who might arrive in command 
of the relieving force — one on the 14th, the other on 
October 30th, in addition to what he had written to Cawn- 
pore on the 28th. Their value to Sir Colin will be seen 
presently. 

Outram's views and anxieties and his communications 
to the outer world were necessarily coloured by his ideas 
of the state of the food supply. The rations were slightly 
reduced from time to time at short intervals ; and, bearing 
this in mind, extracts from his letters in order of date will 
best show the progressive aspect of this question. The 
dates on which he wrote, and the prospects on these dates, 
were as follows, in October — 

On the 7th. — " We have grain and gram, bullocks and 
horses, on which we may subsist a month." 



THE BLOCKADE 245 

On the 9th. — " Our grain alone and gun bullocks may 
possibly be eked out for a month, and but little else for 
twenty days." 

On the nth. — "Our grain, allowing it to be all good, 
will last only till November 6 ; our meat not so long." 

On the 1 6th. — "Our atta and bullocks will last only till 
November 18." 

On the 20th. — " Our food, upon a very reduced ration, 
may possibly last till November 20." 

On the 28th. — " We can manage to screw on till near 
the end of November on further reduced rations." 

It is to be remembered that in all such rough statements 
of the probable duration of supplies, there was a liability 
to vagueness as to the kind of supplies referred to — whether, 
for instance, it did or did not include gram or meat, or 
might possibly refer to meat only ; if it included meat, 
whether it included horse-meat as part of it ; and whether 
the grain food included gram, which is customarily food 
for horses only, and not for man. 

It may be said at once that no discovery or find of any 
store of food, which was thought to be unknown before, 
was ever made after October 2nd. All the supplies that then 
existed were measured up, and the stock estimated and 
recorded. By the end of the siege the beef was exhausted, 
its last issue in rations being made on the very last day of 
the defence. The supply of wheat had been so husbanded 
by the quiet and almost imperceptible reduction of rations, 
that, when the garrison marched out, it took with it the 
supplies needed to at least the end of the month, as estimated 
by Outram at the end of October. 

While thus keeping his friends at Cawnpore, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, and others, as correctly informed as he 
could of the prospects of the garrison, he also sent out 
from time to time advice and instructions for such forces 
as might be advancing to his relief. He wrote three such 
letters on the nth, 13th, and 14th; and then again, in great 
detail, at the end of the month. In those first letters he 
showed that he expected at least two regiments, the 23rd 
and 93rd, almost immediately from Calcutta ; he urged 
the commander of the columns from Delhi, whom he as- 
sumed to be the probable relieving General, to move on 



246 THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

with all speed to the Alum Bagh, and there concentrate 
for his final effort ; believing that his presence there as the 
pioneer of the advancing flood of troops would break up 
the hostile force in Lucknow ; and in the third of these 
letters, that of October 14th, he advised the route eventually 
taken by Sir Colin, with some deviations in the details. 

It was not till near the end of the month that he heard 
of Cawnpore being threatened by the neighbourhood of the 
Gwalior Contingent, and the advice he then sent out to 
Cawnpore on October 28th was — " It is so obviously to the 
advantage of the State that the Gwalior rebels should be 
first effectually destroyed, that our relief should be a 
secondary consideration. I trust, therefore, that Brigadier 
Wilson " (in command at Cawnpore) " will furnish Colonel 
Grant " (commanding the Delhi column) " with every 
possible aid to effect that object before sending him here." 
It was in this letter that he mentioned that we could 
manage to screw on, as regards food, till near the end of 
November. 

His letters of the 30th and 31st contained complete 
detailed advice for the route, 1 the sites of batteries for 
the relieving column ; a system of signals to show its 
arrival at the different positions on the route ; and inform- 
ation of the steps the garrison would take on receiving 
those signals. 

It is legitimately open to question whether Outram was 
right in advising this route (No. 3) so strongly as the only 
one to be thought of. One reason against it was that, 
as customary with natives, the enemy would certainly 
expect that since the first relief had come by the route 
between the palaces and the river, the second relief would 
also advance by it ; they would accordingly prepare the 
posts along that route for defence ; and there would be 
heavy and serious obstruction, though not as serious as in 
actual street fighting. Another reason was that Havelock 
had been strongly in favour of route No. 4, and had not 
adopted it in the first relief only on account of the validity 
of the special objection to it at that particular date ; viz. 
the swampy condition of the ground after a continuance 
of heavy rain, which prevented the movement of the heavy 

1 Route No. 3, see p. 218. 






THE BLOCKADE 247 

guns. With the absence of this special and temporary 
objection, there were strong reasons in favour of route No. 4. 
It would probably be unexpected by the enemy, and there- 
fore unprepared. It was certainly much more open ground, 
and much freer from obstructions or strong positions for the 
enemy to hold. The Badshah Bagh, the only large enclosure 
on the route, would not be a place of strength to the 
enemy, while it would be a valuable place of shelter for the 
families on their withdrawal ; and with the command that 
had now been gained of the iron bridge from Innes's post, 
there would be no difficulty in the relieving force getting 
possession of it. Such are my reasons for thinking that 
Outram might have suggested route No. 4 as well as No. 
3. As it was, Sir Colin followed Outram's plan, with some 
modifications, and arrived on the plain before the Kaiser 
Bagh on November 16th. 

The operations by which Outram proposed to aid the 
relief, and which, at any rate, would be in concert with 
its advance if it adopted the route he advised, were : to blow 
up the most mischievous buildings in the close proximity 
of the advanced garden ; to throw down the garden-wall, 
after forming heavy gun-batteries inside the enclosure, so as 
to command and sweep the ground by which the relief 
must advance, thus clearing it of the enemy ; and to batter 
whatever adjacent buildings they might hold in force. So 
from about the end of October, two batteries for the heavy 
guns were under construction in the advanced garden, while 
mines were driven out into the buildings called the Steam- 
Engine and the Hirun Khana ; the latter ending in three 
branches, one of which required to be very long, about 
three hundred feet from the shaft to its extreme point. 

The orders given required that these preparations should 
be completed on November 12th; but they were not put 
into use till the 16th; with the result that much of the 
powder that formed the charge had got damp and failed 
to operate with the proper effect ; also the mine that was 
directed against the Engine-house was stopped by an open 
trench. Still the mine at the Hirun Khana blew up a 
breach by which the building was entered and captured, 
and held. The front wall of the advanced garden was 
sufficiently thrown over to admit of the guns afterwards 






248 THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

levelling it properly ; and the two batteries opened out 
with due effect on the neighbouring palaces and buildings 
occupied by the enemy, enabling the minor ones inter- 
vening between the garden and the Motee Mahul to be 
attacked and seized. Next day the fire and movements 
of the garrison co-operated with the relieving force. The 
Motee Mahul was captured, and our generals with their 
staff ran the gauntlet of the enemy's fire to the Koorsheyd 
Munzil, where they were received by Sir Colin, and the 
relief and junction were effected. For the operations of 
this junction, Outram had been unable to muster 2,000 
bayonets ! 

Next day, November 1 8th, the fiat went forth that the 
Residency was to be abandoned. With what bitterness 
this was heard by the old garrison may be readily 
imagined ; the position they had so long and so resolutely 
held was to be given up — the British flag, the emblem of 
their assertion of their country's supremacy and honour, 
was to be hauled down. One more meed of gratitude 
than they probably knew of they owed now to the noble 
Havelock. His last official act was to urge on Sir Colin, 
with definite proposals, the retention of the old position, 
and other arrangements in its support ; and in these pro- 
posals he is believed to have been supported by Outram. 
But it was not to be. The subject is dealt with in the 
next chapter in connection with the relief, and need not 
be further touched on here. 

Next day, the 19th, began the exodus of the families ; 
they left the advanced gardens by twos and threes in the 
course of the day, revelling in the fresh air and the fresh 
food. Their course was along a lane, which had been 
screened off so as to conceal all movements till they 
reached the Secundra Bagh ; and there they halted till 
dark, when they went forward in a column to the Dil 
Koosha. On the 22nd the garrison evacuated the Resid- 
ency, and the whole force concentrated in the Dil Koosha. 
Two days afterwards the)' moved on to the Alum Bagh, 
and with this the tale of the defence may be said to end. 

The families accompanied Sir Colin in safety to Cawn- 
pore, and were then sent down, in December, to Allahabad 
and Calcutta. But at the Alum Bagh, on November 24th, 



THE BLOCKADE 249 

at the close of the defence, a fit and touching date, Henry 
Havelock calmly breathed his last — worn out by hardship 
and illness ; a true, heroic, stern, God-fearing old warrior, 
happy in the knowledge that his deeds had stirred to the 
depths the hearts of his Queen and his country, and 
rejoicing in the thought that those for whose succour he 
had struggled so long and so gloriously, were at length safe 
under the protection of Sir Colin's army. 



CHAPTER III 

RELIEF BY SIR COLIN CAMPBELL 

THE last chapter brought our story up to the close of 
the defence under Outram, and the relief of the beleaguered 
garrison by Sir Colin's force. The advance and measures 
for that relief have now to be described. Heretofore all 
operations had been conducted by the Generals in local 
command ; now, however, the Commander-in-Chief was 
appearing personally on the scene ; affecting the mode and 
course of the contest — in this relief to begin with — by his 
own views of the military and political situation, and his 
own knowledge and experience of war. 

That experience was large and varied. He had fought 
throughout the Peninsular War, beginning with Moore's 
retreat to Corunna. He had served in China, and then in 
India during the Punjab Campaign ; and afterwards in 
command against the hill tribes at Peshawur. Finally he 
had earned great distinction with the Highland Brigade 
in the Crimea. He enjoyed the highest repute as a good 
soldier and a sound commander; but he had never had 
an opportunity of showing his capacity as a General in 
charge of great operations ; much less in such a crisis as 
that with which he had now to deal. And though full of 
energy and vigour, he had now reached the ripe age of 
sixty-five years. 

The time of his arrival in India was in the gloomiest days 
of the struggle. It was in the middle of August, and 
the outlook then seemed almost hopeless. Delhi had not 
yet been captured. The Punjab was expected to turn 
against us at any moment. The Lucknow garrison was 
apparently in the most desperate straits. Havelock had 
withdrawn back to Cawnpore. Mutiny and insurrection 
had broken out in the Lower Provinces, and they were so 
disturbed that the troops were being detained there which 



RELIEF BY SIR COLIN CAMPBELL 251 

had been meant to assist in the operations above Allahabad. 
Moreover, all Central India had risen against the British, so 
that the task which Sir Colin appeared to have before him 
at that stage was the re-conquest of the whole Bengal 
Presidency at least. 

But by the end of October, when he undertook the 
direct command of operations, a great change had come 
over the scene — Delhi had been captured ; the Punjab was 
secure, and had begun to assist the British actively with 
fresh levies ; the Delhi district, the centre of the great 
struggle, had been cleared of the rebel army. The Luck- 
now garrison had been succoured, and though both they 
and their relievers were as fully beleaguered as ever, the 
enemy that was now investing them seemed powerless to 
attack them, though it now virtually consisted of the whole 
mutineer array of Upper India. British troops had come 
south from Delhi to Cawnpore ; other troops had already 
gone north from Calcutta to Cawnpore. One half of the 
China Expeditionary Force were well on their way up- 
country ; the other half had started, and the pioneer 
regiments of the great reinforcing army from England had 
already arrived. The storm had been weathered — the 
tide of British supports were sweeping up rapidly. Still 
Sir Colin seemed weighed down with a sense of the gravity 
of the situation, as if it were as great as ever. Had he 
grounds for this ? How did the present situation really 
compare with the past ? 

The numerical strength of the enemy was somewhat less 
than it had been, by reason of their losses, while they had 
not as yet received any material accession to their strength, 
and their army that at Delhi had been behind massive de- 
fences was now in the field or in the open city of Lucknow. 
Our force of some 2,500 men that had before been in the 
open at Cawnpore was now helping to hold in security, 
until relieved, the positions at the Alum Bagh and in 
Lucknow. And the spirit of the enemy at Lucknow could 
be gauged by their never venturing to attack the weak 
Alum Bagh post seriously. 

Delhi had been taken by 3,300 British soldiers, aided by 
8,000 native troops and allies ; 2,500 men had been able to 
penetrate through the enemy into the Lucknow Residency. 



252 THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

Whereas Sir Colin had now at his disposal 5,000 men free 
for movement on Lucknow ; 2,000 men in Lucknow ; 1,000 
men at Cawnpore ; the second half of the China Force on 
its way to Cawnpore ; several battalions of reinforcements 
from England already arrived and moving upwards ; the 
Punjab now actively siding with us, and raising and send- 
ing down fresh troops towards Oude. 

All this surely implied a momentous improvement in the 
state of matters to be dealt with by the Chief, both as to 
the difficulties to be overcome and his means of meeting 
them. 

But his grave view of the situation, notwithstanding, is 
shown by his writings. His letters said, " I have made up 
my mind not to hazard an attack which would compromise 
my small force. . . . Sir James Outram is in great straits. 
. . . My object — to extricate the garrison from Lucknow 
— I will do, if it can be accomplished with the ordinary 
military risks ; but there are larger interests pending than 
even that great object, and I must watch over the safety 
of the small body of troops with which I begin this 
undertaking." 

Such were Sir Colin's recorded thoughts, estimates, and 
anxieties as to his situation and his resources at the end of 
October, though the incomparably more slender means 
by which an incomparably graver crisis had been quite 
recently met and overcome seem sufficiently obvious. 

In this spirit of caution he entered on the command and 
guidance of the relief. 

The column, which now came under his leadership in 
November 1857, and effected the relief of Outram's garrison, 
was made up of two bodies of men : one, the column which 
had been despatched south from Delhi, the other the gradual 
collection of reinforcements from the Calcutta direction. 

The column from Delhi, which left it about September 
24th, consisted of 1,800 infantry, 600 cavalry, and sixteen 
guns. The infantry were 500 of the 8th and 75th Regi- 
ments, and the rest the 2nd and 4th Punjab Infantry. The 
cavalry were the 9th Lancers and three squadrons of 
Hodson's Horse. The artillery were a field battery, and 
two batteries of Horse Artillery, each short of one gun. 
At first the force was under the command of Colonel 



RELIEF BY SIR COLIN CAMPBELL 253 

Greathed, and moved down the Doab (t. c. the Mesopo- 
tamia, or " land between the rivers " Ganges and Jumna) 
in pursuit of the fugitive mutineers from Delhi. After 
overtaking and defeating them at Bolundghuhur, on 
September 28th, and again at Malagurh and at Allygurh, 
it moved to the right to Agra, whither it had been urgently 
summoned. There, on October 10th, it had an unex- 
pected battle with the Indore Brigade of the Central India 
mutineer army, which it routed and punished in a crushing 
manner, capturing thirteen guns. The column then turned 
towards Cawnpore, and was overtaken shortly by Colonel 
Hope Grant, who assumed its command ; and after another 
combat at Kanouj, it reached Cawnpore on October 26th. 

The reinforcements which came up from the Calcutta 
direction consisted partly of the troops which had been 
detained below Benares while Havelock was still at Cawn- 
pore, and partly of the new arrivals of the China Expedi- 
tionary Force. Some of these reinforcements had already 
been sent on to the Alum Bagh, as has been mentioned ; and 
Hope Grant found that the troops which Brigadier Wilson 
could transfer to him at Cawnpore, added to his own 
column and to the Alum Bagh garrison, would bring up 
his force to nearly 3,800 men. So he crossed the Ganges 
on October 30th, and marched towards Lucknow. A further 
reinforcement of 1,200 men was expected; and Sir Colin 
meant to push on himself and join them at Allahabad, as 
soon as he could take on two additional regiments thence 
to Cawnpore. Till he could do so, his own presence was 
required at Calcutta more than elsewhere. 

The new troops that Hope Grant took on with him from 
Cawnpore, were the 93rd Highlanders and a wing of the 
53rd, with detachments for the regiments already at the 
front. After crossing the Ganges, he pushed on with the 
intention of reaching the Alum Bagh speedily ; but he now 
received orders from Sir Colin, which led him to halt and 
await his arrival at Buntheera beyond the Sye river. Its 
bridge at Bunnee had been by this time broken down, but 
the stream was now easily fordable. 

At Buntheera, Sir Colin Campbell joined him on 
November 9th. He had left Calcutta on October 27th, reach- 
ing Cawnpore on November 3rd ; and having heard from 



254 THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

Outram that he could hold out till near the end of the 
month, he halted there a few days to organize the arrange- 
ments for the security of Cawnpore and his communications. 
The danger that threatened was from the Gwalior Contingent, 
a compact and well-disciplined force of some 5,000 men with 
a powerful artillery ; increased to 10,000 men by the Nana 
Sahib's followers, and the rebels who had joined them when 
they were hovering on the south of the Jumna near Kalpee. 
This body of men had never been far from that neighbour- 
hood, that is from within a short distance of Cawnpore, 
since Havelock returned there in August ; and I have no 
authentic knowledge of the reason that prevented their 
advancing on Cawnpore, when Havelock and Outram left 
it after the middle of September. To hold Cawnpore 
against this array, Sir Colin left 500 British soldiers and 
550 Madras troops as the permanent garrison of the 
entrenchment there, under General Windham ; whom he 
also directed to forward on to Lucknow the additional 
reinforcements that were likely to arrive from day to day, 
unless he should find it necessary to detain them at Cawn- 
pore for its defence. It is somewhat unfortunate that he 
did not require Windham to increase his force up to some 
specified strength before forwarding on reinforcements, for 
it was known that the Gwalior Contingents were really 
showing signs of advancing, and that they were a compact, 
united, and well-trained force with a powerful artillery. 
This action was a departure from the cautious procedure 
which he had laid down for adoption. 

Sir Colin then joined Hope Grant at Buntheera on 
November 9th, halted there a couple of days, and concen- 
trated his force at the Alum Bagh on the 12th; having a 
smart action with a body of the enemy on the way, and after- 
wards taking possession of the old fort of Jellalabad. 

At the Alum Bagh, he settled in detail his plan of oper- 
ations for the relief. He had decided on it, in a general 
way, before leaving Calcutta, and now he had before him 
the proposals which Outram had sent out on October 30th ; 
besides the maps and papers brought out still later from the 
Residency by Mr. Cavanagh, who had penetrated through 
the investing army in disguise. And he now definitely 
decided (in opposition to the urgent advice of his chief 




RELIEF BY SIR COLIN CAMPBELL 255 

engineer, who was in favour of Route No. 4) to adopt Route 
No. 3 ; slightly deviating however from the exact line pro- 
posed by Outram near the Secundra Bagh. 

This route l was, in its general course, what has through- 
out this narrative been called No. 3 ; and although it 
entirely avoided all street fighting — even the small length 
which Havelock had from Neill's Gate to the Residency — 
it had to pass the series of strong posts by which Havelock 
had advanced, and which, though not then held by the 
enemy, were sure to be occupied by them on this occasion. 
On the other hand, Route No. 4 was free from all the 
objections which seemed to prey on Sir Colin's mind. It 
was along absolutely open ground. The Badshah Bagh 
would have been no obstacle, and would have been useful ; 
and the sole objection to the route at the time of Havelock's 
advance did not exist now. Further, Sir Colin had with 
him a very powerful heavy artillery, which, with room to 
handle it, could have mastered any flanking or other 
artillery the enemy might oppose to him ; and also a 
very smart body of Engineers with effective equipment. 
As it was, he lost much of this advantage from the cramped 
space in which he had to manoeuvre. 

The force now collected under Sir Colin, including (I 
believe) the reinforcements that arrived on November 14th, 
was probably rather more than the 5,000 men which Hope 
Grant had expected. Of these, 400 men were to remain 
at the Alum Bagh as its garrison ; of the rest, 3,800 were 
infantry in three brigades, and comprised the 93rd, the 23rd, 
and the 8th, besides a wing of the 53rd, and detachments of 
the 82nd and other regiments, as well as the 2nd and 4th 
Punjab Infantry. The cavalry were the same as had been 
with Hope Grant, with the addition of two squadrons of 
the Military Train. The artillery was very strong, and 
included — eight heavy guns of Peel's Naval Brigade, one 
heavy battery of Royal Artillery, two and a half field 
batteries, two Horse Artillery batteries, and a mortar 
battery ; and there were four companies of Sappers and 
Pioneers. 

On the 13th, Sir Colin reconnoitred in force to his front 

1 See Map V. 



256 THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

and his left, in order to deceive the enemy ; and then, on the 
morning of the 14th, moved off to the right, circling round 
to the Dil Koosha. On reaching the Dil Koosha, the con- 
test began. At this spot itself the resistance was short ; 
for finding their flank threatened, the enemy abandoned 
the Dil Koosha and retreated to the Martiniere. Then the 
Martiniere also was attacked and taken ; and these two 
posts, the Dil Koosha and the Martiniere, were held as 
defensive positions, round which the troops bivouacked 
that night. In the evening, the rebels from the west of 
the canal brought a fire to bear on these positions ; but they 
were held in check by the 93rd along the canal, and were 
then attacked on their own ground and routed by the 53rd 
and the 4th Punjabees. During the afternoon a semaphore 
was erected on the Martiniere and signals exchanged with 
Outram according to the preconcerted code. The rear- 
guard were engaged with the enemy during all the 14th, 
and the 15th was spent in concentrating the troops and 
arranging for the struggle of the following day. After 
setting aside a force of all arms, containing the 8th regi- 
ment and half of the cavalry, with five guns, to hold the 
Dil Koosha and the rear, the column left available for the 
operations towards the Residency was 4,200 strong. 

Altogether this array was very much stronger than any 
that had before met the enemy in Oude ; but this enemy, 
it is to be remembered, now included the bulk of the 
mutineer army from Delhi in addition to the Oude 
mutineer force that had all along occupied Lucknow and 
the neighbouring districts. 

Outram's proposals were that the force should cross the 
canal by or near the bridge on the alignment of the Huzrut- 
gunge road, attack the old infantry barracks and the 
Begum's Palace, and then turn to the right for the Secundra 
Bagh. But Sir Colin, in reconnoitring on the 15th, came 
to the conclusion that this route was held in great strength 
by the enemy. He resolved therefore to cross the canal 
further north near the river, and advance thence by the 
more open ground along the river-bank towards the Motee 
Mahul, where he expected Outram to sortie and meet him. 

To mislead the enemy, he repeated his tactics of the 
13th; and from the evening of the 15th he maintained a 






RELIEF BY SIR COLIN CAMPBELL 257 

fire on the Begum's Palaec, and in that direction generally, 
as if that was to be his route of attack. 

On the morning of the 16th the force crossed the canal 
close to its debouchure into the Goomtee, and then 
advanced along the bank of the river ; finding itself, how- 
ever, cramped up in narrow roads between gardens and 
buildings till it emerged into more open ground close 
to the Secundra Bagh, an enclosure 150 yards square, 
with massive walls bastioned at the angles. The enemy 
in it had not expected the attack in this direction, and 
having closed up all the gateways on the opposite side, 
were caught as in a trap. They had no guns, but their 
walls were stout, and, owing to the nearness of the en- 
closures round it, the attacking artillery were subjected to 
a very telling fire. Blunt's battery of horse artillery lost 
a third of its men, but Travers's two heavy guns at length 
effected a breach in a corner of the enclosure. The attack 
was ordered ; the 93rd Highlanders and the 4th Punjabees 
raced for the breach and entered it together; and the 
defenders, upwards of 2,000 men, a compact brigade of 
three complete regiments, were absolutely annihilated. 
Thus was the first important post held by the enemy 
stormed and secured — a post which formed practically the 
key to the passage of the canal on the right — no advance 
in the meantime being made on the left, only the bridge 
there being strongly held, as on the 15th. 

In the afternoon the advance on the right was continued 
from the Secundra Bagh, the next objects of attack being 
two posts called the Kuddum Kussool and the Shah 
Nujeef. The former was captured by the Punjabees. But 
the latter, which had massive walls forty feet high, with- 
stood all efforts to breach it the whole afternoon, and its 
fire kept playing havoc in Peel's Naval Brigade and Mid- 
dleton's Battery, which had been brought close up under 
its walls. At length, however, by a happy chance, the 
93rd, who explored round the building, found a small 
opening in its rear wall ; whereupon an entrance was 
effected and the position captured. 

No further movement was made that day, either to the 
front or to the left flank, which was still exposed to the 
fire from the (former) barracks (of the 32nd), from the 

s 



258 THE SECOND DEFENCE OF THE RESIDENCY 

Begum's Palace, and from other positions along the Huzrut- 
gunge road ; only a strong body of infantry bivouacked 
between these barracks and the Secundra Bagh. 

But in Outram's position, as has been already shown, the 
programme which had been arranged, for co-operation with 
Sir Colin, was carried out on the 16th; the front wall of 
the advanced garden was thrown down, the mines nearest 
the adjacent buildings were blown up, leading to their 
being forthwith captured and occupied ; and the batteries 
in the advanced garden opened out on the more distant 
buildings. 

The Motee Mahul was the only position which, on the 
night of the 16th, was left intervening between the relieving 
force and Outram's advanced posts. It was, however, 
strongly supported and protected by the old 32nd mess- 
house, of which the proper name was the Koorsheyd Munzil ; 
and the two had to be attacked and captured together. 

Next day, the 17th, Sir Colin's earlier operations were 
towards the left flank, in order to secure the whole of the 
open space ; and so the old 32nd barracks and Banks's 
house were attacked, captured, and occupied. After that 
the Koorsheyd Munzil, which was a strong position, and 
surrounded by a broad, deep ditch, was first subjected for 
many hours to the fire of Peel's ship guns. At three o'clock 
it was captured, along with a strong little post close to it 
called the Tara Kothee or Observatory. Then a simul- 
taneous move was made from the Koorsheyd Munzil on 
the one side, and Outram's position on the other, against 
the Motee Mahul, which was speedily occupied ; and the 
junction of the besieged with their relievers was effected. 
These operations had been attended with the loss, in killed 
and wounded, of 45 officers and 496 men. Outram had 
not been able to muster 2,000 bayonets. 

And then, on the following day, the old garrison heard 
that the position which they had so long and so resolutely 
held, was to be abandoned. 

Opposition to the measure was futile. The Chief had 
made up his mind, whether rightly or wrongly I do not 
propose to argue ; though I hope to be excused for suggest- 
ing that, in questions of military operations throughout this 
struggle, their political aspect, that is their effect on the 



RELIEF BY SIR COLIN CAMPBELL 259 

spirit of the enemy, was a point of nearly as great moment 
as their purely military or strategical bearing. And the 
enemy would now certainly think and feel, and proclaim 
that they had, at length, so mastered the British as to have 
driven them into evacuating and surrendering the recog- 
nized seat of their rule and power. However, on the 18th 
the fiat went forth; on the 19th the families moved out by 
twos and threes, in the daytime, along a lane which had 
been screened off from the enemy's fire, to the Secundra 
Bagh ; and then at night, in a continuous stream, to the 
Dil Koosha. 

By the 22nd everything, the treasure, the food, and all 
the guns that had not been destroyed, had been removed 
out of the Residency without the enemy's knowledge ; their 
attention having throughout been turned to the ceaseless 
artillery fire which was being poured on them ; on that 
night, the garrison evacuated the position they had held 
for six months, and the army concentrated on the Dil 
Koosha, and then on the Alum Bagh and its outlying 
posts, without any molestation from the enemy during the 
movement. There it halted from the 24th to the 27th. 
During this time Sir Colin was preparing partly for the 
move towards Cawnpore, and partly for the further 
measure on which he had resolved — the occupation in force 
of the Alum Bagh, as a position from which to keep 
the city of Lucknow in check, and proclaim that Oude 
was not evacuated, nor Lucknow finally surrendered. 
Outram was to remain in this position with a division of 
about 4,000 men, while the rest of the army, with its rear 
thus protected, moved on to Cawnpore. 

Thus was the old Residency position relieved, its garrison 
withdrawn, and the new position or force at the Alum 
Bagh, under Outram, substituted for it. 



BOOK V 

CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

CHAPTER I 

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS ON THE GANGES 

Sir Colin's first measure after relieving and evacuating 
the Residency was, as already stated, to place Outram in 
the Alum Bagh position, as it was thenceforward called, to 
keep Lucknow in check. He left with him for this purpose 
about 4,500 men ; 500 of whom, however, were to be 
detached to the Bunnee Bridge; the 4,500, of whom 3,400 
were English, consisting of 340 artillery, 370 cavalry, and 
the rest infantry. 

The apex or front of the position was the Alum Bagh 
enclosure (about two miles from the Char Bagh), from 
which it bent or curved back right and left, so as to form a 
sort of semicircle, with a radius of about two miles. Outram 
disliked the position on account of its being so close to the 
canal and the city that the enemy could attack him freely 
at their own convenience, while he would be unable to 
pursue and punish them properly after repulsing them. 
But Sir Colin adhered to the site, as its significance was 
obvious and must tell on the people of the province, 
especially with Outram in command. 

Having settled him there, Sir Colin's next step was to 
return to Cawnpore ; partly in order to take the Lucknow 
families there and send them down thence to Allahabad 
and Calcutta, partly to deal with the Gwalior Contingent, 
which had been so long threatening Cawnpore, and thus 
begin to clear the ground for his subsequent operations. 

On November 27th, therefore, he started from the Alum 
Bagh ; and next morning, on advancing from Bunnee, he 
became aware that the Gwalior Contingent had forestalled 






PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS ON THE GANGES 261 

him and attacked Windham at Cawnpore. Accordingly, 
taking the cavalry and horse artillery with him, and leaving 
the rest of the force to follow on with the convoy, he 
pressed forward to Cawnpore in great anxiety about the 
bridge. But he found it safe, crossed over, and joined 
Windham ; and having discussed the situation and settled 
on the immediate arrangements, he recrossed in the evening 
back to his camp, three miles on the north of the river, 
where his force and the convoy had just begun to arrive. 

Windham was indeed being hardly pressed, and to 
describe the situation properly the tale must go back to the 
time of Sir Colin's advance towards Lucknow. 

It has been shown that the Gwalior Contingent, a com- 
pact and well-disciplined body, amounting with other 
troops to some 10,000 men, with a strong force of artillery, 
about 38 guns, had been long hovering on the south of the 
Jumna. They had now come under the guidance of an 
able leader, Tantia Topee, who had resolved to make a 
dash at Cawnpore when it was left sufficiently weak and 
unsupported, and thus break in on the British line of com- 
munications. He waited patiently till Sir Colin and all the 
available troops were moving into Oude. Then he concen- 
trated at Kalpee, and leaving 3,000 men there with 20 guns 
as his rear-guard for the time, he crossed the Jumna on the 
9th (the day on which Sir Colin joined Hope Grant), with 
the rest of his force — 7,000 men and 18 guns ; and then, 
when Sir Colin was fully committed to the struggle at 
Lucknow, he moved forward to the north, forming a chain 
of posts across the Doab as he advanced, and reaching the 
Ganges at Sheorajpore some twenty miles above Cawn- 
pore. There he came into touch with the rebels in Oude, 
and was joined by some 4,000 of the Nana's followers, and 
apparently by other troops as well. Windham heard of all 
this, and was perplexed by the orders which he had 
received ; but this is a point into which I do not propose 
to enter. He had been loyally forwarding on to Sir Colin 
most of the reinforcements that had been arriving, and on 
the very day on which he felt constrained to make a move- 
ment to check the advance of the Gwalior army, he had 
sent out a small force to the Bunnee Bridge in support of 
Sir Colin. 



262 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCK NOW 

Windham had occupied a position on November 17th, 
on the western boundary of Cawnpore, to cover it in the 
direction of the enemy's probable advance ; but they were 
nearer him on the south than on the north, so he moved his 
outlying force on the 24th southward to a passage of the 
Ganges canal, about eight miles from Cawnpore ; where, on 
the 26th, he encountered and defeated the enemy's right 
column, about 3,000 strong, capturing three guns. 

By this time the Gwalior force had been joined by most 
of the men and guns which had been left at Kalpee ; and 
while they thus first attracted Windham's attention on their 
right, their real movement in force was on their left along 
the bank of the Ganges, their aim being the bridge across 
that river near the entrenchment. 

Windham's force, on defeating the enemy's right wing on 
the 26th, pursued them a short distance ; and then, after 
returning to the scene of action, continued its retirement 
still further up to its original camp in front of the city. 
During this movement the defeated enemy, and especially 
their cavalry, turned back from their flight and followed 
Windham up closely. Still he hoped that the punishment 
he had inflicted would delay the enemy's closer attack. 
But during the night of the 26th the centre and left of the 
rebel force advanced on Cawnpore on its northern or 
Ganges side, as their leader had planned ; and at noon on 
the 27th Windham found himself attacked along his whole 
front. The enemy had an overwhelming superiority in 
artillery, which they used to the utmost ; keeping their 
infantry in cover, and driving the British back by their 
converging artillery fire. By night they had forced Wind- 
ham back step by step to a line of posts only a quarter of 
a mile from his small entrenchment. 

Next day, the 28th, Windham had arranged his force of 
1,700 men thus : right wing under Carthew on the Ganges, 
left wing under Walpole on the canal, himself with the centre 
in support, and the 64th in reserve in the entrenchment. 

The enemy persistently attacked all day, but their chief 
efforts were against Carthew ; their great object, as already 
shown, being the bridge over the Ganges. Carthew's force 
was quite inadequate, and he had only two guns ; so that 
by the evening he was forced back into the entrenchments, 



PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS ON THE GANGES 263 

and with him the 64th, which had gone forward to his 
support. The enemy were now in dangerous proximity to 
the bridge, while Walpole had also fallen back on the en- 
trenchment. Such was the situation when Sir Colin arrived. 

Early on the following morning, the 29th, he lined the 
bank of the river with Peel's naval guns. Their fire and 
that from the guns in the entrenchment gradually mastered 
the enemy's fire from the ground near the river, which they 
had seized on the previous evening, and then the rebels 
retired, setting the buildings alight. On this Sir Colin's 
force and the convoy began crossing over from Oude ; and 
this passage did not end till the evening of the 30th, when 
the troops and the families were encamped on the plain on 
the Allahabad side of the canal, comparatively secure from 
molestation. 

The arrival of the leading troops of Sir Colin's force 
the Cavalry, Horse Artillery, and Hope's Brigade, had at 
once placed the contest on a more assured footing. 

From the 1st to the 5th there was some desultory 
fighting, but after the families had been despatched 
towards Allahabad on the evening of the 3rd, Sir Colin 
matured his plans on the two following days. 

An important feature in the topography of Cawnpore 
and of the contest was the Ganges canal ; a wide and 
deep artificial stream, which flowed down the district in a 
course more or less parallel to the Ganges, till, on nearing 
Cawnpore, it was only about four and a half miles from the 
river. Here it curved round in a quarter circle of that 
radius, debouching into the river at the entrenchment. It 
ran through the city near its lower (or south-east) end, 
cutting off a part of it called the General Gunge. Except 
in the immediate neighbourhood of the entrenchment, the 
enemy held all the ground between the canal and the 
river; while the British held the entrenchment, and the 
plain to the south-east of the canal. 

Sir Colin's plan was to separate the enemy inside the 
city and on the river face from those outside the city on 
the Kalpee side, i. e. between the city and the canal ; to 
hold the former in check while he attacked and defeated the 
latter ; and then to turn on the former and possibly capture 
that force. 



264 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

Windham occupied the entrenchment with a sufficient 
reserve ; the rest of the force — 5,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, 
and 36 guns — were employed for the action, and were 
drawn up under cover on the eastern or Allahabad side of 
the canal, facing it ; all the enemy, except on the right 
flank, being on the other side. The Infantry Brigades, 
from the right (nearest the entrenchment) to the left, were 
Greathed's, Walpole's, Hope's, and Inglis's. The plan was 
this : Windham was to start the battle by opening artillery 
fire from the entrenchment against the city, so as to draw 
the enemy's attention in that direction. Greathed's Brigade 
was to attack and occupy the General Gunge (the small part 
of the city that lay on the Allahabad side of the canal), 
hold the canal there, and prevent any attempt of the 
enemy to cross it. Walpole's Brigade was to dash across 
the canal, and advance skirting the southern face of the 
city, masking all its points of egress, and preventing the 
enemy inside the city from joining the enemy outside; 
while Hope's and Inglis's Brigades, with the cavalry, were 
to cross the canal to the left, and then sweep onward driving 
the enemy there before them. 

Windham began his cannonade about nine o'clock. 
Greathed carried out his part of the programme about 
eleven, and kept up a continuous fire from the position he 
had gained on the enemy in the city. Then Walpole 
charged across the canal, and, aided by the Artillery fire 
massed on the left, advanced and hemmed in the city, 
blocking its gates. Hope's and Inglis's Brigades following, 
with their movements screened by the dust of the cavalry, 
attacked the enemy on their side of the canal, drove them 
across, stormed the bridge (one of Peel's ship guns leading), 
and advanced rapidly, driving back the enemy (their right 
wing) along the whole open space between the city and the 
canal, which had here curved so as to become parallel to 
the city and the river. The advance became a continuous 
charge, especially when our men came in sight of the rebel 
camp. When they reached it, they had captured all the 
guns of the enemy, whose right wing was in full flight 
towards Kalpee. So Sir Colin, sending the Cavalry and 
Horse Artillery under Hope Grant in pursuit, ordered 
General Mansfield, his chief of the Staff, to turn to the 



PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS ON THE GANGES 265 

right and advance towards the river ; so as to attack the 
enemy's centre and left, cut off their retreat, and thus drive 
them into the river and destroy them. That body of the 
enemy under the fire from Windham's guns, and from 
Greathed's and Walpole's Brigades, seeing how their right 
wing was faring, had begun to withdraw from the city and 
retire along the Bithoor road. Here they should have 
been met and attacked by Mansfield at a position called 
the Soobahdar's Tank ; but, by some blundering, he failed 
to intercept their line of retreat, and so they streamed off 
towards Bithoor almost unscathed and unmolested. After 
such a complete victory over the right wing, it was a severe 
blow to Sir Colin that so large a body of the enemy should 
have thus escaped. However, on the 8th (after a complete 
day's rest) he sent off Hope Grant with a picked force in 
pursuit of them towards Sheorajpore. By the evening he 
came up with them just as they were attempting to cross 
the river, and defeated and routed them utterly, taking all 
their guns, and inflicting very heavy loss. 

The number of guns thus taken on the 6th and the 8th 
was thirty-two, and the total British loss was ninety-two 
killed and wounded. The success was complete. The 
enemy disappeared from the scene, never again to appear 
there. Sir Colin's communications were safe, and he was 
free to set about his further operations there. 

These further operations were practically unconnected 
with Oude, and will, therefore, only be lightly touched on. 
His present aim was to clear the districts lying westward 
between the Ganges and the Jumna, and this he effected 
by the use of three columns. One moved under Walpole 
from Cawnpore on December 18th, first towards Kalpee, 
and then up the left bank of the Jumna to Mynpoorie 
and Bewur. Practically it did not encounter any enemy. 
The second column came southwards from Delhi under 
Seaton. It left on December 9th, about 2,000 strong, 
gained two victories on the road, and joined Walpole at 
Bewur on January 3rd. The third column, under Sir 
Colin's personal command, marched against Futtehgurh 
and Furruckabad on the Ganges opposite the boundary 
of Rohilkund and Oude. It left Cawnpore on December 
24th ; when nearing Futtehgurh it encountered the enemy 



266 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

(troops of the Nuwab of Furruckabad) at the Kalee 
Nuddee, and routed them completely, driving them across 
the Ganges into Rohilkund. Next day, January 3rd, Sir 
Colin seized the fortress of Futtehgurh, where he was 
joined by Seaton and Walpole ; which made the troops 
now with him amount to 10,000 men. 

By this time other troops were gradually coming up- 
country, and fresh levies were being raised and trained in 
the Punjab ; so that Sir Colin could rely on soon having 
a very large army at his command, both for overawing and 
reducing the various districts into submission, and also for 
carrying out any special enterprises. What his first 
enterprise should be was the point now in question. He 
was for clearing Rohilkund, and had addressed Lord 
Canning to that effect on December 22nd. To this the 
Governor-General had replied at great length on the 29th, 
showing that, in his opinion, Oude should be first dealt 
with and Lucknow taken. This decision he now confirmed 
in his letters of January 7th and 8th, after considering Sir 
Colin's arguments. 

From this date Sir Colin's task was the concentration 
of troops for the attack and capture of Lucknow. His 
anxiety was still excessive ; though nothing else, nothing 
that he dwelt on, approached to one quarter of the risk 
that he imposed on Outram, in requiring him to hold on 
at the Alum Bagh with 4,000 men, when he knew from 
authentic sources that 95,000 hostile troops were con- 
centrated in Lucknow, by whom he might be attacked at 
any moment, as also perhaps by the Talookdars of Oude. 

The forces that Sir Colin hoped to have at his disposal 
were — 

I. Those that were already with him on the Doab. 

II. The additional troops still due from Calcutta. 

III. The siege-train from Agra and the troops with 
it. 

IV. A column from the Punjab promised him by Sir 
John Lawrence, which should advance from Roorkee 
through Rohilkund. 

V. Outram's force at the Alum Bagh. 

VI. A division under General Franks which was holding 
the eastern frontier of Oude. 






PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS ON THE GANGES 267 

VII. A Nepaulese army under Jung Bahadur which was 
also approaching from the east. 

For some time there was discussion and correspondence 
respecting the mode and direction of the attack. Before 
this, when Sir Colin's plans had been to clear Rohilkund 
first of all, it had been urged that the troops should then 
converge on Lucknow, and that the enemy should be 
hemmed in ; and Napier had included an attack on its 
west in his scheme. But now that Rohilkund was to be 
left in the enemy's possession, it was decided that, instead 
of attacking Lucknow on the west, there should be an 
outlet left on that side, by which they might try to escape, 
to be then caught by the cavalry in the open ; while the 
south face should be blocked, the north be taken in flank 
and turned, and the direct attack be made from the east. 

All this time the enemy in the city were being carefully 
watched, and Outram knew fully of their proceedings ; 
including the construction of massive lines of defence 
against the British attack, which they expected from the 
eastward. All their former leaders, mentioned in the early 
days of the first defence, were still ruling and holding court. 
They had been collecting all the troops they could. There 
were more than 30,000 mutineers of our old regiments, and 
60,000 of the old Oude troops or Nujeebs, besides the 
Rajwara contingents — that is Talookdars' retainers — whom 
they had summoned in from throughout the province. 

Meanwhile, these Talookdars, though they had sent their 
contingents to Lucknow by the Durbar's orders, ever since 
Havelock had recrossed to Cawnpore in August, had not, 
any more than before, taken personally any active part or 
shown hostility against us. 

It will be remembered how, after being previously hostile 
to us up to March 1857, they had been pacified, and became 
friendly, under Sir Henry Lawrence's control ; how they 
had helped us with provisions for storage against the siege ; 
how they had protected the residents of out-stations and 
assisted them into security ; what names there were among 
them that should be held in honour by our countrymen for 
their kindly aid — as Hurdeo Buksh, Morarmow and other 
Byswara chiefs, Hunwunt Singh of Dharoopore, Rustoom 
Sah of Dehra, and rajahs such as those of Amethee and 



268 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

Bulrampore. It has been shown how they had remained 
absolutely passive until Havelock had recrossed to Cawn- 
pore ; and that they had then been obliged to acknowledge 
the rule of the rebel Durbar, and to send contingents of 
their followers to the arm)- at Lucknow, but had not 
themselves joined personally against us. 

Yet the friendliness which all this really indicated had 
never been recognized, still less taken advantage of. They 
were still remaining passive ; though their contingents were 
at Lucknow, and had fought well against us when they 
had been required to fight ; better, it was said, than the 
regular Sepoys. But they were either under no special 
command, or under the command of the Brahmin Maun 
Singh, the craftiest of Amils, one of the most detested of 
the oppressors of the Rajpoot Talookdars and peasantry. 
This was not pleasant either to these contingents or to the 
chiefs. Unassisted and unguided, they were practically 
powerless ; and they, and the province generally, were domin- 
ated and terrorized by the huge Sepoy army at Lucknow. 

Still the power of these Talookdars was really very great, 
as was proved by the trouble they afterwards gave us when 
they really turned against us ; and, considering the friend- 
liness that they had evinced, it is reasonable to suggest that 
skilful negotiations through well-selected agents might have 
ranged those men and their clans on our side. 

As it was, they were ever reckoned in the weight against 
us. The tendency was to treat them, without thought, 
as enemies. Hunwunt Singh's fort of Kalakunkur was 
fired at. from our river steamer ; and it was seldom that 
they were spoken of save as unmitigated scoundrels and 
ruffians. Anyhow the Rajpoot chiefs were not enlisted in our 
favour. And hence the Lucknow rebel Government were able 
to distribute these Talookdaree troops among such command- 
ers as they chose to elect — to the Moulvie, to Maun Singh, 
to Mahomed Hoossein, to Mehndee Hussun, and the like. 

At this stage, when Sir Colin is preparing his combina- 
tions for penetrating into Oude and attacking Lucknow in 
force, let us turn to the defence of the new position at the 
Alum Bagh, which Outram had been required to under- 
take, with 4,000 men, against all . the efforts of the enemy, 
more than 90,000 strong, only two miles off. 



CHAPTER II 

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS IN OUDE 

OUTRAM had been left at the Alum Bagh on November 
27th with a force, including 500 detached to the Bunnee 
Bridge, of about 4,400 men, of whom 1,000 were natives. 
The object with which this force was thus left in the imme- 
diate neighbourhood of Lucknow was, in Outram's own 
words, to retain a military footing in Oude, to maintain the 
honour of the British arms, and to represent the authority 
of the British Government in the province. Sir Colin con- 
sidered it desirable, both on political and strategic grounds, 
that the position should be in close proximity to Lucknow. 
It was within a mile and a half of its suburbs, and its 
advanced post was within gunshot range of the outworks 
of the city ; which swarmed with the concentrated strength of 
the rebel force of the Upper Provinces, amounting, accord- 
ing to a careful estimate prepared in January, to 95,000 
men, exclusive of the Rajwara troops actually present. 

The Alum Bagh enclosure, fortified, as he had directed 
while in the Residency, was the post that formed the chief 
defence of Outram's right front, which was nearest the enemy. 
The old and tumble-down fort of Jellalabad protected his 
right flank; extemporized field-works guarded his left 
front and left. His force was encamped in the open across 
the Cawnpore road, with defensive works thrown up on 
the alignments between those posts. 

As has been already noted, Outram objected to the 
position, and proposed to be allowed to move more to the 
rear. This was in the early days of the defence during 
December, when Sir Colin's views were that Lucknow 
should not be attacked till the very last, till Rohilkund and 
all the neighbouring districts had been conquered and 
cleared — not, in short, for another ten or twelve months. 

Outram held that the close proximity to Lucknow was 



270 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

objectionable for these reasons — the enemy were able to 
attack and worry him whenever they chose without his 
having a chance of retaliating, and pursuing and punishing 
them in return. His position was cramped and liable to 
surprise, and consequently required a stronger force to 
hold it securely, and also to maintain his more lengthened 
communication with Cawnpore. Further, to remain in the 
vicinity of Lucknow without making any effort to take it 
was liable, in his opinion, to be interpreted as a declaration 
of weakness. He held that, so long as he remained on the 
soil of Oude, a position nearer Cawnpore was preferable for 
these military reasons, without being open to any objection 
on political grounds ; for it was immaterial what particular 
spot he occupied as a proof that we were not deserting 
Oude, while it would be futile to attempt to move troops 
about or re-establish any civil Government so long as we 
were not in possession of the capital. 

But Sir Colin slighted his objections ; and after he had 
defeated the Gwalior Contingent, went so far as to propose 
that the 4,000 men at the Alum Bagh should be reduced by 
600 infantry, half of the cavalry, and Olpherts's Battery. But 
Outram's strong remonstrance prevented this being carried 
out. Still this proposal is an instance of the singular contrast 
between Sir Colin's estimate of the difficulties Outram had 
to face, and of those that had to be met by himself and others 
elsewhere. For nowhere else was there, during all these 
months, any hostile force, or group of forces, of which the 
strength was not insignificant compared to the rebel army, 
of which the focus was at Lucknow, and which might attack 
Outram any day in full force. What, for instance, com- 
pared to it was the Rohilkund gathering, to meet which Sir 
Colin had collected 10,000 men at Futtehgurh ? 

For three months Outram occupied this position. During 
that period the enemy attacked him, and he defeated them, 
on six separate occasions — December 22nd, January 12th, 
1 6th, February 15th, 21st, 25th. For dealing beyond his 
lines with such attacks he had only about 2,000 men avail- 
able, with one horsed battery ; for of his full complement of 
4,000, 600 had to garrison the Alum Bagh and Jellalabad 
posts, 400 were absent on convoy, and 1,000 were absorbed 
by brigade and camp requirements or were in hospital. 



OUTRAM AT THE ALUM BAGH 271 

The first attack on him was on December 22nd, when he 
had been left nearly a month without serious molestation. 
The enemy at Lucknow had, at first, been cowed by the 
handling and losses at Sir Colin's hands ; but they had 
gradually recovered their spirits on hearing of the occasional 
successes, duly magnified, of the rebel troops at Cawnpore, 
and their impunity elsewhere ; and also from the accession 
to their strength of the troops that had escaped over into 
Oude after December 8th. The rebels had succeeded 
thoroughly in establishing a blockade of the Alum Bagh as 
regards supplies, and nothing was to be obtained except from 
Cawnpore under convoy escort. At length, on December 
20th and 2 1st, Outram was informed by his spies that the 
enemy meant to circle round his right flank and intercept 
his communications ; and that they numbered 4,000 infantry 
and 400 cavalry, with four guns. So he moved out against 
them on the early morning of the 22nd with some 1,200 
infantry, 200 cavalry, and six guns. Attacking their rear 
about a mile from the canal, he at once defeated it, inflicting 
considerable loss, and capturing four guns ; when their 
main body, fearing to have their retreat intercepted, with- 
drew by a wide detour to the Dil Koosha. This was a 
cheering success, and gave good augury for the future. 

The second attack was made three weeks afterwards, on 
January 12th, with the object of enveloping his position and 
assailing him all round ; and the foe therefore came out in 
force, some 30,000 men. One of their commanders, Mausoob 
AH, had been threatening the convoys between Alum Bagh 
and Cawnpore, and Outram had therefore been obliged (as 
was probably the enemy's intention) to detach a large 
escort, and weaken his own position more than usual. So, 
when the attack came off, after providing for the several 
posts and pickets, he had available for movements in the 
field only some 1,500 infantry and Olpherts's battery, with 
the Military Train as cavalry in support. 

The enemy first attacked on the left, and were allowed 
to come sufficiently near ; when they were met by such a fire 
from the guns in position that they fled precipitately, while 
Olpherts's guns and the cavalry drove off those who had 
been trying to get at their left rear. While this was going 
on the enemy attacked the right in great force, chiefly 



272 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCK NOW 

infantry. But the right brigade turned their flank and 
drove them northwards, bringing them under the fire of 
the Alum Bagh post guns. They made fresh efforts, 
however, both on the left and the right, but were again 
repulsed ; and after a fifth effort at the Alum Bagh post, 
where they were heavily punished by both artillery and 
rifle fire, they withdrew, disappearing about four o'clock 
into the shelter of their own works. Our loss was trifling. 

A third attack, similar to that of the 12th, was made 
four days later. The enemy were in fewer numbers, but 
they advanced more boldly, and were therefore more heavily 
punished. Again our loss was insignificant — one man 
killed and seven wounded. 

After a skirmish on February 15th, in which the Moulvie 
was wounded, they made a vigorous attack on the left and 
centre of the position, and eventually on the Alum Bagh 
post ; keeping up their fire till late in the evening, though 
they lost considerably, chiefly from our artillery fire. This 
I call the fourth attack. 

By this time the enemy appear to have obtained better 
knowledge of the ground around Outram's position, and to 
have taken advantage of the surrounding groves and other 
cover to construct trenches, and to arrange for means of 
collecting in force ; which of course enabled them to make 
much more sudden and heavy attacks than when they had 
first to traverse the outlying ground beyond. 

So, on February 21st, they made their fifth attack, the 
signs by this time growing strong and clear that they 
would not have many more such opportunities ; as the 
British advance was beginning, both from the east and 
from Cawnpore. The attack this time was in front and 
on both flanks, with efforts to turn the rear. The frontal 
attacks were, as heretofore, steadily met and repulsed by 
artillery and rifle fire ; while the turning movements were 
encountered on the Jellalabad side by the Volunteers and 
Native Cavalry, and on the left by the Military Train. It 
was estimated that the enemy's loss was heavier than on 
any of the previous attacks. 

Up to now the reinforcement that had from time to time 
joined Outram, had amounted to 2,400 men, less the 75th 
regiment, which had returned. And now there arrived, 



CONCENTRATION FROM THE EAST 273 

as the pioneers of the army for the siege of Lucknow, the 
1st Bengal Fusiliers, Hodson's Horse, two squadrons of 
Hussars, and Remington's troop of Horse Artillery. It 
was when Outram had received these additions to his force 
that the enemy made their last attack on him on February 
25th. This time they were in great strength. The trenches 
in front were held in great force. There were large masses 
of infantry and cavalry, with several guns on the left, and 
on the right there were thirty regiments of infantry, one 
thousand cavalry, and eight guns. 

The attack on the left was soon repulsed ; that on the 
right was shrewdly dealt with under Outram's personal 
guidance. A strong body of cavalry was sent out from the 
right rear to sweep round and get on the enemy's rear. 
Another force of cavalry moved forward on the right front, 
flanked by infantry, to intercept the mutineer column from 
the canal ; and then the main force advanced against that 
column and began driving it back. The enemy now saw 
the danger on their flanks and rear, and began a rapid 
retreat ; but too late, for our two turning bodies of cavalry 
came down on their flanks, the Military Train charged into 
their rear, and there was a great rout. The city reports 
laid their loss at from 400 to 500 men. 

Such was the last of the attacks. The thought inevitably 
arises, that the enemy's conduct in connection with the 
Alum Bagh, whether before Sir Colin's relief or during the 
following January and February, cannot be held to have 
evinced the skill and prowess demanding huge forces and 
elaborate precautions to deal with them. Battalions were 
now required by the Chief instead of companies ; whereas 
the enemy themselves seem to have been affected less by 
numbers than by energy in action, and by boldness and 
promptitude in attack. 

I now turn to the other forces concentrating for the siege. 
Besides Outram's, I mentioned six columns or groups — two 
from the eastward, three with Sir Colin, and one from 
Roorkee. This last column did not after all join for the 
fray at this period. The districts in its own neighbourhood 
were held to be in too unsettled a state ; but possibly a 
part of the troops meant for that column may have come 
round by Agra instead with the siege-train, which started 

T 



274 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

thence for Cawnpore on January 22nd. This siege-train 
convoy, the force he had with him at the Kalee Nuddee, 
and the additional troops streaming up from Calcutta, were 
the three columns which were quoted as being with Sir 
Colin ; and they moved into Oude by degrees from Cawn- 
pore, as the time for action approached, without any 
conflicts. 

The columns that were to penetrate Oude from the 
Benares districts were two : one under General Franks ; the 
other a body of Nepaulese troops under the famed Jung 
Bahadur. 

General Franks's field force consisted of three British 
regiments, the 10th, 20th, and 97th, six battalions of Ne- 
paulese under their General, Pulwan Singh, two field bat- 
teries, and some other guns, but only some thirty or forty 
cavalry. He had been keeping clear the districts on the 
eastern frontier of Oude, and had had some small affairs 
latterly at Nusrutpore and Soraon ; but at length he was 
ordered to enter Oude by the Sultanpore road on February 
19th. The enemy that had been waiting near the borders of 
Oude to confront him were under the ex-Amil, Mehndee 
Hussun, with about 10,000 men ; while another body of 8,000 
men, under his Lieutenant Bunda Hussun, were in advance 
at Chanda, nearer the frontier. Except some 2,500 dis- 
ciplined Sepoys, these men were all Rajwara troops, chiefly 
matchlockmen, with no heart for the contest while under 
the leading of Mahomedan court officials. Their artillery 
was very miscellaneous, and drawn by bullocks. 

Franks encountered the Chanda force early on the 19th, 
defeated them easily, and then advanced and changed 
front to the left, from which direction he heard that 
Mehndee Hussun was advancing. Him also, when he 
appeared on his flank in the dusk of the evening, he 
defeated with the same ease, and then bivouacked for the 
night. The want of cavalry prevented full or even a fair 
advantage being taken of this success. But practically 
there had been no serious conflict or struggle at all on this 
the first day of the advance. 

Two marches ahead, however, there was a difficult ravine 
to be forced at a pass guarded by the Fort of Budayan. 
This was susceptible of defence, and might occasion serious 



CONCENTRATION FROM THE EAST 275 

loss ; so Franks tricked the enemy. Making arrangements 
openly as if for a halt half way, he instead marched the 
whole distance in one day, and crossed the ravine, reaching 
and seizing the fort just in time to anticipate the enemy's 
force. Holding the fort securely, he brought up the rest of 
his force, and the rear-guard, and halted his men during all 
the 22nd to rest and refresh them for the next day's 
impending battle at Sultanpore ; hoping also that those 
bodies of cavalry which he knew were pressing on from 
the rear to join him, might arrive in time to be used in the 
combat. These were the Lahore Light Horse, Vivian's 
Puthan cavalry, and Aikman's Jullundur Levy ; but, as will 
be seen, they were just a few hours too late for the fray. 

The Sultanpore action was skilfully managed. The 
whole force of the enemy, re-assembled from the recent 
fights and joined by fresh arrivals from Lucknow, were now 
under the command of Guffoor Beg, an artillery general 
of the late Government. The road by which Franks was 
to advance crossed a nullah or ravine on the confines of 
Sultanpore. It was deep and easy of defence where 
crossed by the road. It was very deep, and broken into 
a series of ravines a mile more to our right as it neared 
the Goomtee ; but to the left it was much narrower and 
shallower, whilst it was lined by groves of trees at intervals 
throughout. Franks adopted the same manoeuvre as 
Havelock had done at the battle of Cawnpore. He halted 
part of his force before reaching the ravine, and sent 
forward some skirmishers and his horsemen to its bank to 
raise a dust, conceal his movements, and distract and draw 
the fire of the enemy. Then he took a strong force with 
a large party of picked skirmishers round by the left, and 
crossing the ravine where it was shallow and where they 
were screened by the groves, he turned to the right, and 
moved down on the flank of the enemy drawn up in line 
defending the ravine. As he emerged from the groves 
he deployed his line, but sent his skirmishers well ahead 
at the enemy to do the fighting. Struggle there was none. 
Under the fire from the front and flank and -rear, flight 
began at once, commencing with a horsed battery which 
had been on their extreme right. Soon the plain was 
covered with fugitives, flying either towards Lucknow or 



276 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

towards the river. The slaughter from our artillery and 
rifle fire was nothing to what it would have been had our 
cavalry arrived. But as it was, Franks utterly dispersed 
the enemy and took thirty-four guns ; as many, he laughingly 
boasted, as had been taken at the siege of Moultan. 

His whole loss in the three actions he had fought was 
only two killed and sixteen wounded. The secret of this 
lay in the formation of his fighting force being not in line 
but in open skirmishing order. 

The road was now clear, and he was joined in a few 
hours by the much-longed-for cavalry, of whom a party 
were forthwith sent in pursuit. And now Franks received 
orders to advance to Selimpore, a march short of Luck- 
now, by the " 29th inst." — a curious slip, as it was the 
month of February, and there would be no 29th inst. This 
he easily did without further fighting, and then, on being 
summoned forward, he joined the army near the Dil 
Koosha on March 4th, having on the way attacked and 
captured the guns in the fortified village of Dhorwara. 

This successful march, if the enemy's forces are properly 
considered in detail, as well as their leaders and the re- 
sistance they made, points to some significant conclusions. 
It is quite certain that the bulk of the enemy consisted 
of matchlockmen, Rajwara or Talookdaree troops, and 
that they did not fight well ; in fact hardly fought at all, 
except when forced to stand at bay. Moreover, during the 
whole of this period, not one of their leaders was of their 
own race, Hindoo Rajpoots ; they were all Mahomedans 
and ex-officials of the Lucknow court — such as Mehndu 
Hussun, Bunda Hussun, Guffoor Beg, Fuzl Azim, Mahomed 
Hoosseyn, and so forth. In fact, the conduct of the Rajwara 
men under these circumstances — very different from what 
it was on other occasions when led by their own chiefs — 
seems to point irresistibly to the conclusion that their 
chiefs held aloof from these hostilities, and that the men 
were in their hearts with their chiefs, and joined grudgingly 
in the fighting. 

But this march of General Franks, besides being im- 
portant in itself, was valuable from its clearing the way for 
Jung Bahadur's army following in its rear. 

Jung Bahadur had, early in the winter months, sent down 



CONCENTRATION FROM THE EAST 277 

in advance various bodies of Nepaulese, which had been of 
material help in clearing the Goruckpore and Azimgurh 
districts, and had latterly detached six battalions to form 
part of Franks's force. He had followed himself, with ad- 
ditional troops, at the end of December, and now crossed 
the Ganges into Oude on February 25th with some 9,000 
men. He first attacked and captured the fort of Ambar- 
pore, and then marched forward steadily to Lucknow, his 
progress being undisturbed by the enemy, of whom Franks 
had cleared the road. But he did not reach the camp at 
Lucknow and take part in the operations there till March 
nth, four days after the siege had begun in full vigour. 

Practically, when the troops that Sir Colin had sent 
forward from Cawnpore to the Alum Bagh had collected 
there by the end of February, and Franks had joined on 
March 4th, they, with Outram's force which had been 
holding the Alum Bagh, began operations on March 5th. 



CHAPTER III 

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF THE CITY 

THE city of Lucknow, 1 which the enemy now held in 
force, and which Sir Colin was about to attack, had been 
prepared strongly for defence according to the enemy's 
lights. Putting aside the idea of any attack from the west- 
ward of the Cawnpore road, they had protected the city 
along the canal face from the Char Bagh eastwards round 
to the Goomtee ; and also for a mile or so, as a flanking 
defence, to the west of the Char Bagh. Along that part of 
the canal to the east which was bordered by dense city — 
that is up to Banks's house — the defences were a line of 
parapet with occasional batteries, and barricades at the out- 
lets of roads and streets ; but from Banks's house to the 
river there was a line of massive earthwork ramparts, with 
bastions and batteries at close intervals. This was their 
first or outer line of defence. 

The portion between Banks's house and the river was 
almost a straight line, with only a slight curve outwards 
towards the Dil Koosha. Behind that line, it will be 
remembered, lay the broad plain narrowing to the west, 
by which both Havelock and Sir Colin had advanced to 
the relief of the Residency ; a plain bordered on the north 
by the Goomtee, and on the south by the long street be- 
ginning with the Huzrutgunge at the Begum's house, and 
then skirting a series of palatial buildings ending with the 
Kaiser Bagh. Over this plain were dotted the several 
enclosures and buildings that had given so much trouble to 
the relieving forces — such as the Barracks, the Secundra 
Bagh, the Shah Nujeef, the mess-house or Koorsheyd 
Manzil, the Motee Mahul, and others. 

The second line of defensive ramparts which the enemy 
had constructed started from the Emambarah, one of the 

1 See Map V. 



THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF THE CITY 279 

palatial buildings above referred to, connecting it with the 
mess-house, and then went on to the Motee Mahul and the 
river. 

The third line, at right angles to the other two, merely 
covered, at a close distance, the entire front of the Kaiser 
Bagh. 

They had not constructed any defences on the north 
side of the Goomtee, but had contented themselves with 
occupying it with a considerable body of troops, chiefly 
cavalry. 

The numbers of the enemy were believed to be much the 
same as had been there during Outram's occupation of the 
Alum Bagh position ; but all the Sepoy troops had been 
called in from the outlying districts, and the Rajwara troops 
had been withdrawn and sent there to take their place. 
The enemy had, as I have said, made up their minds that 
Sir Colin would attack them on the eastern portion of the 
canal ; and Sir Colin proposed, while gratifying them so far, 
to attack that position not only on its front but also on its 
flank, from the north. His dispositions and arrangements 
were these — 

His force on March 2nd was about 19,000 men and 120 
guns. Franks's column was due in a couple of days, and 
Jung Bahadur's a week later ; and these two would bring 
the total strength up to 31,000 men and 164 guns. 

At first his force was in three divisions — 

Outram's at the Alum Bagh ; behind it, echeloned on the 
Cawnpore road, LugarcTs ; and then Walpoles, with which 
was the siege-train. The cavalry were under Hope Grant and 
Brigadier Campbell. Sir Colin re-arranged this. He pro- 
posed to place under Outram part of his own division, and 
all Walpole's division, with Hope Grant's cavalry ; and to 
leave the rest of Outram's division as a brigade under 
Franklin at the Alum Bagh. The new disposition he 
arrived at was to send Outram's force, thus organized, across 
to the north side of the Goomtee ; to place Lugard's 
division opposite the Dil Koosha portion of the canal ; to 
leave Hodson's Horse as a connecting link between it and 
the Alum Bagh ; and to give to Brigadier Campbell and his 
cavalry the task of holding the ground to the west of the 
Char Bagh and Alum Bagh. Franks's column, on arrival, 



280 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

was to form up, at first in support, and afterwards on the 
left, of Lugard ; and Jung Bahadur was to come into line 
on the left of Franks, so filling up the gap to the Alum 
Bagh. 

Sir Colin began operations on March 2nd, by moving out 
from the rear of the Alum Bagh position to the right, and 
circling by a wide detour round Jellalabad towards the 
Dil Koosha. The force he took was Hope Grant's cavalry, 
a strong body of artillery, and Lugard's division. It drove 
in the enemy's outlying pickets and advanced to the Dil 
Koosha plateau ; which was found to be under very powerful 
and accurate fire from the enemy's batteries, along the front 
line of defence, especially at the passage of the canal by the 
Dil Koosha road. He therefore moved the column some- 
what to the rear, to be more secure from the fire, but seized 
the two posts of the Dil Koosha Palace, and the Mahomed 
Bagh ; where, in order to reply effectually to the enemy's 
guns, he proceeded to construct two powerful counter- 
batteries. These opened fire next day, and silenced the 
enemy's guns, causing them to be withdrawn. On the 
4th, Walpole's division, with the rest of the siege-train, 
moved over from the Alum Bagh, and all encamped on the 
Dil Koosha position, where, at dusk, Franks's column also 
marched in and joined. 

That same evening, two bridges were begun from the 
Dil Koosha position across the Goomtee, on a stretch of 
that erratic river, that ran eastwards, near the village of 
Beebiapore. By next morning, the 5th, one of them was 
finished ; a strong picket was then thrown across, and a 
defensive bridge-head begun at once. On the night of the 
5th the bridges and the necessary arrangements were com- 
pleted, and the whole of Outram's force had crossed over 
by daybreak. Until that force had advanced sufficiently 
in its turning movement, that is until the 9th, Sir Colin's 
troops at the Dil Koosha remained inactive, not even 
attacking the Martiniere, which continued to worry them 
with its fire ; but Franks's column moved up and replaced 
Walpole's division on Lugard's left. 

Outram's column, after crossing the Goomtee, moved in 
a northerly direction towards Chinhut, and on striking the 
Fyzabad road, turned to the left. On reaching Ishmael- 



THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF THE CITY 281 

gunge (the actual site of the battle of June 30th, with which 
the siege of the Residency began), a body of the enemy's 
cavalry were seen in the front, and our cavalry were sent 
at them. The enemy fled and were followed up, and the 
pursuit brought our cavalry into broken ground close to 
the enemy's infantry posts. This necessarily checked them 
and caused some loss, especially to the leading regiment, 
the Queen's Bays, whose Major, Percy Smyth, was killed. 
There was a spice of romance about this charge of the 
Bays ; for it was the first occasion on which that regiment 
had ever been in action, and the men were eager to be the 
first to get it its baptism of fire. They had been at 
Nusrutpore with Franks, but no real fighting occurred on 
that occasion. After the enemy had been driven off, the 
column encamped for the night at Ishmaelgunge. 

Here Outram was still considerably short of the distance 
he had to advance in order to turn the enemy's first line of 
defences ; while they were holding, to protect its flank and 
rear, a small post called the Chukkur Kothi (race-stand) 
on his left front near the river ; which had to be taken to 
admit of his turning operations being properly effected. 

Outram's camp halted at Ishmaelgunge during the 7th 
and 8th. On the morning of the 7th he was attacked in 
force, but defeated and drove off the enemy ; and the rest 
of the time was spent in clearing the ground and advancing 
his pickets, which entailed constant skirmishing. On the 
evening of the 8th he received his heavy siege-guns 
(twenty-two), and sent back to Sir Colin one of his Horse 
Artillery Batteries, and the 9th Lancers. At the same 
time he began, and during the night completed, two 
powerful batteries ; one on his extreme left for his principal 
objective, i. e. to enfilade the enemy's line of defence, and 
take the Martiniere in rear ; the other to batter the Chukkur 
Kothi, and assist his own advance up the left bank of the 
Goomtee. 

Next morning, the 9th, the ball opened, the enfilade fire 
began, and Outram attacked and captured the Chukkur 
Kothi ; he personally leading half his force in a frontal 
attack, while Walpole with the other half worked round to 
its flank and rear. 

It was taken with but slight loss, and then the whole 



282 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

combined column advanced up the left bank of the river 
till it seized and held the Badshah Bagh ; and was able, 
from the position it occupied, to sweep the flank and rear 
of such of the enemy on the other side as might try to hold 
both the first and the second line of the defences, up to the 
Kaiser Bagh Palace itself. Meanwhile, his battery on his 
extreme left which had, since the morning, been enfilading 
the enemy's first line of defences, had driven the occupants 
from its northern end ; and a gallant feat was now per- 
formed by Butler of the ist Fusiliers, who swam the Goom- 
tee, climbed the enemy's parapet, and there signalled to 
Adrian Hope, who was leading Sir Colin's attack, to show 
that these works had been evacuated by the enemy. 

The time had now come for Sir Colin, after about five 
days of inaction, to make a move and deliver his frontal 
attack ; of which the aim was to storm the enemy's line of 
defence, and then to capture the great row of palaces along 
the Huzrutgunge, and the posts between them and the 
river. The troops he used for this purpose were Lugard's 
division and Franks's, which had stepped into the line 
before held by Walpole's. At first Lugard led, and Franks 
was in support. 

The first move was against the Martiniere, which was in 
advance of the first line of defence. Sir Colin had opened 
a very heavy fire on it from the Dil Koosha early that 
morning, the 9th, but waited, before making his advance, 
for the signal agreed on to show the capture by Outram 
of the Chukkur Kothi — the hoisting of the British flag on 
its roof. At two o'clock the signal was seen, and Hope's 
Brigade, supported by the rest of Lugard's division, im- 
mediately advanced and captured the Martiniere without 
any real contest ; the enemy flying at once, mostly across 
the river. Hope's Brigade continued the advance towards 
the right front, saw Butler's signaling, crossed over the 
enemy's earthworks at the river end, and then, turning to 
the left, swept down to the other end, near Banks's house ; 
the rest of the attacking force crossing the line of entrench- 
ments about its centre. They halted for the night about 
the positions near the Dil Koosha road bridge, and thus 
closed the operations of the 9th March. 

On the 10th Sir Colin attacked on the left and captured 






THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF THE CITY 283 

Banks's house, and the first of the houses and enclosures 
in the long line of palatial buildings along the Huzrut- 
gunge, thus securing the basis of his further advance on 
that line. Outram, on the north of the Goomtee, was 
attacked by the enemy, whom he defeated and drove off 
as usual ; and then, while using his cavalry to patrol and 
clear the ground to his west and north, constructed gun 
and mortar batteries against the posts which lay in the 
line of Sir Colin's attack, thus fully and effectually carrying 
out his role of flanking and furthering the main advance 
and struggle under Sir Colin. 

On the nth marked and important progress was made. 
Batteries had been constructed and guns placed in posi- 
tion at Banks's house ; and in the morning they opened a 
powerful fire on the Begum's Palace, the first of the strong 
positions along the Huzrutgunge. While this was going 
on, Lugard advanced on the right against the detached 
posts, seizing, without opposition, first the Secundra Bagh, 
and then the Kuddum Russool and the Shah Nujeef, 
the scenes of the conflict of November 16th. The latter 
were specially important posts, from their close proximity 
to the enemy's second line of defences ; and their seizure 
was due to the enterprise of two engineers, Medley and 
Lang, who, reconnoitring for themselves, found them 
empty, caused supports to come forward and secure them, 
and then threw up defences and works against the next 
forward movement. 

By the afternoon the batteries at Banks's house had 
breached the Begum's Palace, and it was accordingly 
stormed, Hope's Brigade leading. The contest was severe, 
as the enemy were more resolute than usual, while the 
position consisted of several strong buildings and enclosures 
which were held in force, bravely defended, and had to 
be attacked one after the other. The 93rd Highlanders 
and the 4th Punjabees working together as if one regiment, 
gained on the enemy inch by inch ; and when at last they 
had expelled them, there were 600 Sepoys' corpses left 
within the walls. This struggle was marked by the death 
of the famed Hodson, an ideal leader of cavalry, whose 
services, whatever his faults, real or alleged, had been 
simply invaluable throughout the war. 



284 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

Whilst Sir Colin's troops had thus been gaining ground 
on the south of the Goomtee, Outram had been operating 
up the left bank. He advanced up to the road running 
from the iron bridge to the cantonment, in two columns ; the 
left under Colonel Pratt skirting the river, the right under 
Walpole proceeding by the Fyzabad road, with the cavalry 
under Hope Grant sweeping the flank up to the canton- 
ment ; the two columns being connected by a line of skir- 
mishers, which, as well as the left column itself, met with 
considerable opposition. On reaching the iron bridge 
steps were taken to seize and secure its northern end, in 
the course of which that most able officer, Lieutenant 
Moorsom of the Quartermaster-General's department, was 
killed, to the general regret, and Outram's special loss. 

The right column with the cavalry then continued the 
advance, reconnoitring through the crowded suburb up to 
the stone bridge, surprising on its way the camp of the 
15th Cavalry and the Sandeela Contingent; but as the 
defences and posts at the stone bridge were found to be 
very strong, the column returned to the iron bridge, and 
later on back to camp, leaving the necessary posts and 
pickets held in force. 

On the nth, then, the Begum's Palace had been secured, 
also the Secundra Bagh and the Shah Nujeef, and Outram 
had advanced and was holding as far as the iron bridge. 
The artillery and mortar fire on the line of palaces and 
other buildings and positions was duly maintained ; and a 
special episode of this day was the arrival of Jung Bahadur's 
army, which next day duly took up its position opposite 
the canal between Banks's house and the Char Bagh, as 
had been arranged. 

During the 12th and 13th the actual progress was not 
much marked outwardly. The engineers were steadily 
forcing their way through the several palaces, such as 
Jaffir Ali's and Jarour ood Dowlah's up to the Emam- 
barah, the troops occupying and securing them as they were 
seized. 

Meanwhile Outram was halting, his orders not warranting 
his further advance. On the 12th, however, Jung Bahadur 
had formed up on the line assigned him, and on the 13th 
he had been requested to cross the canal on his front and 






THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF THE CITY 285 

work through the city on the left of Lugard's advance 
through the palaces. Now on the 14th the lead of that 
advance was transferred from Lugard's to Franks's division. 

By that morning, the 14th, the situation was this : Sir 
Colin's main column had penetrated and sapped through 
the palaces up to the Emambarah, and had made a breach 
in its walls ; on its left the Nepaulese were working through 
the ordinary city ; on its right he held the position in front 
of the enemy's second line of defences. On the other side 
of the river Outram had turned that second line of defences 
and seized his end of the iron bridge. On that day he 
asked leave to force the iron bridge, and operate against the 
enemy's posts behind their second line, but he was pro- 
hibited by an order not to do so if it would cause his losing 
a single man. The bridge was blocked by a battery and 
held in force by the enemy ; so he had to remain passive. 

Not so Franks at the range of palaces. The breach 
having been made in the wall of the Emambarah, Sir 
Colin gave the order for the storming of that position. 
The attack was made by the 10th Foot and Brasyer's 
Sikhs, the stormers being two companies of the former 
and sixty men of the latter. After a sharp struggle they 
made good their entrance and drove back the enemy, who, 
once they saw the lodgment made in force, fled precipitately, 
leaving the Emambarah in the hands of the English. In 
their flight they emerged through its great gateway, and turn- 
ing to the left, streamed down the street towards the Kaiser 
Bagh, with some of our stormers following in close chase. 

But General Franks had sent on his Adjutant-General, 
the younger Havelock, with the attacking party to guide 
its movements. And he led the 90th and others of that 
party, not in pursuit of the fugitives, but by a line parallel 
and close to their route into the next palace; which was 
separated by only one other building from the Kaiser 
Bagh, and from which he found he could command the 
three nearest bastions of the third line of entrenchments 
running along in the immediate front of the Kaiser Bagh. 
Bringing a musketry fire to bear on these bastions, he 
drove the enemy off and forced them to quit the guns — one 
of them an eight-inch howitzer — and he also led them to 
see that their second line of defences was taken in rear at 



286 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

this end, after it had already been turned by Outram's 
operations at its river end, and was practically no longer 
tenable. So some of them at once began to desert those 
works and to take shelter in the buildings and enclosures 
which still lay between the ground we were holding and 
the Kaiser Bagh. Brasyer, however, seeing the chance, led 
his men by a bastion which had been evacuated into that 
intervening position, and being followed up by supports, 
cleared it entirely of the enemy. 

This was the limit of the programme for the day, but 
circumstances sometimes destroy the value and the real 
practicability of such limits in military operations, especi- 
ally in dealing with the Asiatic. Once get them on the 
run, and it is as dangerous and mischievous to halt in the 
advance as it is advantageous to press it on. So young 
Havelock called up the ioth to support Brasyer, and they 
followed up the enemy into the Cheenee Bazar ; that part of 
the prolongation of the Huzrutgunge which skirted the 
Kaiser Bagh (or rather the tomb of Saadut Ali on its 
front), and lay inside the third line of defences. This 
movement consequently turned that third line of the enemy's 
defences, and supported those of our stormers who, after 
taking the Emambarah, had followed close on the heels of 
the flying enemy. 

Now, at this juncture, the enemy who had been posted 
in the middle of their second line of defence, and had been 
holding the Tara Kotee and the mess-house (the Koorshid 
Munzil), began to find, as those on their right had already 
done, that their position had been turned, and that they 
were in danger of being cut off from their line of retreat. 
So they began pouring down towards the Cheenee Bazar 
and the Kaiser Bagh, some 5,000 or 6,000 in number; and 
if they had forced their way, would have been a very 
awkward foe for the handful of our troops who had 
penetrated into the Cheenee Bazar. Again young Havelock 
came to the rescue. He guided the Sikhs near him to 
the bastions in the enemy's third line, seized them, turned 
their guns on the tide of the enemy rushing over from the 
posts in the second line, and checked and drove them off; 
forcing their flight in the direction of the Chuttur Munzil 
buildings. 



THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OE THE CITY 287 

Then the main column of attack followed up and secured 
the posts which had thus been seized. After them speedily 
came up the supports, led by Franks accompanied by 
Napier. Thereupon the rest of the division was summoned 
up ; our troops who were holding the Secundra Bagh and 
other posts in front of the enemy's second line were told 
that that line was clear ; and they forthwith advanced and 
captured the Motee Mahul, the mess-house, and the other 
intervening posts. 

Franks at the same time sent forward his own column 
into the courtyard of Saadut Ali's mosque ; where they 
stormed the enclosures and gardens of the Kaiser Bagh 
itself, and cleared it of its defenders, so capturing and 
securing the very heart of the enemy's position. 

Numerous had been the rumours of the desperate 
measures and arrangements that the enemy had adopted 
for the defence of the Kaiser Bagh ; and Sir Colin was 
much discomposed and disturbed on hearing of its sudden 
capture and occupation, fearing that there would be great 
explosions of mines and the like. He is believed to have 
even sent orders to evacuate it, and to have received from 
Franks in reply the English, or rather the Irish, equivalent 
of the famous " J'y suis, j'y reste." But thus it was that on 
March 14th, Franks's column in the one day captured the 
whole of the enemy's positions from the Begum's house, 
whence it started, to their last real stronghold, the Kaiser 
Bagh ; considerably anticipating Sir Colin's programme, 
and at the same time enabling the second line of the 
defences to be carried, and the posts beyond them 
occupied. 

On March 15th little was done; no special progress was 
made at the palaces, except in the way of clearing, securing, 
and strengthening ; but Walpole's division was required to 
watch very closely the river face at and between the two 
bridges. Also the two cavalry brigades — Hope Grant's 
from near the iron bridge, and Campbell's from the west of 
the Alum Bagh — were directed respectively to pursue the 
fugitive Sepoys along the Seetapore and Sandeela roads, 
by which they were assumed to have fled. 

On the 1 6th there were three important events. First — 
Outram was directed to re-cross the Goomtee to its right 



288 CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF LUCKNOW 

bank and join in the operations there. Second — a great 
mass of the enemy, taking advantage of the gap or unpro- 
tected space on the north of the Goomtee — caused by this 
movement of Outram's, combined with the absence of the 
cavalry on the Seetapore road — forced their way across the 
stone bridge ; and then turning to the right, circled round 
the rear of Walpole's division, and escaped unmolested by 
the Fyzabad road into the open country, there to re-assemble 
and continue the war. Third — the enemy endeavoured to 
retaliate, and interrupt our communications with Cawn- 
pore, by an extensive attack in force on Franklin, at the 
Alum Bagh, which was for the time unsupported by Camp- 
bell's cavalry. Each of these three episodes needs some 
more detailed account. Outram crossed the Goomtee near 
the Secundra Bagh by a temporary bridge ; he left Wal- 
pole's division to watch the iron and the stone bridge, took 
with him Douglas's Brigade, and was joined on crossing 
by the 20th and Brasyer's Sikhs. He advanced to the 
Kaiser Bagh, and then turned to the right and pushed on 
to the Residency. Capturing it at once, his force followed 
on the heels of the enemy, taking in reverse the guns and 
posts along the right bank of the river. Supported by the 
fire of the heavy guns, which he left at the Residency to play 
on the Mutchi Bhown, he stormed it with the ist Fusiliers 
and Brasyer's Sikhs ; and then, still pushing on, he turned 
the stone bridge and captured the great Emambarah near 
it. With this he ended his operations on the 16th. 

The enemy had been flying before him all day, and 
after reaching the stone bridge, some crossed by it and 
engaged Walpole's division so as to occupy and divert its 
attention, whilst the rest of the fugitives crossed the river 
in the best way they could higher up, and, as noted above, 
escaped round the flank and rear of that division. 

The movement of the enemy against the Alum Bagh 
was in great force, their infantry threatening its front, and 
their artillery and cavalry its left. But they were met with 
such vigour by Franklin's cavalry (Military Train and 7th 
Hussars) and artillery (under Eyre and Olpherts) that they 
were repulsed, and retired without Stisted's infantry having 
been at all seriously engaged. 

Meanwhile Jung Bahadur, with his Nepaulese, had been 



THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OE THE CETY 289 

clearing the city between the palaces and the canal, though 
his progress had not yet reached so far as the road from 
the Residency to the Char Bagh. 

Thus closed the proceedings of March 16th, after which 
the operations lay simply in forcing the enemy westwards 
through and out of the city. 

On the 17th and 18th Outram's advance took him past 
the Hooseynee Mosque and the Dowlut Khana up to 
Shuruf ood Dowlah's house, and near AH Nukkee Khan's ; 
while Jung Bahadur had also worked along on the left. It 
was now known that a considerable force of the enemy, 
consisting of its most resolute troops, meant to make a final 
stand at the Moosa Bagh, on the extreme west of the city ; 
and it was believed that they were animated by the pre- 
sence of the Begum, the young Nuwab, the Moulvie, and 
all the other leaders of the rebel party except the Nana. 
So Sir Colin arranged for an effective finishing stroke. 
Outram was to attack the position, aided by flanking fire 
from the north of the Goomtee, while Hope Grant's cavalry 
on the right (to the north of the Goomtee) and Camp- 
bell's on the left should catch the enemy as they were 
driven out. Outram carried out his part of the programme 
thoroughly ; capturing the position and clearing it of the 
enemy, who fled in large masses along the road where 
Brigadier Campbell was to have caught them. Campbell, 
however, failed, and the enemy escaped with but slight loss. 

Lucknow had been taken, but the foe had not been 
crushed nor even punished, and they were free to re-assem- 
ble elsewhere in their thousands and tens of thousands. 

So Sir Colin lost nearly the whole of the hoped-for fruits 
of his capture of Lucknow, and he had to thank himself 
for it; first from his checking Outram on the 14th; then 
from his misguided pursuits of the 15th; and finally from 
failing to ensure proper leading for his splendid force 
of cavalry, at the most opportune and critical moment of 
the war. 

Thus ended the second stage of the war in Oude. The 
British loss in the capture was 127 killed and about 600 
wounded. 



BOOK VI 

SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 
CHAPTER I 

THE HOT-WEATHER CAMPAIGN 

OUR narrative left the siege of the city of Lucknow 
brought to a successful close on March 19th, by its com- 
plete capture and the expulsion of the rebel troops, after a 
struggle of less than a fortnight. After so signal a proof 
of the power and prowess of the British, and with no 
marked rallying point left to the enemy, it was reasonable 
to expect that they would offer but little further resistance, 
and gradually disperse to their homes. Instead of this, 
however, hostilities at once broke out afresh, and over a 
much wider area than before ; being no longer confined in 
their real force to the province of Oude, but being spread, 
with equal if not greater virulence, over the adjoining- 
province of Rohilkund on the west, and the Azimgurh 
districts on the east. Moreover, the hostility in Oude itself 
was both enormously increased and specially characterized 
by the active accession of the whole country population, the 
Rajwara troops, the followers of the Talookdars of Oude, 
with whom the contest assumed the aspect of a genuine 
guerilla war, of which no signs had ever hitherto appeared. 
The causes of this increase of virulent hostility and the 
accession to it of the country population were quite un- 
mistakable. They were two : first, Sir Colin's failure to 
prevent or even check the escape of the rebel troops and 
their leaders, or to pursue them effectively when driven out 
of Lucknow ; and second, the issue by Lord Canning of 
his Confiscation Proclamation. 1 

The unimpeded retreat of the rebel army in the two 
1 See Appendix XIII. 



THE HOT-WEATHER CAMPAIGN 291 

detachments of March 16th and 19th, and the escape of the 
whole of their leaders, naturally emboldened them and led 
to their gathering afresh in new groups in Oude itself, 
mainly in its north-west and north-east; while the weak- 
ness which it seemed to indicate in the British, caused 
the Rohillas to rise in Rohilkund under Khan Bahadur 
Khan and Prince Feroze Shah ; besides inciting old Konwur 
Singh of Shahabad to raise commotion afresh in the 
Azimgurh direction ; so that Sir Colin had to despatch 
troops and organize operations at once in those two almost 
fresh theatres of war. This was especially disappointing 
and vexatious, because it would involve a hot-weather 
campaign, with all the exposure and the mischief that 
would follow to the young and unacclimatized troops fresh 
out from England, while the new levies that were being 
raised in the Punjab and the north-west were not yet fit 
to relieve them to any material degree. 

The cause of the outburst of hostility on the Oude 
country population was, as I have said, the proclamation 
issued on March 20th by Lord Canning ; generally known 
as the Confiscation Proclamation. It was a singular act on 
Lord Canning's part, because he seemed to stand almost 
alone as its author, and alone in his insistence on it. He 
was strenuously opposed by Outram, who prophesied of it 
precisely what happened. It was condemned by every 
authority and every class in India. It raised a storm of 
surprise and indignation in England, and caused the severest 
crisis in the fate of the English Ministry. Its policy was 
defended with his utmost ability by Lord Canning; but 
however just and sound theoretically, results showed that 
it was practically a blunder, and led to the very wide-spread 
increase which has been mentioned in the hostility of the 
country. All the chiefs, except some half-dozen men of no 
importance, were declared to have been guilty of rebellion 
and of waging war against the Queen, and to have 
consequently forfeited all their proprietary rights. Some 
hair-splitting conditions and offers that were mentioned at 
the same time were neither cared for nor believed. The 
chiefs realized that their position was desperate, and they 
rose en masse in active rebellion ; which they certainly had 
not done before. 



292 SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 

Outram raised very strong and well-argued objections to 
the Proclamation, but even these were far short of the facts 
that might have been urged against it. He virtually 
admitted that the Talookdars had rebelled, but pleaded 
that it was natural that they should do so, and that they 
should be treated as honourable enemies. Yet this story 
will have been told in vain if it has not shown that the mass 
of these Talookdars had, since Sir Henry Lawrence's arrival, 
and owing to his line of action, refrained from a hostile 
bearing ; to as great a degree as could be expected, or as was 
possible, under the despotic native rule and powerful army 
that dominated the situation at Lucknow and throughout 
the province. It is only necessary to recall how they had 
aided the fugitive residents of out-stations at the outbreak ; 
how they had helped Sir Henry Lawrence with supplies ; 
how with three exceptions they had held aloof from joining 
the rebel army, either personally or through their retainers ; 
how they continued this loyalty till Havelock evacuated 
Oude territory and returned to Cawnpore ; how even then 
they sent to the rebel camp only such contingents as were 
demanded, and personally remained passive ; and how, 
throughout the rest of the campaign, they had abstained 
from any harassing of the British troops — in marked contrast 
with their conduct after this Proclamation was issued. 

This much, however, can almost certainly be said in 
excuse for Lord Canning, that he was ignorant and mis- 
taken on these points ; that in point of fact very few 
persons did know of them at the time ; and that more 
general knowledge of them did not spread, nor reach the 
highest quarters till a later date. 

But the Proclamation had a still deeper and more wide- 
spread effect than on the Talookdars alone. It was viewed 
as a declaration of the British Government that, on becom- 
ing sufficiently powerful, there was no despotic action which 
it would not take if it so willed ; and as confirming the truth 
of all the worst charges which the malcontents had been in 
the habit of making, respecting the intentions and aims of 
the British. 

The enemy in Oude now consisted of four actively 
hostile parties — 

i. The mutineer Sepoys. 



THE HOT-WEATHER CAMPAIGN 293 

2. The resuscitated forces of the Nuwab — the Begum's 
troops as they may be conveniently called. 

3. The Mahomedan followers of the Fyzabad Moulvie. 

4. The Talookdars and their retainers and clansmen. 

The numbers of the parties 1 and 2 had now dimin- 
ished considerably. They had taken the leading part 
in all the military operations heretofore, had been now 
thoroughly defeated, and were somewhat sick of the 
struggle. But the Moulvie's force was becoming a more 
prominent factor in the struggle, and was acting as a 
focus of Mahomedan hostility ; while the Rajwara men 
under their chiefs, all over the province, had started their 
old style of guerilla warfare ; which lay, not in aggressive 
and combined movements against the common foe, but in 
stopping and cutting off supplies, checking and harassing 
the movements of the troops and emissaries and officers of 
Government, making and threatening local attacks, frus- 
trating every effort to introduce civil administration, and 
encouraging marauders and brigandage. 

The Talookdaree gatherings and warfare were mainly in 
Byswara and the south-east of Oude ; but the three other 
parties collected in two groups ; one on the north-west of 
Oude towards the Rohilkund border, under the leading 
of the Moulvie ; the other on the north-east, consisting of 
all the four classes of rebels, and forming themselves into 
four separate bodies, though keeping together without any 
one recognized chief; a large number of persons exercising 
more or less influence and command over the several 
sections, such as the Begum, Mummoo Khan, Jeylall Singh, 
the Nana's brother, various officers of the Sepoy troops, and 
the like. 

These three gatherings came to a head not simultaneously 
but at different and successive periods — the north-west first, 
then the Talookdars in Byswara in May, and afterwards 
the north-east gathering in June. Before dealing with 
these hostile bodies, Sir Colin arranged for securing proper 
command of Lucknow itself, by starting the construction 
of a large fortified position on the south bank of the 
Goomtee facing the stone bridge, called the Mutchi 
Bhown fort. It was about half a mile each way, and in- 
cluded within its enceinte the old Mutchi Bhown citadel at 



294 SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 

one angle, and the Great Emambarah and other large 
edifices at other points ; and was bordered by a large clear 
esplanade on its landward faces which had involved a 
sweeping demolition of the denser part of the heart of the 
city. 

Also the old Residency position was now surrounded 
with ramparts on a more correct trace, and formed a 
separate detached fort. 

While these were in progress, and before dealing with 
the threatening gatherings in Oude, Sir Colin sent off troops 
to Azimgurh and to Rohilkund. 

The column directed against Rohilkund was commanded 
by Walpole, and was to sweep up the left bank of the 
Ganges to clear and settle those districts. The part it 
played was important, and requires description. Walpole 
left Lucknow on April 7th, and in a fortnight reached 
Rhodamow, near which was the jungle fort of Roya, held 
by a Talookdar named Nirput Singh. He was not a man 
of any power or following, but his father, Jussa Singh, 
though he had not risen against the English in Oude, had 
been a staunch friend of the Nana, had joined him at 
Bithoor, and had been killed in one of his combats with 
Havelock. The son had followed in his father's footsteps, 
and had given a home and shelter in Roya to the Nana 
when driven out of Bithoor. 

Nirput Singh was now holding out in Roya, and had to be 
attacked. The fort was small, not, like some others, many 
miles in circumference. Its strength lay in its thick mud 
walls and deep ditch surrounded by an impervious thicket 
of bamboo jungle ; which, however, as was the case with all 
such forts, was not equally strong all round, but had some 
faces weaker than others, and also gaps here and there by 
which access was easy. Putting aside the more powerful 
modes of attack, in which artillery and mortars come into 
play, the recognized and well-known mode of capturing 
these places without serious loss was to discover the weak 
points and gaps and then force an entrance. 

Now General Walpole would not adopt an)- such plan. 
He had a splendid little force, the Highland Brigade (42nd, 
79th, and 93rd), the 4th Punjabees (old comrades of the 
93rd), the 9th Lancers, and a Punjab cavalry regiment, 






THE HOT-WEATHER CAMPAIGN 295 

with two batteries of Horse Artillery and some heavy guns 
and mortars. But he would not take advantage of the 
opportunities such a body of troops gave him. He did not 
reconnoitre. He did not listen to the information tendered 
him. He simply sent his Highland regiments forward to 
pierce through and storm the defences at the strongest 
points. The result was a heavy loss in men and officers, 
especially in the death of that ideal soldier, Adrian Hope ; 
and a positive repulse, inasmuch as the British force was 
withdrawn from the attack. Nirput Singh evacuated the 
fort during the night. 

Walpole proceeded on with his force after this into 
Rohilkund, and he no longer takes part in the warfare in 
Oude. But this episode of Roya had a most serious effect. 
Its fame, as a matter of course, spread with exaggerations 
throughout the province, and emboldened the Talookdars. 

Sir Colin presently proceeded to conduct and control the 
operations in Rohilkund in person, and Hope Grant was 
left in command in Oude to meet and suppress whatever 
efTorts the enemy might make. It was, doubtless, hoped 
at first that the enemy would be gradually scattered and 
dispersed ; but it soon became evident that this could not 
be effected in this hot season, and that the organized and 
thorough crushing out of the rebellion must be deferred to 
the cold weather ; present efforts being confined to the 
attack and dispersion of important gatherings. 

The first movement against such gatherings was made 
on April nth, when a force under Hope Grant marched 
by the Seetapore road against the party of Mahomedan 
rebels, who, under the leading of the Moulvie, formed what 
I have called the North-west group. They were really in 
touch with the insurgents in Rohilkund, but at present were 
in the Mahona direction, at Baree, some twenty-five miles 
from Lucknow. Grant's column was about 3,000 strong, 
with some eighteen guns, and contained British and native 
troops of all arms. As they neared Baree, the Moulvie 
tried to turn their flank and get at the baggage ; but the 
flanking movement was detected and defeated, chiefly by 
the charge of the 7th Hussars. After this the Moulvie's 
men would not bide the British attack, but evacuated the 
village which they had occupied as their stronghold, and 



296 SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 

then withdrew in retreat and disappeared. This force 
apparently retired to Rohilkund ; to form part of the 
gathering with which Sir Colin had to deal in that province, 
and which does not concern our story. 

From Baree, Hope Grant turned to the right to Ma- 
homedabad and the Gogra, hoping to catch the Begum at 
Ramnugger or Bithoolee. But she had fled on his ap- 
proach, and so his immediate task was to co-operate with 
Jung Bahadur's army which had started on its return to 
Nepaul. 

It was about this period that Maun Singh, the Brahmin 
Talookdar and ex- A mil, who had hitherto tried to play a 
double game, and to stand well with both the British and 
the rebels, now openly tendered his allegiance to the 
Government and held his fort of Shahgunge in their in- 
terests. The enemy soon appeared before his fort and 
besieged it, and there he remained till relieved in June. 

But to return to Hope Grant's movements. The gather- 
ing on the north-west having been cleared off for the 
present, he returned to Lucknow. He did not, however, 
rest there, but led a force to disperse a party of the enemy 
that had collected on the south and were threatening, from 
the east, the Ganges end of the Lucknow and Cawnpore 
road. This was the beginning of the Byswara gathering ; 
but it was not the same body that assembled afterwards 
under the leading of Beni Madho. It consisted chiefly of 
the followers of another Byswara chief, Baboo Ram Buksh 
of Doondea Khera, who had been an avowed malcontent 
from the outset, though he had not joined in the siege of 
the Residency. This expedition lasted about a fortnight. 
On May 1st, Hope Grant reached Poorwa, and then took 
the fort of Punchingaon. On the ioth he appeared before 
Ram Buksh's fort of Doondea Khera. This was very 
large and very formidable, but he found it evacuated. 
Two days later he found the enemy drawn up for contest 
at Sirsee, and there attacked and defeated them thoroughly, 
dispersing them, killing one of their leaders, Amruthun 
Singh, and taking their guns. 

On the 25th the gathering under Beni Madho developed. 
He was by repute the best soldier, the most influential 
chief, and the most popular leader of the Byswara clans ; 



THE HOT-WEATHER CAMPAIGN 297 

and now, large though his gathering was, he avoided any 
serious engagement, at once adopting the ubiquitous tactics 
of genuine guerilla warfare — skirmishes and surprises — cease- 
lessly harassing and then eluding the British troops ; which 
he could easily do, as his followers (of whom he is said to 
have had over 80,000, chiefly matchlockmen), scattered over 
the district, knew every inch of the ground. Hope Grant 
was not long in seeing that against such an enemy as this 
our troops must remain comparatively passive and on the 
defence during the summer heats and rains. So leaving 
others to deal, for the present, with the enemy in Byswara, 
Hope Grant started earl}- in June to attack the hostile 
force of the north-cast. Here he was able to be of much 
more use, for this body of the enemy had now gathered to 
a head, and like the mutineer army before the siege of the 
Residency, had advanced from the Fyzabad direction and 
concentrated at Nuwabgunge, eighteen miles from Luck- 
now. This group, as has been already described, was made 
up of four different parties, each under a separate leader ; 
and was without much cohesion in the parties or unanimity 
and concert in the chiefs. There were Sepoys of the 
regular army, troops of the old court of Oude, Talook- 
daree troops, and such of the Mahomedans as had not 
followed the fortunes of the Moulvie into Rohilkund. 
These four groups kept more or less apart, instead of 
acting in unison under one acknowledged leader. Hope 
Grant had a strong division, two British and one Punjab 
Infantry regiment, three batteries of artillery, some six 
squadrons of British cavalry, and 900 native cavalry. He 
marched against the enemy at night, turned the right of 
their position, and took them by surprise in the morning. 
They fought well, especially the Talookdaree troops, who 
routed Hodson's Horse ; but after three hours of hard 
combat had to fall back, leaving 600 dead on the field. 
This victory dispersed the enemy, and had also the effect of 
checking and turning back the additional hostile bodies 
that were in motion to concentrate on Nuwabgunge. The 
defeated enemy had fled in different directions — to Gonda, 
to Fyzabad, to Sultanpore, and so on. Hope Grant fol- 
lowed towards Fyzabad, and at the same time sent a 
column towards Sultanpore. On his approach to Fyzabad 



298 SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 

the enemy who were besieging Rajah Maun Singh in his 
fort of Shahgunge close by dispersed and disappeared ; 
and Maun Singh being thus relieved, Hope Grant had then 
to turn to the right to support the force at Sultanpore. 
Here occurred the last real combat in the heat of that 
summer. The enemy were in considerable strength, 14,000 
men with fifteen guns, but the difficulty to be overcome 
was the passage of the Goomtee, which had to be crossed, 
as they were on its right bank. This operation occupied 
from August 25th to 27th, but at last it was effected, and 
the battle came off on the evening of the 28th. The 
enemy were the assailant, but they were checked in their 
attack, then driven back, and finally put to flight, leaving 
Sultanpore in Hope Grant's possession. 

During the next six weeks the operations were desultory 
and isolated ; being directed chiefly to clearing and 
strengthening the posts we had already seized and meant 
to use as the starting-point for the cold-weather movements. 

The enemy in Oude now consisted mainly of the Talook- 
daree troops ; followers of such chiefs and leaders as Beni 
Madho, the Rajah of Ameythee, Hunwunt Singh, and the 
like. Sir Colin determined to reserve his real attack on 
them till the winter, and meanwhile, to save his men as 
much as possible from further exposure during the trying 
heat and malarious rainy season. The mutineer Sepoys 
who had belonged to the two northern gatherings had now 
in great part disappeared and dispersed. Their cause was 
gone, and they had to make the best of their plight. 

But the Mussulman fanatics, and the adherents of the 
Oude Durbar, and of the Nana, were still in force. More- 
over, the whole country population of the province was in 
dogged rebellion, and had to be subdued ; and Sir Colin 
was planning to effect this during the coming winter. 



CHAPTER II 
FINAL WINTER CAMPAIGN 

SIR COLIN, then, had determined that, during the coming- 
cold weather, the Province of Oude should be thoroughly 
subjugated. The general outline of his scheme was this. 
Oude was bordered on the west by Rohilkund, and on the 
east by the Azimgurh districts, which had been already 
reduced to submission, and were held in force by our troops. 
The Gogra, running through the province somewhat 
parallel to the Ganges, divided it into two parts, the 
southward part being itself subdivided into two by the line 
of road that ran from Cawnpore to Lucknow and onwards. 
Each of these three parts was to form a separate theatre of 
operations. The two to the south of the Gogra were to be 
attacked first, and simultaneously ; and the enemy in them 
that were not crushed were to be driven into the district 
north of the Gogra, which would thus form the final seat of 
operations. 

In the two theatres south of the Gogra, Sir Colin had 
three lines of troops with which to operate. On the west 
was the Rohilkund line ; on the east was the Azimgurh 
line ; and in the middle was the Cawnpore and Lucknow 
line, with Lucknow as the great centre of all. The troops 
in the two outer lines were to advance inwards, beginning at 
their southern ends, and so gradually edge the enemy off to 
the north, and then drive them across the Gogra. The 
middle line at the south end was held by Evelegh, who was 
to operate to the cast or west according to the exigencies of 
the occasion. 

Now the region north of the Gogra, lying between it and 
the Nepaulcse Himalayas, into which the enemy were to be 
driven, is a triangle ; with its apex at the west and its base 
at the east, where the space is wide and the mountains are 
distant from the river. As the mountains run westwards, 



3oo SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 

they incline towards the river, till at length they meet it at 
its debouchure, forming the apex of the triangle. Sir 
Colin's plan, in this final part of the war, was to guard the 
Gogra strongly so as to prevent any slipping back of the 
enemy into the southern districts ; and then, having formed 
a line, so to speak, at the base of the triangle on the east, 
to sweep upwards through the narrowing districts, forcing 
back the enemy before him till they should be dislodged, or 
captured, or driven into Nepaul. 

Further, in the eastern of the two southern parts, Sir 
Colin had to deal with a crowd of large jungle forts, and 
with the clansmen of the district ; he therefore determined 
to hem these in and coerce them locally as much as 
possible. So the lines from Lucknow round by the Gogra 
to Fyzabad, and along the Goomtee were very strongly 
held ; and, in attacking any fort, he designed to concentrate 
on and around it, so as to make escape almost hopeless, 
and lead, if possible, to its surrender without fighting. 
Afterwards, as he drove the enemy before him, and cap- 
tured their towns and positions, he proposed to occupy 
them with police, and so re-establish civil administration. 

In October the operations began ; and first of all in the 
western district south of the Gogra. For here the ball was 
opened, not by the British but by the rebels. The enemy 
collected in force, 12,000 men with twelve guns, and marched 
on our post at Sandeela in the heart of that district, on 
October 3rd. On the 6th, its garrison, which had shut itself 
up in the fort, was relieved by a small party under Major 
Maynard, which forced the enemy off for some four miles ; 
and then, on the 8th, Brigadier Barker with a strong brigade 
arrived from Lucknow. Barker, after a fierce fight in which 
he lost eighty-two men killed and wounded, defeated the 
enemy thoroughly ; and a few days afterwards he turned 
the tables, attacking and taking their fort of Birwah. 

Meanwhile our movement inward into that part of Oude 
from the Rohilkund side began on the 18th. Under the 
orders of General Seaton, who kept watch over Rohilkund 
itself, two columns penetrated Oude ; one under Colonel 
Hall from Furruckabad at the south end, towards Roya 
and Sandeela ; the other under Brigadier Troup from 
Shahjehanpore, further north, towards Seetapore. 



FINAL WINTER CAMPAIGN 301 

While Hall advanced from the west, Evelegh cleared the 
ground along the Ganges from the south end of the middle 
line up to Sandeela. Then Barker, co-operating with Hall, 
captured Roya on October 28th ; and thus the south part 
of that western theatre was cleared of the enemy, and held 
by our own police ; while the Ganges became free for 
navigation. 

Brigadier Troup, on the north, when desiring to move 
from Shahjehanpore on Seetapore, found that he had first 
to deal with the Rohilla chief, Khan Ali Khan ; and 
began by defeating him and driving him across the Gogra. 
Having thus gained the clear command of that frontier, at 
the extreme west of Oude, he then crossed the boundary 
into Oude, and took the fort of Mithoolee. 

In the next month, November, Brigadier Barker advanced 
iiorthzvards from Sandeela, clearing the country right and 
left, and at the end of the month secured Khyrabad and 
Biswah ; leaving, however, a gap on the Lucknow side, 
though nearing Troup on the other flank. To co-operate 
with him, Brigadier Troup, after capturing Mithoolee, also 
moved northwards in advance of his left, driving the enemy 
before him to Aligunge, near the Gogra, across which most 
of them were forced after a sharp action on the 17th. Then 
he turned to his right and marched along the right bank 
of the Gogra, and reaching Biswah on December 2nd, 
effected his junction with Barker. 

At this time Evelegh, in the middle line, had been directed 
to operate on the north-west of Lucknow, to fill up the gap 
between Lucknow and the site of Barker's operations. In 
doing this he took the fort of Oomeria, on December 2nd. 

So that now all that western district had been subdued, 
and all its rebel troops, with one exception, driven across 
the Gogra by Barker's forward and Troup's flank move- 
ment. That exception was that Prince Feroze Shah, when 
being hemmed in on the Gogra near Biswah, escaped past 
and between our troops with some 1,500 men, and doubling 
back south by Sandeela to the Ganges, crossed it and then 
the Jumna, and finally joined the Central India rebel 
army ; so disappearing from the scene in Oude. 

Thus was the western district cleared and subdued by 
the beginning of December ; and I now turn to the con- 



3o2 SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 

temporary operations in the eastern district. These were 
conducted under the personal guidance of Sir Colin 
Campbell. 

Before they were begun, our troops held in force the line 
from Sultanpore via Pertabgurh to Allahabad ; and also 
from Sultanpore north to Fyzabad ; but, since it was essential 
to prevent any opportunity for the enemy to escape east- 
wards across the Sultanpore-Fyzabad line into the Azimgurh 
districts, Sir Colin began his operations by strengthening 
the Sultanpore position, and detaching Hope Grant to his 
eastward flank to co-operate with a column which he directed 
to advance under Colonel Kelly from Azimgurh into Oude. 
This Colonel Kelly did, driving the enemy before him, and 
securing Akbarpore and then Tanda ; near which he halted 
on October 30th, to watch and guard that flank during the 
ensuing operations. 

The flank within which he wished to hem in the enemy 
being thus provided for, Sir Colin's first step in his direct 
operations westwards was to send forward a brigade under 
Wetherall towards Rampore Kussia, the stronghold of the 
Khanpooria clan, and there to co-operate with Hope Grant 
in capturing it. But Wetherall did not wait for that co- 
operation, and finding the weak point of the fort in an 
almost impregnable triple circle of defences, attacked and 
stormed it on November 3rd, with a loss of eighty men. 

Continuing westwards, the next point to be attacked was 
Ameythee, a very strongly fortified position belonging to 
its powerful chief, the Rajah Lai Madho Singh, who had 
been conspicuously friendly at the outbreak, and instru- 
mental in aiding English families and escorting them into 
security. To operate against this fort three columns con- 
centrated on it — on its east, Pinckney's (Sir Colin with it) 
from Pertabgurh ; on its south, Wetherall's from Rampore 
Kussia ; and on its north-west, Hope Grant's. While thus 
concentrating, Sir Colin summoned the Rajah to surrender, 
which he did eventually on November 10th; not, however, 
till he had seen, from the strength of the attack by which 
he was menaced, that resistance was hopeless. But though 
he surrendered personally, most of the garrison, some 4,000 
men, of whom 1,500 were Sepoys, had evacuated the fort 
and escaped during the night. 



FINAL WINTER CAMPAIGN 303 

The next move, still westwards of course, was against 
Shunkcrpore, the stronghold of its chief, Beni Madho. The 
three columns that had taken Ameythee were to concen- 
trate on it on its north, east, and south ; while Evelegh's 
brigade from Poorwa on the Lucknow-Cawnpore line was 
to advance on it from the west. But the latter was delayed 
by the resistance he met with on the way. As with Amey- 
thee, so Sir Colin summoned Beni Madho to surrender. 
The fort was a huge one, some eight miles in circumference, 
but its defences were incomplete and full of gaps ; and Beni 
Madho, who was a soldier of ability, knew he could not 
hold it. He replied accordingly that he would evacuate 
the fort, but would not surrender personally, holding him- 
self a subject of the Nuwab of Oude, and not of the British 
Government. So he and his followers, said to be 15,000 
men, with several guns, marched out of the fort on the 
night of the 15th, taking their route to the west towards 
Doondea Khera. On their way, however, they were met 
by Evelegh on the 1 7th, and defeated with the loss of three 
guns, though their escape westwards was not averted. 

On becoming, next morning, aware of Beni Madho's 
flight, Sir Colin sent off (1) Wethe rail's brigade, now Taylor's, 
towards Fyzabad, to prevent his circling round to the east, 
and to keep that line secure ; and (2) Hope Grant to Roy 
Bareilly and Jugdespore, to its north, to get into more im- 
mediate contact with Beni Madho, if he should be trying to 
escape in that direction. After leaving a detachment to 
destroy the fort, Sir Colin himself followed on to Roy 
Bareilly with Pinckney's Brigade to effect a junction with 
Evelegh. On the 19th, he heard of the successful combat 
of the 17th, and gathered that Beni Madho had been 
effectually kept to the south between Doondea Khera and 
the Ganges. To hem him in, he continued his march west- 
wards parallel to the Ganges, up to Buchraon, between 
Doondea Khera and the river. There he turned, on the 21st, 
to his left, and bore down on Beni Madho on the morning- of 
the 24th. He found the opposing force drawn up in line of 
battle, with its back to the river, and its front protected by 
a jungle of thorny scrub, which had been filled with 
skirmishers. Sir Colin advanced against Beni Madho in 
line ; infantry in the centre, cavalry on the flanks, guns 



304 SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 

between the infantry and cavalry, and the whole preceded 
by skirmishers. These last forced the opposing skirmishers 
back through the jungle ; and on the latter emerging from 
it defeated, the enemy's entire line broke and fled along the 
banks of the river, without ours having to come into action 
at all. Beni Madho escaped along the river-bank ; then 
turned and fled north ; and eluding the several columns that 
met but only checked his progress, he crossed first the 
Goomtee and then the Gogra. 

Meanwhile the troops that had been all along left on the 
Lucknow-Fyzabad line had tackled and defeated all the 
local gatherings, and gradually driven them all to the north 
of the Gogra ; including the Begum, Mummoo Khan, Nirput 
Singh, the Nana and the rebels that followed them. Thus 
by the end of the month, the eastern district of Oude south 
of the Gogra had been cleared of the enemy, and police 
posts and civil administration established ; while the pre- 
cisely similar measures, already described, were being carried 
out in the western district. 

And now the last part of the programme, the finale, the 
subjugation or expulsion of the enemy in the triangular 
tract on the left of the Gogra, had to be carried out. A 
necessary preliminary to this end was the construction of a 
bridge at Fyzabad, the point on which the line that had to 
sweep up the district must turn. This had been effected by 
the strenuous exertions of Lothian Nicholson R.E., with 
the support of the Fyzabad garrison, against the persistent 
fire and opposition of the enemy on the opposite bank. 
These were under the command partly of the ex-Amil 
Mehndee Hussun, and partly of the Gonda Rajah ; who, as 
shown in the description of the province, was the recognized 
head of the federation of the whole of the Rajpoot clans 
on the left of the Gogra. The arrival of Taylor's Brigade 
(from Shunkerpore), and afterwards of Hope Grant's column, 
enabled action to begin at once. And so on November 
25th, Hope Grant had crossed the bridge, had attacked and 
routed the Gonda Rajah's and Mehndee Hussun's following, 
and had thus secured the means for starting the required 
movements and operations. 

Here Hope Grant remained till about December 6th, 
clearing the line across the districts to the hills as well as 



FINAL WINTER CAMPAIGN 305 

he could, capturing Bunkussia and other forts belonging to 
the Gonda Rajah and other chiefs, and awaiting the arrival 
of a column from Goruckpore under Rowcroft which was to 
take part in the final operations. 

After defeating Beni Madho, Sir Colin had returned to 
Lucknow ; and now on December 5th he started thence with 
a very strong column, an infantry division, a cavalry brigade, 
and some fourteen guns, en route to Fyzabad via Nuwab- 
gunge Barabankee. But on reaching this latter point, he 
heard that the enemy under Beni Madho were encamped at 
(another) Nuwabgunge, on the other side of the Gogra, close 
at hand, at its passage at Byram Ghaut ; and were holding 
the fort of Bithoorlee, and threatening to recross the river 
southwards. So Sir Colin halted to protect that passage, 
and sent orders to Hope Grant to advance (up the left bank 
of the Gogra) to Secrora, which lay on the east, close to 
Bithoorlee. This movement led to the enemy's evacuation 
of the position they were occupying ; and accordingly leav- 
ing a sufficient force to hold the Byram Ghaut and construct 
a bridge there, Sir Colin proceeded with the rest of his 
column to Fyzabad. 

On the 14th the active operations began. Sir Colin's 
column advanced from Fyzabad to Secrora ; Rowcroft's 
column, which had come up on the right, was directed 
northward across the Raptee, and then turned to the left 
to Toolseepore, whither also Hope Grant was detached to 
co-operate with him ; while Evelegh's brigade followed in 
the rear, as a reserve, and to stop any doubling back of 
the enemy. 

Rowcroft on the right then advanced against Toolseepore, 
captured it, and was there joined by Hope Grant, whose 
cavalry prevented the enemy doubling back. From this 
point they instead drove them steadily forward towards 
Bhinga, till at length, in the first days of January, the 
insurgents were forced across the frontier and took refuge 
in Nepaul, leaving all their guns in Hope Grant's 
possession. 

Meanwhile the main column under Sir Colin had 
advanced from Secrora on December 15th against Baraitch, 
where the Begum and the Nana were, with the troops that 
still adhered to them. It reached Baraitch, which the 

x 



3o6 SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 

enemy evacuated on its approach, retreating towards Nan- 
para and Pudnaha. From Baraitch a force had to be 
detached under Colonel Christie to move close up the left 
bank of the Gogra, to aid our posts on the other bank in 
preventing its re-passage by the enemy with whom it had 
a smart action on December 23rd. Sir Colin was some- 
what delayed in his advance from Baraitch, partly from 
having to wait till Hope Grant came sufficiently forward 
on his flank, and partly to enable the police arrangements to 
be properly organized ; on the 23rd, however, he made his 
advance towards Nanpara. On arriving there he found it 
deserted ; but the enemy were said to be at Burgidia, a 
short distance ahead, and he moved on it on the 26th. 
Finding them drawn up for action, he formed up his troops 
on their front, and then suddenly moving on their left, he 
attacked them on that flank ; on which they fled precipitately, 
abandoning their guns. Next day, December 27th, the force 
advanced on the neighbouring fort of Musjidia, which was 
shelled for three hours, and was then found to be aban- 
doned. These forts were all in a corner or neck of the 
triangle in which the space between the river and the 
mountains was of the narrowest. 

During the 28th and 29th, the enemy were being pressed 
up further and further towards the hills into the narrow 
space where the Raptee debouches from the mountains and 
reaches the plains ; till it became known that they were 
massed at a spot called Bankee, and meant to make a 
last stand there. Their position was at the edge of forest 
ground ; Sir Colin moved his force forward during the 
night, attacking them in the early morning with his 
horse artillery and cavalry, and then with skirmishers. 
The enemy never made any attempt at a resolute stand, 
but kept retiring before the skirmishers, who with the guns 
and cavalry advanced following them up. At length they 
were forced back from the jungle into more open ground 
with the Raptee behind them. Thereupon the 7th Hussars 
and 1st Punjab Cavalry charged them, driving them 
headlong into and across the Raptee. With this episode in 
the last day of December 1858 ended the long-sustained 
war in Oude, and with the birth of 1859, peace was restored 
to the land. 






FINAL WINTER CAMPAIGN 307 

No one will be inclined to dispute the thoroughness of 
Lord Clyde's work in this final winter campaign, and his 
subjugation of Oude. But the strength of the forces now 
at his disposal was enormous ; and the consequent facilities 
for carrying his work into effect made the task easy. Not 
only had he then some 80,000 English troops under his 
command, but by this time the Punjab levies alone are 
said to have rivalled them in numbers ; and no ordinary 
local gathering was attacked without the force employed 
being as large as that which had undertaken the siege of 
Delhi or the succour of Lucknow. There was no such 
skill or hardihood, no such generalship involved, no such 
dread inspired in the enemy, as had enabled Havelock to 
confront the armies of Oude, and to face the dangers by 
which he was surrounded, with less than 1000 men available 
for line of battle. 

In this last campaign also the contest was chiefly with 
the Talookdars and their followers ; and the trouble they 
now gave, and the hostility they showed, may be fairly 
gauged by the force we had to use against them. Com- 
paring this with the fact that Havelock was never harassed 
by them at all, it seems to be certain beyond all dispute 
that they at the earlier period held positively aloof from 
all hostility ; and that the allegations on which they were 
adjudicated rebels, and deprived of their property by the 
Confiscation Decree, were virtually groundless. Keenly 
must Lord Clyde have felt the blunder involved, and the 
blindness of the Government to the consequences that were 
to result from it. 

As a fitting conclusion to this narrative, I venture to 
contrast the beginning and the ending of the struggle in 
Oude. 

In the one case, Henry Lawrence's thorough knowledge, 
sound instincts, and statesmanlike action minimized local 
animosity ; while his wise precautions, resolute attitude, 
and bold measures enabled him to prepare the Residency 
position for an effective defence by a mere handful of men, 
and to hold back the rebel army of Oude from joining at 
Delhi, or from operating outside the province. 

In the other case, Lord Canning roused the whole 
province, gratuitously and needlessly, into desperate hos- 



3oS SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT 

tility ; while the escape of the rebels and their leaders from 
Lucknow, under the blundering management of the cavalry, 
led to a fourfold expansion of the theatre of war ; and in 
order to cope with the situation thus produced, tens of 
thousands of troops were employed, under Sir Colin's 
method, where before tens of hundreds would have been 
expected to achieve the required success. 






APPENDICES 



APPENDIX I 

THE MISGOVERNMENT OF OUDE BEFORE ITS 

ANNEXATION 

EXTRACTS FROM OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE 

Colonel Sleeman. June ai, 1849. 

There are at this time in Oucle 246 forts or strongholds, mounted with 476 
pieces of cannon, all held by landholders of the first class, chiefly Rajpoots ; 
not one of these landholders now feels it safe to entrust himself within the 
camp or cantonments of an officer of the Government. . . . These estates 
are well cultivated, often in spite of all the best efforts of the contractors and 
collectors to prevent it, in order to reduce them to obedience. It is not at all 
uncommon for the landholders to have the land ploughed and the seed drilled 
in at night by stealth when beleaguered by the king's troops ; and this ac- 
counts for the land being so much better cultivated than those of other native 
States in the midst of disorders that would soon make them waste in any other 
country or state of society. 

Maun Singh and Rughbeer Singh have large forces with artillery fighting 
every day for the possession of the lands which they get by fraud and violence. 

General Outram to Government of India. 
February 6, 1855. 

Paragraph 2. In the district of Nanpara, the warfare which has continued 
for three years past, has of late assumed a more serious aspect in consequence 
of the determined resistance to the king's troops of the partisans of the late 
Rajah's young son, the rightful heir, who has been dispossessed by the young 
widow with the aid of the Amil, and the support of the Oude troops. 

Nanpara, one of the richest districts in Oude, and yielding the late Rajah 
^30,000 yearly, is reduced to such a state that it does not now yield anything 
at all. The whole of the villages are deserted and in ruins. 

The rebel son of the Tootseepore Rajah has lately joined the Nanpara 
malcontents. He quarrelled with and wished to dispossess his father. He, 
in November last, collected a force of about 2,000 men, attacked the king's 
troops at Toolseepore, took the king's guns, plundered the treasury, and 
since then, having united his forces to the rebels of Nanpara, he is devastat- 
ing the country far and wide. 

General Outram to Government of India. March 15, 1855. 

98. In the same proportion as the landholders are compelled to maintain 
armed followers to repel over-exactions on the part of the Durbar, are they 
driven to over-tax their ryots to supply those retainers. 



3 io APPENDIX II 

Minute by Governor-General. June 18, 1855. 

10. The revenues are collected without system, by force of arms ; the Amils 
are left to plunder uncontrolled ; the ryots have no security from oppression, 
nor redress for injustice. 

20. There is the same perpetual collision between the collectors of the 
revenue and the landholders. The troops of the collectors, without discipline 
and with little and uncertain pay, prey upon the people and depopulate the 
villages they come near. The Zemindars, on being driven from their strong- 
holds or deprived of their estates, become robbers and murderers. 

23. The great landholders have absorbed the greater part of the estates 
of their weaker neighbours, and employed their increasing rents in maintaining 
large bands of armed followers and building forts and strongholds, which 
enable them to withstand the demands of the State. Their weaker neighbours 
were the proprietors or holders of what are called the Khalsa or allodial lands, 
four- fifths of which have now been absorbed by the great landholders, (who) have 
taken their lands either by fraud and collusion with the local authorities, or by 
open violence, in utter contempt of such authorities. These landholders have 
converted large quantities of the most fertile lands into jungles around their 
strongholds, some of them extending over spaces from ten to twenty miles long 
by from four to eight miles wide, into which no man dares to enter without 
their permission. 

The surface of Oude, with the exception of the belts of jungle above described, 
is well cultivated, and the soil is richer than in any of our own districts. 



APPENDIX II 

BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MISGOVERNMENT 

EXTRACTS FROM OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE 

Governor-General to King of Oude. February 4, 1855. 

The British Government, influenced by the obligation which many years 
ago it took upon itself in relation to the people of Oude, can no longer lend its 
countenance and support to a Government whose existence is the fruitful source 
of misrule, oppression, and misery to all who live under its control. 

The other, and not less important obligation of the treaty, the stipulation, 
namely, whereby his Excellency bound the sovereigns of Oude to conform 
ever to the counsels of the British Government, and to establish such a system 
of administration as should secure the lives and property of his subjects, and be 
conducive to their prosperity, has from that day to this been utterly and system- 
atically set at nought. The misgovernment of the country continued unabated ; 
the landholders were exposed^ to the habitual extortions of the farmers of the 
revenue ; the farmers of the revenue were authorized to levy their demands by 
the most violent and oppressive means ; there was no confidence in the integrity 
of the Government, no security that the fruits of honest industry, whether com- 
mercial or agricultural, would be protected, and no assurance whatever that 
the wrongs and grievances of the people would be, even tardily, redressed. 



APPENDIX 111 311 

If the Governor- Genera] permits the continuance of any flagrant system of 
misgovernment, which by treaty he is empowered to correct, he becomes the 
participator in abuses which it is his duty to repress. And in this case, no 
ruler of Oude can expect the Governor-General to incur a responsibility so 
repugnant to the principles of the British Government, and so odious to the 
feelings of the British people. 

Governor-General's Minute. June 18, 1855. 

47. It is by these aids alone (the countenance of the Government of India 
and the presence of its troops in his dominions) that the sovereigns of Oude 
have been enabled for more than half a century to persist in their course of 
oppression and misrule. . . . Secure of the safety of his person— secure of the 
stability of his throne — each successive ruler has passed his lifetime careful for 
nothing but the gratification of his individual passion. . . . Were it not for 
the support which the Government of India is known to be bound to afford 
the king against all domestic as well as foreign enemies, were it not for the 
constant presence of British troops at Lucknow, the people of Oude would 
speedily work their own deliverance, and would impose upon their ruler that 
effectual check of general revolt by which Eastern rulers are best controlled. 
. . . If our troops were withdrawn from Oude, the landholders would, in one 
month, march over it all and pillage the capital of Lucknow. 



APPENDIX III 

ON THE LOYALTY OF THE NUWABS OF OUDE 
p:xtracts from official correspondence 

General Outram to Governor of India. March 15, 1855. 

24. I believe no native sovereigns in India have been better disposed to- 
wards the British Government than they (the kings of Oude) have been, or 
have, in times of difficulty, rendered aid to the extent of their ability with 
more cordiality or cheerfulness. 

Minute by Governor-General. June 18, 1855. 

58. The rulers of Oude .... have ever been faithful and true in their 
adherence to the British power. No wavering friendship has ever been laid 
to their charge. They have long ackowledged our power, submitted without 
a murmur to our supremacy, and aided us as best they could in the hour of our 
utmost need. 

Note A. of General Low's Minute of August 15, 1855. 

So much has been published in newspapers respecting real and alleged 
misrule in Oude during the last thirty years, with no one to write on the 
opposite side and explain misstatements ; and it is, moreover, so frequent a habit 
on the part of many of my countrymen who have never sojourned in native States, 
to lay the blame of all acts of violence that may occur in those States on the 
individual native ruler at the head of it ; that it has occasionally happened, 
to my positive knowledge, that the kings of Oude have been spoken of in 



312 APPENDIX IV 

English society as merciless tyrants over their own subjects, and as men who 
had no feeling of gratitude for the protection or the forbearance of the British 
Government. Now, that sort of language is positively untrue, as regards 
every one of the last five kings. They have sadly mismanaged their own 
affairs, I admit ; and I also admit fully that it has become quite necessary to 
deprive them of all political power, but their general conduct towards us, both 
as useful public allies of our Government, and as individual princes conducting 
business in a regular, attentive, courteous, and friendly manner with our public 
functionaries, has been unusually meritorious and praiseworthy ; and we have 
gained so many solid advantages from that conduct on the part of those kings, 
that, in my opinion, the present king (if he shall sign the treaty we propose 
to him), and his heirs and successors after him, are well entitled to most liberal 
treatment in a pecuniary point of view, after we shall have deprived them of 
the power, and dignity, and freedom, and wealth which heretofore have 
belonged to their position as sovereigns of Oude. 

It is not only that the kings of Oude have never been hostile to us in their 
proceedings, and never intrigued against us in any way ; they have abstained 
from every kind of communication with other native potentates, except openly, 
and through the medium of the British Resident ; and during our wars against 
our enemies they have constantly proved to be really active and most useful 
allies to us ; they have, again and again, forwarded large supplies of grain or 
cattle, etc., to our armies, with an alacrity that could not be exceeded by our 
own British Chiefs of Provinces ; and during our wars against the Nepaulese 
and Burmese, the King of Oude lent us very large sums of money — no less than 
three crores of rupees — when we were extremely in want of it, and could not 
procure it elsewhere ; and even so late as in 1842, the grandfather of the 
present king supplied us with fourteen lakhs of rupees, and his son (the father 
of the present king) supplied us with thirty-two lakhs of rupees, which were of 
very great use indeed to Lord Ellenborough's Government, in enabling him 
to push on and equip General Pollock's army, to retrieve our disasters in 
Afghanistan. 



APPENDIX IV 

ALTERNATIVES OF TREATMENT OF OUDE AND ITS 
DYNASTY ON TAKING OVER ITS GOVERNMENT 

Minute of Governor-General. June 18, 1855. 

57. There are four modes in which the interposition of the Supreme 
Government may be proposed — 

1st. The king may be required to abdicate the sovereign powers he has 
abused, and to consent to the incorporation of Oude with the territories of the 
British Crown. 

2nd. He may be permitted to retain his royal titles and position, but may 
be required to vest the whole civil and military administration of his kingdom 
in the Government of the East India Company for ever. 

3rd. Or for a time only. 

4th. He maybe invited to place the management of the country in the hands 
of the Resident, to be carried on by the officers of the king, aided by selected 
British officers. 



APPENDIX V 313 

Minute of Sir Barnes Peacock. August 22, 1855. 

I would not place the residue of the revenue (of Oude) at the disposal of 
the East India Company, but would leave it to be disposed of entirely for the 
benefit of the people of the province. 



APPENDIX V 

REASONS AND ARTICLES OF THE DRAFT TREATY 
PROPOSED TO THE NUWAB, FEBRUARY 1856 

Reasons. — Whereas in the year 1801, a treaty was concluded between the 
East India Company and his Excellency the Nuwab Vizier Saadut Ali Khan 
Bahadur, and whereas the 6th Article of the said treaty requires that the ruler 
of Oude, always advising with and acting in conformity to the counsel of the 
officers of the Honourable Company, shall establish in his reserved dominions 
such a system of administration, to be carried into effect by his own officers, as 
shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure 
the lives and property of the inhabitants ; and whereas the infraction of this essen- 
tial engagement of the treaty by successive rulers of Oude has been continued 
and notorious ; and whereas its long toleration of such infraction of the treaty 
on the part of the rulers of Oude has exposed the British Government to the 
reproach of having failed to fulfil the obligations it assumed towards the people 
of that country ; and whereas it has now become the imperative duty of the 
British Government to take effectual measures for securing permanently to the 
people of Oude such a system of just and beneficent administration as the 
Treaty of 1801 was intended but has failed to provide. 

Articles (summary) — 

I. The Honourable East India Company takes over sole and exclusive 
administration of Oude, with full and exclusive right to its revenues, and 
engages to provide for the due improvement of the province. 

II. His Majesty and his heirs male in continual succession shall retain 
sovereign title of King of Oude. 

III. And shall be treated with corresponding honour. 

IV. And shall have full jurisdiction in his palace and park at Lucknow. 

V. Shall receive twelve x lakhs per annum, and also three lakhs more for his 
palace guard. 

VI. The Honourable East India Company takes upon itself maintenance 
of all collateral members of the Royal Family — heretofore provided for by his 
Majesty. 

Open to increase by three lakhs if desired. 



314 APPENDIX VI 



APPENDIX VI 

PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF OUDE ON ITS 
ANNEXATION. FEBRUARY 1856 

By a treaty concluded in the year 1801, the Honourable East India Com- 
pany engaged to protect the Sovereign of Oude against every foreign and 
domestic enemy, while the Sovereign of Oude, upon his part, bound himself to 
establish "such a system of administration, to be carried into effect by his own 
officers, as should be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and calculated 
to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants." The obligations which 
the treaty imposed upon the Honourable East India Company have been 
observed by it for more than half a century, faithfully, constantly, and 
completely. 

In all that time, though the British Government has itself been engaged in 
frequent wars, no foreign foe has ever set his foot on the soil of Oude ; no 
rebellion has ever threatened the stability of its throne ; British troops have 
been stationed in close promixity to the king's person, and their aid has never 
been withheld whenever his power was wrongfully defied. 

On the other hand, one chief and vital stipulation of the treaty has been 
wholly disregarded by every successive ruler of Oude, and the pledge which 
was given for the establishment of such a system of administration as should 
secure the lives and property of the people of Oude, and be conducive to their 
prosperity, has, from first to last, been deliberately and systematically violated. 

By reason of this violation of the compact made, the British Government 
might, long since, have justly declared the treaty void, and might have with- 
drawn its protection from the rulers of Oude. But it has hitherto been 
reluctant to have recourse to measures which would be fatal to the power and 
authority of a royal race who, whatever their faults towards their own subjects, 
have ever been faithful and true to their friendship with the English nation. 

Nevertheless, the British Government has not failed to labour, during all 
that time, earnestly and perseveringly, for the deliverance of the people ot 
Oude from the grievous oppression and misrule under which they have 
suffered. 

Many years have passed since the Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, 
perceiving that every previous endeavour to ameliorate the condition of the 
people of Oude had been thwarted or evaded, made formal declaration to the 
court of Lucknow, that it would become necessary that he should proceed to 
assume the direct management of the Oude territories. 

The words and the menace which were then employed by Lord William 
Bentinck were, eight years ago, repeated in person by Lord Flardinge to the 
king. The sovereign of Oude was, on that day, solemnly bid remember that, 
whatever might now happen, "it would be manifest to all the world " that he 
"had received a friendly and timely warning." 

But the friendly intentions of the British Government have been wholly 
defeated by the obstinacy, or incapacity, or apathy of the viziers and kings of 
Oude. Disinterested counsel and indignant censure, alternating, through more 
than fifty years, with repeated warning, remonstrance, and threats, have all 
proved ineffectual and vain. 

The chief condition of the treaty remains unfulfilled, the promises of the 



APPENDIX VI 315 

king rest unperformed, and the people of Oude are still the victims of incom- 
petency, corruption, and tyranny, without remedy or hope of relief. It is 
notorious throughout the land that the king, like most of his predecessors, 
takes no real share in the direction of public affairs. 

The powers of government throughout his dominions are for the most part 
abandoned to worthless favourites of the court, or to violent and corrupt men, 
unfit for their duties and unworthy of trust. 

The collectors of the revenue hold sway over their districts with uncontrolled 
authority, extorting the utmost payment from the people, without reference to 
past or present engagements. 

The king's troops, with rare exceptions undisciplined and disorganized, and 
defrauded of their pay by those to whom it is entrusted, are permitted to 
plunder the villages for their own support, so that they have become a lasting 
scourge to the country they are employed to protect. 

Gangs of freebooters infest the districts. Law and justice are unknown. 
Armed violence and bloodshed are daily events : and life and property are 
nowhere secure for an hour. 

The time has come when the British Government can no longer tolerate in 
Oude these evils and abuses, which its position under the treaty serves in- 
directly to sustain, or continue to the sovereign that protection which alone 
upholds the power whereby such evils are inflicted. 

Fifty years of sad experience have proved that the treaty of 1801 has wholly 
failed to secure the happiness and prosperity of Oude, and have conclusively 
shown that no effectual security can be had for the release of the people of that 
country from the grievous oppression they have long endured, unless the 
exclusive administration of the territories of Oude shall be permanently trans- 
ferred to the British Government. 

To that end it has been declared, by the special authority and consent of the 
Honourable Court of Directors, that the treaty of 1801, disregarded and 
violated by each succeeding sovereign of Oude, is henceforth wholly null and 
void. 

His Majesty Wajid Alee Shah was invited to enter into a new engagement 
whereby the government of the territoriesof Oude should be vested, exclusively 
and for ever, in the Honourable East India Company ; while ample provision 
should be made for the dignity, affluence, and honour of the king and of his 
family. 

But his Majesty the King refused to enter into the amicable agreement 
which was offered for his acceptance. 

Inasmuch, then, as his Majesty Wajid Alee Shah, in common with all his 
predecessors, has refused or evaded, or neglected to fulfil the obligations of the 
treaty of 1801, whereby he was bound to establish within his dominions such 
a system of administration as should be conducive to the prosperity and 
happiness of his subjects ; and inasmuch as the treaty he thereby violated 
has been declared to be null and void ; and inasmuch as his Majesty has 
refused to enter into other agreements which were offered to him in lieu of 
such treaty ; and inasmuch as the terms of that treaty, if it had been still 
maintained in force, forbade the employment of British officers in Oude, with- 
out which no efficient system of administration could be established there, it is 
manifest to all that the British Government had but one alternative before it. 

Either it must altogether desert the people of Oude, and deliver them up 
helpless to oppression and tyranny, which acting under the restriction of the 
treaty it has already too long appeared to countenance ; or it must put forth 
its own great power on behalf of a people for whose happiness it, more than 



316 APPENDIX VII 

fifty years ago, engaged to interpose, and must at once assume to itself the 
exclusive and permanent administration of the territories of Oude. 

The British Government has had no hesitation in choosing the latter 
alternative. 

Wherefore, proclamation is hereby made that the Government of the 
territories of Oude is henceforth vested, exclusively and for ever, in the 
Honourable East India Company. 

All Amils, Nazims, Chuckledars, and other servants of the Durbar ; all 
officers, civil and military ; the soldiers of the State ; and all the inhabitants 
of Oude, are required to surrender, henceforth, implicit and exclusive obedience 
to the officers of the British Government. 

If any officer of the Durbar — Jageerdar, Zemindar, or other person — shall 
refuse to render such obedience, if he shall withhold the payment of revenue, 
or shall otherwise dispute or defy the authority of the British Government, he 
shall be declared a rebel, his person shall be seized, and his jageers or lands 
shall be confiscated to the State. 

To those who shall, immediately and quietly, submit themselves to the 
authority of the British Government, whether Amils or public officers, 
Jageerdars, Zemindars, or other inhabitants of Oude, full assurance is hereby 
given of protection, consideration, and favour. 

The revenue of the districts shall be determined on a fair and settled basis. 

The gradual improvement of the Oude territories shall be steadily pursued. 

Justice shall be measured out with an equal hand. 

Protection shall be given to life and property ; and every man shall enjoy, 
henceforth, his just rights, without fear of molestation. 



APPENDIX VII 

OX THE FEELING OF OUDE TO THE ENGLISH BEFORE 
ANNEXATION 

Minute of the Governor-General. June 18, 1855. 

27. Though the British Resident has never been able to secure any sub- 
stantial and permanent reform in the administration of the Oude Government, 
he sometimes interposes successfully in individual cases, to relieve suffering 
and secure redress for wrongs : and the people see that he interferes for no 
other purposes. . . . The British character is, in consequence of these 
efforts made by the Resident to secure their protection and redress, respected 
in the remotest jungles and villages in Oude, and there is no part of India 
where a European gentleman is received among the people of all classes 
with more of kindness and of courtesy than in Oude. He is treated with the 
same respect and courtesy in the most crowded streets of the populous city of 
Lucknow. 



APPENDIX VI II, IX 317 

APPENDIX V1I1 

CONCILIATORY TREATMENT OF PEOPLE ENJOINED ON 
THE ANNEXATION 

Governor-General's Minute ok January 15, 1856. 

19. It is natural to expect that dislike will be felt, and that opposition will 
be made to the intended transfer of the Government of Oude by officers, 
nobles, and others of the Court of Lucknow whose personal interests, con- 
sideration, and official position are likely to be affected by the change. It 
must obviously be our policy to conciliate all such opposition. 



APPENDIX IX 

INSTRUCTIONS RESPECTING THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND 

REVENUE 

Letter from the Governor of India to General Outram 
of February 4, 1856. 

128. Objects in view will be facilitated by the early adoption of measures 
to conciliate the minds of all persons whose interests or personal consideration 
may be affected by the dissolution of the existing Government, and you are 
authorized to use your discretion in giving such assurances and holding out 
such advantages as (without imposing any undue burden upon the State) will 
tend to reconcile the minds of influential persons in Oude to the intended 
transfer of the powers of Government, and you will suggest the amount and 
the mode of provision which you may consider suitable. 

9. Every means should be taken to give employment to the natives of 
the province, and every encouragement should be held out to them to accept 
it. Many of them will be found able, no doubt, to undertake the duties 
which devolve upon the highest classes of native functionaries. 

125. You will doubtless recognize the necessity of absorbing in the Oude 
irregular force and the military and district police, as many of the soldiers of 
the king's army as may be found fit for the duties that will be required of 
them. 

Letter from the Governor of India to General Outram 
of February 7, 1856. 

14. The (District Officers) must at once proceed to the formation of a 
summary settlement of the land revenue. The settlement should be made, 
village by village, with the parties actually in possession, but without any 
recognition, either formal or indirect, of their proprietary rights. The term of 
the settlement should be fixed for three years certain. You will take care to 
impress upon the Financial Commissioner, and through him upon all the 
officers subject to his authority, the great importance of making the assessments 
moderate, and, so far as that may be practicable, equable. 

21. The administration is to be conducted as nearly as possible in 
conformity with the system which has been introduced in the Punjab. 



3iS 



APPENDIX X 



38. Government is to show its respect for existing rights by confirming 
and maintaining all grants for which sufficient authority can be produced and 
established. 



APPENDIX X 

LORD STANLEY'S DESPATCH OF OCTOBER 13, 1858, 
REVIEWING THE TREATMENT OF OUDE AFTER THE ANNEXATION. 



To the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India 
in Council. 
1. My Lord, 
The last despatch, addressed to your Government, on the general affairs of 
Oude, was dated on December 10, 1856. At a subsequent period, a despatch, 
reviewing considerably in detail all the principal incidents of the administration 
of the province during the Commissionership of Mr. Coverley Jackson, was 
under preparation by the Court of Directors of the East India Company, when 
the disturbances in the North-West Province of India, to which the peculiar 
circumstances of Oude naturally imparted extraordinary local virulence, 
rendered many of the remarks, which it was proposed to make on the state of 
the country and the progress of British rule, altogether unsuited to the altered 
circumstances of the times. 

2. The despatch above noted was written under the not unreasonable hope 
that the favourable appearances, which were indicated in the earlier months of 
our administration, would, under the progress of time and circumstances, 
continue to satisfy the expectation of the British Government. But this hope 
has been disappointed, and it has now become the duty of that Government to 
consider in what manner, if at all, the disastrous events of 1857, as far as they 
were connected with Oude, are to be attributed to, or could have been averted 
by, the measures of your Government, or the acts of the local officers, during 
the first year of your administration of the Province. 

3. In pursuance of this object, I propose to consider firstly, whether there 
was any failure to give effect to the benevolent intentions declared in your 
letter of instructions of February 4, 1856, wherein you insist on the duty of 
adopting measures to conciliate the minds of all persons, whose interests or 
personal consideration may be affected by the dissolution of the existing 
Government ; and secondly, whether there was on your part, or on that of the 
chief local functionaries, any neglect of those wise precautions, which it is 
necessary to observe, during a period of transition from one system of govern- 
ment to another, when men's minds are naturally unsettled by sudden changes, 
and designing persons are always ready to take advantage of the imperfect 
organization which necessarily distinguishes the first introduction of a new 
administrative system and the employment of a new administrative agency. 

4. The position of the former Sovereign of Oude, after his country had 
been proclaimed a British Province, demands the earliest consideration. In 
their despatch of December 10, 1856, the Court of Directors confirmed your 



APPENDIX X 319 

proposal to settle upon Wajid Ali, the deposed King of Oude, an annual 
pension of twelve lakhs of rupees, and to leave him in the enjoyment of the 
Royal Title for the remainder of his life, with jurisdiction within the Palace 
and Royal Parks of Lucknow. He refused, however, to enter into any arrange- 
ment with your Government, and having fixed his residence in Calcutta, he 
despatched to England a deputation, consisting of his mother, his son (the 
" Heir- Apparent"), and his brother, General Secundur Hushmut (with a 
numerous retinue), and instructed them to endeavour to obtain, in this country, 
the restitution of his alienated territorial possessions. You assured the king 
that the members of his family would meet with a respectful reception in 
England, and it appears that everything, which circumstances permitted, was 
done by the Court of Directors to justify this assurance. 

5. Respecting your subsequent proceedings towards the King of Oude, it 
is matter of notoriety, that shortly after the outbreak in the North- West 
Province, you caused Wajid Ali and some of his principal dependants to be 
arrested and detained prisoners in Fort William. Of this measure no just 
opinion can be derived from the information which you have forwarded to 
England. You are desired, therefore, to report with as little delay as possible 
whether the arrest and confinement of the king have been merely measures of 
precaution, or whether you were moved to this course by any knowledge, or 
any reasonsable suspicion, of his having been concerned, either directly or 
indirectly, with the defection of the native army of Bengal, or with the 
instigation of revolt in Oude, or in any other province of India. 

6. On the departure of the king for Calcutta, a large number of members 
of the Royal Family of Oude necessarily remained in the different palaces 
of Lucknow. The utmost consideration was due to the position of these 
unfortunate persons. Any sudden or violent removal from the asylum in 
which they dwelt, during the existence of the native Government, would have 
been more than ungenerous ; it would have been cruel. It is stated, however, 
by the ex-king of Oude, in a memorial which was forwarded to you, in 
January 1S57, that little or no regard was paid to the situation, even of the 
ladies of his family, who were rudely driven from their former homes, and, 
although there is doubtless exaggeration in these statements, it is possible 
that in the arrangements made for the appropriation of the public buildings of 
Lucknow to administrative purposes, there may not have been in all cases that 
consideration shown for the helpless position even of the female members of 
the Royal P'amily suddenly deprived of their legitimate protector, that would 
have become a great and generous nation, after such an assertion of its power 
over a weaker State. 

7. It is only in your letter of June 17 last, received since this despatch was com- 
menced, that you have afforded any information respecting the manner in which 
the Oude Commission dealt with the stipendiaries of the king, of whom there 
was a large number in Lucknow, including many members of the Royal Family. 
It now appears that up to the beginning of March 1857, more than twelve 
months after the annexation of the province, the stipends had not been paid. 
During that protracted period, therefore, many influential persons must have 
been reduced to great pecuniary straits, with all the humiliations attendant on 
such a state. It is difficult to understand what circumstances can have rendered 
such a delay in the performance of what was one of the first duties of the 
British Government, after the removal of the native Sovereign, either an un- 
avoidable or a justifiable omission. Whether the stipends were actually paid 
before the outbreak at Lucknow, does not appear from the papers received, 
but even if the adjustment had actually taken place, the previous delay was as 



320 APPENDIX X 

conspicuous for its impolicy as for its injustice, and there is little room to doubt 
that it did much to embitter the feelings of the upper classes against a Govern- 
ment apparently so neglectful of the welfare and the respectability of those 
whom circumstances had placed under the immediate protection of the State. 

8. In one important respect, however, you appear to have given early con- 
sideration to the position of the privileged classes. The attention of the Chief 
Commissioner and of your Government was directed towards the mode of 
legal procedure to be adopted towards the members and especially towards 
the ladies of the Royal Family. Laudably desirous of sparing their feelings, 
the Judicial Commissioner proposed that an authorized list of persons en- 
titled to claim exemption from ordinary processes on the score of their high 
rank should be prepared, and that all cases in which such persons were con- 
cerned should be tried in a Special Court, presided over by the Town Com- 
missioner, right of appeal being had to the Chief Commissioner. On a full 
consideration, however, of this proposal, you did not think it advisable to 
establish a .Special Court for privileged classes of the community. But, you 
directed that, instead of issuing ordinary summonses for the appearance of 
such persons, letters couched in respectful terms should be addressed to all 
members of the king's family, and transmitted through the assessment agent to 
the Governor-General when their attendance might be required in your courts. 

9. Besides the numerous members of the Royal Family of Oude, the annex- 
ation of the province must have grievously affected the interests of a large 
number of influential persons connected with the Court, and the public depart- 
ments. In your letter to the Chief Commissioner of January 23, 1856, you 
observe — " It is natural to expect that dislike will be felt, and that opposition 
will be made to the intended transfer of the Government of Oude, by officers, 
nobles, and others at the Court of Lucknow, whose personal interests, con- 
siderations, and official opinion, are likely to be affected by the change. It 
must obviously be our policy to conciliate all such opposition. The Governor- 
General in Calcutta requires, therefore that you will use your discretion in 
giving such assurances and holding out such advantages as (without imposing 
any undue burden upon the State) will tend to reconcile the minds of in- 
fluential persons in Oude to the intended transfer of the powers of Govern- 
ment ; " and in your letter of February 4 of the same year, you again called 
the attention of the Chief Commissioner to the duty of "reconciling the minds 
of influential persons in Oude to the intended transfer of the power of 
Government." 

10. But there is little or nothing in the papers before the Council to lead to 
the belief that the consideration here spoken of has been shown either for the 
welfare or for the feelings of the particular classes to which you referred. 
That many persons holding high offices, and deriving large emoluments from 
their offices in connection with the Court, and some who were charged with 
official duties at the capital and in the several districts, must have been 
suddenly deprived both of the wealth and of the influence appertaining to 
their position, was one of the immediate necessities of the change. The 
justice, in such a case, of making liberal provision for all who are suddenly 
deprived of their offices by the introduction of a new system of government, is 
not more obvious than the policy of the proceeding. The rules, however, 
laid down for the granting of pensions and gratuities to the servants of the 
late Government, were of such a character that the schedule you have for- 
warded contains the name of only one person entitled to receive a consider- 
able pension under them. And it is stated by the Financial Commissioner 



APPENDIX X 321 

that " a very large number of officers not coming within the rules for pension 
or gratuity have been excluded altogether." There is too much reason, indeed, 
to fear that great hardship was inflicted upon, and much natural irritation 
excited among, the old servants of the Oude Government, who saw themselves 
everywhere superseded by native officials from the older provinces without any 
prospect of ever recovering the position they had lost, or of receiving just 
compensation for their losses. And it is a source of surprise and dissatisfac- 
tion that the pensions which were awarded to the Oude functionaries under 
these rules were so tardily adjusted that many must have despaired of receiving 
them at all ; and it is to be feared that a large number of persons were reduced 
to absolute want by the delay of your officers in examining and reporting upon 
their claims. The introduction of a new system of government may have 
demanded the employment to some extent of a different agency from that 
which you found existing in the province, but the tardiness with which your 
officers proceeded to afford relief to those whom the change had deprived of 
the means of subsistence, there is nothing to justify or to excuse. 

11. With the disbanded soldiery of the native Oude Government it was also 
difficult to deal in such a manner as at once to afford just compensation to 
them for the loss of their means of subsistence, and to prevent their sudden 
dispersion from becoming a cause of disorder and of danger. Sixty thousand 
soldiers in the pay of the late native Government were suddenly disbanded, 
and in the new Oude levies and police battalions you could find employment 
only for a small proportion of the number. To some part of the remainder 
you determined to grant pensions and gratuities, and in accordance with in- 
structions contained in your letter of February 4, 1856, to the Chief Com- 
missioner, military committees assembled at the different large stations to 
investigate the claims of the disbanded soldiers. These claims were fully 
examined and reported upon, and dealt with in accordance with the 127th 
paragraph of the above-mentioned letter of instructions. Taking into con- 
sideration the large number of men to whom these pensions and gratuities were 
to be paid, they were, perhaps, fixed upon as liberal a scale as your finances 
could bear, but they were scarcely of a nature to satisfy men thus suddenly 
thrown out of employment. Twenty-five years' service was the minimum 
period qualifying a soldier to receive even a pension equal to only quarter of 
his pay. All men having served for a shorter period, not less than seven 
years, were to receive gratuities ranging between three months' and nine 
months' pay. Under the discretion allowed to the Chief Commissioner, he 
properly transgressed in some special cases the general rules submitted for his 
guidance, by granting higher pensions to deserving old officers, than those 
fixed by your Government ; and he brought another class of claimants, not 
contemplated in these pension rules, under their operation, by conferring small 
pensions upon men of short service who had been wounded, or otherwise dis- 
abled, in Government employ. Other small concessions were made, showing 
a disposition on the part of the Chief Commissioner to give a liberal interpret- 
ation to your instructions. But, on the whole, it is not to be denied that 
under the operation of these rules, the compensation must, in most cases, have 
been inadequate to the amount of injury necessarily inflicted upon the military 
class, as upon Government servants of other descriptions, and that a very large 
number of persons trained to the use of arms, and habituated to the commis- 
sion of acts of lawlessness and violence, must have been let loose upon the 
country, with the means only of temporary subsistence, and with every dispo- 
sition to become on the first fitting opportunity the enemies of the State which 
had deprived them of their employment. 

Y 



322 APPENDIX X 

12. A question of a different kind was presented to you in the settlement of 
the landed revenue of the province. The instructions which you issued to the 
Chief Commissioner in your letter of February 4, were briefly that a sum- 
mary settlement should be made with existing occupants for three years, and 
that the question of determining proprietary rights should, during that time, 
be held in abeyance. Before, however, these summary settlements were made, 
the duty of realizing the outstanding balances due to the State devolved upon 
the local Commissioners. In only one instance was the demand resisted. The 
Rajah of Toolseepore was in arrears to a large amount, and he refused to attend 
any summons, or to make any arrangements for the payment of the Government 
dues. 

13. Although this great landed proprietor was the only one of the powerful 
Talookdars who openly resisted the authority of the British Government on 
your first assumption of the administration of Oude, he was, in all the general 
features of his condition, a type of his class. He had been long engaged in a 
struggle against authority, which had exhausted his finances, and thus im- 
poverished he had not the means of meeting his legitimate engagements with 
the State. He had a large body of armed retainers, who were in arrears of 
pay, and were therefore levying contributions upon the surrounding villages. 
He had failed to contract a loan. His personal property was of little value ; 
and there appeared to you to be no means of realizing the Government dues, 
except by the sequestration of his estate. 

14. The measure was approved by the Chief Commissioner, and Mr. Wing- 
field, the Commissioner of Baraitch, was authorized to carry it out. His great 
difficulty consisted in the large number of fighting men in the Rajah's pay, 
whom there was little hope of dispersing while their master was at large. It 
was determined, therefore, as a preliminary measure, to seize the person of the 
Rajah ; a detachment of troops was placed at Mr. Wingfield's disposal, and 
he effected, with great vigour and address, the capture of the Rajah, and carried 
him a prisoner to Bulrampore. Then the armed followers of the Talookdar 
tendered their submission, and having received gratuities each according to 
his respective claims, were quietly dismissed. The Toolseepore estate, com- 
prising 1000 villages, was declared to be sequestrated during the period of the 
summary settlement, and the greatest readiness to obtain leases was shown. 
" Such," observed Mr. Wingfield, "is the sense of security now felt." 

15. It appeared that a difference of opinion existed between the Judicial 
and the Financial Commissioners regarding the case of this man, the Judicial 
Commissioner being of opinion that he could not justly be treated as a de- 
faulter. Whatever opinion might be entertained upon this point, it appears 
that his inability to meet the demands of the new Government arose out of a 
state of things antecedent to our assumption of the administration. It was the 
almost necessary result of the misrule which constituted the grounds of that 
assumption. It would, therefore, have been sounder policy, as it would have 
been just in principle, to have taken into consideration the circumstances to 
which we refer, and to have been lenient towards the pecuniary failures of 
those whom we found on our assumption of the Government to be without the 
means of meeting their engagements. 

16. The information now before me relating to the summary settlement is 
scarcely sufficient to enable me to pronounce any decided opinion on its merits. 
In your letter of February 4, 1856, you instructed the Chief Commissioner to 
direct the different officers under his superintendence, as soon as they had 
organized provisional establishments, "at once to proceed to the formation of 
a summary settlement of the land revenue, and simultaneously the revival and 



APPENDIX X 323 

organization of the village police. The settlement," it was added, "should 
be made village by village, with the parties actually in possession, but without 
any recognition, either formal or indirect, of their proprietary right. The 
terms of the settlement should be fixed for three years certain, and it should 
be added that it will remain in force and binding on those entering into 
engagements beyond that period, until another settlement, whether summary 
or regular, shall be made." 

17. Having thus explained the nature of the summary settlement, you pro- 
ceeded, in very proper terms, to impress upon the Chief Commissioner, and 
through him upon the district officers, " the great importance of making these 
assessments moderate, in so far as that may be practicable." " And," you 
added, " you will require him (the Financial Commissioner) to furnish you, as 
soon as possible, with a brief statement of these summary settlements, in order 
to enable the Government to arrive at an approximate estimate of the revenue 
which the province of Oude may be expected ultimately to yield, as well as 
of that which will be immediately available for purposes of the administration, 
and the liquidation of other demands, which will be properly chargeable to it." 
But it does not appear that, up to the time of the outbreak at Lucknow, any 
statement regarding the summary settlement had been forwarded to your 
Government. 

18. It is to be gathered, however, from certain minutes of the Financial Com- 
missioner, Mr. Gubbins, forwarded by that officer to the Court of Directors, 
as well as from a letter received from him, that in many parts of the country 
the assessments were made, in the first instance, at too high a rate, that he 
ordered their reduction, and that their reductions had been carried out by the 
district officers, before the outbreak, to the great satisfaction, as it is alleged, 
of the people. 

19. A question not less important than that of the rate of assessment is 
that of the parties with whom the settlement was made. The general ten- 
dency of the instructions issued to the Chief Commissioner in your letter of 
February 4, was to impress upon the officers of the Oude Commission the 
expediency of making the settlement as much as possible in accordance with 
the system which had "brought the North-West Province to a state of un- 
exampled prosperity," and the Commissioners were especially instructed "to 
improve and consolidate the popular institutions of the country by maintaining 
the village Coparcenaries, and adapting our proceedings to the predilections 
of the people, and the local laws to which they were accustomed." And it 
appears to me 5 from such information as I have before me in a scattered frag- 
mentary shape, that the revenue officers in Oude, intent upon giving effect to 
these instructions, and laudably anxious to promote to the utmost the welfare 
of the great body of the agricultural classes, were not sufficiently regardful of 
the interests of the great landed proprietors, or aware of the dissatisfaction 
with which that class in the North-West Province had been inspired by our 
proceedings there, but did in many instances ignore their acquired rights, and 
overlooked them altogether in the three years' summary settlement, although 
unquestionably persons " actually in possession" at the time of the annexation 
of the country. 

20. This was undoubtedly an error. Many of these large landholders may 
have obtained possession of these holdings by means of violence and of fraud. 
But the British Government was not responsible for this, and as, by abstain- 
ing from summary interference with the existing state of things, you made no 
constructive promise to prolong it beyond the period of the summary 
settlement, it would have been better to tolerate for a time the possible injustice 



324 APPENDIX X 

which you found in existence, than, by the introduction of sudden changes, to- 
incur the risk of originating injustice of your own. 

21. On a deliberate survey of all the proceedings above noticed, it is im- 
possible to resist the conviction that the intentions of your Government to con- 
ciliate all classes of the community were, especially in respect to the most 
influential classes, frustrated, partly by the circumstances of our position in 
Oude, partly by the insufficiency of the means prescribed for the settlement of 
the country, and partly by the remissness of the agents employed by you to give 
effect to your measures. 

22. It was the natural tendency of the introduction of British rule into the 
Province of Oude to embitter the feelings of these influential classes against the 
British Government ; firstly, the nobility of Oude ; secondly, the public func- 
tionaries of the native Government ; thirdly, the military classes ; fourthly, 
the territorial aristocracy. But much of this bitterness might have been 
allayed by a more judicious and considerate course of procedure than that 
which was adopted, and it is with much regret that I find myself compelled to 
record my opinion that the Oude Commissioner was in the important instances 
above-noted injuriously precipitate where caution and deliberation were required, 
and that where promptitude was demanded there was in some instances culpable 
delay. 

23. It is desirable now to examine the precautionary measures to which you 
resorted to diminish the dangers of any possible opposition which might be 
offered to the progress of your rule. It was natural that the very peaceable 
manner in which the Government was suffered to pass out of the hands of 
the native sovereigns of Oude should have beguiled you into a belief in the 
perfect security of your position. Confident that the change would be bene- 
ficial to the people, you believed that these benefits would be generally ap- 
preciated, and that any large display of military force in the country would 
be a practical denial of your faith in the blessings conferred upon it by the 
intervention of the paramount State. You therefore considered a single weak 
regiment, with one battery of artillery, a sufficient European force for the 
maintenance of tranquillity in Oude. There was no reason at that time to 
doubt the fidelity of the native army, and it was not unreasonable to believe 
that the formation of small movable columns, upon the Punjab system, ready 
to move from different points at a moment's notice, would meet the require- 
ments of the province far more effectually than more cumbrous bodies of 
troops without the same facility for prompt operations. 

24. If there was a probability at that time of the British troops being 
engaged in internal warfare, it was for the suppression of some possible 
rebellion on the part of the great landholders of Oude. You were well 
aware, on first entering upon the administration of the province, that one of 
the greatest obstacles to its internal tranquillity, under the native Government, 
had been the occupation by the great Talookdars and other territorial chiefs 
of numerous fortified places, and the entertainment by them of large bodies 
of armed retainers ; a condition of things which often enabled them to defy 
the officers of the native Government. It is stated that in September 1856, 
the number of fortified places held by the great landholders and other in- 
fluential persons in Oude amounted to 623, of which 351 were in good repair. 
Although only a small proportion of these was said to have guns mounted in 
the embrasures, it was known that many more had been thus defended before 
our assumption of the Government, and that a considerable number of pieces 
of ordnance had been buried or otherwise concealed, was a probable con- 
jecture, the truth of which subsequent events have confirmed. The ex- 



APPENDIX X 325 

pediency of levelling these forts, or of otherwise rendering them incapable 
of resistance, at the earliest possible date, was strongly insisted on by"the 
Judicial Commissioner. In the meanwhile, he recommended that a pro- 
clamation should be issued requiring the surrender of all guns and military 
stores, and declaring that the retention of any such munitions of war after a 
certain date should be pronounced an offence against the State, punishable as 
a misdemeanour. The Chief Commissioner concurred in this recommend- 
ation, and without previously obtaining the sanction of your Government, 
issued a proclamation demanding the surrender of all the artillery in the 
possession of individuals, and declaring the retention of any pieces of ordnance 
or any military stores, after October I, to be illegal. In obedience to this 
order a large number of guns were surrendered (the value of the metal being 
accounted for as so much revenue paid to the State), and it is not stated that 
the demand gave offence to the Talookdars. That many guns, however, and 
probably the most serviceable ones, were still retained in concealment, buried 
in the earth, bricked up in walls, or concealed in the jungle, until brought out 
after the disorganization of the country by the military revolt, there is much 
reason to believe. 

25. It is certain that the existence of large bodies of armed retainers, in the 
precarious pay of the great landholders, must have been very hostile to the 
general peace and tranquillity of the province. It does not appear, except in 
the case of the Rajah of Toolseepore adverted to above, that the disbandment 
of these levies had been effected previous to the outbreak of the revolt. Ad- 
vantageous, however, as it might have been to break up these corps of un- 
disciplined soldiery, simultaneously with the gradual introduction of some 
measure to facilitate their employment in peaceful pursuits, it is by no means 
certain that the sudden dispersion of considerable bodies of armed men would 
not have been a remedy even worse than the disease. In such a state of 
society, to discharge a soldier is often to make a bandit, and it would be not 
unreasonable to expect, that upon the first appearance of a general convulsion, 
the disbanded retainers of the great landholders, either returning to their old 
masters, or placing themselves under new leaders, would fight upon the side 
of our enemies with animosity, strengthened by the remembrances of the 
injury which they considered had been inflicted upon them by the British 
Government. 

26. Still more important even than this was the question which arose re- 
garding the general disarming of the people. This measure was suggested by 
the Judicial Commissioner, and the Chief Commissioner, though with some 
qualification, approved the suggestion. On a subject of so much importance, 
however, he desired to have the largest amount of information. He invited, 
therefore, an expression of the opinion of the District Commissioners, and they 
(with one exception) were adverse to the proposal. Colonel Goldney, whose 
■previous experience in Scinde and the Punjab entitled his opinion to be re- 
ceived with particular respect, indicated in a very forcible manner both the 
difficulties in the way of the accomplishment of such a measure, and the 
inherent objections to it if accomplished. On a review of all the opinions 
expressed, and all the arguments advanced, you came rightly to the conclusion 
that it would not be desirable to attempt a general disarming of the people. 
-In the Governor-General's minute of September 17, 1856, the arguments 
which then forced themselves upon his mind are recorded at some length. In 
the then existing circumstances of the times, they were such as naturally 
suggested themselves to you. The expediency of disarming the people of the 
Punjab, and the success which attended that measure, furnished in reality no 



326 APPENDIX X 

argument in favour of a similar measure in Oude. In the Punjab, the warlike 
habits of the people, and the ambitious character and military talent of some 
of the chiefs, rendered armed demonstrations on a large scale not improbable 
events, so long as the benevolent intentions of the new Government and the 
eventual advantages of the change were imperfectly understood by the Sikh 
nation. That nation had been in arms against us. It had invited the contest 
by invading our borders, and had many times met the British army with 
desperate courage in the field. But Oude had become a province of the 
British empire, not by armed conquest, but by the peaceful, unresisted as- 
sertion of the power of the paramount State. You had reason indeed to 
believe that the great majority of the people were grateful for their liberation 
from the insecurity necessarily resulting from continued misrule. No rebellious 
movement against the new Government had taken place, none was antici- 
pated, and it was considered that the personal affrays and acts of individual 
violence, which had been so frequent under the native Government of Oude, 
might be gradually suppressed by some extension of the severity of the 
ordinary penal enactments, such as a law decreeing transportation beyond the 
seas, a punishment viewed with mysterious horror by dwellers in an inland 
province. 

27. It was impossible, too, to consider the question of the disarming of the 
population, without some reference to the fact that Oude had long been the 
principal nursery of the Bengal army. There was, at that time, no reason to 
believe that the habitual use of arms by the people, from which so large a 
number of British recruits were drawn, would do otherwise than contribute to 
the strength and security of the British Indian empire. 

28. On a review of all the opinions expressed by the chief functionaries in 
Oude, and after full consideration in council of all the arguments adduced by 
the Governor- General, I do not hesitate to declare my opinion that you were 
justified by the information then before you, in refusing to sanction either the 
general disarming of the people or the passing, except with local restrictions, 
of a law against the carrying of arms ; and it is at least doubtful whether any 
attempt to carry out such a measure would have been attended with general 
success. Even if no opposition had been offered, and from some classes of the 
population it was to be expected, concealment would have been so general 
that the offensive powers of the people in any season of general disturbance 
would have been but little diminished by the attempt. You had not force 
readily at your disposal to enable you to carry out such a measure as one of 
military coercion, and as a mere magisterial enactment it would have been 
evaded or disobeyed. 

29. All the circumstances above enumerated being deliberately weighed, it 
appears that although the local administration did not succeed in carrying out 
those measures of conciliation towards all classes of the community which your 
Government had so wisely and so justly urged upon the Oude Commission, no 
better results would have been attained, if you had endeavoured to secure the 
tranquillity of the province by" mere rigorous repressive measures. However 
consistent such measures may be with the policy naturally observed towards a 
conquered country, or one that has been in rebellion, it cannot but be remem- 
bered, that inasmuch as the paramount motive for assuming the Government of 
Oude was the promotion of the happiness of the people, it was especially the 
duty of the new administration to recognize existing rights, to be tolerant of 
ancient usages, and to pay regard to the habits and feelings of all classes of the 
community, however greatly they might be at variance with our own views, 
and opposed to the just principles of social polity. To succeed in reforming. 



APPENDIX X 327 

the habits of a people it is necessary, at the outset, to be tolerant of much 
evil, and to trust greatly to the efficiency of time, and the growth of moral 
influence. 

30. The first circumstances of British administration in Oude having thus 
been brought under review, the policy which it behoves you to adopt on the 
re- establishment of your authority throughout the province demands most 
deliberate consideration. The despatch of the Court of Directors of May 5 will 
have made you acquainted with the spirit in which it is desired that you should 
address yourselves to the great work of pacification, and it is probable that, on 
some at least of the points to which your attention is now directed, you will 
have anticipated my instructions. 

31. Your future proceedings towards the ex-king of Oude will be regulated 
by circumstances, with respect to which the Council are at present in uncer- 
tainty. But if the seizure and confinement of Wajid A.H were merely measures 
of precaution, not influenced by any knowledge or reasonable suspicion of his 
complicity in the hostile movement against the British Government, it may be 
concluded that you will adhere to the resolutions already announced, to make a 
liberal provision for the remainder of the king's life. It is not, however, con- 
sidered desirable, in the altered circumstances of the times, that the British 
Government should pledge itself to a continuance of the annual stipend of 
twelve lakhs, or of any fixed amount to the successors of the present king. 
Recent events have clearly indicated the expediency of leaving the decision 
upon this point to the Government of the day, which will act in accordance 
with the knowledge of the new claimant's character and conduct, and the 
probability of a large command of money becoming in his hands a blessing or 
a curse to himself and to others. 

32. The perpetuation of the kingly title is still more objectionable. On a 
former occasion the Court of Directors emphatically declai-ed the grounds of 
their repugnance to the maintenance of such empty titular sovereignties as the 
kingship of Delhi. And recent unhappy events have strengthened the im- 
pression of the impolicy, and in a large sense of the inhumanity, of prolonging 
the existence of that which, however shadowy and unreal, is so likely to keep 
alive delusive hopes, to become a focus of intrigue and a rallying-point of 
sedition ; and thus to involve, not only the titular Sovereign himself, but large 
numbers of his adherents, in irremediable ruin and disgrace. On the death, 
therefore, of Wajid AH Shah, whatever provision you may make for, and 
whatever privileges you may bestow upon, his successors, the titular sovereignty 
should cease for ever with the life of the present nominal king. 

33. The privileges above adverted to it will be necessary to restrict. 
Although the experience of half a century had clearly indicated, in the case of 
the titular kings of Delhi, the inconvenience of permitting them, in consider- 
ation of their former power and grandeur, to exercise sovereign dominion 
within the precincts of the Imperial palace, the Court of Directors were still 
disinclined, on the deposition of the King of Oude, to depart from the con- 
siderate and indulgent policy which had been observed towards the sovereigns 
of the house of Delhi. You were therefore authorized to concede to the 
titular King of Oude similar jurisdiction within the palace and royal pleasure- 
grounds of Lucknow. But the events of the last year have painfully demon- 
strated, that such a privilege may be abused in a manner even beyond the 
previous conceptions of the most experienced, and that it would be culpable 
ever again to place in the hands of a pensioned prince, the power of using the 
asylum afforded him as a shelter for conspirators and a refuge for traitors of the 
worst kind. Whilst, therefore, it is right that every consideration consistent 



328 APPENDIX X 

with a wise precaution should be shown for the fallen fortunes of the ex-king 
of Oude, it is incumbent upon the British Government to withhold the privilege 
which it was formerly willing to grant, of independent jurisdiction within the 
precincts of the palace, or rather stated bounds, even though it should appear 
that Wajid Ali is guiltless of all complicity in the rebellious proceedings which 
have inflicted so much injury on the country. 

34. Towards the members of the Royal Family of Oude you will exercise 
a becoming liberality. In their last despatch on the affairs of the province, the 
Court of Directors adverted to that part of the treaty originally proposed, in 
which it is stipulated that " the Company shall take upon itself the maintenance 
of all collateral members of the Royal Family, for whom provision is now 
made by the king," and said they left it to your Government to decide what 
members of the Royal Family shall be supported out of the hereditary grant 
of twelve lakhs per annum, and what members shall be brought under the 
provisions of the above-mentioned article. I see no reason for the with- 
drawal of these instructions, except where members of the Royal Family are 
clearly identified with the commission or connivance at some outrage upon 
humanity. I am willing that their claim should be considered with as much 
liberality as if the tranquillity of Oude had not been disturbed. Simple 
hostility is not to be regarded as an offence incurring the forfeiture of all 
claims upon the favourable consideration of the British Government. In this 
view of the case, you will doubtless be disposed to act with becoming but 
discriminating liberality towards these unfortunate persons. With such 
exceptions as are above noted, the members of the Royal Family may be 
placed in possession of the legitimate stipends which they bona fide enjoyed under 
the Government of the late king, with such arrears as maybe found to be due to 
them. The mode of payment, whether from the revenues of the province or 
from the pension of the king (should he accept it), may be left for future con- 
sideration and adjustment. 

35. On the re-organization of the administrative agency, greater regard than 
heretofore ought to be paid to the expediency of employing the natives of the 
province in all departments of the executive Government. They may not, in 
all respects, appear to be the best instruments to give effect to a new system 
of administration ; but it is better for a time to submit to this inconvenience, 
and either to adapt our system at first to the agents at our disposal, or to 
wait until the agents can adapt themselves to the system, than that we should 
perpetually incur the reproach of usurping all the offices of the State, and of 
taking from the inhabitants of the province the bread which they were in the 
habit of earning and giving it to strangers. And even as regards the efficiency 
of the administration, it is not certain that the native officials are more corrupt 
and more oppressive than those who have been transplanted from the older 
provinces into Oude ; and whether the great object of all administration, the 
happiness of the people, is more likely to be obtained by the employment of 
expert native agents from the regulation districts, under a numerous body of 
European superintendents, than by resorting to the agency which was found in 
use on the annexation of the pi-ovince. 

36. There are few more delicate questions than that with which you have 
to deal, when you are called upon to decide in what manner to bring those 
privileged persons who, under an arbitrary native Government, have been 
exempt from ordinary legal liability, within the pale of the law, in such a 
manner as to satisfy the requirements of justice without outraging the feelings 
of individuals accustomed to the enjoyment of peculiar privileges, undesirable 
as it is to perpetuate or to prolong the existence of privileged classes, springing 



APPENDIX X 329 

from the stock of extinct dynasties. To the persons thus favoured the intended 
kindness is often practically injurious. Whilst it is an injustice to the community 
at large, and a source of embarrassment to the Government, there are neverthe- 
less conjunctures in'which it may be wise to incur the risk of these more remote 
inconveniences, for the sake of conciliating not only the influential few, but 
the more numerous class of persons who have learnt to venerate the ancient 
houses, with whose fortunes they have been associated, who identify their 
own honour and importance with that of their superiors, and who look with 
jealousy and resentment on every measure which has a tendency to degrade 
the ancestral reputation of the local nobility. In cases where existing 
prerogatives and privileges can be continued without any direct injury to 
humanity, they might perhaps be granted to those who were found, on the 
annexation of the country, in the enjoyment of special privileges, under a 
distinct understanding, that after death of the person to whom they had been 
originally granted, they are either absolutely to cease or to be open to recon- 
sideration. You might expediently take into your consideration the system 
for the adjudication of suits in which members of the privileged classes were 
concerned, introduced by the Honourable Mr. Elphinstone into the countries 
conquered from the Peshwah. 

37. It appears, however, that the greatest difficulty with which you will 
have to contend, in your measures for the general pacification of Oude, will 
result from the large number of people whom you will find, on the re-assertion 
of your authority, without any means of honest subsistence ; starving men are 
desperate men. It is probable that many who have been in arms against the 
British Government have been incited to hostility simply by the hope of 
recovering the livelihood which they had lost by the annexation of their 
country. To provide these people with profitable employment would be to 
disarm them of their enmity against us. But it is impossible to overrate the 
difficulty of forming any comprehensive scheme, for the direction into peaceful 
channels of the energies of 100,000 men, many of whom, lawless in their 
habits before the outbreak of the rebellion, have been rendered doubly so by 
a year of rapine and disorder. 

38. It is probable that the re-organization of the police of the province may 
afford you a fitting opportunity of providing for a portion of those who, ac- 
customed to military service, have been thrown out of employment by the 
disbandment of the Oude army. Whether, during the partial restoration of 
your authority, it would be found safe to employ in such offices the natives of 
the province, is, however, open to doubt ; brought into contact and communi- 
cation with their countrymen, many of them still hostile to the British Govern- 
ment, they would be less likely perhaps to remain true to their employers than 
strangers from another province. It is probable, therefore, that in the first 
instance you will be compelled to yield to the necessities of the moment, and 
form the local police corps chiefly from among the natives of other provinces. 
But this will doubtless suggest to you the expediency of finding similar em- 
ployment for the natives of Oude in other parts of the country. It will be 
sound policy thus, as far as possible, to dissolve the material cohesion of hostile 
facts resulting from family ties and local interests, and to place men beyond 
the reach of those influences which are most likely to warp them from their 
allegiance to the British Government. 

39. In any schemes for the pacification of the country, the extension of 
agriculture, will necessarily enter largely into your consideration, and you will 
perhaps thus be able to provide honourable and profitable employment for 
many who are now compelled to earn a precarious subsistence by questionable 



330 APPENDIX X 

means. You will doubtless, on the restoration of your authority throughout 
Oude, find large tracts of uncultivated land, some covered with forests and 
jungles, the clearance of which might be encouraged by advantageous grants, 
and when expedient even by advances of money from the public treasury. 
Your great object will be to raise the hopes of the people of the soil, to induce 
all classes of the community to identify the complete restoration of British rule 
with their own personal interests ; a judicious expenditure in this direction 
will, in the end, prove the truest economy. 

40. Towards the Talookdars and other great landholders of Oude you have 
already entered upon a r course of policy which it is to be hoped will, by a 
fuller recognition of their ancient rights, bring them into allegiance to the 
British Government. It will be necessary to destroy their fortified places, 
and to clear the jungles surrounding them, which afford even better defences 
than the walls of their strongholds. But in doing this, it is desirable that you 
should induce the landholders so to co-operate with you, as to render the 
destruction of their fortresses as little as possible a cause of offence or a source 
of humiliation. You will of course exercise a discriminating clemency or 
severity towards them, graduated in accordance with your knowledge of the 
part taken by them in the rebellion ; but as a general rule I would prescribe 
oblivion of past offences as the only guarantee of the cordiality of future rela- 
tions. You will endeavour by wise and conciliatory personal explanations 
to make the intentions of your Government clearly understood, and not only 
by the restoration of their ancient rights, but also by liberal remissions or 
advances, facilitate the agricultural operations, which must have been greatly 
obstructed by the recent disorganization of the country. 

41. To the general disarming of the province (with such exceptions as cir- 
cumstances may render expedient) you will doubtless address yourself at an 
early period. You will have earned the right to deal with Oude as a conquered 
country, and although there is no reason to consider that the general mass of the 
population has evinced any hostility to British rule, there is more than enough in 
the circumstances noted in the despatch to indicate the necessary connection of 
such a measure with the future tranquillity of the province. It is right, however, 
that you should take into your consideration the propriety of giving to those who 
surrender their arms within a certain time adequate compensation for such loss 
of property. This will at the same time prevent the measure from injuriously 
affecting the well-disposed, and will appeal to the self-interest of the evil-dis- 
posed, who, by delaying the surrender of their arms, will not only forfeit their 
value, but expose them also to the infliction of such punishment as you may 
decree for disobedience. As has been before observed, the great practical diffi- 
culty with which you have to contend in attempting to give effect to a general 
measure for the disarming of the people, is their disposition to evade the opera- 
tion of the law by concealing their weapons. There is a natural unwillingness 
on the part of men of all descriptions to be deprived of their property, and a 
sword or a matchlock is not less an article of property than a cooking-pot or a 
drinking-vessel. But men will often sell what they will not give, and although 
in some cases the desire to retain their arms may not be dependent on the 
consideration of their money value, there is little doubt that the promise of 
compensation will greatly increase the facility, and promote the success of the 
undertaking. 

42. But although the only hope of such a pacification of Oude as can be 
contemplated with any satisfaction is based upon the adoption of these and 
similar conciliatory measures, it is to be feared that some time must necessarily 
elapse before you can dispense with the continual display of your military 



APPENDIX XI 331 

power. Moral influences are slow of operation, and we can never conciliate 
the good feelings of a people with such effect as when we are demonstrably 
able to chastise their hostility. I am assured, however, that you will endeavour 
so to stimulate the general confidence of all classes, in the benevolent designs' 
of the British Government, as henceforth to render active demonstrations on a 
large scale events of improbable occurrence. 

Yours truly, 

Stanley. 



APPENDIX XI 

SIR HENRY LAWRENCE'S ESSAY OF 1843, FORECASTING 
THE EVENTS OF 1857 

Asia has ever been fruitful in revolutions, and can show many a dynasty 
overthrown by such small bands as, on November 2, 184 1, rose against our 
force at Cabul ; and British India can show how timely energy, as at Vellore, 
Benares, and Bareilly, has put down much more formidable insurrections. . . . 
Dissensions among our enemies has raised us from the position of commercial 
factors to be lords over emperors. Without courage and discipline we could 
not thus have prevailed ; but even these would have availed little had the 
country been united against us, and would now only defer the day of our 
discomfiture were there anything like a unanimous revolt. The same causes 
operated for our first success in both India and Afghanistan, and the errors 
by which we lost the latter may any day deprive us of the former. 

Perhaps our great danger arises from the facility with which these conquests 
have been made — a facility which in both cases has betrayed us into the 
neglect of all recognized rules for military occupation. Our sway is that of 
the sword, yet everywhere our military means are insufficient. There is always 
some essential lacking at the very moment when troops are wanted for imme- 
diate service. If stores are ready, they may rot before carriage is forthcoming. 
If there are muskets, there is no ammunition. If there are infantry there are 
no muskets for them. In one place we have guns without a man to serve 
them ; in another we have artillerymen standing comparatively idle, because 
the guns have been left behind. 

To come to examples. Is Delhi or Agra, Bareilly or Kurnaul, Benares 
or Saugor, or, in short, any one of our important military positions better 
prepared than Cabul was, should 300 men rise to-morrow and seize the town ? 
Take Delhi more especially as a parallel case. At Cabul we had the treasury 
and one of the commissariat forts in the town ; at Delhi we have the magazine 
and treasury within the walls. 

Now suppose that any morning 300 men were to take possession of these. 
What would follow if the troops in the cantonment (never more than three 
regiments) were to keep close to their quarters, merely strengthening the 
palace guards ? The palace at Delhi stands much as did the Bala Hissar with 
respect to the city, except that the former has not sufficient elevation to com- 
mand the town, as the latter did. What then would be the result at Delhi, 
if the palace garrison were to content themselves, as Colonel Shelton did, with 
a faint and distant cannonade from within their walls ; not even effectually 
supporting the king's bodyguards, who had already sallied into the town, 



332 APPENDIX XI 

nor even enabling or assisting them to bring off their field-guns when driven 
back from the city, but should suffer these guns to be abandoned at the very 
palace gates, and there to lie ? Let not a single effort be made to succour or 
bring off the guards at the magazine or treasury ; give up everything for lost ; 
suffer unresistingly the communication between the town and cantonment 
(almost precisely the same distance in both cases) to be closed ; let all this 
happen in Hindoostan on June 2, instead of among the Afghan mountains on 
November 2, and does any sane man doubt that twenty-four hours would 
swell the hundreds of rebels into thousands ; and that, if such conduct on our 
part lasted for a week, every ploughshare in the Delhi States would be turned 
into a sword ? And when a sufficient force had been mustered, by bringing 
European regiments from the hills and native troops from every quarter 
(which could not be effected within a month at the very least, or in three at 
the rate we moved to the succour of Candahar and Jellalabad), should we not 
then have a more difficult game to play than Clive had at Plassey, or Welling- 
ton at Assaye ? We should then be literally striking for our existence, at the 
most inclement season of the year, with the prestige of our name vanished, and 
the fact before the eyes of imperial Delhi, that the British force, placed not 
only to protect but to overawe the city, were afraid to enter it. • 

But the parallel does not end here. Suppose the officer commanding at 
Meerut, when called on for help, were to reply, " My force is chiefly cavalry 
and horse artillery, not the sort to be effective within a walled town, where 
every house is a castle. Besides, Meerut itself, at all times unquiet, is even 
now in rebellion, and I cannot spare my troops." Suppose that from Agra 
and Umbaila an answer came that they required all the force they had to defend 
their own posts ; and that the reply from Sobathoo and Kussowlee was, " We 
have not carriage, nor, if we had, could we sacrifice our men by moving them 
to the plains at this season." All this is less than actually did happen in 
Afghanistan, when General Sale was recalled, and General Nott was urgently 
called on for succour ; and if all this should occur at Delhi, should we not have 
to strike anew for our Indian empire ? 

But who would attribute the calamity to the Civil Commissioner at Delhi ? 
And could not that functionary fairly say to the officer commanding, "I knew 
very well that there were not only 300 desperate characters in the city, but as 
many thousands — men having nothing to lose, and everything to gain, by an 
insurrection. You have let them plunder the magazine and the treasury. They 
will, doubtless, 'expect as little resistance elsewhere. A single battalion could 
have exterminated them the first day, but you let the occasion slip, and the 
country is now in a blaze, and the game completely out of my hands. I will 
now give you all the help I can, all the advice you ask, but the Riot Act has 
been read, and my authority has ceased." Would the civil officer be blamed 
for thus acting ? Could he be held responsible for the way in which the out- 
break had been met ? 

I have endeavoured to put the case fairly. Delhi is nearly as turbulent and 
unquiet a city as Cabul. It has residing within its walls a king less true to ns 
than was Shah Shoojah. The hot weather of India is more trying to us than 
the winter of Afghanistan. The ground between the town and cantonment of 
Delhi, being a long rocky ridge on one side of the road, and the river Jumna 
on the other, is much more difficult for the action of troops against an insurgent 
population than anything at Cabul. At Delhi the houses are fully as strong, 
the streets not less defensible. In short, here as there, we occupy dangerous 
ground. Here, if we act with prudence and intrepidity, we shall, under God's 
blessing, be safe, as we should have been, with similar conduct, there. 



APPENDIX XI 



333 



But if, under the misfortune that has befallen our arms, we content ourselves 
with blaming the envoy, or even the military authorities, instead of looking 
fairly and closely into the foundations of our power, and minutely examining 
the system that could admit of such conduct as was exhibited in Afghanistan, 
not in one case, but in many ; then, I say, we are in the fair way of reaping 
another harvest more terrible than that of Cabul. 

The foregoing parallel has been drawn out minutely, perhaps tediously, for 
I consider it important to show that what was faulty and dangerous in one 
quarter is not less so in another. 

I wish, moreover, to point out that the mode of operation so pertinaciously 
styled "the Afghan system," and currently linked with the name of the late 
envoy, as if, with all its errors, it had originated with /it'/u, is essentially our 
Indian system ; that it existed with all its defects when Sir William Macnaghten 
was in his cradle, and flourishes in our own provinces now that he is in his 
grave. Among its errors are — moving with small parties on distant points 
without support ; inefficient commissariat arrangements ; absolute ignorance 
on all topographical points ; and reckoning on the attachment of our allies (as 
if Hindoo or Mahomedan could love his Christian lord, who only comes before 
him as master or tax-gatherer j as if it were not absurd to suppose that the chiefs 
of Burmah, Nepaul, Lahore, and the like could tolerate the power that restrains 
their rapacious desires and habits, that degrades them in their own and each 
other's eyes). 

Men may differ as to the soundness of our policy, but no one can question 
its results, as shown in the fact of Hyder Ali twice dictating terms at the gates 
of Fort St. George (Madras) ; in the disasters that attended the early period of 
the Nepaul war ; in the long state of siege in which Sir Archibald Campbell 
was held at Rangoon ; in the frightful mortality at Arracan ; in the surrender 
of General Matthews ; in the annihilation of Colonel Baillie's detachment ; in 
the destruction of Colonel Monson's force ; and in the attacks on the Resi- 
dencies of Poonah and Nagpoor. These are all matters of history, though 
seldom practically remembered. Still less is it borne in mind how little was 
wanting to starve General Harris at Seringapatam, General Campbell in Ava, 
or Sir John Keane in Afghanistan. All these events have been duly recorded, 
though they have not withheld us, on each occasion, from retracing our old' 
errors. At length a calamity that we had often courted has fallen upon us ; 
but direful as it is, and wrecked though it has the happiness of numbers, we 
may yet gather fruit from the thorns, if we learn therefrom how easily an army 
is paralyzed and panic-stricken, and how fatal such prostration must ever be. 
If we read the lesson set before us, the wreck of a small army may be the 
beacon to save large ones. 

Our chief danger in India is from within, not from without. The enemy 
who cannot reach us with his bayonets, can touch us more fatally if he lead us 
to distrust ourselves, and rouse our subjects to distrust us ; and we shall do 
his work for him if we show that our former chivalrous bearing is fled, that we 
pause to count the half-armed rabble opposed to us, and hesitate to act with 
battalions where a few years before companies would have been deemed 
sufficient. 

The true basis of British power in India is often lost sight of, namely, a 
well-paid, well-disciplined army, relying, from experience, on the good faith, 
wisdom, and energy of its leaders. 

"We forget that our army is composed of men like ourselves, quick-sighted 
and inquisitive on all matters bearing upon their personal interests ; who, 
if they can appreciate our points of superiority, are just as capable of 



334 APPENDIX XII 

detecting our deficiencies, especially any want of military spirit or soldierly 
bearing. 

At Cabul we lost an army, and we lost some character with the surrounding 
States. But I hold that by far our worst loss was in the confidence of our 
native soldiery. Better had it been for our fame if our harassed troops had 
rushed on the enemy and perished to a man, than that surviving Sepoys should 
be able to tell the tales they can of what they saw at Cabul. 



APPENDIX XII 

TRANSLATION, OF LETTER FROM RAJAH MAUN SINGH TO 
TALOOKDARS. Dated July 20, 1857. 

There are many who, having become independent by reason of their 
hereditary estates, have expended their fortune in procuring bodily comforts, 
and in the enjoyment of sensual pleasures, and are ignorant of the history of 
former times, and are unacquainted with the misery and ruin which the 
Mahrattas and Mahomedans inflicted upon India in days gone by. 

All such people have become quite careless of the blessings which God has 
conferred upon every one through the British Government, and are overjoyed 
at a false hope of increasing their wealth and rank by a change. 

In our opinion this change must be for the worse as regards the lives and 
property of the people of India. 

. We ought to know how much suffering there was in the times of the 
Mahrattas and Mussulmans. In those days the proverb originated, "The 
cultivators till their fields, but their harvest is plunder for those in power." 

Those who cultivated their land could not calculate upon enjoying its 
produce. If they escaped from the Mahratta cavalry, and the plunder and 
ravage of Sepoys, and succeeded in storing their corn in barns, then only could 
they hope to enjoy the fruits of their labour. 

The jungles in which we find traces of old wells and enclosures were all once 
thickly populated ; these places became jungles by the destruction of the 
inhabitants, and the country then remained waste for a long time. So many 
lives were lost in feudal quarrels, that up to this date re-population has not 
taken place. 

The present time is worse than the former one. May God protect us ! 

My friends, we ought to keep our respect and dignity in our own hands, 
and wish for the same Government as abolished the tyrannical system of 
former days, and conferred comfort and peace on the people. 

No human being ought to hate that thing which produces comfort, or covet 
that thing which gives pain and misery. 

You can never hope to become rulers by merely assembling bands of armed 
followers in this time of anarchy, neither can the Telingas x ever achieve victory 
or success. 

There are three reasons for this — 

1st. Though they are well disciplined, and it is true that by their assistance 
the British conquered India, still, in reality, they were always kept like a 
machine which could move or fire a musket on the touch of a spring. They 

1 Telingas is a native term for Sepoys. 



APPENDIX XII 335 

do not know how to fight, neither do they understand the art of war. The 
British officers kept this knowledge to themselves. Without those officers they 
are a machine without a spring, and in the time of need they will neither be 
able to move nor to fire. 

2nd. There used to be twenty or twenty-five British officers to every iooo 
men, and these officers were subordinate to one single man, but now-a-days 
there are iooo officers, and iooo kings amongst iooo men, i. e. the men are 
officers and kings themselves, and when such is the case there are no soldiers 
to fight. Kings cannot fight alone. 

3rd. Life is not a thing which can be given away for nothing. There are 
three things which make a man careless about sacrificing his life. 
1 st. Fear. 
2nd. Covetousness. 
3rd. Shame. 
By none of these will the Sepoys be induced to fight. 

As they are kings themselves they fear neither imprisonment, corporal 
punishment, nor dismissal from service. 

They have plundered thousands of houses, and they consider every person's 
property to be their own ; therefore they are not likely to covet anything more. 
As for shame, every one knows they have none. The worst member of a 
family used to run away from his parents and enlist in the army. 

When they have none of the three inducements above specified, how can 
they be expected to give their lives in the field and thus deprive themselves of 
that power for which they have mutinied ? 

Besides this, when they went into the field under the British Government, 
they used to be provided with everything, but now they have to provide for 
themselves, and, finding themselves in want of everything at the time of action, 
they will be obliged to give up the fight. They must inevitably be defeated. 
However, even if they were to gain a victory, we cannot but suffer from their 
hands. 

1st. We ought to consider that when they have thrown off the yoke of such 
a powerful Government from their shoulders, they are not likely to care much 
for us. 

Every person must have observed that one Sepoy of a mutinous regiment 
can disturb the whole community. What hopes then can we have of our lives 
from a herd of mutineers ? 

We should also look back to the Lahore war. How many officers were 
killed in a very short space of time, and no one expected that the Khalsa 
troops would leave the British alive. But after all what became of those 
Khalsa troops ? They were all annihilated. 

My friends, a paper boat can never float on a bankless river. 
2nd. It is also worthy of consideration — that in each of the villages under 
every Talookdar there cannot be less than ten Telingas, and consequently there 
will be as many kings in each village. 

The Talookdars were dissatisfied and complained enough when only one 
king (the British) annexed the country, but when they find thousands of kings 
upon their respective estates, it will be difficult for them to save either their 
estates or their lives. 

3rd. If the Telingas could be reformed and made peaceful subjects, even 
then we should not be able to manage. They would demand lakhs and lakhs 
of rupees on account of their pay, and not one of us, but every one of us would 
have to pay them. 

After meeting their exorbitant demands for a short time, we should be 



336 APPENDIX XII 

reduced to such a state of poverty that not a stitch of cloth to cover our bodies 
would be left ; what reason is there then for us to be happy ? 

Those who have butchered the children of their masters after eating their 
salt for ages, will never spare recent acquaintances like us. 

It is the custom of this country that when a servant commits himself once, 
he can never get employment anywhere, and is excluded from society. How 
then can we with prudence countenance these people ? 

We should indeed be surprised if any one was to say that we ought to take 
up the cause of our religion. The Telingas do not fight for religion. They 
do just the thing which our religion prohibits. They plunder and murder 
women and children, and no religion admits of such deeds. 

People of this sort are called " chundals," or abominably wicked people, and 
no one who adheres to his religion ought even to salaam to such creatures. 

To become their ally is to take part in a sacrilegious deed. 

It is also surprising that people should aid and put into power those very 
Mussulmans who, on invading India, destroyed all our Hindoo temples, 
forcibly converted the natives to Mahomedanism, massacred whole cities, 
seized upon Hindoo females and made them concubines, prevented Brahmins 
from saying prayers, burnt their religious books, and levied taxes upon every 
Hindoo. 

They are those very Mussulmans who prided themselves on calling us infidels, 
and in subjecting us to all sorts of humiliation. 

If any person will reflect on their former deeds, it will make his hair stand 
on end, cause such disgust that the very sight even of a Mahomedan will be 
abhorrent. 

What is more surprising still, is that the people should consider it a religious 
deed to kill and destroy those very persons who permitted the re-establishment 
of the decayed religion, and allowed all temples and places of worship to be 
rebuilt, and all religious ceremonies to be performed without any hindrance 
whatever. 

We should consider how much we suffered in the time of the Mahomedan 
kings in Oude. 

A short time ago, Moulvie Gholam Hoosein and Ameer Aly did their best 
to destroy the Hunnooman Gurhee, but it was owing to General Outram that 
they did not succeed ; otherwise all of us would either have lost our lives or 
our religion, from the oppression of tyrants. The people are forgetting those 
days, and now not only strive to destroy those who saved our religion, but 
make their destruction out to be a religious act. 

These are the very Telingas who did not consider that taking medicines from 
the hospitals or biting cartridges with their teeth caused loss of religion, yet 
now they say that breaking a cartridge by the hand, instead of biting it as 
formerly, is contrary to their religion. 

Is not this all nonsense, a false excuse and mere pretence ? 

People should reflect and really adopt measures to save their religion, 
honour, and estates. 

They should rest assured they will never be able to cope with that army and 
people who defeated ten lakhs of Russians in spite of their discipline, wealthy 
and munitions of war, and finally captured Sebastopol. 

Three thousand European soldiers have lately dismayed all the Iranees in 
Persia. 

Have not the English caused the Emperor of China to make good their 
losses ? 

There is not a single king in the world who does not fear them. 



APPENDIX XIII 337 

But if the English were defeated, what good have we to gain ? We shall 
lose our religion, and all our temples and places of worship will be destroyed. 
Our people, by supporting Mahomedans, will in fact be instrumental in 
annihilating their own religion. 

In our opinion, to gain the favour of the British is to save religion ; to annoy 
them is a violation of all things sacred. 

You may think that the British were always formerly victorious because 
they treated all with kindness and rendered justice to every one who went to 
their courts, and that now, as they have forsaken their Clod and become 
fearless, they cannot succeed. 

It may be true that certain district civil officers, instead of rendering justice 
as formerly, now strike poor people with rulers, and on a reference to any 
rule or section of their code, answer that they have all such rules at their 
fingers' ends. Some may now even hate to see natives, may deprive them of 
their hereditary rights, and make them consent to do things which are against 
their religion, and may act contrary to their promise. 

And from all this, it may be argued that God therefore made them (the 
British) instrumental to their own destruction. 

But, my friends, this was the folly of the district officers, and they are 
punished for it. The Supreme Government never intended such things. 

Indeed had the Government so intended, God would have been for you, 
and the British could never have defeated the Nuwab's numerous army with a 
small force. 

Yet you see them conquering on with a handful of men ; and still you 
believe that God is for you — what folly ! 

God has made kings and governors to rule and cherish their subjects, and 

to keep them in comfort. But He has also allowed rulers to tax their people. 

If kings neglect their duty, they will of course receive punishment from God. 

Observe how many kings and rajahs have been ruined by mismanagement. 

When our rajahs neglected to seek knowledge and to cherish their subjects, 

they lost their kingdoms and were punished by foreigners. 

When the Mahomedan kings neglected their duty, the British came in. 
At the first symptoms of the British evincing negligence in discharging their 
duty, they received a reprimand from God. 

Those who have made it a profession to kill people can never hope for 
mercy. 

You see that God inflicted punishment upon individuals, because they used 
to strike people with rulers, etc. How could He ever dream of restoring the 
Government to you, from whom He snatched it some iooo years ago for your 
unworthiness, finding, as He does, that you are spilling blood in this manner? 
If you choose to display loyalty and fidelity to your king (of Oude) still, 
you should not annoy the British, because your king is in their hands, and 
if through your wise deeds they were to kill the king, you will be proved 
disloyal. 

If you wish to prove your loyalty to the king, you should assist the British 
in their bad days. They may then become pleased, release the king, and 
perhaps give him back his country. If you could effect this, what a name 
indeed would you get ! 

You may argue that the king is absent, but his son is present. In that 
case even, you ought to remain neutral, because it is written by wise men that 
where there is a female, a boy, many kings, or no king at all to rule, there can 
be no hope of prosperity. 

No one can be prosperous in such a country, and if he escapes with honour 

Z 



33$ APPENDIX XIII 

he ought to consider himself very lucky. Each of these four things (viz. a 
female, a boy, many kings, or no kings, to rule) is dangerous to life and honour. 

But when you have these four together, what means have you of saving your 
lives and honour ? 

If you insist upon having the former times back again, all of you should 
send in a petition to the Queen of England, desiring that one-fourth of the 
country be granted in jagheers to those worthless and illiterate people who are 
generally called in this country Nuwabs and Doolahs, in order that they may 
pass their time without care or thought, in singing and dancing, perhaps 
loaded with one or two seers of gold and silver and jewels which, besides the 
burden of their own bodies, they may desire to carry ; that the income of the 
remaining three-quarters of the country be deposited in the treasury and laid 
out in bricks and chunam, or be given to buffoons and dancing-girls, or spent 
on other kingly pomps, or expended on increasing the pay of parasites and 
sycophants, so that when they die or become useless, their houses may be 
confiscated, as was done in the time of former kings. 

That an order be sent to all the rajahs to select beautiful girls and send 
them to the prince. 

That an order also be sent to the Governor-General, to select from the 
females of respectable families slave-girls for the Mahul, or, should the Gover- 
nor-General have no confidence in those appointed to select, he should order 
a meena bazaar or fancy fair to be held in the Kulan Kothee, and go himself 
in disguise to pick out the prettiest females. 

That, like Nadir Shah and Ahmud Shah Abdallee, her Majesty should order 
a general massacre, or, like Aurungzebe, should order a general destruction of 
all the Hindoo temples, and the building of her own in their place. 

That European soldiers may be ordered to spit in the faces of all the Hindoos 
and Mahomedans, and thus convert them to Christianity ; that the pensions 
of all the rajahs, baboos, and nuwabs be stopped, or that they may be killed 
either by putting out their eyes, or by feeding them upon bread made of equal 
parts of salt and flour. 

That the Government should not pay lakhs of rupees as interest for the money 
due to bankers, but, like Toghluk Shah, should institute a leather coinage, 
and thus at once pay off all loans. 

That should her Majesty desire to see the sport of a boat sinking, she 
should, like Surajooddowlah, order the bottom of a ferry-boat to be knocked 
out in mid-stream, and passengers and all be swamped. 

Orders should likewise be solicited that the Pindarees remain idle no longer, 
but plunder the roads, one-quarter of their loot being the property of Govern- 
ment. 

That it should be ordered that the troops receive their pay one or two years 
in arrears, in order to force them to borrow money from bankers on interest ; 
that when the troops are much in want, they be allowed to plunder the market 
and to live upon the loot. 

That there is no use in fulfilling any engagements with the landholders or 
the ryots. The Government should extort money from them according to the 
circumstances of each, press the people to carry the soldiers' baggage on the 
march, lay a tax on the Zemindars to provide royal pigeons, fighting-cocks, and 
other amusements. 

That the Government need not keep a commissariat department, but make 
the ryots supply the Government cattle with food. The sugar-canes can be 
seized from the ryots' fields, and the trees at the gates of people's dwellings 
felled as fodder for the elephants. 



APPENDIX XIII 339 

That her Majesty should please her poor subjects by passing her days in 
pleasure, keeping crores of slaves, God having created them all specially for 
her benefit. 

He will therefore be pleased to steel her heart against any feeling for their 
inconvenience. 

That should the editors of newspapers write anything against her Majesty, 
an order for their hands to be cut off should assuredly be passed, or, by way of 
variety, they may with readiness be blown away from guns. 

That the people have not run away from their houses for a long time, there- 
fore all the Amils should be ordered to attack them and make them fly. 

That no house floors have been dug up for a long time, that orders should 
therefore be sent out to level a few cities to the ground. 

The Governor-General should be ordered to instruct his officers to see every 
bride before he allows marriage processions to pass. 

Two or three sham expeditions should be made to keep the troops up to 
their trade and support their spirits. 

That in order to secure a change every year, her Majesty, like Mahomed 
of the Deccan, should order five lakhs of Hindoos to be massacred, or by way 
of variety some well-populated city to be annihilated. 

Rely on it, my friends, that if her Majesty does not care for her name, she 
will sanction all these prayers, and you will gain your desired object without 
any trouble. 

But if you do not like a return to such times, you should strive for peace. 

If all of you unite and seek for peace, I am sure the Government will remove 
all your doubts (of whatever kind), and something better will come out of the 
future. At any rate we cannot lose anything by the attempt. 

(Signed) Maun Singh. 



APPENDIX XIII 

Proclamation, March 1858 

The army of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is in possession of 
Lucknow, and the city lies at the mercy of the British Government, whose 
authority it has, for nine months, rebelliously defied and resisted. 

This resistance, begun by a mutinous soldiery, has found support from the 
inhabitants of the city, and the province of Oude at large. Many who owed 
their prosperity to the British Government, as well as those who believed 
themselves aggrieved by it, have joined in this bad cause, and have ranged 
themselves with the enemies of the State. 

They have been guilty of a great crime, and have subjected themselves to a 
just retribution. 

The capital of their country is now once more in the hands of British troops. 
From this day it will be held by a force which nothing can withstand, and the 
authority of the Government will be carried into every corner of the province. 

The time, then, has come at which the Right Honourable the Governor- 
General of India deems it right to make known the mode in which the British 
Government will deal with the Talookdars, chiefs, and landholders of Oude 
and their followers. 

The first care of the Governor-General will be to reward those who have 
been steadfast in their allegiance at a time when the authority of the Govern- 



34o APPENDIX XIII 

ment was partially overborne, and who have proved this by the support and 
assistance which they have given to British officers. 

Therefore the Right Honourable the Governor-General hereby declares that 
Drigbiggei Singh, Rajah of Bulrampoor, Koowunt Singh, Rajah of Pudnaha, 
Rao Kurdeo Buksh Singh of Kutiaree, Kashee Pershad, Talookdar of Sissain- 
dee, Hubr Singh, Zemindar of Gopal Khais, and Chundee Lai, Zemindar of 
Moraon (Baiswarah), are henceforward the sole hereditary proprietors of the 
lands which they held when Oude came under British rule, subject only to 
such moderate assessment as may be imposed upon them ; and these loyal men 
will be further rewarded in such manner and to such extent as, upon consider- 
ation of their merits and position, the Governor-General shall determine. 

A proportionate measure of reward and honour, according to their deserts, 
will be conferred upon others, in whose favour like claims may be established 
to the satisfaction of the Government. 

The Governor-General further proclaims to the people of Oude that, with 
the above-mentioned exceptions, the proprietary right in the soil of the 
province is confiscated to the British Government, which will dispose of that 
right in such manner as to it may seem fitting. 

To those Talookdars, chiefs, and landowners, with their followers, who shall 
make immediate submission to the Chief Commissioner of Oude, surrendering 
their arms and obeying his orders, the Right Honourable the Governor-General 
promises that their lives and honour shall be safe, provided that their hands 
are not stained with English blood murderously shed. But as regards any 
further indulgence which maybe extended to them, and the condition in which 
they may hereafter be placed, they must throw themselves upon the justice and 
mercy of the British Government. As participation in the murder of English 
men and English women will exclude those who are guilty of it from all mercy, 
so will those who have protected English lives be entitled to consideration and 
leniency. 



THE END. 



Richard Clay &> Sous, Limited, Lendou &> Bungay. 




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